6  . ) .  , 

LIBRARY  OF  THE  THEOLOGICAL  SEMINARY 

PRINCETON,  N.  J. 

Presented  by 


""BisVioocMcaW  YY\srnor\(?\\^uria. 

BX  320  . G38  1923 

Gavin,  Frank  Stanton  Burns, 

1890-1938 . 

Some  aspects  of  contemporar' 
Greek  Orthodox  thought 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2019  with  funding  from 
Princeton  Theological  Seminary  Library 


https://archive.org/details/sorneaspectsofcon00gavi_0 


Sent  by  provision  of  the  will  of  the 
late  Bishop  Hale,  with  compliments 
of  the 

BISHOP  HALE 
MEMORIAL  FUND, 

Western  Theological  Seminary, 

2716  Washington  Boulevard, 
Chicago,  U.  S.  A. 


SERIES  OF  1922 

THE  HALE  LECTURES 

WESTERN  THEOLOGICAL  SEMINARY 
CHICAGO,  ILL. 


SOME  ASPECTS  OF 

CONTEMPORARY  GREEK  ORTHODOX  THOUGHT 


THE  HALE  LECTURES  1922 


Some  Aspects  of 

Contemporary  Greek  Orthodox  Thought 


By  the 

REV.  FRANK  GAVIN,  B.  H.  L.,  M.  A.,  TH.  D. 

Professor  of  New  Testament 
Nashotah  House 
Nashotah,  Wisconsin 


Milwaukee 

MOREHOUSE  PUBLISHING  CO. 
London 

A.  R.  MOWBRAY  AND  CO. 
1923 


COPYRIGHT  BY 

MOREHOUSE  PUBLISHING  CO. 
1923 


EXTRACTS 


From  the  Will  of  the  Rt.  Rev.  Charles  Reuben  Hale,  D.D.,  LL.D., 
Bishop  Coadjutor  of  Springfield,  born  1837;  consecrated  July  26, 
1892;  died  December  25,  1900. 


I,  Charles  Reuben  Hale,  Bishop  of  Cairo,  Bishop  Coadjutor  of 

Springfield,  of  the  City  of  Cairo,  Illinois,  do  make,  publisli,  and  declare 

this,  as  and  for  my  Last  Will  and  Testament,  hereby  revoking  all 

former  wills  bv  me  made. 

*/ 

First,  First  of  all,  I  commit  myself,  soul  and  body,  into  the 
hands  of  Jesus  Christ,  my  Lord  and  Saviour,  in  Whose  Merits  alone 
I  trust,  looking  for  the  Resurrection  of  the  Bodv  and  the  Life  of  the 
World  to  come. 


* 


In  the  Xame  of  the  Father,  and  of  the  Son,  and  of  the  Holy  Ghost. 
Amen. 


Fourteenth.  All  the  rest  and  residue  of  my  Estate,  personal  and 
real,  not  in  this  my  Will  otherwise  specifically  devised,  wheresoever 
situate,  and  whether  legal  or  equitable,  I  give,  devise,  and  bequeath  to 
“The  Western  Theological  Seminary,  Chicago,  Illinois,”  above 
mentioned,  but  nevertheless  In  Trust,  provided  it  shall  accept  the  trust 
by  an  instrument  in  writing  so  stating,  filed  with  this  Will  in  the 
Court  where  probated,  within  six  months  after  the  probate  of  this 
Will — for  the  general  purpose  of  promoting  the  Catholic  Faith,  in  its 
purity  and  integrity,  as  taught  in  Holy  Scripture,  held  by  the  Primitive 
Church,  summed  up  in  the  Creeds,  and  affirmed  by  the  undisputed 
General  Councils,  and,  in  particular,  to  be  used  only  and  exclusively 
for  the  purposes  following,  to-wit :  — 

(2)  The  establishment,  endowment,  publication,  and  due  circula¬ 
tion  of  Courses  of  Lectures,  to  be  delivered  annually  forever,  to  be 
called  “The  Hale  Lectures.” 

The  lectures  shall  treat  of  one  of  the  following  subjects: 

(a)  Liturgies  and  Liturgies. 

(b)  Church  Hymns  and  Church  Music. 

(c)  The  History  of  the  Eastern  Churches. 

(tf)  The  History  of  National  Churches. 


vi 


EXTRACTS 


(e)  Contemporaneous  Church  History:  i.e,  treating  of  events 
happening  since  the  beginning  of  what  is  called  “The 
Oxford  Movement,”  in  1833. 

It  is  the  aim  of  the  Seminary,  through  the  Hale  Lectures,  to  make 
from  time  to  time  some  valuable  contribution  to  certain  of  the  Church’s 
problems,  without  thereby  committing  itself  to  agreement  with  the 
utterances  of  its  own  selected  Preachers. 


GUILIELMO  ET  LAURAE  GAVIN 
PAR  EXT  I  BUS  CARISSIMIS 
FI  LIUS 

CARITATIS  EXEMPLIS 
SACERDOS 
PRIMES  MAGISTRIS 
DISCI  RE  EES 
HAS  PRIMITIAS 
AUCTOR 
D.  D.  D. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

Pages 

PREFACE .  xix 

BIBLIOGRAPHY . xxix 

LECTURE  I.  PROLEGOMENA . 1-56 

1.  Dogma  and  Dogmatic :  three  uses  of  the  word  dogma 
p.  4)  ;  Androutsos  on  dogma, — objective  and  subjective  as¬ 
pects;  his  definition  descriptive  rather  than  analytic; 

Rhosse, — his  definition  relates  to  its  content  ( p.  5 )  ;  R.  on 
Christianity  (p.  6)  and  on  Dogmatic:  four  notes  of  its 
scientific  character  (p.  7).  Organizing  and  unitary  prin¬ 
ciple  of  Orthodox  Dogmatic:  Androutsos  (p.  8),  and  Rhdsse 
(p.  9)  ;  comparison  of  the  two  methods  (p.  10). 

2.  Revelation:  (a)  inspiration, — internal  or  subjective  r., 

— and  (b)  miracle, — external  or  objective  r. ;  criteria  of 
valid  r.  (p.  11);  notes:  (1)  creative  and  new  quality,  (2) 
consistency  and  supplementary  character  (p.  12), — ‘‘natural” 
and  “supernatural”  are  relative  terms,  valid  for  human  ex¬ 
perience  (p.  13), — and  (3)  progressive  development  (p.  14). 

3.  Revelation  and  Miracle  :  the  conception  of  m. ;  (a)  neither 
violation  nor  suspension  of  natural  law,  (b)  but  result  of 
the  introduction  of  a  new  cause;  (c)  not  derogatory  to  the 
unchangeableness  of  God,  (d)  nor  ‘impossible’  scientifically 
(p.  15).  Inspiration  and  miracle;  the  Incarnation  as  the 
complete  and  final  revelation  (p.  16). 

4.  The  Sources  of  Dogmatic :  definitions  (p.  17). 

5.  (1)  The  Bible :  (a)  the  Church  as  infallible  interpreter 
p.  18)  ;  (b)  Canon  and  Text;  O.  T.  and  Deutero-canonica ; 

N.  T.  (p.  19);  status  of  LXX;  condemnation  of  vernacular 
N.  T.  (p.  20)  ;  (c)  Inspiration  of  B. :  definition ;  degrees  of  in¬ 
spiration  (p.  21);  canonicity  not  dependent  upon  author¬ 
ship;  fact  of  inspiration,  but  no  definite  theory  accepted;  in¬ 
spiration — not  literal  (p.  22),  not  simply  subjective,  or  re¬ 
sult  of  delusion,  hallucination,  or  imagination,  nor  limited 
to  dogma  and  morals  (p.  23);  Orthodox  view  of  i. ;  (d) 

Biblical  teaching  in  relation  to  Dogma;  rule  of  faith  (p.  24). 

6.  (2.)  Tradition :  (a)  origin  and  relation  to  Bible;  oral 
preceded  written  word  ( p.  25 )  ;  N.  T.  first  formulation  of  T. ; 
relation  of  Bible  to  T.  (p.  26)  ;  (b)  content  and  formula- 


X 


CONTEXTS 


Pages 

tion  of  T. ;  formulation  necessary  to  protect  scriptural 
teaching  (p.  27)  ;  causes  and  content  of  formulated  T., — later 
synods,  &c. —  (pp.  28-30). 

7.  Faith  and  Reason:  (1)  in  relation  to  religion :  data  of 
science,  philosophy,  and  Christianity  compared  (p.  30)  ; 
presuppositions  of  science  and  philosophy  practically  dog¬ 
mas;  relation  between  philosophy  and  theology  (p.  31)  ;  sta¬ 
tic  elements  of  Christian  theology  forbid  its  evolution,  but 
allow  its  development ;  revelation  possible  only  through  faith 
( p.  32).  Faith,  essentially  a  spiritual  matter  (p.  33),  leading 
to  knowledge  by  means  of  experience,  generates  a  two-fold 
certainty, —  (a)  objective  and  (b)  subjective  (p.  34), — yet 
faith  remains  fundamentally  the  same  in  quality  (p.  34); 

(2)  in  relation  to  Dogma:  reason  operating  on  content  of 
faith  (a)  in  X.  T.  and  (b)  history  of  doctrine  (p.  36);  form 
and  matter  of  dogma;  reason  in  relation  to  development  of  doc¬ 
trine;  matter  of  dogma  remains  same  while  form  changes 
( p.  37).  Reason  (a)  as  organ  of  the  formulation  of  dogma; 
two  objections;  necessity  of  r.  to  the  Faith  (p.  38).  R.  as 
(b)  means  for  the  appropriation  and  realization  of  the  con¬ 
tent  of  the  Faith  ( p.  39).  True  development:  identity  of  con¬ 
tent  under  change  of  form  (p.  40);  Orthodox  view  (a)  vs. 
Rationalists  and  Liberal  Protestants’  criticisms  (pp.  41-42), 

( h )  vs.  Roman  doctrinal  development. — Rome  has  added  to 
and  perverted  the  content  of  the  Faith  (p.  43).  R.  as  (c) 
means  for  the  vindication  of  dogma  (pp.  44-45).  Additional 
Notes:  A.  The  Relation  between  Faith  and  Knowledge  (pp. 

40-45);  B.  Dogmatic  and  the  Other  Theological  Disciplines 
(p.  50);  C.  Palmieri  on  the  Orthodox  View  of  the  De¬ 
velopment  of  Doctrine  (pp.  51-5G). 

LECTURE  II.  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  GOD . 57-144 

1.  God  as  object  of  knowledge:  (1)  ‘‘Existence”  and  “Be¬ 
ing”  (p.  60);  “Absolute”  and  “Infinite”;  (2)  Possibility  of 
knowing  God;  a  real  knowledge  possible,  though  not  a  ‘scien¬ 
tific’  k.  in  narrower  sense  (p.  61);  vs.  agnosticism  (p.  62). 

(3)  Sources  of  our  knowledge  of  God:  (a)  innate  instinct 
(p.  63),  (b)  faith,  and  (c)  reason.  (4)  Method  of  know¬ 
ing  Him  (p.  64)  :  subjective  and  moral  factors;  God  made 
known  through  (a)  Nature  and  (b)  Revelation  (p.  65). 

(5)  Character  of  our  knowledge  of  God:  imperfect,  incom¬ 
plete,  relative,  limited,  and  by  analogy  (p.  66),  yet — true, 
progressive,  valuable,  sufficient;  three-fold  reaction  of  the 
human  mind  in  search  for  God.  towards  the  phenomena  of 
Nature  (p.  67).  (6)  Our  conception  of  God  neither  prag¬ 

matic  nor  nominalist  (pp.  68-69).  Summary  (p.  70). 


CONTENTS 


xi 


Pages 

2.  The  Argument  for  the  Existence  of  God,  and  its  hearing 

on  our  knowledge  of  Him:  (1)  cosmological, — G.  as  highest 
power  and  might  (pp.  71-72)  ;  (2)  psychological, — G.  as 

highest  Reason,  Will,  Knowledge  (pp.  72-73);  (3)  teleolog¬ 
ical. — in  relation  to  the  material  world,  G.  is  end  and  pur¬ 
pose  (p.  73)  ;  in  relation  to  the  world  of  mind,  He  is  Highest 
Good,  and  End  of  rational  life  (p.  74)  ;  summary  of  three 
arguments  and  discussion  of  their  limitations  (p.  75);  (4) 

ontological, — the  Absolute:  Plato,  St.  Gregory  of  Nyssa,  St. 
Augustine,  Boethius  (p.  75),  St.  Anselm;  this  conception 
necessary:  Descartes,  Spinoza,  Kant  (p.  76)  ;  Absolute  and 
Infinite;  relation  of  this  to  preceding  arguments  (p.  77); 
conception  of  Absolute,  negative  in  form  but  positive  in  con¬ 
tent  (p.  78);  (5)  historical  (p.  78).  All  of  these  consti¬ 

tute  but  one  single  argument ;  each  alone  is  refutable.  Survey 
and  criticism  of  this  ‘proof’  (p.  79). 

3.  Content  of  our  Knowledge  of  God:  definitions  of  attrib¬ 
utes,  properties,  and  predicates.  ( 1 )  Arrangement  of  ma¬ 
terial  (p.  80),  by  orientating  it  about  one  central  attribute, 

— such  as  Love,  Personality,  the  Absolute,  Spirit, — “empir¬ 
ical”,  or  topical  division  into  physical,  logical,  and  ethical, 
attributes  (pp.  81-82).  (2)  The  Attributes  of  God:  re¬ 

lation  to  the  Divine  Nature  (p.  82)  ;  as  absolute  and  relative 
in  relation  to  our  conception  of  the  Absolute  (pp.  82-83). 

A.  Physical:  (a)  Omnipresence, — negatively,  involves  the 
notions  of  spacelessness,  incomprehensibility,  immateriality; 

G.  is  pure  spirit  (p.  84)  ;  positively, — G.  is  everywhere  pres¬ 
ent,  both  transcedent  and  immanent  ( p.  85);  modes  of 
Presence;  (b)  Eternity, — negatively,  G.  is  above  the  limita¬ 
tions  of  time,  aseitv  (p.  86);  positively. — G.  is  present  at 
each  moment  (p.  87);  immutability  of  G.,  His  relation  to 
time  (p.  88);  (c)  Omnipotence:  three  kinds;  definitions; 

“G.  can  do  all  He  can  will”  (p.  89)  resolves  into  two  parts, 

— “God  can  do  all  He  wills”,  and  “God  can  will  what  is  in 
accord  with  His  Nature”  ( p.  90);  relation  of  Divine  Omni¬ 
potence  to  D.  Will  (pp.  90-91).  B.  Logical  or  “rational” 
attributes:  presuppose  personality  (p.  91)  ;  vs.  objection  that 
personality  involves  limitation  of  Divine  Nature  (p.  92); 
“necessary”  and  “free”  knowledge;  (a)  omnipresence; 

<  p.  93);  content  of  God's  k.  (p.  94),  and  its  division 
(p.  95);  God’s  Foreknowledge;  difficulty  of  conception,  and 
attempted  solutions:  limiting  God's  foreknowledge  or  man’s 
freedom;  Rhosse;  Androutsos  (pp.  96-99).  Summary,  (b) 

God  is  All-Wise:  (p.  100).  C.  Ethical:  relation  between 
the  three  attributes; — (a)  Holiness:  (p.  101);  (b)  Right¬ 
eousness  or  Justice;  relation  of  the  two  (pp.  102-103)  ;  (c) 


xii 


CONTEXTS 


Pages 

Love:  in  relation  to  Creation;  distinctions  in  Divine  Love 
(pp.  104-106). 

4.  The  Doctrine  of  the  Holy  Trinity :  importance;  defini¬ 
tion  (p.  107);  (1)  in  the  Bible:  ‘‘Father’,  “Spirit”, 

“Word”,  “Angel”  (pp.  108-109)  in  the  O.  T.;  St.  Matt  28, 

19,  Father,  Son, — preexistence,  Christ,  Logos,  God, — Spirit; 

— X.  T.  (pp.  110-114).  (2)  in  the  Church:  formulation 
(p.  114)  due  to  heresy:  Gnosticism,  Sabellianism  and  St. 
Athanasius,  Arianism, — St.  Athanasius,  St.  Gregory  Nazian- 
zen,  St.  Basil,  St.  Gregory  of  Nyssa. — summary  of  patristic 
work  (pp.  115-122);  “Hypostasis”  and  Essence  (p.  123). 

( 3 )  Properties  of  the  Persons :  “subordination”,  in  what 
sense  meant  (p.  124);  the  “Son”  as  “Begotten”  (p.  125); 
the  Procession  of  the  Holy  Spirit;  dogmatic  difference  be¬ 
tween  East  and  West;  addition  of  the  Filioque  (p.  126)  ; 
“through  the  Son”  in  Greek  Fathers  (p.  127), — referable 
to  transcendental  or  economic  Trinity?  (p.  128).  Photius 
vs.  Filioque  (pp.  129-132).  Conclusion  (p.  132).  (4)  Theo¬ 

logical  theory  in  regard  to  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity; 
early  speculations  (p.  132)  ;  Rhosse:  nature,  reason,  and 
will  in  Godhead, — reconciliation  of  difficulties  (pp.  133-135)  ; 
Androutsos  (p.  136). 

Additional  Note:  On  the  Filioque  controversy  (pp.  136- 
143). 

LECTURE  III.  SIN  AND  SALVATION .  145-202 

Part  I:  Creation,  Man,  and  the  Fall, — pp.  148-171. 

1  Creation :  cause  of  (p.  148);  Orthodox  teaching  and 
various  philosophical  theories  (p.  149);  the  truth  is  funda¬ 
mentally  a  mystery;  four  divisions  of  the  dogma  (p.  150): 

(a)  God  freely  created  the  universe  from  nothing  (pp.  150- 
151);  (b)  He  created  it  in  time;  yet  it  does  not  follow 

that  His  will  for  Creation  should  need  to  have  had  eternal 
fulfilment  or  that  He  became  Cause  of  world  only  at  the 
time  He  created  it  (pp.  152-153)  ;  (c)  Creation  had  a  definite 
aim  and  purpose  (pp.  153-154),  (d)  and  a  certain  method 
and  order  (p.  155);  (e)  His  Providence  rules  over  and 

guards  His  creation  (pp.  155-157). 

2.  Man ;  his  constitution  and  nature:  trichotomy  or  dicho¬ 
tomy?  (p.  158)  ;  unity  and  solidarity  of  human  race 
(p.  159)  ;  origin  and  immortality  of  the  soul  (pp.  160-161)  ; 

“image”  and  “likeness”  (pp.  162-163)  ;  Orthodox  view  vs. 

Roman  and  Protestant  conceptions  (p.  164). 

3.  The  Fall:  the  sin  of  Adam  (p.  165). 


CONTENTS 


xiii 


Pages 

4.  Original  Sin:  (a)  material  aspect, — neither:  total 
depravity,  nor  abrogation  of  free-will  (pp.  166-167);  (b) 

formal  aspect, — guilt;  difficulty  of  dogma  and  three  possible 
explanations  (pp.  168-169);  (c)  consequences  (pp.  170-171). 

Part  II.  Salvation  and  the  Saviour, — pp.  171-202. 

1  Causes  and  Purpose  of  the  Incarnation :  Scotist  and 
Thomist  theories;  Orthodox  views:  Rliosse,  Kephala,  Meso- 
lora,  Androutsos  (pp.  172-177)  ;  preparation  of  Gentiles 
and  Jews  for  the  Incarnation  (pp.  177-178)  ;  doctrine  of 
Christ  (p.  179). 

2.  The  Doctrine  of  our  LorcVs  Person ;  A.  the  Person  of 
Christ:  two  Natures  in  one  Person;  their  relationship 
(pp.  ISO-183).  B.  Corollaries  and  implications:  (a)  the  com- 
municatio  idiomatum;  human  knowledge  and  will  in  Christ 
(pp.  184-186);  (b)  the  B.  V.  M.  is  Theotokos  (p.  187); 

(c)  worship  of  Jesus  Christ;  (d)  sinlessness  of  Christ 
(p.  1S7);  the  Temptations;  the  likeness  to  Adam  (pp.  187- 
189). 

3.  The  Doctrine  of  our  Lord’s 'Work:  A.  The  three-fold  Of¬ 
fice  of  Christ  (pp.  190-191):  (a)  High  Priest. — the  Atone¬ 
ment:  patristic  theories,  Nicholas  of  Methone,  St.  Anselm, 
Androutsos,  modern  Protestant  conceptions  (pp.  191-195); 
universal  scope  and  character  of  redemption,  the  glory  won  by 
by  the  Cross  (p.  195)  ;  Roman  doctrine  of  satisf actio  super- 
abundans ;  death  of  Christ,  as  His  Intercessory  Work  (pp. 
196-197);  (b)  Prophet  (pp.  197-198);  ( c )  King :  the  Descent 
into  Hell,  the  Resurrection  and  Ascension  (pp.  198-201). 

B.  Redemption,  Atonement,  and  Salvation  (pp.  201-202). 

LECTURE  IV.  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  GRACE 

AND  OF  THE  CHURCH .  203-268 

Introduction:  The  Sources  of  Modern  Orthodox  Teaching, 

— pp.  206-218.  (a)  The  development  of  modern  theology 

(pp.  206-207)  ;  (b)  post -Reformation  Synods,  their  authority 
and  acts  (p.  208);  the  documents:  Gennadius  (p.  211); 
Jeremiah  II,  (p.  211);  Kritopoulos  (p.  212);  Mogila  (pp. 
212-213)  ;  Acts  of  the  Synods  of  Constantinople  (1638),  Jassy 
(1641-2),  Jerusalem  (  1672),  and  Constantinople  (1672) 

(p.  214);  Cyril  Lucar  (p.  215);  Dositheus  (pp.  216-218). 

Part  I.  The  Doctrine  of  Grace, — pp.  218-236. 

1.  ~Sature  of  Grace:  place  of  the  doctrine  in  Christian 
theology  (p.  219);  definition:  (a)  necessary,  (b)  free,  and 
(c)  universal  (pp.  219-221);  relation  of  Grace  to  Foreknowl- 


xiv 


CONTENTS 


Pages 

edge  and  Foreordination  (pp.  222-224);  G.,  predestination, 
and  free-will  (pp.  224-225). 

2.  The  Operation  of  Grace :  (a)  preparation  for  justifica¬ 
tion  (p.226);  (b)  justification:  (1)  negative  aspect, — remis¬ 
sion  of  sins  (p.  227),  not  forensic,  but  actual  (p.  227)  ;  im¬ 
puted  and  imparted  righteousness  (p.  228);  (2)  positive 
aspect, — sanctification  (pp.  229-230). 

3.  Faith  and  Good  Works,  the  terms  of  justification 
(p.  231);  St.  Paul  and  St.  James  (pp.  232-234);  Orthodox 
vs.  Protestant  and  Roman  doctrine  (pp.  235-236). 

Part  II.  The  Doctrine  of  the  Church, — pp.  235-267. 

1.  Conception  and  Mission  of  the  Church  (pp.  237-239). 

2.  The  Church  divinely  founded  and  established :  C.  has 
authority  and  power  of  Christ,  hence  is  infallible  (p.  239)  ; 
is  "Home  of  Salvation”;  extra  ecclesiam  nulla  salus , — in 
what  sense  true  (p.  240). 

3.  The  Nature  of  the  Church :  visible,  tangible,  real 
not  ideal,  not  a  fellowship  of  perfected  saints  but  includes 
sinners  (pp.  241-242)  ;  the  four  notes:  (a)  One,  in  Faith  and 
Order;  organic  nexus  of  Christian  doctrine  (pp.  243-244)  ; 

(b)  Holy  (pp.  244-245);  (c)  Catholic  (p.  245);  (d)  Apos¬ 
tolic  (p.  246). 

4.  Constitution  and  Organization  of  the  Church:  origin 

of  three-fold  Ministry  (p.  246),  distinction  of  offices 

(p.  247);  Bishops  the  organ  of  the  Church’s  infallibility 
( pp.  248-249 ) . 

5.  The  Orthodox  Church:  present-day  Church  questions 
in  relation  to  modern  Orthodox  thought  (p.  249);  funda¬ 
mental  necessity  of  doctrinal  agreement,  since  heresy  for- 
feits  membership  in  the  Church  ( p.  250 )  ;  Orthodox  Church 
claims  (a)  to  hold  the  one  true  Faith  and  therefore  to  be 
the  Church  (p.  251);  Rhosse  (p.  251)  and  Androutsos 
(pp.  252-253)  on  the  Orthodox  position,  (b)  The  Orthodox 
Church  claims  therefore  to  be  infallible  (p.  254)  ;  theory 
of  infallibility;  growth  in  dogmatic  explicitness  and  pro¬ 
gress  in  doctrinal  definition  (pp.  255-256)  ;  synodical  and 
conciliar  action  as  expression  of  the  voice  of  the  Church; 
vs.  Palmieri  and  the  Roman  contention  (p.  257)  ;  Orthodox 
Church  able  to  convene  a  General  Council;  vs.  Dr.  Neale’s 
arguments  (pp.  258-259).  (c)  There  can  be  no  “Branches” 

of  the  one  Church,  since  the  Catholic  Church,  like  the  Faith, 
is  an  organic  unity  (pp.  259-263).  Additional  Note:  The 
Rebaptism  of  Latins  (pp.  263-267). 


CONTENTS 


xv 


Pages 

LECTURE  V.  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS  .  269-354 
Part  I.  The  Sacraments  in  General, — pp.  272-305. 

1.  The  notion  and  purpose  of  sacraments :  “mystery”  and 
“sacrament”  (p.  272);  definition  (pp.  273-274);  character¬ 
istic  and  essential  notes  of  a  sacrament:  (a)  divine  institu¬ 
tion  (p.  274)  ;  (b)  visible  sign  (pp.  275-276)  ;  (c)  Grace 
bestowed,  which  is  necessary  for  salvation  (pp.  276-277). 

2.  The  number  and  classification  of  the  sacraments :  the 

Seven  Sacraments  (pp.  278-279)  ;  evidence  in  the  case 
(p.  279).  Classification  into:  (a)  two  “chief”  and  five 
“lesser”  (pp.  280-281);  (b)  “obligatory”  and  “voluntary” 

(pp.  282-283)  ;  (c)  “iterable”  and  “non-iterable”  (p.  283)  ; 
theory  of  indelible  character  not  accepted  by  modern  Or¬ 
thodox  thought  (pp.  283-285)  which  has  developed  another 
theory  to  account  for  the  same  facts  (pp.  285-286). 

3.  The  administration  of  the  sacraments:  (a)  proper 
external  rite  (pp.  287-288)  ;  sacraments  not  magic  (p.  288)  ; 

(b)  proper  minister  (pp.  289-290);  necessity  of  intention 
(pp.  290-291);  no  sacraments  valid  outside  the  Church 
(p.  291).  The  doctrine  of  Economy :  in  relation  to  the  non- 
iterable  sacraments  (p.  292);  the  Fathers  on  sacraments 
administered  by  those  outside  the  Church  (p.  293)  ;  two  ex¬ 
planations  possible,  Latin  and  Orthodox,  (p.  295)  ;  Orthodox 
theory  is  that  of  Economy :  meanings  of  the  word, — “dispen¬ 
sation”,  “special  ruling”,  “exception”,  and,  in  technical 
theology,  “sphere  of  action”  (p.  296);  motive  in  using 
economy ;  no  exact  definition  of  the  principle  involved 
(p.  297);  Dyobouniotes  on  E.  (p.  298);  excommunication 
of  the  Bulgarian  Church  as  a  modern  illustration  of  the  prin¬ 
ciples  in  question  (pp.  299-300);  Orthodox  clergy  who 
lapsed  into  heresy  or  schism  (pp.  300-301).  The  validity  of 
Anglican  Orders  (pp.  302-303).  (c)  subjective  conditions 
(p.  304);  ex  opere  operato,  and  sacramentals  (p.  305). 

Part  II.  The  Sacraments  in  Particular, — pp.  306-353. 

1.  Baptism :  definition,  divine  institution  (p.  306),  proper 
minister  (p.  307);  outward  signs, — water,  trine  immersion 
(pp.  307-308),  and  formula  (309-310);  Grace  bestowed 
( p.  311)  absolutely  necessary  for  salvation  (p.  312).  In¬ 
fant  B.  (p.  312).  Preparation  on  part  of  recipient  for 
proper  appropriation  of  the  Grace  (pp.  313-314).  B.  not  iter¬ 
able  (p.  315). 

2.  Chrism  or  Confirmation:  definition,  intimate  connec¬ 
tion  with  Baptism  (p.  316),  evidence  of  Holy  Scripture 


XVI 


CONTENTS 


Pages 

(p.  317)  ;  administered  by  anointing  with  Chrism  and  laying 
on  of  hands  (pp.  317-318),  and  discussion  (pp.  318-320) .  Out¬ 
ward  signs  (p.  321)  ;  the  chrism  consecrated  by  a  bishop  but 
administered  by  a  priest  (p.  322)  ;  Grace  bestowed, — the  gifts 
of  the  Holy  Spirit  (p.  323).Ch.  joined  with  Baptism,  and, 
like  it,  non-iterable  (p.  323).  Use  in  connection  with  the 
reconciliation  of  converts  (p.  324). 

3.  The  Holy  Eucharist :  (a)  Definition  and  institution; 

prophetic  foreshadowings  (pp.  324-325)  ;  Institution  at  the 
Last  Supper  (p.  325)  ;  wrong  interpretations  of  the  Words 
of  Institution  (pp.  326-327).  The  Real  Presence  (p.  327); 
patristic  teaching  (pp.  327-328).  The  doctrine  of  the 
Change,  Conversion,  or  transubstantiation  (p.  328);  seeming 
deviations  in  the  Fathers’  doctrine  (p.  329)  ;  Orthodox  reluc¬ 
tance  to  attempt  definition  of  manner  in  the  Change  (p.  330)  ; 
Androutsos,  Dyobouniotes,  Dositheus,  and  early  evidence, 
on  transubstantiation  (pp.  330-335);  its  legitimacy  as  part 
of  Orthodox  doctrine  established  (pp.  335-336).  (c)  The 

Eucharist  as  Sacrament:  outward  signs  (pp.  336-337):  (a) 
leavened  wheaten  bread,  (6)  pure  grape  wine  (pp.  337-338), 
and  (c)  the  epiklesis  (pp.  338-339);  the  moment  of  Conse¬ 
cration  (p.  339);  corollaries:  doctrine  of  concomitance, 

Christ  whole  in  each  consecrated  particle  yet  Himself  pres¬ 
ent  everywhere  (p.  340),  consecration  is  indelible,  Real  Pres¬ 
ence  not  contingent  upon  act  of  communion  (p.  341),  legi¬ 
timacy  and  propriety  of  Eucharistic  worship  (p.  342)  ;  the 
fraction  (pp.  342-343);  practical  consequences:  Infant  Com¬ 
munion  (pp.  343-344)  and  communion  in  both  kinds  ; 
(p.344);  the  minister  of  the  sacrament  (p.  345)  and  the 
Grace  bestowed  (p.  346).  (d)  The  Eucharist  as  Sacrifice: 

conception  of  sacrifice,  words  of  institution  (pp.  347-348)  ; 
the  Eucharist  and  Calvary  (pp.  348-349), — identity  of  es¬ 
sence,  but  difference  in  form  (pp.  349-350)  ;  the  Sacrifice 
in  the  Consecration  (p.  351);  Eucharist  a  sacrifice  of:  ex¬ 
piation  and  propitiation,  praise  and  thanksgiving,  and 
prayer  and  supplication  (pp.  352-353). 

LECTURE  VI.  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 

(concluded)  AND  OF  THE  LAST  THINGS  .  355-423 

Paet  I.  The  Sacraments  in  Particular, — pp.  358-393. 

4.  Penance:  definition  (pp.  358-359)  ;  divine  institution 
( p.  359 )  ;  compass  of  absolution, — extends  over  all  sins  what¬ 
soever  (pp.  359-360)  ;  personal  (subjective)  conditions  form 
part  of  the  outward  signs  of  this  sacrament:  (a)  penitence, 
which  issues  in  confession  of  sins  before  a  priest  (pp.  360- 


CONTENTS 


xvii 


Pages 

362)  ;  proper  character  of  the  confession  (pp.  362-363)  ;  (b) 
laying  on  of  hands  of  priest  (p.  364)  ;  (c)  formula  of  abso¬ 
lution  (pp.  364-365)  ;  Roman  and  Orthodox  formulae  com¬ 
pared  (p.  365)  ;  the  priest,  as  judge,  absolves  or  retains 
sins,  and,  as  physician,  gives  counsel  and  prescribes  penance 
(pp.  366-367);  absolution  full  and  complete  in  its  nature  and 
scope  (pp.  367-368)  ;  Roman  theory  of  penance  involves 
(a)  doctrine  of  merits,  based  on  works  of  supererogation, 
and  (6)  doctrine  of  purgatorial  fire  (pp.  368-369),  rela¬ 
tion  of  absolution  to  penances  (pp.  369-370). 

5.  Holy  Order :  definition  (pp.  370-371);  divine  institu¬ 
tion  and  apostolic  practice  (pp.  371-372);  outward  signs: 

(a)  laying  on  of  hands,  and  (b)  prayer  of  ordination 
(pp.  372-373)  ;  minister,  (pp.  373-374)  ;  the  “minor  orders’’ 

(p.  375);  requirements  for  candidates  for  Holy  Orders 
(pp.  375-376)  ;  the  Grace  of  the  sacrament:  spiritual  author¬ 
ity  and  power  for  the  work  of  the  grade  of  the  ministry 
received,  together  with  divine  assistance  to  achieve  the  duties 
of  that  office  worthily  (p.  376)  ;  non-iterable  and  non-dele- 
table  (pp.  377-378). 

6.  Matrimony :  definition  (pp.  378-379);  M.  in  the  N.  T. 

(pp.  379-380),  and  in  Sacred  Tradition  (pp.  380-381);  out¬ 
ward  signs:  (a)  public  consent  and  profession  of  free  agree¬ 
ment  (pp.  381-382),  (b)  blessing  of  the  priest  (pp.  382- 
383)  ;  recipients  of  the  sacrament  (p.  383)  ;  Grace  bestowed 
(pp.  383-384)  ;  two  principles  involved  (a)  monogamy,  and 

(b)  indissolubility  of  marriage-bond  (p.  384)  ;  divorce 
(pp.  384-385);  Orthodox  teaching  and  practice  (p.  385). 

7.  Unction :  definition  (pp.  386-387);  biblical  authority 
(p.  387),  from  which  these  conclusions  follow:  (a)  practice 
referred  to  by  St.  James  was  not  a  novelty  (p.  387)  ;  (b) 
not  medical  procedure  (pp.  387-388);  (c)  not  a  charisma¬ 
tic  gift;  (d)  not  the  “last  anointing”  or  extreme  unction, 
but  “prayer-oil”  (p.  388);  (e)  not  the  faith  of  the  sick 
person  but  the  prayer  said  over  him,  conveys  the  Grace 
(p.  389);  evidence  of  Sacred  Tradition  (p.  3S9).  Outward 
signs:  (a)  oil,  (b)  unction  therewith,  together  with  (c) 
prayer  (pp.  389-390);  minister  and  recipients  (pp.  390- 
391).  Grace  conferred:  (a)  healing  of  body  (pp.  391-392), 
and  (b)  forgiveness  of  sins  (pp.  392-393)  ;  Roman  perver¬ 
sion  of  Unction  (p.  393). 

Part  II.  The  Doctrine  of  the  Last  Things, — pp.  394-422. 

Articulation  of  Eschatology  in  Orthodox  dogmatic  (p. 

394). 


xviii 


CONTENTS 


Pages 

1.  The  Particular  Judgment :  (a)  doctrine  of,  definition 
and  exposition  (p.  395);  in  the  Bible  (pp.  396-397)  and  in 
Sacred  Tradition  (pp.  397-398)  ;  relation  to  General  (Last) 
Judgment,  as  regards  the  state  of  the  soul  (p.  398)  ;  (b) 
relation  of  the  Church  Militant  to  the  Church  Triumphant 
(pp.  399-400)  ;  the  intercession  of  the  Saints,  and  our  invo¬ 
cation  of  them  (pp.  400-402)  ;  veneration  of  ikons  and  relics 
(pp.  403-404)  ;  (c)  the  Church  Militant  in  relation  to  the 
Departed  (p.  404)  ;  the  problems  involved  (pp.  404-405)  ; 
the  state  of  the  departed  before  the  Last  Judgment:  An- 
droutsos  (p.  406)  ;  Jeremiah  II;  Kritopoulos  (p.  407)  ;  Mo- 
gila  (pp.  407-408);  Dositheus  (p.  409);  Mesolora  (pp.  409- 

410)  ;  summary  of  doctrine  of  Symbolic  Books  (pp.  410- 

411) ;  form  of  later  teaching  conditioned  by  anti-Roman 
bias  (pp.  411-412);  modern  opinion:  Mesolora  (p.  413); 
Androutsos  (p.  414)  ;  Macarius  (pp.  414-415)  ;  Dvobounio- 
tes  (p.  415). 

2.  The  Consummation  of  All  Things:  (a)  the  Second 
Coming  (pp.  416-417);  (b)  the  Resurrection  of  the  dead; 
cliiliastic  speculation  (pp.  417-418);  the  Resurrection  of 
the  body  ( pp.  418-419),  and  nature  of  the  resurrection-body 
(pp.  419-420)  ;  the  R.  and  the  end  of  the  world  (p.  420)  ; 

(c)  the  life  of  the  world  to  come, — eternal  bliss  and  eternal 
punishment  (pp.  420-421)  ;  difficulty  of  the  dogma  (pp.  421- 
422 ) . 

INDEX .  424-431 


PREFACE 


The  Primitive  Church  extended  its  message  to  all  parts  of 
the  world.  Secure  in  the  commission  and  promise  of  its 
Founder,  it  presented  to  the  common  needs  of  mankind  a 
gospel  in  which  was  embodied  an  answer  universal  in  its  scope 
and  character.  Just  in  proportion  as  the  Faith  took  deep  root 
in  different  places  it  underwent  certain  inevitable  transforma¬ 
tions.  The  Gospel  must  needs  be  translated,  and  as  the  pro¬ 
cess  of  translation  involves  more  than  merely  turning  a  mean¬ 
ing  in  one  language  into  its  nearest  equivalent  in  another,  the 
translation  of  the  Church's  message  effected  certain  differences 
in  emphasis,  brought  to  light  new  aspects  of  its  meaning,  and 
involved  subtle  variations  in  the  kind  and  degree  of  its  ap¬ 
prehension  on  the  part  of  different  peoples.  That  such  a 
process  should  come  about  is  both  a  result  of  and  a  testimony 
to  the  inherently  universal  character  of  the  Church’s  Faith, 
the  intrinsic  value  and  appeal  it  possessed,  and  the  power  of  the 
assimilative  faculties  of  the  three  dominant  types  of  Catholic 
Christianity  which  emerged.  These  three  resultant  presenta¬ 
tions  had  almost  the  distinctness  of  personalities;  Semitic, 
Greek,  and  Latin  Catholicism  were  in  essence  fundamentally 
the  same,  but  strongly  marked  and  almost  personal  in  their 
own  individuality  of  character. 

Semitic  Catholicism,  which  has  long  ceased  to  exist  as  a 
correlative  and  collateral  branch  of  Catholic  Christendom,  in 
a  very  true  sense  approximated  most  closely  to  Apostolic  Chris¬ 
tianity,  since  for  it  no  process  of  translation  had  been  neces¬ 
sary.  It  may  best  be  studied,  in  the  few  remaining  vestiges  of 
a  once  mighty  Church,  in  the  writings  of  Aphraates.  Its 
history  is  instructive.  Beginning  with  St.  Ephraim,  Semitic 
Catholicism  attempted  the  impossible  task  of  Hellenization ; 
while  St.  Ephraim  and  his  successors  concerned  themselves 
with  the  translation  into  Semitic  terms  of  contemporaneous 
Greek  thought,  this  process  later  degenerated  into  a  kind  of 


XX 


PREFACE 


thought  transliteration,  which  did  violence  to  both  Greek  and 
Syriac,  and  resulted  in  the  lamentable  mediocrity  which  is  the 
distinguishing  mark  of  its  subsequent  literature.  The  true 
Semitic  Catholicism  was  so  thoroughly  erased  from  history  that 
we  have  become  accustomed  to  think  of  early  Christianity  as 
of  two  types  only — Eastern  and  Western,  Greek  and  Latin. 

Each  of  these  two  great  surviving  types  has  its  own  strongly 
marked  character,  and  throughout  history  it  has  been  the  bane 
of  Christianity  that  neither  has  succeeded  in  understanding 
the  other.  The  differences  between  East  and  West  are  funda¬ 
mental,  and  the  divergences  spring,  so  to  speak,  farther  up  the 
stream  of  corporate  consciousness  than  at  the  point  of  Chris¬ 
tianization.  Much  as  we  may  emphasize  our  identity  of  Faith 
in  fundamental  matters,  we  must  yet  make  allowance  for  deep- 
rooted  differences  of  temperament.  East  and  West  not  only 
differ  in  their  essential  character  and  viewpoint,  but  also  have 
had  these  underlying  differences  protracted  and  exaggerated 
by  the  underlying  experiences  of  the  East  and  the  West. 
Our  history,  both  before  and  after  the  Schism  of  the  eleventh 
century,  has  been  different;  our  code  and  table  of  values  has 
been  different;  external  conditions  have  been  different.  Finally, 
from  the  days  of  the  first  Ecumenical  Councils  until  to-day, 
there  has  been  the  almost  insuperable  barrier  of  the  difference 
in  language. 

When  we  come  to  scrutinize  and  analyze  these  fundamental 
differences  we  are  met  with  other  problems  of  no  slight  diffi¬ 
culty.  To  set  off  in  a  phrase  the  essential  character  of  Eastern 
Orthodox  Christianity  would  indeed  have  a  certain  worth  and 
value.  Kattenbusch  speaks  of  its  “essentially  mystagogic 
character/’  passing  over  other  fundamental  characteristics ; 
Domer  makes  this  one  of  three  essential  notes,  of  which  the 
others  are  its  emphasis  on  ‘^knowledge”  and  the  strong  bond 
between  ethics  and  religion.  Most  Orthodox  writers,  such  as 
Eugenius  Bulgaris  and  Ehdsse,  put  special  accent  on  the  in¬ 
timate  union  of  the  moral  life — that  is,  religion  as  conduct — 
with  true  faith — religion  as  right  belief.1  According  to 

1  Kattenbusch  in  ConfessionsJcunde;  Dorner,  Grundriss  der  Dog- 
mengeschichte,  pp.  613-614;  Eugenius  Bulgaris,  Seokoytuov  (translated 
into  Greek  by  Agathangelos  Leontopoulos,  Venice,  1872)  ;  Rhosse, 
Aoy/iaTLKri,  pp.  35-36;  Mesolora,  UpaKTiKT)  QeoXoyia,  pp.  16-18. 


PREFACE 


xxi 


Androutsos,  “authenticity  and  freedom”  are  the  chief  notes 
of  Orthodoxy.1  In  Dr.  Frere’s  very  illuminating  but  brief 
paper  on  The  Eastern  Orthodox  Church  he  characterizes  the 
Westernizing  process  as  a  movement  animated  by  two  main 
forces,  legalism”  and  “regimentation”.2 3  The  impress  and 
effects  of  these  two  tendencies  on  all  Western  Christianity  has 
so  greatly  influenced  our  way  of  looking  at  Church  matters 
and  theological  questions  that  a  certain  process  of  un-westerniz- 
ing  must  be  undertaken  before  we  can  attain  to  any  measure 
of  sympathetic  understanding  of  Orthodoxy.  Familiar  and 
almost  axiomatic  preconceptions,  which  are  all  but  universal  in 
the  Western  point  of  view,  must  be  laid  aside  if  we  are  to  com¬ 
prehend  the  genius  of  Eastern  Christianity.  The  process  is 
not  so  difficult  if  we  read  history  carefully,  and  thereby  become 
conscious  of  certain  presuppositions,  from  which  we  must  divest 
ourselves. 

Two  examples  which  illustrate  the  difficulty  in  the  way  of 
the  West  understanding  the  East  come  to  mind  immediately: 
we  may  find  it  almost  impossible  to  rid  ourselves  of  the  effect 
of  the  sixteenth  century  Reformation,  which  as  a  movement 
of  thought  has  so  profoundly  influenced  all  of  Western  Chris¬ 
tendom  as  to  color  our  views  of  all  theological  and  ecclesiastical 
matters.  In  the  East,  however,  this  movement  had  nothing 
like  so  far-reaching  an  influence.  It  did  indeed  affect  Eastern 
thought,  both  directly  and  indirectly,  but  it  did  not  impinge  on 
all  Church  life  in  the  East.  As  an  instance  of  this  effect  of 
the  Reformation  on  our  thinking,  we  have  all  been  infected 
in  varying  degrees  by  the  notion  of  the  Church  as  invisible, 
so  when  we  come  to  study  Orthodoxy  we  see  everywhere,  with  a 
significance  which  it  perhaps  does  not  deserve,  the  so-called 
“Erastian  character”  of  the  national  Orthodox  Churches.  Some 
of  the  difficulties  which  these  conditions  impose  on  us  the 
writer  has  briefly  pointed  out  elsewhere.®  Again,  the  westerner 
is  confronted,  not  only  with  the  problem  of  the  nationalistic 
character  of  Orthodoxy,  but  with  that  of  its  seemingly  prepon- 

1  Androutsos,  ’Lvix^oXlkt],  p.  350. 

*  In  the  Report  of  the  First  Anglo-Catholic  Congress,  1920,  S  P  C  K, 
1920,  pp.  98-99. 

3  Some  Aspects  of  Greek  Church  Life  Today,  in  the  Church  Quarterly 
Review,  July,  1921,  pp.  236-251. 


xxii 


PREFACE 


derant  emphasis  on  conservatism.  Western  Catholicism  is 
conservative,  but  this  conservatism  is  hardly  an  end  in  itself ; 
the  Western  Catholic  is  actuated  by  some  motive  usually  practi¬ 
cal  and  pragmatic.  Even  a  cursory  study  of  the  Liturgy  in 
the  East  and  West  will  show  how  changes  in  the  West  were 
usually  in  the  nature  of  abbreviation  and  curtailment,  while 
the  Eastern  Liturgy  has  grown  by  accretion  and  amplification. 
The  Mass  of  the  Catechumens  has  long  since  disappeared  as 
a  distinct  entity  in  the  Western  Liturgy,  while  it  is  retained  in 
full  in  the  East.  In  both  East  and  West  the  institution  of  the 
Catechumenate  has  long  been  lost.  But  when  we  remember 
the  vast  differences  in  Church  history  in  East  and  West  we  are 
reminded  of  the  circumstances  and  conditions  of  Orthodox  life. 
Under  Turkish  tyranny  survival  and  the  preservation  of  the 
type  became  the  fundamental  evidence  of  life.  The  greatest 
proof  of  the  “life"  of  Orthodoxy  for  centuries  lay  in  this  evi¬ 
dence  of  its  power  to  survive :  “to  live”  meant  “to  exist”,  and 
conservatism  as  a  principle  was  the  index  of  life. 

So,  naturally,  we  should  conclude  that  Orthodoxy  is  static, 
and  that  our  conceptions  of  development  and  growth  in  theol¬ 
ogy  and  thought  in  general,  would  be  entirely  foreign  to  it,  es¬ 
pecially  to  that  type  of  Orthodoxy  which  has  most  poignantly 
suffered  from  the  Turk.  While  the  iron  has  entered  into  the 
soul  of  the  Greek  Church,  the  living  soul  has  been  able  to  out¬ 
grow  the  wound.  The  vitality  and  dynamic  power  of  Orthodox 
thought  may  be  seen  in  such  a  modern  conception  as  is  de¬ 
veloped  in  these  words  of  Dyobouniotes :  “In  Holy  Scripture 
is  contained  the  loftiest  revelation,  but  this  revelation  exists 
in  germ  and  stands  in  need  of  development.  Individual  (be¬ 
lievers)  and  especially  the  Church  (in  which  the  Holy  Spirit 
dwells  to  guide  it  and  preserve  it  from  every  error),  must  con¬ 
cern  themselves  with  the  development  of  the  religious  truths 
and  moral  ideas  contained  in  germ  in  Holy  Writ,  keeping  in 
mind  the  fact  .  .  that  this  has  infinite  value  as  well  for  the 
Church  as  for  the  individual.  The  profundity  of  these  ideas 
is  such  that  the  Church  can  succeed  in  understanding  them 
only  at  the  price  of  great  effort.  .  .  .  The  more  warm  and 
vigorous  is  the  religious  sense  in  the  individual  and  in  the 
Church,  the  more  vigorous  and  warm  will  be  the  interest  of 
individual  and  Church  in  a  deeper  penetration  into,  and  de- 


PREFACE 


xxiii 


velopment  of  the  religious  and  efthical  truths  contained  in 
Holy  Scripture  .  .  .  Unfortunately  this  work  of  dogmatic  de¬ 
velopment,  begun  in  the  Eastern  Church  with  such  marvelous 
insight  and  such  unlimited  enthusiasm,  was  cut  off  short  by 
unhappy  circumstances  beyond  her  control,  and  the  work  she 
had  undertaken  with  diligence  and  zeal,  and  not  by  mere 
chance,  was  only  half  done.”1  In  another  connection  the  same 
writer  says :  “It  is  obvious  that  the  early  Church  had  the 
right  and  duty  to  develop  dogmas ;  thus  too  the  later  Church 
has  both  the  right  and  the  duty  as  well  to  develop  dogmas  not 
developed  by  the  early  Church.  This  development  is  prepared 
in  advance  by  the  work  of  theological  writers,  since  theological 
opinion  can  rightly  enter  into  dogmatic,”  2  as  Androutsos  ob¬ 
serves.3  The  modern  ring  of  such  a  passage,  and  its  under¬ 
lying  thought,  will  do  much  to  disabuse  us  of  the  notion  that 
Orthodoxy  is  sterile  and  static,  that  it  views  the  Church  as 
mechanical  rather  than  as  living,  or  that  Orthodoxy  is  a  prone 
corpse,  incapable  of  manifesting  energy  of  thought  or  living 
action.4  It  is  significant  that  from  the  history  of  its  external 
affairs  of  the  past  six  centuries  one  would  scarcely  expect  what 
he  actually  finds  in  the  study  of  present-day  Orthodoxy.  In 
the  case  of  the  student  of  this  subject,  happy  indeed  is  the 
man  who  finds  himself  wrong  in  his  expectations ! 

The  following  lectures  have  as  their  purpose  the  study  of 
a  limited  field  of  Orthodox  literature — the  writings  of  some 
of  the  conspicuous  present-day  Greek  Orthodox  theologians.  The 
subject  matter  includes  the  treatment  by  these  writers  of  some 
of  the  cardinal  doctrines  of  the  Orthodox  Church.  No  at¬ 
tempt  could  have  been  made  to  deal,  even  briefly,  with  all  of  the 
Greek-Orthodox  theologians  of  the  modern  school,  and  certainly 
it  would  have  been  impossible  within  the  compass  of  these 
lectures  to  attempt  a  resume  of  the  whole  of  present  Orthodox 
teaching.  Strangely  enough,  Slavic  Orthodoxy  has  had  more 

1  Dyobouniotes,  ’OcpetXonevrj  air  av  ripens,  pp.  155-156. 

2  Ibid.,  ^oy/jLaTLKTj  rov  k.  ’Avdpovrcov  Kpivop-ev 77,  p.  62. 

3  Ao'YP.aTiKi),  p.  3. 

4  Interesting  in  this  connection  is  the  complacently  depreciatory 
tone  of  certain  Roman  Catholic  writers  on  Orthodoxy — e.  g.,  S. 
Vailhe,  s.  v.  “Greek  Church”,  in  the  Catholic  Encyclopedia,  VI, 
p.  769. 


xxiv 


PREFACE 


attention  from  Anglican  writers  than  that  of  the  Greek-speak¬ 
ing  sections  of  the  Church  of  the  East.  The  initial  difficulties 
of  language  are  much  less  in  the  case  of  the  Greek  writers  than 
in  that  of  the  Russian,  and  it  is  to  be  hoped  that  an  ever  in¬ 
creasing  number  of  Anglican  readers  will  interest  themselves 
in  the  fruitful  and  stimulating  literature  of  the  modern  thinkers 
of  the  Greek  Church. 

Contemporary  with  the  liberation  from  the  Turk,  the  Church 
of  Greece  especially  (and  in  fact  all  other  parts  of  the  Ortho¬ 
dox  Church  where  Greek  is  the  language  spoken,)  shook  off 
the  lethargy  of  centuries  and  began  to  develop  a  theological  and 
philosophical  literature  which  is  modern,  living,  genuinely  true 
to  native  genius,  and  loyal  to  the  Orthodox  heritage  of  the 
ages.  The  intrinsic  worth  of  some  of  the  writers  of  this 
school  is  such  that  any  company  of  modern  scholars  would 
gladly  and  gratefully  admit  them  to  their  fellowship.  Passing 
over  the  earlier  generation,  some  of  the  writers  of  which  ex¬ 
ercise  a  profound  influence  to-day,  we  have  a  number  of  eminent 
theologians  who  are  all  but  unknown  to  the  Anglican  world: 
Philippos  Papadopoulos,  the  Archimandrite  Chrysostom  Papa- 
dopoulos,  Constantine  Rhalle,  Zekos  Rhosse,  P.  Comnenos,  Con¬ 
stantine  Dyobouniotes,  I.  E.  Mesolora,  Antoniades,  and  the  most 
distinguished  theological  writer  of  the  present  day — Chrestos 
Androutsos.  Of  the  above  a  preponderant  number  obtained 
much  from  their  German  education — exactness,  accuracy,  ex¬ 
haustiveness  of  research,  and  acquaintance  with  and  grasp 
of  modern  problems  in  philosophy  and  theology.  All  of  them 
are  “modern”  in  their  point  of  view,  alive  to  present-day  dif¬ 
ficulties,  keenly  interested  in  the  progress  of  European  scholar¬ 
ship,  broad  in  the  horizon  of  their  sympathies,  and  utterly  an¬ 
tagonistic  to  narrow  insularity,  complacency,  and  to  the  posi¬ 
tion  called  “obscurantist”.  If  the  present  lectures  serve  but  to 
introduce  such  men  to  American  Churchmen  they  will  not  have 
been  entirely  in  vain.  If  they  serve  to  discount  the  venerable 
and  deeply-rooted  calumny  that  Orthodoxy  is  “intellectually 
sterile”,  ‘^barren  in  the  results  of  modern  scholarship  and 
theological  research”,  “static”',  “out  of  touch  with  modern 
thought  and  conditions”,  and  “not  alive  to  the  problems  of 
the  day”,  their  purpose  will  have  been  fulfilled.  The  following 
lectures  attempt  to  present  the  results  of  the  writer’s  studies  in 


PREFACE 


xxv 


the  works  of  modern  Greek-Orthodox  theologians.  In  so  doing 
the  writer  has  confined  himself  to  a  very  limited  portion  of  the 
field,  and  to  a  few  outstanding  theologians.  The  scheme  is 
largely  due  to  the  arrangement  in  Androutsos’,  Aoy/xaTiKr;,  and, 
as  far  as  has  been  possible,  the  presentation  has  been  purely 
objective. 

The  work  of  a  modern  Greek  theologian  has  not  been  easy. 
Damalas  admits  that  outside  theologians  could  justly  speak  of 
a  kind  of  relative  stagnation  and  torpor  of  the  Orthodox  Church,1 
and  the  signs  of  intellectual  life  were  not  always  greeted  with 
due  acclamation  and  sympathy.  Furthermore,  besides  the  ac¬ 
cusations  of  “innovating”  and  “perverting  true  Orthodoxy”  with 
which  the  earlier  attempts  to  create  a  scientific  theology  were 
met,  there  are  intrinsic  difficulties  which  face  the  modern  theo¬ 
logian.  In  many  cases  he  cannot  transcribe  statements  of  belief, 
but  must  speak  in  the  spirit  of  Orthodoxy,  on  matters  not  ex¬ 
plicitly  defined.2  Androutsos’  great  work3  is  a  conspicuous  evi¬ 
dence  both  to  the  depth  and  to  the  keenness  of  the  writer’s 
thought;  it  is  brilliantly  written,  concise,  lucid,  fearless,  and 
alive  to  difficulties,  which  are  always  faced  and  never  shirked  or 
summarily  disposed  of.  It  provoked  several  bitter  attacks — 
notably  those  of  Dyobouniotes,4  and  Balanos,5  the  first  numbers 
in  a  veritable  pamphlet  campaign.6  Androutsos  was  harried  and 
irritated  by  his  critics,  and,  despite  the  sharpness  in  the  remark, 
there  is  undoubtedly  some  basis  for  his  comment :  “getting  in¬ 
to  print  is  the  surest  way  to  advancement”.7  An  interesting 
review  of  the  work  of  Androutsos  and  his  difficulties  with  his 
critics  appeared  in  the  Echos  d’  Orient .8  None  of  the  writings 
of  this  eminent  theologian  have  appeared  in  English  except 


1  ITepi  apx uv,  Leipzig,  1865,  p.  5. 

2  Androutsos,  Aoy/xaTiKri,  preface,  p.  10. 

3  AoyfiariKri  rgs  ’0 pdodo^ov  ’AvaToXiKrjs  ’E/c/cXT/crtas,  Athens,  1907. 

4  'H  Aoyp.aTiKTi  rod  k.  ’Avdpovraov  Kpivogevg,  Athens,  1907. 

5  Kpurts  ryjs  Aoyp.aTiKTjs  rov  k.  ’Avdpovraov,  in  Nea  'Lluv,  1907,  vol.  V, 
pp.  669-705. 

6  AoypLarLKal  M eXirai,  A’,  Athens,  1907 ;  Dyobouniotes,  ’ OcpeiXogevr 7 
dirdpTTjaLS ;  Androutsos,  AoypLocriKal  MeXerai,  B’,  Athens,  1908. 

7  Aoyp.aTLKai  M eXercu,  B’,  p.  5. 

8  Jugie,  Une  nouvelle  dogmatique  ortliodoxe,  trois  theologiens  grecs 
en  presence,  vol.  XI,  1908,  pp.  146-154,  257-264. 


xxvi 


PREFACE 


his  monograph  on  Anglican  Orders/  which  in  its  translated 
form1 2  is  not  altogether  accurate.3 4 5 6 7 

Another  work  of  conspicuous  merit  is  Rhosse's  Aoy/xanK^/ 
of  which  the  first  volume  only  has  appeared.  Both  of  these 
works,  Dyobouniotes  On  the  Sacraments /  Mesolora’s  'Zv^ftoXcKr), 
and  in  fact  most  of  these  modern  works  in  general,  owe  much 
to  European  scholarship.  In  their  effort  to  refute  the  allega¬ 
tion  that  Orthodoxy  is  intellectually  moribund,  present-day 
writers  have  availed  themselves  extensively  of  what  non-Ortho- 
dox  thinkers  have  done.  Thus  Rhosse’s  words  in  his  preface 
“The  Orthodox  theologian  in  his  scientific  investigation  and 
orderly  presentation  of  dogma  stands  in  need  of  the  study  of 
dogmatic  theologians,  both  Latin  and  Protestant — especially 
the  latter,”  and  Dyobouniotes’  frank  admission  of  the  fact  that 
he  had  used  “such  Roman  teaching  as  in  his  judgment  is 
based  on  a  sound  interpretation  of  Holy  Scriptures  and 
Sacred  Tradition”'  as  well  as  Protestant  works  chiefly  of  a 
historical  nature,  suggest  the  indebtedness  of  theologians  of 
the  modern  school  to  Continental  scholarship,  especially 
German.8  In  fact  Dorner  commented  on  Rhosse’s  Aoy gariKy 
in  the  words :  “Die  Schrift  zeigt  sich  von  der  spekulativen 
deutschen  Theologie  des  vorigen  Jahrhunderts  auf  das  Starkste 
beeinflusst.”9  Most  of  the  knowledge  of  things  Anglican  which 
contemporary  Greek-Orthodox  writers  possess  has  been  gained  at 

1  To  Kvpos  twv  ’Ayy\iK<x>v  ’Keiporoviujv ,  Constantinople,  1903. 

2  1'he  Validity  of  English  Ordinations,  from  an  Orth-odox  Catholic 
point  of  view,  by  the  Most  Rev.  Ohrestos  Androntsos  (sic),  translated 
by  F.  W.  Groves  Campbell,  London,  1909. 

3  On  which  cf.  The  Relations  of  the  Anglican  Churches  with  the  East¬ 
ern  Orthodox,  the  Rev.  J.  A.  Douglas,  London,  1921,  p.  98,  note  3. 

4  Hvcrrypa  Aoyga.ri.Kijs  rrjs  opdodo^ov  ’E/c/cXTjcri'as,  vol.  I,  Athens,  1903. 

5  Ta  M.v<TTr)pia  rrjs  ’ Avar o\l Kps  ’O pOodo^ov  ’E/c/cX^crtas,  Athens,  1913. 

6  'Lvaryya  Aoyp.ari.Kris,  p.  6. 

7  Ta  Alvarypia,  preface,  pp.  3-4. 

8  For  example,  Androutsos  frequently  refers  to  Mohler’s  Symbolik, 
Martensen’s  Dogmatik,  Nitzsch’s  Lehrbuch  der  evangelischen  Dogmatik, 
Sclieeben’s  Handbuch  der  katholischen  Dogmatik,  Schmidt’s  Christ- 
liche  Dogmatik,  Simar’s  Lehrbuch  der  Dogmatik ;  Rhosse,  to  the  works 
of  Miartensen,  Trendelenburg,  Dorner,  etc.,  and  Dyobouniotes’  bib¬ 
liographies  contain  a  preponderance  of  non-Orthodox  works. 

8  Eine  neue  grieschische  Dogmatik,  Z  W  T,  vol.  xlviii,  1905,  p.  153. 
Theologischer  J ahresbericht ,  Berlin,  vol.  xxiii,  1904,  p.  692. 


PREFACE 


xxvii 


second  hand — through  French,  Latin,  or  German  translations 
of  our  formularies,  or  interpretations  and  studies  of  our  Church 
written  in  these  languages.  Yet  the  Greek  Orthodox  are  not  a 
whit  different  in  this  regard  from  most  of  us,  who  know  so  little 
about  the  Greek  Church  of  to-day  from  its  own  official  teaching 
and  its  own  representative  scholars. 

In  conclusion,  the  writer  desires  to  thank  most  sincerely 
the  Committee  of  the  Hale  Lectureship  Foundation  for  ex¬ 
tending  to  him  the  invitation  to  deliver  these  lectures.  Es¬ 
pecially  are  his  thanks  due  the  Dean  of  the  Western  Theologi¬ 
cal  Seminary  for  many  courtesies  extended  to  him  in  the 
course  of  the  preparation  and  delivery  of  the  lectures.  He  de¬ 
sires  to  acknowledge  with  gratitude  the  care,  interest,  and 
suggestions  of  the  Rev.  Prof.  F.  J.  Hall,  and  the  Rev.  Chrys¬ 
ostom  Trahatheas.  His  wife  has  been  of  great  assistance  in 
the  preparation  and  correction  of  the  manuscript.  Finally 
his  thanks  are  due  Miss  Anne  AYnus  for  her  careful  and 
painstaking  work  in  the  typing  of  the  lectures.  F.  Gavin. 

St.  Agnes  by  the  Lake,  Algoma,  Wisconsin, 

Feast  of  the  Xativity  of  Our  Lady,  1921. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


The  Sources1  of  Orthodox  Teaching 

(I)  The  Holy  Bible ;  the  Old  Testament  in  the  Septuagint 
Version,  and  the  New  Testament  in  the  original  Greek.' 

(II)  Sacred  Tradition;  which  includes  the 

(a)  Decrees  and  Definitions  of  the  seven  Ecumenical 
Councils /  namely,  those  of:  (1)  Nieaea,  (325);  (2)  I 
Constantinople,  (381)  ;  (3)  Ephesus,  (431)  ;  (4)  Chal- 
cedon,  (451)  ;  (5)  II  Constantinople,  (553)  ;  (6)  III 
Constantinople,  (680)  and  the  Synod  in  Trullo  (3wo8os  vev- 
0€ktti),  (691);  (7)  II.  Nicaea  (787). 

(b)  Ecumenical  Creeds,4  namely:  (1)  the  Apostles' 
Creed;  (2)  the  Niceno-Constantinopolitan  Creed;  and  (3) 
the  Athanasian  Creed. 

(c)  Writings  of  the  Fathers  of  the  Undivided  Church, 
both  Eastern  and  Western,  with  a  special  preeminence  ac¬ 
corded  the  works  of  the  “Doctors”,  particularly  St.  John 
Damascene. 

(d)  Symbolic  Books;6  including  the  following: 

(1)  'H  ofioXoyia  TewaS/foi;  roii  a^oXapLov. 

( The  Confession  of  Gennadius  Scholaris.) 

(2)  At  Tpets  aTroKpLueis  'I epepiiov  tov  B  .  iraTpidpypv 
K(ovaTavTivov7r6A.etos  tt pos  tov s  8tapxLpTvpopi€vov<;  Oeo- 
Xoyovs  Trjs  Tv/3iyyr]<;. 

( The  Three  Answers  of  Jeremiah  II,  Patri¬ 
arch  of  Constantinople ,  to  the  Protestant  Theo¬ 
logians  of  Tubingen*) 


1  On  which  cf.  Lecture  I,  pp.  17-30;  IV,  pp.  206-218. 

2  Cf.  Lecture  I,  pp.  19-20;  Mesolora,  2u£t/3o\i/o7,  III,  pp.  34-63. 

3  Cf .  Mesolora,  ibid.,  pp.  31-32;  Nicholas  Bulgaris,  QeoXoyLKov, 
(Greek  translation)  p.  68;  Diomede  Kyriakos,  ’EWtjviktj  'I aropia. 

4  Cf .  Androutsos,  ZvnfioXucr),  pp.  17-31;  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  I,  pp. 
1-64;  IV,  pp.  458-459. 

5  Text  in  Kimmel,  Monumenta  Fidei  Ecclesiae  Orientalis,  Jena, 
1850,  vols.  I  &  II;  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  vols  I  &  II,  and  cf.  ibid.,  IV,  pp. 
457-458;  Cf.  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  31-38;  Lecture  IV,  pp.  206  if. 

6  Acta  et  Scripta  theologorum  Wirtembergensium  et  Patriarchae 
Constantinopolitani,  D.  Hieremiae,  Wiirtemberg,  1633. 


XXX 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


( 3 )  H  ofxoXoyta  M.rjTpo<f)a.vovs  tov  KpiT07rovA.ov,  7ra- 
TpLapxov  ’A Xe£av8peuis. 

( The  Confession  of  Metrophanes  Kritopoulos, 
Patriarch  of  Alexandria.) 

(4)  H  6p66$o£o<;  6/xoA.oyia  Hirpov  tov  MoyiAa,  p.r)Tpo- 
ttoXltov  Kie/lov. 

( The  Orthodox  Confession  of  Peter  Mogila, 
Metropolitan  of  Kiev.) 

(5)  Ta  -rrpaKTLKa  tujv  iv  KojvorravTivovTroXeL  (1638)?  ev 
’Iao-tw  (1641-2),  cv  'IepocroAv/mis  (1672),  KCLL  €V 
K<jov(TTavTtvov7roAet  (1672)  crvvoSmv. 

( The  Ads  of  the  Synods  (held)  in  Constan¬ 
tinople,  (1638),  Jassy  (1641-1642),  Jerusalem 
(1672),  and  Constantinople  (1672). 

(  6 )  H  6p.oA.oyia  tov  AocnOeov,  Trarptapyov  JepoaoXvpuov. 

( The  Confession  of  Dositheus,  Patriarch  of 
J  erusalem.) 


List  of  some  of  the  most  important  theological  works 
of  the  Greek  Orthodox  Church 

(a)  Works  of  the  earlier  periods: 

St.  John  Damascene,  'H  ck&o'is  (IkSocrs)  dxpi/Jr/s  rrj<s 

op0oSo£ov  7T6crTea)?. 

( The  Exposition  of  the  Precious  Orthodox  Faith.) 
This  work,  as  Palmieri  notes,  is  the  “sole  compen¬ 
dium  of  dogmatic  theology  up  until  the 
seventeenth  century.”1 

1  Theologia  Dogmatica  Orthodoxa  ( Ecclesiae  Qraeco- Russiace)  ad 
lumen  Catholicae  Doctrinae  examinata  et  discussa,  Tomus  I,  Prolegome¬ 
na Florence,  1911,  p.  140,  and  pp.  ff.  Dvobouniotes’  monograph  on 
St.  John  (‘Icoawrjs  6  Aa/iacrKgvos,  Athens,  1903,)  is  of  very  considerable 
value.  Rangabe  writes:  “Le  manque  de  fecondite  theologique  chez 
les  Grecs  tient  a  l’esprit  meme  de  l’figlise  grecque,  qui  repoussant  toute 
innovation,  n’admet  plus  les  discussions  dogmatiques  apr£s  le  septi£me 
Synode  et  depuis  la  scission  de  l’Eglise;  le  droit  d’examiner  et  d’in- 
tepreter  les  dogmes  ne  pouvait  appartenir,  selon  ses  principles  con- 
servatifs,  qu’a  totalite  de  la  chretiente,  lorsqu’elle  etait  reunie” 

( Histoire  litterarie  de  la  Grece  moderne,  Paris,  1877,  vol.  I,  pp.  217, 
218.)  Few  present-day  theologians,  however,  would  endorse  this  state¬ 
ment. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


xxxi 


Coursoulas,  Nicholas,  (1653)2woi f/is  rrjs  Upas  BeoXo- 
yias  (fn\o7rovrj6ei(Ta  els  wefreXeiav  r<nv  opBo8o£ ojv  cfnXo- 
paOwv,  edited  by  Sergius  Rattan  is,  vols.  I.  &II. 
Zacynthus,  1862. 

Athanasius  of  Paros,  (1813)  ’E7n.ro/AT7  elre  avXXoyrj 
t£jv  Be icov  rrjs  7 TLCTeoiS  8oyp.arwv  piera  Tvacrgs  impe- 
Xeias ,  xar  imrop-gv  cf)iXo7rovgBe/i(ra ,  edited  by  the 
Most  Rev.  Macarius  Notara,  Leipzig,  1806. 

Damodos,  Vincent,  Be  La  xal  Upa  8i8a(rxaXia,  grot  opBo- 
8o£os  8oypxxTLKrj  BeoXoyca  rrjs  ayias,  xaBoXiKgs,  ar ro- 
utoXlkyjs  xal  6pBo8o<~ov  ’J^XKXgcrias  rrjs  ’ AvaroXgSy  rrjs 
07rotas  g  8i8aaxaXia  BepeXiOvrai  iv  rrj  Upa  airoxaXvxpei , 
iv  rrj  Beo7rvevcrTw  Tpacfrfj,  iv  rat?  7rapa8o<jecn  twv 
’A7tocttoA(jov,  iv  rats  olxov p.evL xals  xal  romxals  opBo- 
8oI~ols  (tvvo8ols j  xa l  ev  tols  Beiois  7ra rpaai  rrjs  ’EkkXt^- 
( Ttas .  1130. 

Eugenius  Bulgaris,  (1716-1806)  ©eoAoyiKoV,  trans¬ 
lated  and  edited  by  the  Archimandrite 
Agathangelos  Lontopoulos,  Venice,  1872. 

Moschopoulos,  Anthony  (1713-1788),  ’Emropg  rrjs 
8oypxLTixr)s  xal  rjBixrjs  BeoXoyias ,  published  by  the 
Rev.  G.  Solomos,  Cephalonia,  1851. 

(b)  Later  and  contemporaneous  works.1 

Ambraze,  Nicholas,  Aoxipiov  Trepl  ivonreins  r a>v  ’AyyXi- 
xu)v  i7TL(TK07navwv  piera  rrjs  opBo8o£ov  avaroXixgs 
’E KKXrjaiaS'i  Athens,  1891 

. ,  *H  opB68o£os  ’ExxXgcria  ev  o-^ecret  7 rpos  oXas  ras 

XpicrTLavLxas^xxXrjcrtas  i£era£opevg,  •  -Athens,  1902. 

Amphiteatrov,  Antonius  (of  Kiev),  Aoyp anxg  Beo- 
Xoyia  rrjs  6pBo8o£ov  xa BoXixgs  xal  AvaroXixrjs  Ek- 

xXrjcrlas,  revised  according  to  the  sixth  edition, 
of  1856,  and  translated  from  the  Russian  by 
Col.  Theodore  Ballianos,  Athens,  1856. 


1  For  fuller  bibliographical  notes,  cf.  Legrand,  Bibliograpliie  hellen- 
ique  du  XVIIe  siecle,  especially  vol.  V,  (Paris,  1903)  ;  Demetracopoulos 
‘H  6p0o5o£o$  ’EKKXgaia,  Leipzig,  1870;  on  the  minor  works  of  the  earlier 
period,  e.  g.,  those  of  Theoklytos  of  Polyide,  Theophilus  of  Campania, 
Cyril  of  Lisinitze, — cf.  Palmieri,  op.  cit.,  I,  p.  146,  note  2;  Wieder- 
anf tinge  der  theologischen  Literatur  in  G-riechenland,  in  Theologische 
Studien  und  Kritiken,  vol.  I,  1841,  pp.  7-53;  the  brief  history  of  Dog¬ 
matic,  in  Androutsos,  ^oyv-ariKT],  pp.  28,  ff. 


xxxii 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


AndroutsOS,  Chrestos,  ^Ey  M dOrjpxL  nepl  7rpo7raTopLKOV 
a/AapTrjpLaTos,  Constantinople,  1896. 

. ,  Aevrepov  M dOypxt  wept  irpoiraTopiKOV  dpapTrjp.aTO<i , 

Constantinople,  1896. 

. ,  AoKt/ZlOV  'Svp.ftoXLKrjs  i£  e7TOl//€(i)S  6p6o8o£ov, 

Athens,  1901. 

. ,  To  Kvpos  rwv  ’AyyAtKtov  ^etporoviwi/  €7rd(//ea>s 

6p0o86£ov,  Constantinople,  1903.1 

. ,  At  /3dcrcts  Ttjs  eviocreios  tviv  ’EKKA^crtwv  Kara  ra 

apTL<f>avrj  reoy  6p6o8o^(vv  ’EKKXr/criwv  ypap.pxi.Ta , 

Constantinople,  1905. 

. ,  AoypaTLK-q  rrjs  6p6o8o£ov  avaroXcKi ;s  EKKA^crtas, 

Athens,  1907. 

. ,  Aoy/xartKat  McAcrat,  Ah  6  'YcfirjyrjTrjs  rrjs  OeoXo- 

ytas  k.  Avo/3ovvlwttj<;  ct;era£d/zcvos  ets  ttjv  AoypxLTLKrjv 

Kal  €ts  tt]v  AoyLKr/v,  Athens,  1907. 

. ,  Aoy/xartKat  MeAerat,  B".  'H  p,era  ras  e^cracrcts 

SiKatoAoyta  rov  k.  K.  Avo/3ovvl(i)tov,  Kal  rj  Kpiav >  rov 

k.  M7raAavoi;,  Athens,  1908. 

. ,  ’EkkA^ctmi  Kat  IIoAireta  c£  cVo^cws  6p6o8o£ov, 

Athens,  1920. 

Balanos,  D.,  Kpto-ts  ttjs  8oypxLTLKr}<;  TOV  K.  XprjcrTov 

*. Av8povTcrov ,  in  Nea  Stow,  1907,  vol.  V.,  669-705. 

. ,  IIoAireta  Kat  ’EKKA^crta,  Athens,  1920. 

Basil,  Metropolitan  of  Smyrna,  UpaypxLTeta  nepl  tov 

Kvpov' >  rr)s  yeipoTovtas  raw  V7ro  cttio^kottov  Kadgprjp.ivov 

Kal  a\i(Tp.aTLKov  )(€ipoTovr]0evTO)v,  Smyrna,  1887. 
Bulgakov,2  Macarius,  (of  Moscow)  ’Eyxetpt'Siov  r^s 

Kara  Trjv  op668o^ov  cts  XpiaTov  7tlo-tlv  8oypxLTLKrjs 
^coAoytas,  translated  by  the  Archimandrite 
.Neophytes  Pagida,  Athens,  1883. 

Christodoulos,  Apostolos,  AoKipiov  €kkXy](tuio-tlkov 
StKatou,  Constantinople,  1896. 

1  English  translation  by  F.  W.  Groves  Campbell,  The  Validity  of 
English  Ordinations  from  an  Orthodox  Catholic  point  of  view ,  Lon¬ 
don,  1909;  an  excellent  review  of  this  work  by  the  Rev.  Dr.  Severin- 
Salaville,  in  the  Revue  Augustinienne,  vol.  Ill,  1903. 

2  Two  other  works  of  this  writer  are  very  much  used :  Introduction 
d  la  theologie  orthodoxe,  Paris,  1857;  and  Theologie  dogmatique 
orthodoxe,  vols.  I  &  II,  Paris,  1860. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


xxxiii 


Damalas,  X.,  Ilept  ap-^v,  Leipzig,  1865. 

. ,  Ilept  tt}s  cr^ecrecos  rrj 5  ’Ayy Aik^s  ’EK/eA^tnas  npos 

ttjv  6p66bo£ov,  London,  1867. 

Delikanis,  Ta  iv  rols  tov  7rarp.  apyaiOf^vXxLKiov 

(7a)£dpeva  er-tcrT/pa  iKKXycnacrTLKa  eyypa<£a  r a  ac£o- 
pcuvra  ets  ras  cryecrets  tou  OLKOvp.evLKOV  ttcit  pcapyeiov 
7 rpos  ra?  EkkAt/o-uis  'Pcocrcrtas,  BAa^tas,  /cat  MoASa/3ta$, 
*.  t.  A.,  Constantinople,  1905. 

Dyobouniotes,  Constantine,  ’IwawTjs  6  Aapao-K^voA, 
xAthens,  1903. 

. ,  'H  SoypartKr/  rov  k.  Xpr/arov  * AvSpovraov  Kpivo- 

pieuy,  Athens,  1907. 

. ,  ’Oc^etAopeV^  aTravTricns,  Athens,  1908. 

. ,  Ta  M varripLCLTrjs  avaToXLKrjs  opOobo^ov  ’EkkA^ctoxs 

e|  €7r6i//e(os  SoypuTLKrjs,  Athens,  1912  (1913). 

Entaxia,  Toi)  kclvovikov  &iko.lov  rrjs  6p6o$o£ov  avaToXiKrjs 
Ek/A^cticis  ra  7rept  UpaTLKrjs  i^ovauis,  Athens,  1872. 

Gedeon,  KavovtKat  Sta Ta£ets,  €7rLCTToXaL,  Aucrets,  OecnrLcr- 
par a,  tojv  ayttorarcov  7rarpuxp^covK.  a,7ro  Ep^yoptov  rov 
#eoAoyov  pe^pt  At ovwtov  rov  dOro  ' A$piavov7r6Xe<j)s, 

Constantinople,  vol.  1.  1888;  vol.  II.  1889. 

Ghiannopoulos,  SuAAoyr)  to>v  iyKVKXiwv  ttJs  tepas  truvoSov 
’EKKAiycrtas  rps  ‘EAAaSos  peTa  tcov  ot/eetW  vop a>v, 
/3.  Star  ay  parcov,  virovpyiKOiv  eyypa^wv,  obrjyiwv  k.t.X ., 
dOro  rou  1883  pe'^pt  crr;pepov  e’^StSopeVr;  ivroXrj  rrjs 
tepas  crt)vdSov,  Athens,  1901. 

Kephala,  Xectarius,  Xpto-roAoyta,  Athens,  1900. 

Komnenos,  P.  2up/LAat  ets  ras  7rpocnra6eLa<s  Trpos  evwcnv 
ra>v  EKKA^crtaiv,  TeSyos  A,  At  ayyXu<aviKai  \eLpoTovuu, 

Constantinople,  1921. 

Mesolora,  I.  E.  2vp/3oAtKT7  Tps  dp#oSd£ov  avaToXiKrjs 
EKKA^ctas;  Ta  crvp/LAiKa  (3l(3Xul, 

Athens,  vol.  I.  1883;  II.  1893; — III.  1901; 
IV.  1904. 

. ,  IIpaKTt/07  ©eoAoyta, — Edrayaryr),  Athens,  1911. 

Papadoponlos,  Chrysostom,  AWor-apa  tcuv  *AyyAwv 
dvcopdroov  pera  twv  op^oSo^cov,  Alexandria,  1911. 

Petrakakos,  Ttva  7rept  rov  Kvpovs  tcov  yetpoTOVLiov  in 
'YiKKXr]<TLa<JTlKT]  ’AA^eta,  vol.  XXX.,  1910,  pp. 
134-408. 


XXXIV 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


Bhalle  and  Potle,  ^vvraypxi  to>v  Ouivv  Kal  i epwv  Kavovwv 
tiov  T€  ay lwv  Kal  navev(f>r)pLU)v  anoorToXoiv,  Kal  roiv 
lepojv  olKOVfxeviKiov  Kal  tottlkwv  avvoScvv, 

Athens,  Vols.  I-II,  1852;  III.  1853;  IV.  1854;  V. 
1855;  VI.  1859. 

Sakellaropoulos,  ’EkkA^ctuxcttikov  SUaLOV  rrjs  avaToXtKrjs 
opdo$6£ov  ‘EKKXgacas  /xtra  tov  ic^vovtos  vvv  kv  rfj 
YjKK\rj(TLa  tov  irar piapyekov  Kal  kv  'EAAaSi, 

Athens,  1898. 

Severus,  Gabriel  (of  Philadelphia)  Td  lepa  kn-Ta  rrjs 

KaOoXLKrjs  ’EkkA^ctuis  p.v<TTrjpuL. 

Technopoulos,  N.,  'H  Soy/xaTud)  6 kens  ttjs  ayyAi kt}s 
'FiKKXrjaias  KaO  eavrrjv  k^ra^opikvq  in  ^Evaxris  rwv 

'EKKXrjaiwv,  London,  1904,  no.  40,  pp.  635,  ff. 

Theotokas,  No/xoAoyia  TOV  OiKovpevLKOv  iraTpiap'^tLOV, 
tjtol  ttjs  Upas  c rvvoSov  Kal  tov  A.  E.  M.  crv/x/3ovAiov, 

Constantinople,  1897.1 


1  For  additional  bibliographical  material,  cf,  Palmieri,  op.  cit.,  vols. 
I.  &  II,  passim;  Mesolora.  'Zvp^oXiK-f],  II.,  pp.  150-153;  Douglas,  The  Re¬ 
lations  of  the  Anglican  Churches  icith  the  Eastern-Orthodox,  London, 
1921,  pp.  187-194. 


LECTURE  I. 


PROLEGOMENA 


LECTURE  I. 


PROLEGOMENA 

CONTENTS 

Pages  Pages 

1.  Dogma  and  Dogmatic  4-10 

2.  Revelation  11-14 

3.  Revelation  and  Miracle  14-16 

4.  The  Sources  of  Dogmatic  17-18 

5.  (1)  The  Bible:  18-25 

(a)  Church  as  Interpreter  18-19 

(b)  Canon  and  Text  of  the  Holy  Scripture  19-20 

(c)  Inspiration  of  the  Bible  21-24 

(d)  Bible  and  Dogma  24-25 

6.  (2)  Tradition  25-30 

(a)  Origin  and  Relation  to  Bible  25-27 

(b)  Content  and  Formulation  of  Tradition  27-30 

7.  Faith  and  Reason  30-45 

(1)  In  Relation  to  Religion  30-35 

(2)  In  Relation  to  Dogma  35-45 

Additional  Xotes: 

A.  The  Relation  between  Faith  and  Knowl¬ 
edge  45-49 

B.  Dogmatic  and  its  relation  to  the  other  Theo¬ 
logical  Disciplines  50 

C.  Palmieri  on  the  Orthodox  View  of  the  De¬ 
velopment  of  Doctrine  51-56 


1.  DOGMA  AND  DOGMATICS 


The  word  “dogma”  in  its  general  meaning  signifies  an  “opin¬ 
ion”,  a  “precept”,  a  “decree”,  a  “law”.  As  an  “opinion”  the 
word  was  applied  to  the  teachings  of  the  great  philosophical 
schools  founded  by  Pythagoras,  Plato,  Socrates,  and  Aristotle. 
These  “opinions”  had  for  the  members  of  the  schools  the  bind¬ 
ing  force  of  a  precept  or  law.  This  may  be  distinguished  as 
the  philosophical  use  of  the  word,  as  Cicero1  uses  it :  Sapientia 
neque  de  se  ipsa  disputare  debet ,  neque  de  suis  decretis ,  quae 
philosophi  vocant  dogmata ,  quorum  nullum  sine  scelere  prodi 
potest.  In  this  notion  of  dogma  as  a  fundamental  philosophi- 
ical  principle  there  is  present  as  the  essential  note  that  of  va¬ 
lidity  or  authenticity.  The  use  of  “dogma”  in  a  political  sense 
is  akin  to  this,  for  it  is  applied  to  the  decrees,  laws,  or  mandates 
of  a  king  or  a  realm,  always  with  the  essential  connotation  of 
authority  and  validity.  We  find  the  word  so  used  in  the  Bible, 
e.  g.}  Dan.  6,  8-9;  2,  13;  St.  Luke  2,  1;  Acts  17,  7.  In  the 

Bible  the  word  is  also  applied  to  the  precepts  of  the  Jewish 

Law,  as  in  Col.  2,  14,  and  Eph.  2,  15,  and  the  decrees  of  Jew¬ 
ish  courts,  as  in  2  Mac.  10,  8;  15,  36.  To  this  quasi-legal  use 

of  the  word  belongs  the  reference  in  Acts  16,  4  (cf.  Acts  15,  28). 

Nowhere  in  the  New  Testament  has  the  word  “dogma”  taken 
on  the  ecclesiastical  meaning  which  has  prevailed  from  the  time 
of  the  Fathers2  until  the  present  day.  According  to  Androutsos, 
“dogmas,  in  the  ecclesiastical  meaning  of  the  word,  are  the 
ethical  ordinances  and  truths  regulating  the  Christian  life,  and 
more  especially  the  theoretical  doctrines  of  the  Faith,  which  are 

1  Cicero,  Quaestiones  academicae,  TV,  9 ;  cf.  RMsse,  AoyfjLariicfi,  p.  45. 

2  Cf .  Socrates,  Eccl.  Hist.  2,  44;  Greg.  Nyss.  Epist.  6;  Cyril  Jeru. 
Cat.  4,  2,  etc.;  cf.  n.  2,  p.  24,  of  Mesolora,  UpawiKii  QeoXoyla. 


DOGMA  AND  DOGMATICS 


5 


contained  in  the  Bible  and  Tradition,  and  have  been  defined  and 
explained  by  the  Church,  and  formulated  in  part  by  her  holy 
Sjmods/'*1 

The  essential  characteristic  is  the  same  note  of  validity  and 
authenticity  which  is  the  fundamental  significance  of  dogma  in 
its  wider  meaning.  Dogma  as  such  is  the  authentic  declaration 
of  the  faith  necessary  to  salvation,  and  contained  in  the  Bible 
and  Tradition.  This  may  be  called  its  objective  aspect.2  But 
the  Church  “as  the  authentic  interpreter  of  Revelation,  ex¬ 
plaining  authoritatively  Scripture  and  Tradition,  formulates 
the  teaching  of  our  Lord  necessary  to  salvation  in  unchange¬ 
able  terms  and  statements  called  dogmas/'3  The  Church  acts 
in  this  way  through  a  reflective  process  of  human  insight  and 
human  reasoning,  whereby  she  presents  that  which  has  been 
defined  and  taught  by  herself  as  the  infallible  Interpreter  of 
the  Bible  and  Tradition  and  the  supreme  Arbiter  in  questions 
concerning  the  Faith.  Under  this  aspect  dogma  is  “the  ex¬ 
planation  of  the  content  of  the  Faith  ....  as  the  mind  of 
the  Church  investigates,  compares,  and  correlates  dogmas  with 
each  other  and  with  the  whole  body  of  her  teaching/'’  This  is 
the  subjective  and  theoretic  aspect  of  dogma/ 

Both  of  these  aspects  of  dogma,  as  (a)  resident  in  and  de- 
ducible  from  the  double  sources  of  Bible  and  Tradition  (which 
may  be  called  the  objective  view),  and  that  of  dogma  as  (b) 
the  product  of  the  reflective  action  of1  the  infallible  Church 
(subjective  view)  are  descriptive  rather  than  analytic.  Dogma 
is  thus  definable  without  a  further  investigation  into  its  con¬ 
tent,  though,  as  we  shall  see,  Androutsos  proceeds  to  analyze  the 
content  of  dogma  and  to  orientate  it  about  one  central  idea. 
According  to  Rhosse,  it  is  impossible  to  define  dogma  without 
reference  to  its  content,  and  to  him  this  core  and  heart  of  dog¬ 
matic  truth  is  the  “teaching  of  the  Faith  concerning  the  opera¬ 
tions  of  God."5  “The  dogmas  of  the  Christian  religion  are 

1  Androutsos,  Aoy/j.aTiK-f],  pp.  1-2. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  2. 

8  Ibid.,  p.  9. 

4  Ibid.,  p.  2. 

6  RhOsse,  AoynaTiKrj,  p.  28. 


6 


I.— PROLEGOMENA 


those  teachings  of  the  Faith  about  the  energies  of  God,  together 
with  the  premises  or  conditions  involved  in  them  and  their  con¬ 
sequences  or  results,  which  are  contained  essentially  and  in  germ 
in  the  Holy  Scripture  and  Sacred  Tradition,  and  have  been 
unfolded,  defined,  and  in  part  formulated  through  legitimate 
theological  speculation  in  local,  ecumenical,  and  general  councils 
of  the  true  (genuine)  Catholic  and  Orthodox  Church  of  Christ, 
under  the  inspiration  and  guidance  of  the  Holy  Spirit  abiding 
in  the  Church,  and  are  authoritative  and  binding  upon  every  true 
member  of  that  Church/’1  “The  Christian  Religion  is  the  re¬ 
moval  of  discord  between  God  and  man  made  possible  by  and 
functioning  through  the  religious  fellowship  (/comma)  founded 
by  Jesus  Christ,  and  the  reestablishment  of  the  right  relation 
of  man  to  God.”2  This  new  relationship  is  reciprocal,  since  it 
was  initiated  by  the  loving  act  of  God,  and  yet  depends  upon 
the  response  of  man  and  his  cooperation  in  it.  Hence  the  in¬ 
evitably  ethical  character  of  Christianity.3  The  whole  heart  of 
Christianity  is  then  the  establishment  of  a  new  status  of  man 
with  God,  the  maintainance  of  which  is  conditioned  as  well  by 
the  continuous  action  on  the  part  of  God  as  it  is  by  a  contin¬ 
uous  response  on  the  part  of  man.  So  Rhosse  would  analyze 
the  content  of  dogma  on  the  basis  of  God’s  energies — e.  g., 
(a)  in  relation  to  Himself:  His  energies  in  eternity — His  eter¬ 
nal  Being,  Life,  Knowledge  of  Himself  as  Absolute  Truth, 
Love  of  Himself  as  Absolute  God,  the  Eternal  Generation  of 
the  Son,  the  Eternal  Procession  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  and  the 
like;  (b)  in  relation  to  the  world,  and  created  things:  His 
energies  in  time — creating,  governing,  and  sustaining  His  cre¬ 
ation;  the  angels  and  man — creation,  fore-knowledge,  redemp¬ 
tion,  sanctification;  (c)  the  constitution  of  man — his  free  will 
as  cooperating  agency  with  the  energy  of  God  in  effecting  his 
regeneration,  redemption,  justification,  sanctification,  and  the 
operations  of  God  in  relation  to  Him.4 

1 Ibid .,  p.  23. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  21. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  21;  cf.  Mesolora’s  definition  in  his  II paKTucfi  QeoXoyla, 
pp.  1-18;  “theology  may  be  termed  the  seience  of  religion”,  p.  14.  ibid; 
cf.  his  2v/xf3o\iKri,  III.  pp.  1-33. 

4  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  23-25,  especially  note  (1)  pp.  24-25. 


DOGMA  AND  DOGMATICS 


7 


Dogmatic  theology1 2 *  is  “the  scientific  presentation  of  the 
teaching  of  the  Christian  Faith,”  and  its  scientific  character, 
according  to  Androntsos,  is  constituted  by  the  four  following 
notes:  (a)  the  consideration  of  the  nexns  of  dogmatic  truths 
each  in  relation  to  the  whole  content  of  dogma,  and  in  the  rela¬ 
tion  of  each  dogma  to  the  other;  (b)  the  explanation  and  expo¬ 
sition  of  the  meaning  of  each  dogma;  (c)  the  recognition  of 
the  historical  background  and  development  of  doctrine;  (d)  the 
presentation  of  the  dogmatic  truths  in  opposition  to  the  re¬ 
futed  errors  which  were  often  the  occasion  of  their  definition/ 
Dogmas  are  simply  the  statement  of  the  content  of  the  Faith, 
but  dogmatic  is  a  science  which  is  characterized  by  the  four 
notes  above  mentioned.  Since  Rhosse  has  included  several  of 
these  characteristics  in  his  definition  of  dogma,  he  defines  dog¬ 
matic  simply  as  a  scientific  presentation  of  dogma  in  the  sense 
which  his  definition  of  dogma  demands:  (“about  the  operations 
of  God,  and  their  premises  and  consequences.”)  “Dogmatic  is 
the  science  which  methodically  presents  these  truths.”8  Both 
deny  the  name  of  “scientific  dogmatic”  to  the  purely  catechet¬ 
ical  presentations  of  the  Orthodox  Faith  "which  have  appeared 
from  the  middle  ages  on,  for  such  manuals  lack  the  ordered 
and  systematic  character  of  a  science,  they  are  deficient  in  his¬ 
torical  method,  and  they  are  not  analytic.4 * * *  Dogmatic,  accord¬ 
ing  to  Androutsos,  does  not  profess  to  prove  dogmas,  but  simply 
presents  the  faith  of  the  Church  as  an  organic  whole.  Hence 
the  so-called  “philosophic  dogmatic”  is  outside  the  province  of 
true  dogmatic,  and  belongs  rather  to  apologetic,  or  to  the  phil¬ 
osophy  of  Christianity.  In  the  same  way  the  scholastic  dog¬ 
matic  manuals  of  the  Western  Church  are  not  true  dogmatic, 
since  in  practice,  though  not  in  theory,  they  conceive  “the  pur¬ 
pose  of  dogmatic  to  be  the  exaltation  of  faith  into  knowledge.”8 

1  On  the  relation  of  Dogmatic  to  the  other  branches  of  theology, 
cf.  additional  note  at  end  of  Lecture  I,  p.  50. 

2  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  2,  3,  21-25,  cf.  T.  D.  Balanos,  Elvai  ij 

deoXoyia  eTri(TT7]fj.T] ;  Athens,  1906;  Skaltsoune,  OprjcTKela  Kal  ’EttuttIJ/imj. 

8  R,h6sse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  23-25. 

*E.  g.,  the  works  of  Damodos,  Eugenius  Bulgaris,  Athanasius  of 

Paros,  Moschopoulos,  Ballianos  [Aoyp.ariKi]  OeoXoy La  rijs  ’Op9o56£ov 

K adoXucov  Kal  ’AvaroXiKTjs  ’E/c/cX^a/as,  Athens,  1858),  Macarius,  etc. 

•  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  23-24. 


8 


I.— PROLEGOMENA 


From  what  has  been  said  it  is  apparent  that  a  dogmatic 
system  should  be  orientated  about  some  single  fundamental  prin¬ 
ciple,  from  which  the  various  truths  are  developed  and  to  which 
they  are  all  related.  In  his  sketch  of  the  history  of  the  dog¬ 
matic,  Androutsos1  divides  it  into  two  periods — the  patristic, 
up  till  the  time  of  St.  John  Damascene,  and  the  modern,  from 
St.  John  till  the  present  day.  Much  of  the  patristic  work  was 
apologetic  rather  than  dogmatic,  though  the  early  works  serve 
as  sources  for  dogmas  afterwards  enunciated  by  the  Church. 
Most  of  the  early  works  lacked  the  systematic  grouping  of  dog¬ 
mas  about  a  central  principle,  yet  Origen  had  as  his  central 
idea  the  principle  that  “God  is  all  in  all”.  Subsequent  theo¬ 
logians  did  not  group  their  dogmatic  presentation  about  a 
single  well-defined  and  central  conception,  and  in  consequence 
lack  unity.  The  theological  output  of  the  middle  ages  was 
scholastic,  barren,  devoid  of  originality,  and  lacking  in  any  liv¬ 
ing  and  vivid  appreciation  of  the  value  of  the  content  of  dog¬ 
matic  truth;  much  of  the  modern  Orthodox  work  has  been 
satisfied  to  follow  the  same  course  of  stereotyped  reproduction2 
of  ancient  dogmas,  without  regard  to  their  living  value  or  their 
systematic  arrangement.  St.  John  Damascene  arranged  his 
theology  by  topics,3  a  useless  and  unscientific  method  for  mod¬ 
ern  times.  Attempts  have  been  made  by  various  schools  of 
philosophy  and  by  various  non-orthodox  theologians  to  discover 
the  unitary  principle  of  Christian  dogma  and  of  Christian 
Faith.  Since  the  Revelation  was  made  not  to  satisfy  a  philo¬ 
sophical  necessity,  but  for  a  practical  end,  Hegel,  Strauss,  Schlei- 
ermacher,  Harnack,  and  others  are  only  partially  successful 
in  attempting  to  discover  in  the  data  of  Christianity  such  a 
unitary  principle,  from  the  standpoint  of  philosophy.4  Androut¬ 
sos  develops  the  following  proposition  as  the  central  dogma  of 
the  Orthodox  Faith:  “the  Church  founded  on  earth  by  Christ 
is  the  treasure  house  of  Salvation.”  He  regards  it  as  a  satis¬ 
factory  principle,  uniting  Orthodoxy  on  the  common  ground 
it  has  with  Roman  Catholic  Christendom,  and  separating  it 

1  Introductory  Chapter,  Sect.  9. 

3  Androutsos,  pp.  28-31. 

8  Cf.  his  VE k5o<xls  ttJs  6p6o5o^ov  TUarecos. 

4  Androutsos,  op  cit.,  pp.  25-26. 


DOGMA  AND  DOGMATICS 


9 


from  the  essential  principle  of  Protestantism.  Furthermore, 
all  the  dogmas  of  the  Faith  are  involved  in  this  principle — 
those  about  Christ,  the  Church’s  Founder,  the  Church  and  Sal¬ 
vation,  the  sacraments  as  means  of  Grace,  the  completion  of  sal¬ 
vation  in  the  teaching  of  Eschatology.  “The  foundation  of 
the  Church  and  the  nature  of  salvation  cannot  be  understood 
without  the  doctrine  of  God,  the  world,  the  nature  and  constitu¬ 
tion  of  man,  the  fore-knowledge  of  God,  His  creation  of  the 
world,  angels,  and  man."1  So  he  divides  his  dogmatic  into  two 
parts — (1)  the  premises  involved  in  the  Redemption  wrought 
by  Christ,  and  (2)  the  redeeming  work  of  Christ.  The  articula¬ 
tion  of  his  whole  system  is  made  on  this  basis,  and  his  dogmatic 
is  adequately  orientated  about  the  principle  enunciated  above, 
that  the  “Church  is  the  treasury  of  Salvation/’  which  is  the 
central  truth  of  Orthodox  dogmatic.2 

Rhosse,  as  we  have  seen,  develops  the  arrangement  of  his 
material  in  accordance  with  the  analytical  definition  of  dog¬ 
ma,  as  the  teaching  of  the  Christian  Faith  about  the  operations 
of  God,  together  with  the  related  premises,  conditions,  and  the 
conclusions  involved.  So  among  the  “premises”  he  discusses 
the  eternal  acts  of  God,  and  as  “conditions”  he  treats  of  the 
nature  of  man,  the  sin  of  Adam,  original  sin,  and  the  like.  As 
“consequences”  of  God’s  operations  are  the  following:  Creation 
out  of  nothing  of  man,  angels,  the  world ;  the  Incarnation,  Re¬ 
demption  of  man,  the  sacrifice  on  the  Cross;  the  actualizing 
of  the  Kingdom  of  God  in  His  Church,  a  conception  which 
before  its  realization  was  only  an  abstract  idea;  the  relation 
of  the  Church  visible  to  the  Church  invisible ;  and  the 
doctrine  of  saints  and  angels.3  The  whole  content  of  Christian 
dogma,  according  to  Rhosse,  is  marshalled  about  this  central 
idea.  “This  conception  of  dogma  is  most  fundamental,  since 
it  contains  in  germ  or  bud  the  conceptions  of  all  the  several  dog¬ 
mas,  which  are  developed  and  unfolded  from  this  fundamental 
conception.  It  contains  the  absolute  or  highest  principle  out  of 
which  all  others  proceed.”4  Androutsos  regards  his  principle 

1  Of.  Androutsos,  ibid.,  p.  27. 

2  Cf .  Androutsos,  pp.  27,  32-33,  165-167. 

8  Cf.  RhCsse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  24-27,  notes  and  124-5. 

4  Rhosse,  ibid.,  pp.  25-26,  note  (1);  for  the  articulation  of  his  sys¬ 
tem  cf.  especially  pp.  23-27. 


10 


I.— PROLEGOMENA 


as  the  one  which  “pervades”1  all  portions  of  the  dogmatic  edi¬ 
fice,  while  Rhosse  regards  his  as  the  source  from  which  all  other 
dogmas  are  derived.2  It  is  typical  of  the  point  of  view  of  the 
two  works  that  Androutsos  should  develop  his  system  on  an 
inductive  basis,  and  that  Rhosse  should  articulate  his  dogmatic 
system  on  a  deductive  basis.  The  former  is  chiefly  concerned 
with  the  practical  bearings  of  dogmatic  truth,  its  clear  expo¬ 
sition,  and  the  articulation  of  his  system  according  to  the  plan 
he  set  himself  for  his  work.  The  latter’s  interest  is  philosophi¬ 
cal  and  theoretical.  His  single  tome  of  five  hundred  pages,  the 
only  portion  of  his  Dogmatic  that  has  appeared,  only  treats  of 
the  content  of  dogma  as  far  as  the  creation  of  man,  with  its 
corollary  truths  regarding  immortality,  free  will,  and  the  re¬ 
lation  of  man’s  will  to  divine  Revelation.  Androutsos’  criti¬ 
cism  of  Rhosse’s  work  is  that  it  is  “rather  a  scientific  justifica¬ 
tion  of  dogmas  than  a  systematic  presentation  of  them.  His 
Dogmatic  has,  rather,  the  character  of  polemic  and  apologetic,  in 
the  style  of  some  of  the  German  conservative  theologians,  par¬ 
ticularly  J.  A.  Dorner,  who  hold  that  the  aim  of  dogmatic  theol¬ 
ogy  as  a  science  is  to  demonstrate  the  logical  necessity  of  dog¬ 
mas”*  which,  Androutsos  says,  subverts  the  true  conception  of 
dogmatic. 

Any  conception  of  dogmatic  in  its  Orthodox  sense,  involves 
three  elements, —  (a)  the  principle  of  a  Revelation  made  by  God 
to  man,  (b)  embodied  in  the  Holy  Scriptures  and  Tradition, 
and  (c)  in  part  formulated  and  defined  by  the  Church.  We 
shall  proceed  to  examine  the  conception  of  Revelation  in  Ortho¬ 
dox  Theology,  as  preliminary  to  a  survey  of  the  sources  of  Dog¬ 
matic,  and  of  its  developed  content. 


1  Androutsos,  op  cit.,  p.  27. 
•RhSssfc,  pp.  20,  114-124. 
•Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  31. 


2.  REVELATION1 


Since  God  is  not  only  above  His  universe,  but  also  working 
in  it,  in  His  Might,  Wisdom,  and  Goodness,  it  is  in  accordance 
with  His  nature  and  character  to  reveal  Himself  to  man.  Man 
is  created  in  His  image  and  likeness,  and  is  capable  of  receiving 
His  revelations  concerning  Himself,  the  more  so  as  God’s  Spir¬ 
it  quickens  and  energizes  the  part  of  man  which  is  in  His  like¬ 
ness.  The  content  of  the  revelation  is  a  truth  which  man  by 
his  own  unaided  powers  would  be  incapable  of  discovering,  but 
which,  when  revealed,  takes  its  place  along  with  other  truths 
which  man  has  discovered,  as  it  were  to  advance,  complement, 
and  complete  them.  The  action  of  the  spirit  of  God  communi¬ 
cating  directly  with  the  human  spirit  in  a  revelation,  is  called 
“inspiration,”  or  “internal  revelation”.  It  does  not  preclude 
the  action  of  man’s  free  will,  for  man  acts  as  an  agent  or  organ 
of  the  Holy  Spirit,  in  full  possession  of  his  faculties  and  con¬ 
sciously,  and  not  as  an  automaton.  When  the  spirit  of  God  acts 
along  with  the  human  understanding,  and  as  it  were  with  a 
parallel  effect  upon  matter  or  by  material  agencies,  the  revela¬ 
tion  is  called  “external”.  Such  manifestations  of  God’s  power 
act  as  validating  and  guaranteeing  the  inner  revelation  made 
to  the  spirit  of  man.* 

There  are  definite  criteria  by  which  the  data  of  revelation 
may  be  examined  and  judged,  and  these  are  two,  external  and 
internal.  The  external  criterion  is  that  of  miracle,  as  an  in¬ 
dication  of  the  will,  power,  and  love  of  God.3  The  internal  cri¬ 
terion  is  both  positive  and  negative;  positive,  in  that  the  truth 
is  demonstrably  “one  which  satisfies  the  religious  and  ethical 
ideals  of  man,  and  makes  for  his  holiness  and  happiness  neg¬ 
ative,  in  that  it  is  capable  of  being  shown  consistent  with  other 

1  “Religion  in  man  consists  not  only  of  a  certain  subjective  energy 
on  his  own  part,  but  also  of  a  certain  energy  of  God  Himself,  by  which 
He  makes  Himself  and  His  Will  known  to  man.  This  act  whereby 
God  makes  Himself  known  is  called  Divine  Revelation.” — RhSsse, 
op.  cit.,  p.  447,  and  cf.  his  treatment  of  the  subject  of  religion,  pp. 
438*444;  Mesolora,  SvpjSoXi/cp,  III,  pp.  17-21,  26-32. 

2Rh0sse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  444-5,  462. 

8  Cf .  1  Cor.  2,  4;  Origen,  Contra  Celsum ,  1,  2. 

4Rh6sse,  ibid.,  p.  446. 


12 


I.— PROLEGOMENA 


revelation,  and  not  repugnant  to  reason.  There  is  also  the 
powerful  argument  for  validity  in  the  demonstration  of  power, 
the  proving  of  the  authenticity  of  Christian  revelation  by  its 
fruits.1 2  There  are,  however,  three  fundamental  notes  of  a 
genuine  revelation,  wThich  render  it  worthy  of  credence  and  be¬ 
lief.  These  are:  (1)  a  creative,  original,  and  new  quality,  (2) 
its  consistency  with  itself,  and  with  the  whole  complex  of  known, 
experienced,  and  revealed  truth,  and  (3)  its  positive  character 
as  part  of  a  gradual  and  progressive  development. 

(1)  God  works  along  with  man  in  his  religious  life,  and 
His  spirit  shares  with  the  human  soul  the  activity  of  reaching 
Godward.  Yet  this  cooperation  of  God’s  spirit  with  ours  may 
be  neither  inspiration  nor  revelation.  The  term  revelation  may 
be  applied  to  the  discovery,  by  means  of  a  new  and  creative  act 
of  God’s  spirit  operating  in  man’s,  of  something  new,  which 
was  not  known  before,  though  man’s  spirit  might  have  been 
capable  of  receiving  it."  Furthermore,  this  distinct  and  new 
act  of  God’s  revelation  to  man  is  not  of  the  sort  that  is  to  be  ap¬ 
propriated  by  the  individual  to  whom  the  revelation  is  made, 
but  it  must  be  proclaimed  abroad,  as  it  is  a  truth  for  mankind. 
The  individual  acts  as  agent  for  the  promulgation  of  the  new 
revelation,  and  his  guarantee  is  the  evidence  of  miracle.  There 
is  an  exact  correlation  and  parallel  between  the  revelation  to  a 
human  soul  from  without,  through  God’s  inspiration,  and  the 
occurrence  of  a  miracle  in  the  order  of  natural  phenomena. 
Both  are  supernatural. 

(2)  At  first  it  would  seem  that  this  note  of  the  catastrophic 
and  apocalyptic  character  of  revelation  would  clash  with  the 
second  note — consistency  with  itself  and  with  the  whole  con¬ 
tent  of  knowledge,  natural  and  supernatural.  But  each  sev¬ 
eral  new  revelation  serves  but  to  explain  better  and  unify  the 
content  of  religious  truth;  it  comes  to  supplement  and  com¬ 
plete,  and  not  to  subvert.  It  must  form  part  of  an  ordered 
whole,  yet  the  method  of  its  introduction  is  always  by  some  such 
extraordinary  subjective  and  objective  declaration  of  God’s 

1  Rom.  1,  16;  1  Cor.  1,  27;  2  Cor.  4,  15;  Eph.  2,  1-6-14;  Gal.  3,  18. 
This  same  argument  is  used  by  Eusebius,  St.  Chrysostom,  and  St. 
Athanasius. 

2Mesolora,  op.  tit .,  Ill,  p.  31. 


REVELATION 


13 


Will.  Every  step  in  the  process  of  revelation  is  initiated  by 
inspiration  and  miracle. 

Nevertheless  it  is  only  from  our  limited  point  of  view  that 
such  extraordinary  events  may  be  regarded  as  even  apparent 
contradictions  of  the  order  of  nature.  The  terms  natural  and 
supernatural,  rational  and  supra-rational,  are  only  relative, 
and  coined  by  man  with  the  limited  experience  of  his  own  fi¬ 
nite  plane.  “The  terms  ‘above  nature’  and  ‘above  reason’  are 
only  applicable  to  the  ‘nature’  and  ‘reason’  of  human  beings 
for  they  are  ‘according  to  reason’  and  ‘according  to  nature’  in 
God’s  sight.  They  are  never  ‘unreasonable’  or  ‘unnatural’  even 
according  to  human  reason.”1 

So  for  convenience  we  use  the  word  “supra-rational”  to  de¬ 
scribe  the  illumination  of  the  mind  of  man  by  God  as  a  means 
of  the  revelation  of  a  truth  to  which  man’s  unaided  reason  could 
not  attain.  We  apply  the  term  “supernatural”  to  an  extraordin¬ 
ary  occurrence  in  the  realm  of  the  tangible  and  physical,  the 
causes  of  which  are  not  the  ordinary  secondary  causes  resident 
in  the  world  of  experience.2  Inasmuch  as  the  two  spheres  of 
natural  and  supernatural,  rational  and  supra-rational,  are  ac¬ 
tually  only  one  unified  plane  of  being,  such  distinctions  are  not 
absolutely  valid,  yet  may  be  logically  helpful  and  legitimately 
useful  because  of  our  limited  and  finite  range  of  knowledge.  Yet 
the  great  fact  remains  that  each  addition,  by  means  of  supra-ra¬ 
tional  illumination  verified  by  miracle  in  the  external  order, 
to  the  stock  of  man’s  knowledge  is  in  the  way  of  an  increment 
to  it,  the  new  fact  being  of  necessity  of  a  sort  to  complement, 
complete,  and  further  the  scope  of  that  knowledge,  of  which  it 
becomes  an  integral  and  constituent  part.  Thus  the  second 
note  of  self-consistency  and  harmony  with  the  previously  as¬ 
certained  body  of  knowledge  is  a  criterion  of  the  validity  of 
revelation.  It  must  dovetail  into  the  past  experience  of  man 
as  well  as  into  the  corporate  body  of  knowledge  developed  by 
revelation.  It  can  never  abrogate  a  truth  once  for  all  given,  nor 
supplant  it,  but  must  supplement,  complement,  and  complete 
it.  This  is  what  is  meant  by  the  self-consistency  of  the  content 
of  a  new  revelation  and  its  agreement  with  the  preceding. 

1  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  449-450. 

2  Hid.,  p.  451. 


14 


I.— PROLEGOMENA 


(3)  “Inasmuch  as  the  religious  receptivity  of  man  allows 
only  of  a  gradual  process  of  inspiration  and  revelation  by  God 
through  new  acts  and  works  in  history,  by  means  of  which 
something  new  is  imparted  which  supplements  and  fulfills 
what  has  gone  before,  divine  Revelation  has  also  the  character¬ 
istic  note  of  a  gradual  and  progressive  development.”1  This 
does  not  violate  the  finality  or  positive  character  of  any  pre¬ 
vious  revelation.  Each  successive  step  in  the2 3 * *  process  is  con¬ 
ditioned  by  the  will  of  God  foreordaining  the  given  sequence 
of  gradual  illumination  on  God’s  part,  and  of  response,  accep¬ 
tance,  and  appropriation  on  the  part  of  man.  The  double 
characteristic  of  conservation  and  progress  is  predicable  of 
every  vital  and  genuine  religion.  The  relation  of  the  two 
functioning  properly  forbids  the  refusal  of  a  hearing  to  a 
new  revelation  by  a  too  literal  adherence  to  the  letter  of  past 
revelation,  and  at  the  same  time  inhibits  an  unregulated  and 
unfettered  evolution  of  novel  and  uninspired  developments 
by  means  of  the  fixed  content  of  past  revelation.  The  proper 
relation  of  the  conservative  and  progressive  principles  of  true 
religion  is  perhaps  best  expressed  in  the  thought  that  Chris¬ 
tianity  has  the  duty  of  conserving  a  growing  thing:  the  better 
it  fulfills  its  conservative  purpose,  the  more  opportunity  does 
it  give  for  the  nascent  life  and  constant  development  of  the  great 
revelation  committed  to  it.  “The  higher  degree  of  the  new  di¬ 
vine  revelation,  preserving  the  fundamental  features  of  the  fore¬ 
going  lower  degree,  fulfills  and  perfects  it,  while  the  lower  de¬ 
gree  of  divine  revelation,  preparing  the  place  for  the  higher, 
raises  expectation  and  desire  for  it,  and  renders  man  ready  and 
capable  to  receive  the  higher  degree.”8 

3.  REVELATION  AND  MIRACLE 

Of  the  two-fold  form  of  revelation  we  have  already  treated 
of  the  first — that  of  “internal  revelation,”  or  “inspiration”.  As 
we  have  seen,  the  external  manifestation  of  the  will  of  God  in 

1  Rhosse,  op  cit.,  p.  452. 

aMesolora,  op.  cit.,  p.  33.  (vol.  III.) 

3  RhSsse,  op.  cit.,  p.  453.  Mesolora’s  definition  embodies  these 

elements:  “Revelation  is  the  Divine,  supernatural,  and  graduated  ac¬ 

tion  of  God’s  energy  upon  man”  {op.  cit.,  Ill,  p.  29). 


REVELATION  AND  MIRACLE 


15 


the  order  of  natural  phenomena  acts  as  a  validation  and  guar¬ 
antee  of  a  subjective  inspiration  vouchsafed  to  man.  There  is 
a  close  and  intimate  relation  between  the  external  and  the  in¬ 
ternal,  the  objective  and  subjective  forms  of  revelation.  “A 
miracle  is  an  extraordinary  and  perceived  phenomenon,  tak¬ 
ing  place  in  the  world  of  matter  or  sense,  which  is  not  attribut¬ 
able  to  nor  explicable  by  the  natural  constitution  of  the  world, 
but  only  attributable  to  a  new  exercise  of  God’s  energy  in  the 
physical  world.”1 2  A  miracle  is  neither  a  suspension  nor  viola¬ 
tion  of  natural  law,  nor  can  it  be  said  to  be  an  impossibility, 
save  on  the  principle  of  the  denial  of  the  existence  of  any 
causes  save  the  resident  causes  in  the  cosmos.  Since  physical 
causes  working  in  a  certain  way  produce  certain  fixed  results, 
we  codifv  the  results  of  the  observations  made  by  natural  sci- 
ence  in  a  “natural  law,"  a  statement  of  the  sequence  of  cause 
and  effect.  In  the  ordered  hierarchy  of  natural  order  certain 
definite  planes  of  action  are  discernible — inorganic,  physical,  or¬ 
ganic,  chemical,  and  the  like.  We  do  not  say  of  the  general 
law  governing  the  action  of  inorganic  bodies  that  it  is  either 
suspended  or  violated  when  they  are  acted  upon  by  organic 
bodies,  functioning  according  to  the  law  of  their  being. 
Neither  does  the  oceurrance  of  miracle,  the  presence  of  a  Cause 
not  generally  active  in  that  way  among  the  forces  of  nature, 
postulate  the  suspension  or  temporary  abrogation  of  natural 
law.*  A  new  Element  has  come  in  as  a  new  cause,  and  the  new 
effect  is  a  miracle.  So  the  miracle  does  not  suspend  or  violate  na¬ 
tural  law.  Nor  is  a  miracle  a  violation  of  the  immutability  of 
God  s  character,  for  He  does  not  change  even  though  He  seems 
to  us  to  adopt  different  ways  of  working  in  His  world.  The 
change  is  something  we  attribute  to  Him,  not  something  be¬ 
longing  to  His  Essence.  Neither  is  it  scientific  to  say  that  mir¬ 
acles  are  impossible,  except  on  the  premise  which  involves  the 

1  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  454. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  456.  On  the  whole  subject,  cf.  the  chapter  on  miracles 
in  N.  Kephala's  XpiaToXoyia,  (Athens,  1901)  pp.  100-115  &  IT.,  and 
Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  119-120:  ‘‘The  possibility  of  miracle  rests 
partly  in  the  Creation  of  the  world  not  of  necessity  but  of  God's 
free-will,  and  partly  in  the  dependence  of  natural  forces  and  beings 
on  the  Will  and  Might  of  God.”  cf.  Lecture  II,  p.  91,  III,  pp.  148-152. 


1G 


I— PROLEGOMENA 


denial  of  everything  save  the  resident  physical  forces  of  the 
universe.1 

As  revelation  to  the  spirit  of  man  acts  upon  that  which  in 
creation  is  nearest  akin  to  God,  subjective  revelation  or  inspira¬ 
tion  is  of  a  higher  order  than  external  or  objective  revelation, 
or  miracle.  External  revelation  seals,  guarantees,  validates, 
and  authenticates  the  subjective  revelation  given  to  man’s  spirit 
directly  from  God.  Inspiration,  or  the  direct  illumination 
of  man's  spirit  by  God,  by  as  it  were  a  temporary  union  with 
Him,  is  not  a  mechanical,  magical,  or  automatic  domination 
of  man  by  the  Divine  Spirit.  The  inspired  man  cooperates 
with  God  in  order  that  the  Revelation  may  become  a  fact  to 
mankind.  He  abandons  neither  reason,  conscience,  nor  will.2 

The  most  complete  Revelation  of  God  to  man  is  in  the  Per¬ 
son  of  Him  who  was  both  God  and  Man,  Who  was  always  God 
from  eternity,  and  from  the  instant  of  His  conception  in  the 
womb  of  our  Lady,  was  perfectly  one  with  the  F'ather.  He  is 
the  climax  of  Revelation.  Prophets  and  seers  were  only  for  the 
time  being  united  with  God  when  He  used  them  as  vehicles  of 
Revelation.  Jesus  was  always  united  with  Him.  The  Incarna¬ 
tion  then  is  the  perfect  and  final  revelation  of  God  to  man — 
perfect  and  final  as  well  in  the  Vehicle  of  the  Revelation  as  in 
the  content  of  what  is  revealed.  He  is  the  acme  of  human  per¬ 
fections  completing  the  edifice  of  man’s  spiritual  development, 
who  was  at  it  were  a  “super-man,”  the  example  and  type  of  the 
Ideal  Man.  The  Revelation  of  Perfect  Man  in  the  Incarnation 
is  also  the  means  of  man's  attainment  of  that  perfection.  As 
the  development  of  God's  plan  made  necessary  the  appearance 
of  the  perfect  and  ultimate  Revelation,  completing  and  unify¬ 
ing  the  whole  process  so  the  nature  of  this  perfect  Revelation 
demanded  a  perfect  Vehicle.  “So  the  idea  of  the  God-man  and 
His  actual  appearance  in  the  historic  Person  of  Jesus  Christ, 
is  at  once  the  Miracle  and  the  greatest  of  all  the  miracles,  and 
is  not  in  opposition  to  the  mind  of  mankind  in  its  healthful 
state,  but  is  rather  demanded  by  it  as  necessary  for  the  perfec¬ 
tion  of  man.”8 

1Cf.  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  §  310,  pp.  457-458. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  461-62. 

3  Cf.  Eph.  4,  13;  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  463-466.  Cf.  St.  Irenaeus’ 
doctrine  of  the  avaK6<fia\aiw<ns. 


4.  THE  SOURCES  OF  DOGMATIC 

“We  derive  our  knowledge  of  the  teaching  of  the  Christian 
Religion  from  Holy  Scripture  and  Sacred  Tradition,  which  we 
therefore  call  the  sources  of  our  Religion”1  This  concise  state¬ 
ment  embodies  the  Orthodox  position  as  to  the  sources  from 
which  all  the  dogmas  of  the  Faith  are  obtained.  They  are  of 
equal  weight.  The  Orthodox  standpoint  is  neither  that  of  the 
Roman  Church,  which  does  not  found  its  dogma  entirely  upon 
the  Bible  and  Tradition,  nor  that  of  Protestantism,  which 
casts  tradition  completely  aside.2  Besides  the  dogmas  of  the 
Faith  there  are  “pious  opinions,”  which  are  allowed  to  circulate 
freely  among  members  of  different  schools  of  thought  as  their 
own  personal  conclusions  and  speculations,  provided  they  do 
not  violate  or  oppose  any  of  the  dogmas  of  the  Faith.3  Tradi¬ 
tion  “in  its  widest  meaning  includes  Revelation,  or  the  teaching 
of  our  Lord  and  the  Apostles,”  handed  down  from  generation 
to  generation,  and  treasured  up  in  the  Holy  Scriptures  and 
other  monuments  of  the  past.4  In  its  narrower  or  restricted 
meaning  it  is  applied  to  the  teaching  of  the  Church  not  set 
down  in  Holy  Scripture.  The  Bible  takes  for  granted  the  oral 
tradition,  for  the  Faith  was  preached  by  word  of  mouth.5  Tt 
was  never  meant  to  be  self-explanatory,  for  it  needs  the  inter¬ 
pretation  of  a  living  tradition.6  Furthermore,  it  was  not  meant 
to  contain  explicitly  all  that  is  necessary  to  salvation,  for  the 
oral  tradition  supplements,  completes,  and  develops  its  doc¬ 
trines.  “The  Holy  Scriptures,  from  their  avowed  purpose,  neither 
were  written  nor  purported  to  be  a  full  and  systematic  presenta¬ 
tion  of  the  Faith  first  imparted  by  living  voice.”7  In  the  words 

1  Orthodox  Cat.  of  Balanos,  Athens,  1920,  p.  4. 

2  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  2-3. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  3.  These  are  called  ‘‘theological  opinions”,  'QtoXoyiKai 
yi /(jj/Acu  or  QeoXoyovp.eva  ( dubia ). 

4  Ibid.,  note  7,  pp.  6-7.  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  57. 

BCf.  2.  Thes.  2,  14;  1  Cor.  11,  2;  2  Tim.  1,  13-14,  2,  2;  2,  St. 
John  12. 

6  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  8.  “Holy  Tradition  is  not  only  the  con¬ 
tinuation  of  the  Word  of  God  contained  in  Holy  Writ,  but  also  the 
trustworthy  guide  and  interpreter  of  it.” — Mesolora,  UpaKTiKp 
QeoXoyia,  p.  29,  note. 

7  Ibid.,  and  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  58,  and  note.  Compare  Dyobouniotes 
'0<pecX,  airavTriaLS,  pp.  154-156. 


18 


I.— PROLEGOMENA 


of  St.  Basil  the  Great  “of  the  doctrines  and  teachings  preserved 
in  the  Church,  we  have  some  from  the  written  word,  and  others 
we  have  received  handed  down  from  the  apostolic  tradition  as 
it  were  in  secret  (lv  fivarrjpito) ,  both  of  which  have  equal  force 
for  our  religion/'’1 

5.  THE  BIBLE: 


(a)  The  Church  as  Interpreter 


un 


The  Church  is  that  holy  Foundation  made  by  the  Incar¬ 
nate  Word  of  God  for  the  salvation  and  sanctification  of  men, 
having  divine  authenticity  and  hearing  His  authority,  consist¬ 
ing  of  men  holding  one  Faith,  hound  to  Christ  and  each  other 
by  the  bonds  of  Faith,  Hope,  and  Love,  believing  the  same  dog¬ 
mas,  having  the  same  worship,  and  governed  by  Bishops  who 
are  genuine  successors  of  the  Apostles/'"  “As  the  authentic 
interpreter  of  Revelation,  authoritatively  explaining  Holy  Scrip¬ 
ture  and  Sacred  Tradition,  she  formulates  the  teaching  of  our 
Lord."3  As  such  she  is  infallible,  for  “the  Saviour  founded  the 
Church  as  the  centre  as  well  as  the  vehicle  of  His  Redemptive 
Work,”4  since  she  is  “inseparably  united  with  her  Head,  Christ, 
the  Living  Centre  of  Redemption.  .  .  .and  exercises  His  priestly 
and  prophetic  office."5  She  has  “preserved  pure  and  undefiled 
both  sources  of  dogmatic  truth,  and  by  her  they  are  rightly  in¬ 
terpreted,  defined,  and  infallibly  formulated  through  the  Holy 
Spirit. "b  By  the  Catholic  Church,  Orthodox  writers  under¬ 
stand  the  undivided  Church  up  to  the  time  of  the  Schism  in 
the  lltli  century,  and  the  Orthodox  Church  since  that  day.  As 
will  be  shown  later,  they  regard  the  Orthodox  Church  as  the 
only  true  Church.  Rome  is  in  heresy  and  schism,  and  all  Prot¬ 
estant  Communions  are  separated  from  the  unity  of  Christen¬ 
dom.  Neither  Protestant  bodies  nor  the  whole  Western  Church 
is  part  of  the  Catholic  Church,  which  consists  solely  of  the  Or- 


1  De  Spiritu  Sancto,  27,  2,  with  which  cf.  the  8th  Canon  of  the 
VII  Ecum.  Coun. 

2  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  262;  Rhosse,  op.  tit.,  p.  56;  Mesolora 
op.  tit.,  IV,  pp.  5-13. 

3  Androutsos,  ibid.,  p.  9. 

4  Androutsos,  op.  tit.,  p.  264,  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  57. 

6 Androutsos,  ibid.,  pp.  260,  277. 

6  RhOsse,  op.  cit.,  p.  58;  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV,  pp.  17-39. 


THE  BIBLE 


19 


tliodox  Church.1  Endowed  by  her  Founder  with  the  inerrant 
faculty  of  “rightly  dividing  the  word  of  truth”  she  fixed  the 
canon  of  Holy  Scripture,1  being  guided  thereto  by  the  Holy 
Spirit.  The  Holy  Scriptures  are  “the  collection  of  books  writ¬ 
ten  by  inspired  men  in  which  the  divine  revelations  are  con¬ 
tained.”5 

(b)  Canon  and  Text  of  Holy  Scripture4 

To  the  24  books,  written  in  Hebrew  and  Aramaic,  of  the 
Hebrew  Canon  were  added  the  books  of  Baruch,  Tobit,  Wis¬ 
dom  of  Solomon,  Ben  Sirach,  and  the  Maccabees.  These  books 
together  with  the  others  in  the  Greek  version  of  the  LXX,  made 
in  the  3d  century  B.  C.,  form  the  Old  Testament  of  the  Ortho¬ 
dox  Church.  As  they  were  regarded  by  the  Fathers — for  ex¬ 
ample,  St.  Athanasius — as  not  quite  on  a  par  with  the  books  of 
the  Jewish  Canon,  and  were  called  by  them  “useful  to  be  read,” 
they  were  included  in  the  councils  of  Hippo  (393)  and  Carth¬ 
age  (397)  as  “deutero-canonical”.  Questions  were  still  raised 
regarding  their  canonicity.,  so  in  later  councils  (post-Beforma- 
tion)  they  were  styled  “good  and  excellent”  yet  lacking  the 
validity  of  the  other  books,  which  only  were  recognized  bv 
such  Fathers  as  St.  Gregory  the  Theologian,  St.  Amphilochios, 
and  St.  John  Damascene.5  The  Xew  Testament  canon  of  the 
Council  of  Laodicea,  (350)  [canon  60]  left  out  the  Apocalypse, 
but  the  subsequent  councils  mentioned  above  (Hippo,  393, 
canon  36,  and  Carthage,  397,  canon  47),  and  the  decrees  of 
the  6th  Ecumenical  Council  decided  on  the  canonicity  of  all 
of  the  books  of  the  Xew  Testament,  including  the  Apocalypse. 

1  Cf.  Rhosse,  op.  ext.,  pp.  24,  56,  489-91,  etc.;  Mesolora,  op  cit.,  vol. 
Ill,  pp.  21-26,  17 ;  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  268,  282,  et  al.  Androutsos,  At 
jSacrets  rijs  'E vuaecos  r.  ’E/c/cA^cr.,  Athens,  1905,  esp.  pp.  22  ff. ;  Monu- 
rnenta  Fidei  Ecclesiae  Orientalis,  Kimmel,  Jena,  1850,  vol.  II; 
'H  'Op065o£os  'EKKXpala,  Nicholas  Ambraze,  Athens,  1902,  pp.  17,  280, 
et.  al.;  also  Lecture  TV,  §  IT.  especially  5. 

2  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  467. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  466. 

4  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  Ill,  pp.  42-49. 

5  For  Council  of  Constantinople,  1675,  cf.  Kimmel,  II,  225;  and 
Kritopoulos’  summary  of  the  Orthodox  position,  ibid.,  pp.  105-6;  in 
extenso,  in  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  I,  pp.  265-361;  so  too  Eugenius  Bulgaris, 
QeoXoyiKov,  §  29, and  Macaire,  Introduction  d  la  theologie,  p.  489  (cf. 
Art  VI  in  B.  C.  P.). 


20 


I— PROLEGOMENA 


Though  the  original  text  of  the  Old  Testament  was  not 
Greek,  yet  the  Septuagint  translation  has  the  same  authority  as 
the  original.  The  LXX  was  the  text  used  by  the  Apostles. 
Moreover  it  had  equal  authority  with  the  original  text  practi¬ 
cally  from  the  time  of  its  translation.  Furthermore,  the  Mas- 
oretic  text  may  not  be  taken  as  a  faithful  transmission  of  the 
Hebrew  original,  as  is  apparent  from  the  critical  study  of  its 
text.1  While  some  Orthodox  theologians  have  attempted  to  as¬ 
sign  a  kind  of  Divine  authority  to  the  LXX  translation,  and 
thereby  have  much  overstated  the  case,2  still  it  is  true  that  the 
Orthodox  Church  treats  the  LXX  as  of  paramount  value,  and 
accords  it  canonical  standing.3  She  has  never  disavowed  the 
careful  work  of1  competent  ecclesiastical  scholars  who  correct 
the  text  of  the  LXX  by  the  Hebrew.  She  does  not  tolerate  any 
translation  of  the  Bible  into  the  current  idiom  of  vernacular 
Greek,  whether  of  the  Old  or  the  New  Testaments.  For  exam¬ 
ple,  the  translation  made  by  Maximus  of  Kallipolis,  revised  and 
published  by  Seraphim  of  Mytilene,  was  banned  by  Gabriel,  the 
Patriarch  of  Constantinople,  in  1704.  The  translation  of  Hil- 
arion  was  condemned  in  1823,  and  the  Holy  Synod  of  Greece 
Sept.  7-9,  1901,  forbade  any  translation  being  made,  sold,  or 
used,  and  excommunicated  any  who  disobeyed.  All  of  the 
translations  into  modern  Greek  made  by  various  Protestant 
bodies,  are  forbidden  to  be  used  by  a  faithful  Orthodox,  as  for 
example,  that  by  Palle.  The  reasons  for  this  attitude  are :  the 
impossibility  of  conveying  the  exact  meaning  of  the  original  in 
a  modern  language  without  the  use  of  paraphrases,  notes,  or 
commentaries;  such  commentaries  and  notes,  even  when  based 
on  good  authorities,  tend  to  be  utterly  misleading;  the  transla¬ 
tions  which  have  appeared  are  crude,  inexact,  and  irreverent; 
any  Greek  who  takes  the  trouble  to  study  can  read  the  original 
texts  without  difficulty;  furthermore,  many  of  the  texts  have 
been  published  for  propaganda  and  proselytizing  purposes,  on 
the  Protestant  principle  of  the  sufficiency  for  salvation  of  the 
Bible  only.4 

^RliOsse,  op.  cit.,  p.  456-6;  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  Ill,  pp.  54-63. 

2  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  6,  note  7. 

3  “It  is  of  the  greatest  ecclesiastical  authority.”  (Mesolora,  op. 
cit.,  III.  p.  63.) 

4  Cf.  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  476-480;  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  6-8,  note  7. 


THE  BIBLE 


21 


(c)  Inspiration  of  the  Bible 

The  writers  of  the  Holy  Scripture  were  men,  “illuminated 
by  the  Holy  Spirit.”1  “Since  the  Holy  Spirit  illuminated 
the  writers  of  the  Holy  Scripture  we  say  that  the  Bible  is  in¬ 
spired. r'2  The  fact  of  inspiration  of  the  Scriptures  is  clear 
from  internal  evidence  of  the  text — cf.  St.  Matt.  5,  17-18;  22, 
43;  Rom.  16,  25-26;  2  St.  Peter  1,  19-21.  All  these  passages 
imply  the  inspiration  of  the  Old  Testament,  and  their  witness 
is  best  summarized  in  2  Tim.  3,  16.  St.  Paul's  conviction 
of  having  the  Spirit  of  God,  and  of  being  taught  by  Him  “com¬ 
paring  spiritual  things  with  spiritual”  (1  Cor.  2,  12-13)  is  evi¬ 
dence  of  the  consciousness  of  inspiration  on  the  part  of  the  writ¬ 
ers  of  the  New  Testament.  Inspiration  means  the  imparting 
of  the  Divine  and  supernatural  truths  to  men  by  the  Holy  Spirit, 
who  gives  grace  to  set  them  down  in  writing  or  to  give  them 
adequate  and  meet  expression.3  The  understanding  of  the 
writer  was  illuminated  and  his  thought  exalted  to  the  fellow¬ 
ship  of  Divine  things,  so  that  the  devout  human  spirit  became 
the  bearer  and  sharer  of  Divine  truths,  receiving  thoughts  and 
ofttimes  even  words,  directly  from  God.4  There  are  different 
degrees  of  inspiration.  Bulgaris  distinguishes  between  inspira¬ 
tion  (eixnvevcns)  “an  internal  energy  operating  in  man’s  mind 
by  which  he  is  divinely  impelled  to  write  or  enact  something 
supernaturally  revealed”,  and  illumination  (^onurpo^)  “the  as¬ 
sistance  and  help  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  guarding  man  from 
error  in  speech  and  writing.”5  So  Rhosse  speaks  of  this  lower 
degree,  the  preservation  from  error  in  writing,  as  being  under 
the  oversight  of  Holy  Spirit,  and  the  higher,  as  that  “whereby 
truths  are  imparted  which  exceed  the  bounds  of  the  finite 
spirit  of  man,  and  which  have  their  origin  only  in  the  Divine 
Revelation.”0 

It  was  because  of  the  inspiration  of  the  various  books  of 

1 Orthodox  Cat.  p.  4;  Conf.  of  Dositheus,  ch.  2,  and  quest.  1,  in 
Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  vol.  1,  pp.  103-4,  120. 

2  Orthodox  Cat.  p.  5,  cf.  Conf.  of  Kritopoulos,  ch.  7. 

3  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  469. 

4  Mesolora  2c/u/3o\t/o7,  III,  p.  38. 

5  Theologikon,  p.  24,  yet  without  the  abrogation  of  man’s  free  will 
or  mental  functioning;  quoted  in  Mesolora,  III,  pp.  38-9,  note  2. 

e  Op.  cit.,  p.  470. 


22 


I.— PROLEGOMENA 


the  Bible  that  they  received  a  place  in  the  Canon.  Canoni- 
city  does  not  depend  upon  the  personality  of  the  writers. 
“Even  if  it  should  be  shown  that  certain  of  the  writings  in 
Holy  Writ  were  not  by  those  holy  men  to  whom  authorship 
has  been  commonly  ascribed,  and  that  they  were  actually  writ¬ 
ten  by  unknown  writers,  the  passages  in  question  would  not 
be  regarded  as  unauthentic."1 2  The  integrity  of  the  Bible  is 
assured  by  reason  of  the  great  care  and  solicitude  with  which 
the  Jews  preserved  the  Old  Testament,  and  the  Christian 
Church  the  Xew  Testament.  Variant  readings  are  never  sig¬ 
nificant,  nor  are  the  minor  errors  which  have  crept  into  the 
text:  for  inspiration  “has  reference  only  to  the  fundamentals 
and  essentials,  and  these  concern  the  revealed  truth  and  dog¬ 
mas  of  the  Faith,  and  the  ethical  teachings."" 

Of  the  fact  of  Inspiration  there  is  no  doubt,  but  there 
is  no  dogmatic  definition  of  its  nature.  It  is  certain,  how¬ 
ever,  that  it  is  not  “literal"  inspiration.  The  personal  pe¬ 
culiarities  and  idiosyncrasies  of  each  writer  are  apparent  every¬ 
where.  There  are  differences  of  style  and  content  in  the 
various  writers,  even  when  they  are  dealing  with  the  same 
subject  matter,  as  St.  John  Chrysostom  and  St.  Jerome  noted.3 
The  fact  of  authorized  translations,  for  example,  and  the  use 
by  St.  Paul  of  the  LXX,  militates  against  the  theory  of  literal 
inspiration.4  Inspiration  was  not  “ecstasy".  Plato,  follow¬ 
ing  Greek  theories  of  inspiration,  such  as  those  of  the  oracles, 
mystery  cults,  and  the  like,  regards  it  as  consisting  of  a  passive 
and  automatic  surrender  to  the  direction  of  the  Spirit.  So  did 
some  of  the  early  apologists,  for  example,  St.  Justin  Martyr, 
who  said  that  the  inspired  men  were  “as  harps  under  the  energy 
of  the  Holy  Spirit",  and  Athenagoras,  “as  a  flute  in  the  hands 
of  a  flute  player".  This  view  developed  into  heresy  when 
Montanism  claimed  this  type  of  inspiration,  and  held  that  it 
was  the  same  as  that  under  which  the  writers  of  Holy  Scrip¬ 
ture  had  written :  “as  passive  instruments’’  of  the  Holy  Spirit. 
The  Fathers  rejected  this  view  and  combated  it  strenously, — 

1  Kliosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  46S. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  469. 

3E.  g.,  St.  Jerome  on  Gal.  6,  I. 

4  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  4-5. 


THE  BIBLE 


23 


Miltiades,  Clem.  Alex.,  Athanasius,  Basil,  Chrysostom,  and 
Epiphanius.  Inspiration  was  "the  imparting  of  conceptions 
and  truths  which  the  holy  writers  could  not  have  discovered  by 
means  of  unaided  human  spirit1  ...  It  did  not  preclude  the 
exercise  of  the  faculties  of  an  individual,  and  cannot  be  under¬ 
stood  as  ecstatic  rapture,  with  its  loss  of  self-consciousness  and 
self-direction”.2 3  It  was  not  "automatic  writing”  at  the  dicta¬ 
tion  of  the  Holy  Spirit. 

Closely  akin  to  the  view  of  inspiration  as  ecstasy  or  rap¬ 
ture,  is  that  of  the  "rationalists”,  who  hold  that  it  was  simply 
subjective,  a  result  of  a  heightened  degree  of  faith,8  and  that 
the  content  of  revelation,  being  shown  by  reason,  "the  critic 
and  judge  of  the  truths  of  revelation,”4  to  abound  in  errors, 
reason  should  pass  on  what  purports  to  be  revelation,  selecting 
what  is  good  and  rejecting  what  is  valueless.  There  can  be 
then  nothing  supernatural  in  the  content  of  Holy  Writ,  and  its 
"inspiration”  is  merely  the  subjective  illusion  of  the  writers. 
Whatever  good  there  is  in  it  is  solely  of  human  origin.  When 
human  reason  is  at  its  highest  and  noblest,  and  functions  with 
its  clearest  insight,  it  may  he  called  "inspiration”.5  This  view  is 
untenable,  since  it  denies  the  possibility  of  supernatural  revela¬ 
tion,  and  puts  reason  above  faith  as  the  means  of  apprehending 
religious  truth.6 * 

The  definition  of  inspiration  which  limits  its  range  to  the 
dogmatic  and  ethical  content  of  Holy  Scripture,  is  also  unsatis¬ 
factory.  Such  a  view  of  inspiration  divides  the  IIolv  Scrip¬ 
tures  into  two  parts — human  and  divine;  but  as  there  is  no  way 
of  deciding  where  one  begins  and  the  other  leaves  off,  the  way 
is  left  open  for  a  purely  rationalistic  conception  of  inspiration, 
making  reason  the  arbiter  and  judge  over  the  content  of  revela- 

1  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  470,  472. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  473;  cf.  Bulgaria  in  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  p.  38,  note  2. 

3  Mesolora,  ibid.,  Ill,  p.  36,  note  3. 

4  Ambraze,  op.  cit.,  p.  191. 

5  Mesolora,  III,  p.  4,  note  2,  and  p.  36-7.  RhOsse,  (op.  cit.,  p.  451, 
note  2)  prefers  u\oyo<ppoavvT]''  for  ‘‘rationalism”,  to  the  usual  word, 

‘‘  opOoXoy  iff  /jlos'’  . 

0  Additional  note  A,  The  Relation  between  Faith  and  Knowledge , 

pp.  45-49,  ff. 


24 


I.— PROLEGOMENA 


tion.1  This  view  logically  leads  to  the  preceding  one,  which  is 
absolutely  incompatible  with  the  Orthodox  position. 

The  Orthodox  view  of  inspiration  involves  these  elements: 
(a)  the  illumination  of  the  writer  by  the  Holy  Spirit,  for  the 
purpose  of  (b)  imparting  religious  or  ethical  truths,  (c)  not 
within  the  range  of  discovery  by  ordinary  human  faculties,  (d) 
together  with  the  grace  adequately  to  set  these  down  in  writing, 
and  (e)  protection  from  error  and  mistake  in  fundamental  and 
significant  matters,  (f)  with  due  regard  for  individuality  and 
the  fullest  exercise  of  all  human  faculties.2  As  internal  proofs 
of  the  Revelation  contained  in  Holy  Writ  imparted  by  the 
Holy  Spirit  inspiring  the  writers,  Mesolora  cites  the  following: 
(a)  the  dogmatic  content  of  Holy  Scripture,  with  its  supernat¬ 
ural  truths  about  God,  creation,  redemption,  salvation,  and  the 
like,  (b)  the  lofty  ethical  content  of  the  Holy  Scriptures,  (c) 
the  subject  matter,  substance,  and  manner  of  construction  of 
Holy  Writ,  as,  for  example,  the  relation  of  prophecy  to  fulfill¬ 
ment,  of  type  to  anti-type,  and  the  like;  (d)  the  reception  of 
it  by  mankind,  the  tremendous  value  put  upon  it  in  the  estima¬ 
tion  of  men,  and  its  effect  on  human  life.3 

(d)  Biblical  Teaching  in  Relation  to  Dogma 

Since  the  Bible  cannot  be  understood  by  itself,  and  the  only 
adequate  test  for  its  interpretation  is  the  standard  of  the 
Church’s  teachings,  it  follows  that  it  may  not  be  used  by  each 
individual  as  a  store  house  from  which  to  derive  any  doctrine 
which  he  seeks  to  find  in  it,  and  which  may  commend  itself 
to  him.  It  must  be  read  in  the  light  of  the  living  teaching  of 
the  Church.  The  rule  of  interpretation  is  the  “mind  of  the 
Church/’4  the  secundum  ecclesiastici  et  catholici  sensus  normam 
of  St.  Vincent  of  Lerins.5  The  Confession  of  Dositheus  expli- 

1  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  5. 

2  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  III.  pp.  36-38;  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  468-473;  Am- 
braze,  op.  cit.,  pp.  190-191;  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p  5. — “God  the  Holy 
Spirit  speaks  in  Holy  Scripture,  and  there  is  no  falsehood  nor  con¬ 
tradiction  in  it.” 

3  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  III.  pp.  39-40. 

4  Hippolytus,  in  Euseb.  Hist.  E.,  V,  28. 

5  Commonitorium,  2.  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  III.  pp.  49-54.  On  the  im¬ 
portance  of  St.  Vincent’s  Canon  according  to  Orthodox  opinion,  cf.  Pal- 
mieri,  II  Progresso  Dommatico,  pp.  255-274. 


(2)  TRADITION 


o-. 

— » * 


citly  states  that  Holy  Scripture  is  to  be  understood  “not  other¬ 
wise  than  as  the  Catholic  Church  has  interpreted  and  trans¬ 
mitted  it”.1  Any  other  standard  than  this  would  subvert  the 
constitution  of  the  Church,  and  make  her  essential  'teachings 
subject  to  the  exegetical  and  hermeneutic  whims  of  the  day.2 
For  “as  it  is  One  and  the  selfsame  Holy  Spirit  who  is  the  Author 
of  both,  it  is  the  same  whether  one  he  taught  by  the  Bible  or 
by  the  Catholic  Church”.3 

6.  (2)  TRADITION: 

(a)  Origin  and  Relation  to  Bible 

Since  the  Bible  takes  for  granted  the  existence  of  oral  tradi¬ 
tion,  and  there  is  “no  evidence  that  the  Apostles  wrote  all  that 
was  necessary  for  the  Faithful  to  know,  or  all  that  they  taught 
them  by  word  of  mouth,  or  that  their  written  words  should  be 
the  sole  canon  of  Christian  faith  and  life,"4  we  find  that  in  the 
earliest  times  the  oral  tradition  held  a  unique  place  in  Christian 
teaching."  For  more  than  twenty  years  the  Church  had  no 
written  New  Testament,  and  “Tradition  was  the  standard  of 
faith  first  in  time  as  well  as  in  importance."6  When  converts 
were  made  they  were  not  sent  to  study  from  a  book,  but  given 
instruction  by  word  of  mouth.7  The  Church  taught  them  her¬ 
self,  pointing  to  the  Bible  for  corroboration  of  her  teaching  when 
such  a  course  would  aid  in  clearing  up  difficulties,  or  explain  her 
tradition.  Her  tradition  of  teaching  was  passed  down  from 
generation  to  generation,  but  it  did  not  at  first  have  a  systematic 
form.  When  first  a  formulation  was  made  it  was  as  a  corporate 
witness  of  the  mind  of  the  Church,  and  an  evidence  of  the  com¬ 
mon  faith  of  communities  of  Christians  scattered  in  different 

1  Cf.  proceedings  of  the  Council  of  Jerusalem,  Mesolora,  IT,  pp. 
01-88.  ch.  2  of  Dositheus,  ibid.,  11,  p.  103. 

2  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  474. 

3  Rhosse,  ibid.,  p.  475. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  481. 

5  Ibid.,  p.  58,  note  1;  Cf.  Orth.  Cat.  pp.  6-7. 

6  Rhosse,  ibid.,  p.  481,  and  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  Ill,  pp.  63-77. 

7  For  an  illustration  of  this  method  and  its  developments,  cf.  the 
History  of  the  Catechetical  School  of  Alexandria,  P.  M.  Papadopoulos 
To  iv  tt)  dpxa.ia  oiKov/ieviKTi  'E/c/cX^oda  Kparpaav  KarrixVTlKOr  Si'arTj/ia ; 
Papadoupoulos,  '0  "A710S  Ato^i'crtos  6  Me^as,  Alexandria,  1918, 


26 


I.— PROLEGOMENA 


localities.  Their  common  agreement  was  a  testimony  to  a 
common  tradition  received  unchanged  from  the  past.  Such  an 
early  formulation  of  the  content  of  Tradition  in  relation  to  the 
dogmas  of  the  Faith  is  embodied  in  the  Roman  baptismal 
formula,  the  so-called  Apostles’  Creed.  Other  typical  examples 
are  to  be  found  in  St.  Irenaeus,  adv.  Haer.  1,  1,  10 ;  Tertullian, 
De  virg.  vel.  1;  de  praescrip.  liner ;  13;  adv.  Prnx.  c.  2;  and 
Origen,  De  principiis,  4  and  5. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  New  Testament  itself  is  the  first 
example  of  the  same  type  of  formulated  oral  teaching.  The 
construction  of  the  synoptics,  the  character  of  the  epistles,  and 
the  Church’s  seal  upon  the  whole  collection,  demonstrate  the  first 
codification  of  oral  into  written  teaching.1 *  It  was  first  in  time, 
the  prototype  of  other  formulation  of  the  teaching  of  the  Church, 
and  in  this  sense  may  be  called  the  first  canon  of  faith.  But  oral 
Tradition,  wider,  fuller,  and  earlier  than  the  written  word,  the 
Tradition  “written  not  with  pen  and  ink  upon  parchment  but  in 
the  hearts  of  the  Faithful  by  the  holy  Spirit,  may  more  properly 
be  called  the  first  canon  of  Faith.”' 

Since  every  true  revelation  lias  as  one  of  its  essential  charac¬ 
teristics  the  note  of  gradual  development,  we  may  expect  to  find 
progressive  development  when  we  investigate  the  history  of 
Tradition.  The  principle  of  development3  is  as  fully  present  in 
the  New  Testament  as  it  is  in  later  formulations  of  Christian 
teaching.  Under  the  guidance  of  the  Holy  Spirit  the  teaching 
of  our  Lord  set  down  in  the  Gospels  is  developed  and  unfolded 
in  the  Epistles.  The  same  Spirit  who  should  “lead  them  into 
all  truth”  is  He  who  directed  and  guided  the  further  develop¬ 
ments  of  Christian  doctrine  in  Holy  Tradition.  “As  proceeding 
from  the  One  and  same  Divine  Spirit,  there  appears  in  a  differ¬ 
ent  form,  more  or  less  amplified,  one  and  the  same  Gospel.  There 
is  consequently  no  essential  difference,  but  solely  a  superficial 
one”4  between  Gospels  and  Epistles,  and  between  the  New  Testa- 


1  Rhosse,  Aoy/xaTiKTi,  p.  483. 

-Ibid.,  pp.  57,  485 — cf.  St.  Irenaeus,  adv.  Haer.  III.  3;  “The  Holy 
Scriptures  are  the  first  written  formulation  of  Tradition”. 

3  On  which,  cf.  subsequent  section,  pp.  35-45,  “Faith  and  Reason 
in  relation  to  Dogma.” 

*  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  484. 


(2)  TRADITION 


27 


ment  and  Christian  Tradition.  The  continuity  of  a  stable  and 
unswerving  Tradition,  varying  its  form  with  the  ages,  at  once 
preserves  the  Church  from  heresy,  false  doctrine,  and  novel  opin¬ 
ions,  and  also  presents  a  living  and  vital  interpretation,  charac¬ 
terized  by  insight  and  complete  understanding  of  the  content 
of  Holv  Writ.1 2 " 

(b)  Content  and  Formulation  of  Tradition 

Of  this  Tradition  which  forms  a  continuous  chain  from  the 
Apostles  to  the  end  of  time,  the  Scriptures  form  the  first  link  of 
its  written  and  formulated  expression.*  Scripture  and  Tradition 
are  one  in  orgin,  since  the  Holy  Spirit  is  Author  of  both ;  one  in 
content,  since  they  teach  the  same  faith ;  and  one  in  essence, 
since  they  are  substantially  the  same  identical  entity.  From  the 
time  of  the  earliest  heresies,  of  the  Gnostics,  Monarch ians, 
Sabellians,  Arians,  Pelagians,  and  Nestorians,  to  those  of  the 
present  day,  heresies  have  attempted  to  found  their  divergent 
interpretations  of  Christian  truth  on  the  word  of  Holy 
Scripture.  The  Bible,  being  so  intimately  bound  up  with  Tra¬ 
dition,  if  it  be  rightly  interpreted  by  it,  presents  one  single  true 
conception,  in  any  given  case.3  Thus  Tradition  is  the  protection 
and  shield  for  the  true  interpretation  of  Holy  Writ.  Heretics, 
in  consequence,  cast  Tradition  aside.  “Though  the  two  sources 
of  dogma  may  be  logically  defined  and  distinguished,  yet  they 
cannot  be  separated  from  each  other,  nor  from  the  Church”.4  As 
Tradition  is  essential  to  the  right  interpretation  of  Holy  Writ, 
so  is  Holy  Writ  essential  as  a  proper  criterion  to  determine  the 
value  and  weight  of  any  specific  Tradition.5 

The  formulation  of  Christian  doctrine  from  the  Bible  to  the 
present  day  is  the  work  of  the  Church.  She  possesses  the  Holy 
Spirit  and  is  an  infallible  teacher,  as  well  as  the  mouthpiece  and 
organ  of  His  expression.  What  she  defines  is  the  same  Faith  as 

1  Rliosse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  486-488.  Cf.  Gavin,  The  Greek  Ortho¬ 
dox  Church  and  Biblical  Criticism,  in  The  Christian  East,  December 
1922  (vol.  Ill,  no.  4),  pp.  162-172. 

2  Rhosse,  ibid.,  p.  485. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  488. 

4  Ibid.,  p.  59. 

5  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  7. 


28 


I.— PROLEGOMENA 


she  has  always  taught,  formulated  with  a  view  to  some  contin¬ 
gency  or  emergency,  usually  the  attacks  of  heretics  on  a  cardinal 
doctrine  of  that  Faith.  Her  act  of  definition  or  formulation  is 
only  the  expression  of  her  mind,  not  the  creation  of  a  new  doc¬ 
trine.  Universality1  is  the  great  test:  quod  apud  multos  invenitur 
unum,  non  est  erratum  sed  traditun,  in  the  words  of  Tertul- 
lian.2  This  is  the  Orthodox  definition  of  the  canon  of  St.  Vincent : 
quod  semper,  quod  ubique,  quod  ah  omnibus  creditum  est.  Rep¬ 
resentative  universality  and  consent  are  all  that  is  necessary,  not 
a  numerical  majority.3  Consequently,  all  the  definitions,  de¬ 
crees,  confessions,  and  formulations  of  the  Church  from  the 
earliest  days  until  now  form  the  content  of  the  Faith  for  an 
Orthodox  Churchman.  Such  include:4  (1)  the  Creeds — the 
Mceno-Constantinopolitan  (without  the  Filioque  clause),  which 
alone  has  a  place  in  the  Orthodox  Liturgy  and  service  books,  the 
Apostles’  Creed,  that  of  St.  Gregory  of  Neocaesarea,  and  that 
of  St.  Athanasius  (given  place  in  an  appendix  to  the 
’EvyoAoytov)  ;  (2)  the  decrees  and  canons  of  the  Ecumenical 
Councils,  and  all  the  definitions  and  formularies  of  the  Undi¬ 
vided  Church;  (3)  decrees  of  councils  and  synods  subsequent 
to  the  separation  of  the  Eastern  and  Western  Churches,  espe¬ 
cially  those  held  since  the  Reformation5 — Jassy,  1638,  Constanti¬ 
nople,  1672,  Jerusalem,  1672  ;  (4)  the  Orthodox  Confessions, 
such  as  that  of  Peter  of  Mogila,  Metropolitan  of  Ivieff,  examined, 
edited,  and  ratified  by  a  committee  of  Greek  and  Russian 
theologians  and  published  with  the  imprimatur  of  four  Eastern 
Patriarchs;  (5)  Encyclicals  and  synodical  letters — such  as  those 
of  the  Patriarch  Jeremiah  II  to  the  Tubingen  theologians, 
Kroustos  and  Andreas  (1570;  the  Encyclical  of  the  Or¬ 
thodox  Church,  published  by  the  Patriarchs  in  the  year  1848; 
that  On  Unit y  and  the  State  of  the  Autocephalous  Churches  of 
the  East,  published  by  all  of  them  in  1902;  (6)  the  authorized 

1  On  the  relation  of  Tradition  to  the  Church,  cf.  Mesolora,  op.  cit., 
III.  pp.  63-67. 

2  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  10-11. 

3  Ibid.,  pp.  10-15. 

4  Cf.  Palmieri,  Theologia  Dogmatica  Orthodoxa,  vol.  1.  (Prolego¬ 
mena),  pp.  138-183,  267-660. 

5  For  a  fuller  discussion  of  all  the  later  sources,  cf.  Lecture  IV,  pp. 
206-218  following. 


(2)  TRADITION 


29 


Catechisms  of  the  Eastern  Church,  such  as  those  of  Kephala 
(1899)  and  D.  S.  Balanos,  published  in  1920. 1 

“The  full  Tradition  of  the  true  Catholic  Church  contains 
not  only  the  decrees  of  the  Ecumenical  Synods,  but  also 
those  dogmas  which  had  not  encountered  the  opposition  of 
heretical  teaching  in  the  ancient  Catholic  Church  previous  to 
the  Schism,  but  which  were  potentially  and  essentially  part  of 
the  genuine  and  full  Tradition,  and,  though  not  formulated  in 
local  or  ecumenical  synods  before  the  Schism,  were  after¬ 
wards  defined  in  the  Holy  Synods  of  the  Eastern  Church  from 
the  16th  century  on.  .  .  These  have  authority  and  binding 
force  upon  every  true  member  of  the  Orthodox  Catholic 
Church.’"2  If  such  dogmatic  decrees  are  not  to  be  counted  as 
binding,3  then  “all  dogmatic  character  is  removed  from  the 
teaching  of  the  Orthodox  Church  on  such  points  as  the  au- 


1  All  are  treated  and  discussed  in  Androutsos’  Zc/qSoXi/cTj,  given  in 
Mesolora’s  2vg.f3o\u<ri,  vol.  I.  and  II.;  in  Monumenta  Fidei  Ecclesiae 
Orientalis,  Kimmel ;  cf.  Ambraze,  'II  opdodo^os  'E/c/cX^crta,  etc. 
p.  16-19;  Androutsos'  essay  on  the  ‘‘Basis  of  Reunion”;  Rhosse, 
Ge/LteXtwSets'  8oyp.arLKal  ’A pycu  TV$  '0 pdodo^ov  ’A varo\LKrjs  ’E/c/cX^crtas  and  his 
report  to  the  Holy  Synod,  1874. 

2  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  59. 

3  Older  writers,  such  as  e.  g.,  Mesolora,  do  not  seem  quite  to  follow 
this  course  of  reasoning  to  this  conclusion.  Mesolora  distinguishes 
apostolic  from  ecclesiastical  tradition.  The  former  is  the  “tradition 
not  written  in  the  Gospels,  which  completes  and  develops  the  teach¬ 
ing  of  Our  Lord”,  which  he  further  subdivides.  The  latter,  “ecclesi¬ 
astical  tradition,  is  the  teaching  of  Our  Saviour  and  His  Apostles 
as  expounded,  developed,  and  defined  officially  and  unanimously  by 
the  Fathers  of  the  One  Catholic  Church  in  ecumenical  synods”  (III. 
op.  cit.,  pp.  69-70).  Tradition  has  equal  weight  with  the  Bible,  for 
the  ecumenical  synods  so  regarded  it  (ibid,  p.  76).  The  Bible  is 
“the  first  source  and  canon  of  true  religious  knowledge”  (ibid.,  p. 
35),  and  Tradition  is  the  second  (ibid.,  p.  65).  Yet  he  seems  to  im¬ 
ply  that  the  Vincentian  standard  of  universality,  antiquity,  and  con¬ 
sent  is  applicable  only  to  the  decrees  of  the  Undivided  Church,  out  of 
the  whole  content  of  Orthodox  Tradition  (ibid.,  pp.  63-64  and  p.  71, 
note  2,  pp.  75-76).  So  the  canons  of  the  seven  ecumenical  coun¬ 
cils,  together  with  the  Bible,  form  the  double  source  of  authorized 
Orthodox  dogma.  “Subsequent  formulations  have  not  the  obligatory 
character  of  the  creed  and  the  decrees  of  the  seven  ecunemical  coun¬ 
cils”,  but  only  illustrative  and  secondary  value  (vol.  I.  pp.  12-13).  For 
a  fuller  discussion,  compare  Lecture  IV.  pp.  206-218. 


30 


I.— PROLEGOMENA 


thenticity  of  the  Church,  the  Seven  Sacraments,  the  doctrine  of 
Justification”,1  and  the  way  will  be  left  open  for  proselytism  of 
the  Orthodox. 

7.  FAITH  AND  REASON 

(1)  In  Relation  to  Religion 

The  theory  of  Revelation  stated  above,  as  well  as  that  of 
biblical  inspiration,  involves  the  interrelation  and  interaction  of 
two  elements — faith  and  knowledge.  Certain  facts  belong  to 
the  domain  of  knowledge  and  are  within  the  range  of  human 
experience.  These  form  the  material  of  science.  Philosophy 
develops  its  speculations  and  inductions  by  means  of  the  data 
of  experience  and  by  the  use  of  the  reason.  Ideas  based  upon 
experience,  developed  by  the  exercise  of  reason,  compared,  cor¬ 
related  and  arranged  into  order  and  form,  constitute  the  ma¬ 
terial  of  philosophy.  But  theology  claims  as  its  sphere  a  field 
which  includes  the  data  of  man’s  experience  and  thinking,  yet 
the  peculiar  content  of  which  is  neither  attributable  alone  to 
human  experience  as  such,  nor  based  ultimately  upon  the  con¬ 
clusions  of  human  thought,  it  is  constituted  of  material  of¬ 
fered  and  presented,  as  it  were,  from  without  the  circumscribed 
area  of  purely  human  experience  and  reasoning,  imparted  to 
man  through  the  inspiration  the  Holy  Spirit,  and  guaranteed 
and  validated  by  phenomena  in  the  external  world  of  experience, 
called  miracles.  Thus  Revelation  transcends  and  extends  be¬ 
yond  human  experience  which  furnishes  the  data  for  the  physh 
cal  sciences,  and  human  thought,  which,  operating  on  the  data 
of  experience,  evolves  a  system  of  ideas  which  form  a  philosophy. 
The  content  of  Revelation  stands  in  the  same  relation  both  to 
human  experience  and  human  thinking:  what  it  offers  us  is  not 
within  the  scope  of  the  circumscribed  range  of  ordinary  human 
powers.2 

1  Rhosse,  ibid.,  note  1,  pp.  59-60,  q.  v.  Androutsos  gives:  ‘‘Dogmatic 
decrees  of  the  ecumenical  councils,  and  the  creed;  and  the  decrees  of 
local  synods  ratified  by  ecumenical  synods;  as  secondary  authorities: 
all  presentations  of  the  faith  made  in  local  synods,  which  agree  with 
Church  teaching, — such  as  the  “symbolic  books’’  on  the  occasion  of  the 
Calvinistic  confession  of  Lucar,  among  which  are  conspicuous  the 
Confession  of  Dositheus ”  (p.  20)  ;  cf.  Sect.  5  of  his  Introduction. 

1  Rhosse,  pp.  36-38,  39-44. 


FAITH  AND  REASON 


31 


In  both  science  and  philosophy,  human  reason  is  the  organ 
for  the  appropriation,  investigation,  and  codification  of  the  data. 
Experience  is  codified  into  conclusions,  and  conclusions  are 
correlated  and  developed  into  a  philosophic  system.  But  any 
philosophic  system  makes  certain  assumptions,  just  as  certainly 
as  does  any  science — geometry,  mathematics,  physics,  or 
chemistry.  Such  axioms,  or  truths  assumed  without  proof  or 
demonstration,  are  fundamentally  dogmatic  in  character.  They 
are  not  demonstrated,  yet  they  are  fundamental.  They  are 
essentially  dogmas,  whether  in  the  domain  of  science  or  philoso- 
phy,  and  they  are  vital  dogmas.  Every  philosophical  system 
assumes,  for  example,  the  validity  of  human  reason.  Even 
Pyrrhonism,  while  it  denies  this  axiom,  is  as  essentially  dog¬ 
matic  in  its  denial  of  this  principle,  as  all  other  systems  are 
in  affirming  it.  It  is  no  less  dogmatic  to  say  “the  human  mind 
cannot  know  anything”  than  to  assert  the  opposite,  for  the  two 
positions  have  in  common  the  idea  of  knowing,  and  the  fact  of 
something  to  be  known.  “Every  system  of  philosophy  which 
accepts  the  possibility  of  knowledge  has  therefore  a  certain 
dogmatic  character.”2  In  this  connection  Origen  observed  the 
necessity  of  faith  in  the  possibility  of  knowing  and  in  the  va¬ 
lidity  of  human  reason,  as  an  essential  pre-requisite  of  any  sys¬ 
tem  of  philosophy.8 

So,  in  a  sense,  philosophy  and  theology  have  a  history  which 
presents  common,  analogous,  and  parallel  features.  Philo¬ 
sophical  speculation  is  reflected  in  theological  thought,  which  in 
its  turn  follows  a  similar  course  of  development.  The  alternate 
phases  of  aprioristic  reasoning,  empiricism,  and  materialism 
have  parallels  in  the  history  of  theological  speculation.4  There 
is,  however,  a  fundamental  difference  between  the  history  of 
Christian  dogmatic  theology,  and  that  of  speculative  philosophy.5 

1  Rh6sse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  44-47. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  48. 

3  Contra  Cel-sum,  1,  10,  11. 

4  Rh6sse,  pp.  50-55.  On  this  topic,  cf.  Palmieri,  op.  cit.,  I,  pp.  252-266. 

5  RhOsse,  op.  cit.,  p.  63.  (in  note)  “Christianity  was  destined  to 
accomplish  a  much  loftier  achievement  than  philosophy  .  .  .  both 
from  the  religious  and  ethical,  as  well  as  from  the  intellectual  point  of 
view  .  .The  Gospel  contained  in  essence  from  the  beginning  .  .  . 
everything  that  was  to  be  developed  and  formulated  from  it  in  time 
to  come  .  .  .  without  change  in  its  substance”  (and  cf.  p.  64). 


32 


I.— PROLEGOMENA 


Philosophy  has  changed,  abrogated,  alternated,  and  discarded 
its  systems.  In  each  such  case  there  was  an  evolution,  not  a 
development — a  creation  of  a  fundamentally  and  essentially 
different  type,  resting  on  different  premises  and  developing  dif¬ 
ferent  conclusions.  In  Christian  thought,  on  the  contrary, 
there  was  undoubtedly  a  development,  but  no  evolution,  in  the 
sense  of  the  emergence  of  an  essentially  different  type.  While 
a  given  philosophical  system  rests  on  the  dogmas  of  its  founder, 
it  is  destroyed  when  their  authority  is  questioned  and  denied. 
The  data  of  Christian  theology  are  the  content  of  the  teaching 
of  its  Founder,  the  Incarnate  God,  and  His  authority  is  always 
accepted  and  affirmed.1  Consequently  the  development  of 
Christian  theology  is  a  fact,  while  the  evolution  of  its  content 
is  an  impossibility,  for  it  remains  the  same  “faith  once  for  all 
delivered  to  the  Saints, 51  once  for  all  claiming  the  constant 
allegiance  of  all  true  followers  of  Him.2 

Faith  is  the  means  to  the  knowledge  of  the  revelation  of 
supernatural  truth  in  Jesus  Christ.3  It  is  the  point  of  de¬ 
parture  for  a  type  and  kind  of  knowledge  which  would  other¬ 
wise  not  be  available  to  man.  “Faith  comes  from  hearing  and 
hearing  by  (through)  the  word  of  God."4  It  may  be  then 
defined  as  “the  assent  of  man,  generated  on  the  basis  of  their 
authenticity,  to  the  truths  of  the  teaching  of  the  Christian  Re¬ 
ligion,  and  the  Divinity  of  Christ. ’’5 6 *  It  is  based  on  the 
reasonableness,  probability,  and  validity  of  these  claims,  for  all 
the  truths  of  Christianity  are  founded  on  the  authenticity  of 
God's  own  word.8  Faith  then  lias  in  this  respect  a  totally  differ¬ 
ent  foundation  from  that  of  human  reason.  It  has  an  objective 
and  external  basis,  independent  and  outside  of  man  himself. 
Reason  leads  man  outside  of  himself  to  appropriate  the  content 
of  Revelation  through  faith.  Faith  will  never  change  into 
knowledge,  for  the  basis  of  it  always  remains  something  es- 


1  Rhosse,  p.  50. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  54. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  70. 

4  Rom.  10,  17. 

5Rh6sse,  p.  66,  and  on  knowledge,  p.  133. 

6  “Reason  is  the  organ,  not  the  source”  of  Religious  Truth, — Meso- 

lora,  op.  cit.,  III.  p.  81. 


FAITH  AND  REASON 


33 


sentially  outside  the  range  and  origination  of  human  specula¬ 
tion — the  authenticity  of  God’s  own  word.1 

The  Fathers  have  always  asserted  this  relation  of  Faith  to 
knowledge.  It  is  indispensable,  for  fides  praecedit  intellectual 
.  .  .  credo  ut  intelligam,  as  St.  Augustine  says.  “Faith 
under  the  influence  of  reason  disposes  (lit.  “pulls  along”)  the 
soul  to  consent.”2  “Neither  faith  without  reason,  nor  reason 
without  faith  would  be  of  any  value:  faith  leads  reason,  and 
reason  follows  faith.  ...  It  is  necessary  first  to  believe, 
thereafter  to  know/'3  Faith  is  then,  in  the  first  instancce, 
a  means  to  knowledge.  It  is  essentially  a  moral  and  spiritual 
matter,  not  simply  an  activity  of  the  intellect.  It  primarily  con¬ 
cerns  the  will,  which  in  turn  is  induced  to  choose  its  path  on  the 
basis  of  probability.  Keason  furnishes  the  motive  power  whereby 
the  will  accepts  and  consents  to  the  objective  validity  of  the  Reve¬ 
lation  given  by  God,  as  possessing  His  authenticity  and  guaran¬ 
tee.  The  assent  of  the  will  makes  a  man  capable  of  acquiring 
knowledge.  Experiment  follows  this  state  of  the  soul,  and  con¬ 
viction  ensues  upon  such  experiment.  “Only  through  experience 
can  the  soul  of  man  be  made  receptive  for  truth.”4  His  under¬ 
standing  digests  the  material  made  available  to  his  experience. 


1  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  12-13.  “Most  of  the  dogmas  become  ac¬ 
cessible  to  the  human  reason  through  different  arguments,  showing 
their  plausibility  and  logical  coherence,  their  practical  religious  and 
ethical  value,  and  their  application  to  our  needs.  So  human  reason 
was  early  recognized  as  a  necessary  and  indispensable  help”  {ibid., 
p.  19).  On  relation  of  faith  and  knowledge  in  regard  to  the  Being 
and  Existence  of  God,  cf.  ibid.,  pp.  34-41.  But  Dyobouniotes  says 
('II  ±oyp.  ’A vSp.  Kpiv .,  pp.  6-7):  “Faith  must  be  elevated  into  knowl¬ 
edge.  Thus  says  Rhosse  in  his  Dogmatic,  thus  teach  the  Holy  Scrip¬ 
tures  and  the  Fathers  of  the  Church,  and  thus  demands  the  logical 
constitution  of  man’s  mind  .  .  .  Man  as  a  logical  entity  tends  from 
h is  nature  to  lift  faith  into  knowledge,  and  the  denial  of  this  resolu¬ 
tion  of  faith  entirely  into  knowledge  is  a  denial  of  the  logical  character 
of  man.” — on  Androutsos’  answer,  cf.  his  A oy/j.aTiKai  MeXe'rat,  A',  pp.  13-21 
and  the  note  at  end  of  this  Lecture  on  “The  Relation  between  Faith  and 
Knowledge”,  pp.  46-49. 

2  St.  Basil,  on  Ps.  116,  1. 

3  Theodoret,  quoted  in  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  17;  Rhosse,  op. 
cit.,  pp.  70-72,  and  note. 

*  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  69. 


34 


I.— PROLEGOMENA 


While  faith  never  changes  into  knowledge,1  yet  it  is  the  means 
of  knowledge.  It  is  an  act  of  the  will  inclining  toward  the  ac¬ 
ceptance  of  the  divinely  guaranteed  revelation  made  by  God,  and 
makes  possible  an  ever  developing  progress  in  knowledge.  It 
never  loses  its  character  of  faith,  for  the  foundation  of  the  ob¬ 
jective  guarantee  of  God’s  revelation  never  serves  as  a  scaffolding 
for  another  foundation.  It  is  always  essentially  a  moral  and 
spiritual  fact,  and  never  declines  to  the  level  of  ithe  merely 
rational.  Nevertheless,  through  it  man  is  so  disposed  as  to  be 
capable  of  experiences  of  a  more  than  simply  rational  order,  and 
the  resulting  experience  brings  certainty.  Religious  certainty 
is  actually,  and  in  practice,  an  inductive  process,  as  it  is  in¬ 
evitably  bound  up  with  the  experience  of  the  Christian  life  in 
the  Church.2  The  types  of  certainty  which  follow  the  practice 
of  the  Christian  religion  may  be  considered  under  their  (a)  ob¬ 
jective  and  (b)  subjective  aspects. 

(a)  The  objective  certainty  which  is  generated  in  the 
practice  of  the  Christian  Religion  is  a  conviction  “of  Christianity 
as  religious  and  ethical  truth  founded  upon  the  authenticity  of 
the  Church.”3  It  is  the  reflection  of  experience  and  reason  on 
the  weight  of  the  evidence  of  the  Church’s  history,  of  her  claims, 
of  her  doctrines  as  being  one  with  those  of  her  Master,  and  as 
the  result  of  this,  the  redoubled  force  of  these  claims  in  the  case 
of  the  individual.4  Furthermore,  it  is  not  only  as  religious  and 
ethical  truth  that  the  individual  perceives  the  force  of  the 
Church’s  teaching,  but  also  as  power  and  life.  Christianity 
is  not  only  the  Truth,  but  also  dynamic  and  vital  contact  with 
God.  The  Church  is  the  means  of  the  dissemination  of  super¬ 
natural  truth,  the  gigantic  unit  transmitting  and  communicat¬ 
ing  power,  and  the  living  organism  begetting  life.5 

(b)  In  his  own  life  the  Christian  comes  to  realize  these  facts 
as  something  not  outside  himself,  but  as  intimately  connected 
with  him.  Experience  of  the  Christian  life  generates  the  con- 

1  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  12-14  and  the  controversy  between  him 
and  Dyobouniotes,  particularly  Androutsos’  response  and  exposition 
of  his  position,  in  koyfiarucai  MeXerat,  A’,  Athens,  1907,  pp.  8-18. 

2Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  72-73. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  73. 

*Ibid.,  pp.  74-77. 

8Rh6sse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  78-9. 


FAITH  AND  REASON 


35 


vietion  of  the  truth  and  living  power  of  Christianity  in  his  own 
case.  It  shows  the  practicability  and  necessity  of  all  the  dogmas 
of  the  Church  and  their  application  to  the  needs  of  his  every  day 
experiences.1  “Spiritual  experience”  and  “personal  religion” 
prove  to  him  the  claim  of  the  Church  as  the  means  by  which  they 
are  made  available  to  him.  His  appropriation  of  the  means  of 
Grace^  the  teaching  of  the  Church;  and  the  discipline  and  stand¬ 
ards  of  life  she  inspires,  bring  him  to  a  realization  of  his  own 
sin,  his  need  of  redemption,  the  fact  of  his  redemption  in  the 
person  of  Jesus,  and  its  realization  in  His  Mystical  Body,  his 
sanctification  through  the  Church  and  his  gradual  appropriation 
of  all  the  truths  of  the  Faith.2 

So  the  objective  and  subjective  experiences  of  a  Christian  in 
the  life  of  the  Church  develop  and  strengthen  his  faith.  Realiza¬ 
tion  by  experience  on  the  one  hand,  of  the  Church  as  containing 
and  presenting  him  the  truth  and  the  living  power  of  Jesus,  and 
on  the  other,  the  knowledge  of  the  Person,  work,  and  teaching 
of  Jesus  in  His  Church,  continue  to  generate  a  certainty  about 
the  Revelation  made  by  God  in  Christ,  which,  while  it  may  seem 
to  attain  almost  the  character  of  knowledge,  is  yet  of  faith.  It 
is  of  the  same  quality,  character,  and  essence  as  that  by  which  he 
set  forth  on  his  pilgrimage,  but  developed,  strengthened,  and 
reinforced  through  experience  and  knowledge.  As  such,  the 
faith  of  “the  profound  theologian  does  not  differ  from  that  of 
the  simple  believer.”8 

(2)  In  Relation  to  Dogma 

The  place  of  reason  in  the  province  of  dogma  is  no  less  im¬ 
portant  than  it  is  in  the  domain  of  religon.  Much  of  what  has 
been  said  in  the  preceding  section  will  apply  equally  here,  if 
the  conception  of  faith  and  reason  be  transferred  to  the  corpor¬ 
ate  life  of  the  Church  instead  of  being  limited  to  that  of  the 
individual.  Theologians  of  the  Orthodox  Church  repudiate 
the  accusation  that  Orthodox  Theology  looks  with  disfavor  upon 
scientific  theological  research,  and  upon  the  theory  of  the  de¬ 
velopment  of  doctrine.  “We  do  not  repudiate  legitimate 

1  Ibid.,  p.  80. 

2  Ibid.,  pp.  81-84. 

3  Androutsos,  op.  tit.,  p.  13. 


36 


I.— PROLEGOMENA 


scientific  development,  but  on  the  contrary  regard  reason  as 
the  indispensable  organ  of  acquiring  the  knowledge  of  Christian 
Truth,  and  of  applying  it.”1  That  the  Eastern  Church  is 
“static  and  in  a  state  of  torpor’’  so  far  as  the  development  of 
its  theology  is  concerned  is  an  accusation  which  Androutsos  ad¬ 
mits  as  in  a  certain  degree  true.  This  static  character  does  not, 
however,  reflect  the  true  spirit  of  Orthodoxy  and  is  rather  the 
consequence  of  external  conditions.'  “No  one  can  dispute  the 
fact  that  in  the  history  of  Dogmas  there  is  a  development  or 
progress,"3  and  the  fact  that  this  development  has  gone  on 
throughout  the  history  of  the  Church,  and  is  discernible  in  the 
Orthodox  Church  since  the  Schism  and  after  the  Reformation, 
without  “the  introduction  of  change  or  innovations”4  is  a  testi¬ 
mony  to  the  vitality  and  life  of  the  Orthodox  Church.5 

A  living  thing  must  develop  and  grow  or  else  it  belies  its 
fundamental  character.  An  essential  quality  of  the  Christian 
message  is  this  capacity  for  growth.  Because  it  is  alive  it  must 
needs  develop.  We  find  a  development  in  the  understanding 
and  in  the  implications  of  the  Faith  even  in  the  New  Testament. 
St.  John's  Prologue ,  with  its  developed  theology,  sets  the  scheme 
for  his  Gospel.  St.  Paul’s  appreciation  of  the  significance  and 
bearing  of  the  Sacrifice  of  the  Cross,6  is  a  true  and  legitimate 
development  of  the  Gospel  message.  “The  inspired  tvriters  of 
the  New  Testament  ....  offer  us  the  prototype  and  basis 
of  all  subsequent  legitimate  theological  speculation".7  “There 
is  latent  in  the  Faith  itself  a  certain  capacity  for  the  fuller  de¬ 
velopment  of  its  content  ....  so  that  what  is  contained  in 
the  Bible  and  Tradition  as  it  were  compactly  and  in  general 
terms,  issues  (later)  in  explicit  statements.”8  “What  is  con¬ 
tained  in  the  Bible  and  Tradition  in  a  vague,  undeveloped  form, 
....  is  capable  of  classification  and  development,  by  which 

1Mesolora,  ’ZvnfHoXiKTj,  III,  p.  80. 

2  Op.  cit.,  p.  16,  note. 


3  Rhosse, 

op. 

cit., 

in  note,  p 

4  Ibid.,  p. 

94. 

5  Ibid.,  p. 

93. 

6  Rhosse, 

op. 

cit., 

p.  91. 

7  RhOsse, 

op. 

cit., 

p.  91. 

8  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  15;  so  also  Dyobouniotes  in  ’O aravT., 
pp.  154  ff. 


FAITH  AND  REASON 


37 


the  same  teaching  .  .  .  . ,  as  a  whole,  is  resolved  into  its  sev¬ 
eral  parts,  each  of  which  is  defined  and  developed  in  the 
Church  ....  and  formulated  by  her  in  a  definite  state¬ 
ment.''1  Such  false  developments  as  those  of  the  Judaisers  and 
of  the  Hellenistic  schools,  departed  from  the  essential  character 
of  Christian  teaching,  and  changed  the  matter  of  its  message. 
The  Church  incorporated  all  that  was  of  value  to  her  from 
Judaism,  the  Greek  cults,  and  the  mystery  religions,2  but  never 
altered  the  matter  but  only  the  manner  of  her  message. 

The  fundamental  character  of  true  development  consists  in 
this,  that  the  substance  of  the  Faith  remain  unchanged,  while 
its  expression  and  formulation  may  be  changed  with  different 
times  and  circumstances.  “We  must  distinguish  between  the 
kernel,  the  content  of  the  Faith,  and  its  integument,  the  form 
it  receives  in  the  more  explicit  definition  of  dogmas  in  the  course 
of  time,  under  the  surveillance  of  the  Holy  Spirit."3  The  form 
of  the  definition  of  the  faith  depends  upon  the  state  of  knowl¬ 
edge  of  the  time.  “The  more  the  knowledge  of  the  content  of 
the  Faith  is  rightly  developed  .  .  .  .  the  more  perfect  its 
expression  becomes/’4 5 6  There  is  always  then  a  parallel  between 
the  state  of  theological  knowledge  and  the  degree  and  quality 
of  theological  statement :  “the  more  developed  theological  science 
is,  the  more  complete  and  clear  will  be  the  formulation  of  the 
content  of  the  Faith/’"  Theological  science  can  add  nothing 
to  the  content  of  the  Faith,  but  continually  derives  new  truths 
from  it.  “There  is  no  question  of  Revelation  fulfilling  its  fore¬ 
ordained  course  and,  with  the  passing  years,  giving  way  before 
the  advent  of  new  dogmas."  There  can  be  no  change  in  content. 
Xo  new  dogmas  are  enunciated,  but  the  personal  appropriation 
and  realization  of  the  truths  of  the  Faith  in  all  their  various 
aspects,  naturally  results  in  the  more  perfect  formulation  of 
3  e  Church.  ^I^lie  dogmas  contained  in  the  Bible  and 

1  Rhdsse,  p.  92,  cf.  also  pp.  116-118. 

2 Ilid. 

3  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  14.  cf.  Dyobouniotes  in  ’0 <pei\op.ivn 
aTavTT]aLs,  pp.  154-156,  quoted  in  the  preface  to  these  Lectures  (pp. 
ix-x,  above ) . 

4  RhOsse,  op.  cit.,  p.  86. 

5  Androutsos,  op.  oit.,  p.  14. 

6  Ibid.,  p.  15. 


38 


I.— PROLEGOMENA 


Tradition ....  being  essentially  the  same  as  those  developed 
in  the  Church,  formulated  through  her  regular  channels,  and 
defined  under  the  guidance  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  differ  from  those 
only  in  form  or  expression.”1 

The  Church  defines,  formulates,  and  enunciates  the  dogmas 
of  the  Faith,  and  her  infallibility  preserves  her  from  any  error 
or  mistake  in  the  process.2  In  so  doing  she  employs  human 
reason,  operating  through  the  theological  speculation  and  in¬ 
vestigation  of  her  children.  Her  “corporate  mind”  is  the  result 
of  a  reflective,  analytic,  and  synthetic  intellectual  activity. 
It  is  reason  actuated  by  and  operating  in  faith,  which  is  al¬ 
ways  the  foundation  of  theological  knowledge.3  As  St.  John 
Chrysostom  said :  “through  faith,  knowledge ;  no  knowledge 
without  faith.”4  “The  more  we  believe,  the  more  we  seek  to 
understand  both  the  cause  and  the  reason  for  its  coming  to 
pass."5  “Human  reason  operating  in  faith  is  ...  .  the  organ, 
but  not  the  source,  nor  alone  the  safe  criterion,  of  religious 
truths.”6  “It  is  the  means  to  the  formulation  of  the  content 
of  the  Faith.”7  If  it  be  objected  that  “the  so-called  knowledge 
built  on  faith.  .  .  .has  no  validity,  weight,  or  worth”,  it  may  be 
answered  that  faith  is  the  one  means  to  make  the  experience 
possible  by  which  alone  the  data  of  Christianity  become  ac¬ 
cessible.8  Others  object  to  this  relationship  of  faith  and  dog¬ 
ma,  by  saying,  “if  faith  be  all  important,  then  knowledge  is 
superfluous.”  “The  knowledge  of  the  inner  truth  of  Christ¬ 
ianity  comes  through  reason  scientifically  applied ....  and  it 
is  not  only  not  superfluous  but  most  essential”  to  this  end.* 
It  is  an  all  important  adjunct  in  receiving  and  appropriating 
the  truths  of  the  Faith.10  Furthermore,  it  refutes  wrong  con- 

1  Rhosse,  pp.  60-61,  p.  93. 

2  “Infallibility”  then  does  not  mean  “inspiration”,  Androutsos, 
op.  cit.,  p.  14. 

3  Mesolora,  III,  p.  80,  and  cf.  p.  79,  and  Clem.  Alex.,  Strom., 
there  quoted. 

4  On  Philippians,  in  Migne,  XI,  p.  265  b. 

5  Quoted  by  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  Ill,  p.  80. 

6  Ibid.,  p.  81,  and  cf.  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  13-14. 

7  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  86-87. 

8  RhOsse,  p.  88. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  89. 

10  Mesolora,  111,  p.  81. 


FAITH  AND  REASON 


39 


ceptions  of  the  Faith,  and  fills  in  the  gaps  in  the  dogmatic 
system,  by  attempting  a  more  thorough  articulation  of  its  mem¬ 
bers.  Theological  knowledge  “is  not  repugnant  to  dogmas 
which  are  authentic.  ..  .but  completes,  clarifies,  and  develops 
them.”1  Reason  is  then  the  organ  for  the  formulation  of  the 
doctrines  of  the  Faith.  The  occasion  of  such  formulation  is 
in  many  cases  the  rise  of  heresies  which  prompt  “the  Church 
to  go  more  deeply  into  the  truths  of  the  Faith  and  enunciate 
them  in  more  explicit  terms,  in  a  way  which  allows  neither 
of  doubt  nor  of  misinterpretation.”2 

As  we  saw  above,  every  true  Revelation  has  three  character¬ 
istics:  a  dynamic  and  creative  character,  the  quality  of  con¬ 
sistency  with  itself  and  with  the  whole  body  of  revealed  truths, 
and  the  note  of  progressive  development.  Revelation,  then,  is 
contingent  upon  the  development  and  capacity  of  mankind. 
’What  was  said  applied  more  properly  to  the  Revelation  made 
by  God  in  the  Old  Testament,  yet  may  be  most  clearly  illus¬ 
trated  from  the  New.  Our  Lord  is  the  final  Revelation  of  God 
to  man.  Yet  if  His  Coming  were  prepared  for  by  a  gradual 
and  careful  process,  a.  progressive  development  of  the  capacity 
of  humanity  to  receive  this  final  Revelation,  we  should  ex¬ 
pect  that  the  full  significance  and  bearing  of  His  Life,  Work, 
and  Teaching  should  not  be  realized  in  the  short  span  of  one 
human  life.  All  the  implications,  consequents,  and  the  full 
meaning  of  the  teaching  of  the  God-Man  were  to  be  apprehended 
and  appropriated  by  successive  generations  of  His  followers, 
bound  to  Him  in  His  Church.  The  appropriation  and  realiza¬ 
tion  of  the  fuller  significance  of  the  Faith  by  means  of  human 
reason3 * * * * 8  is  the  work  of  every  generation  of  believers.  An  in- 


1  RhOsse,  pp.  90-91;  Androutsos,  pp.  13-14,  cf.  his  definition:  “Dog¬ 

mas  as  the  expression  and  formulations  of  the  Faith  are  constituted 

through  the  action  of  the  mind,  distinguishing  the  identical  and  es¬ 

sential  (and  putting  them)  into  brief  statements,  which  include  the 

important  content  of  the  Faith  and  protect  it  from  all  false  views 

and  adulteration”. 

aAndroutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  15. 

8Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  16-17.  On  the  relation  of  faith  to  theolog¬ 
ical  knowledge,  cf.  1  Cor.  2,  8;  2  Cor.  8,  9;  St.  John  7,  18;  2,  32;  14, 
20-31;  2  St.  John  1. 


40 


I.— PROLEGOMENA 


finite  message  cannot  be  comprehended  in  all  its  bearings  and 
aspects  in  any  single  generation.  Rather  do  successive 
generations  work  gradually  towards  the  full  appreciation  of 
the  Revelation  made  in  Jesus  Christ,  and  while  they  develop 
by  faith  and  reason  the  implications  of  that  teaching,  they 
never  exhaust  the  infinite  and  many-sided  aspects  of  its  con¬ 
tent.  It  remains  ever  the  same  infinite  and  final  Revelation. 
Mankind  but  grows  in  the  appreciation  of  its  meaning.  As  the 
Church  grows  more  fully  cognizant  of  its  content,  she  expresses 
her  mind;  growing  in  appreciation  of  her  priceless  heritage, 
she  developes  and  formulates  more  exactly  the  implications  and 
bearings  of  the  same  Faith  she  received  from  the  Incarnate 
Son  of  God. 

Dogma  develops  and  changes  its  form  with  the  successive 
generations  of  the  Faithful,  as  they  grow  in  appreciation  of 
the  meaning  of  their  faith  and  express  this  realization  and 
apprehension  in  new  formulations.  Such  a  development  of  dog¬ 
ma,  inevitable1  where  there  is  true  theological  and  spiritual 
life,  is  a  testimony  both  to  the  vitality  of  the  Church  and  to 
that  of  its  faith.  Dogmatic  development  means  the  more  defi¬ 
nite  and  concrete  exposition  of  the  content  of  Christian  teach¬ 
ing.  It  is  not  an  evolution,2  a  change  in  substance.  Nor  is  it 
a  development  by  accretion,  or  the  addition  to  the  original 
deposit  of  alien  and  foreign  elements.  The  test  of  a  right 
development  is  the  Vincentian  formula3 4,  quod  semper,  quod 
ubique  et  quod  ab  omnibus  creditum  esi.  It  is  St.  Vincent  him¬ 
self  who  first  explicitly  treats  of  the  phenomena  of  genuine 
“development”  ( prof ectus — tt pooSo?),  as  opposed  to  evolution, 
or  “change”  ( permutatio — gerafSoXg)  *  He  uses  the  figure  of 
growth  to  illustrate  his  conception  of  right  development.  A 
boy  does  not  change  his  identity  when  he  becomes  a  man.  As 
a  human  life  develops  and  grows  so  does  the  Church:  sed  in 
suo  dumiaxat  genere ,  in  eodum  scilicet  dogmate,  eodem  sensu, 

1  Cf.  Dyobouniotes,  in  '0(pei\op.evij  air  a.  vtt}(j  is,  pp.  154-156. 

2  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  15;  Rhdsse,  op.  cit.,  p.  93  et  al . 

!  St.  Vincent  of  Lerins,  Commonitorium,  2. 

4  Ibid.,  c.  23;  cf.  St.  Irenaeus,  adv.  Haer,  1,  10,  2-3;  St.  Greg. 
Naz.,  Discourse  against  Julian ,  1,  100;  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  97  ff. ;  An¬ 
droutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  15-16. 


FAITH  AND  REASON 


41 


eademque  sententia.  A  child  growing  into  a  man  does  not 
add  new  members  to  his  body, — quot  parvulovum  artus,  tot 
virorum;  eadem  ipsa  sunt  tamen.  His  advice  to  Timothy 
summarizes  his  conception  of  dogmatic  development,  ut  cum 
dicas  nove ,  non  dicas  nova / 

The  position  of  Greek  theology  on  the  subject  of  the  develop¬ 
ment  of  doctrine  may  best  be  made  clear  by  distinguishing 
it  from  the  views  of  Rationalists,  Protestants,  and  Roman  Cath¬ 
olics.  “Rationalists”  regard  dogmatic  development  as  evolu¬ 
tion,  and  the  several  dogmas  in  their  formulated  character  as 
having  a  certain  intrinsic  worth  or  validity,  but  only  in  each  in¬ 
stance  as  examples  of  a  (claimed)  spiritual  knowdedge1 2  histori¬ 
cally  interesting,  and  as  illustrations  of  the  conceptions  developed 
by  certain  Christian  thinkers.  Liberal  Protestant  scholarship 
tends  to  discover  a  change  in  intrinsic  character  and  essential 
content  in  the  course  of  the  Church's  dogmatic  development. 
Harnack  regards  the  formulation  of  Christian  dogma  as  the  con¬ 
sequence  of  the  action  of  the  Hellenic  spirit  in  the  Church.3  He 
finds  an  antithesis  between  the  Gospel  and  dogma,  for  the  latter 
imported  an  alien  and  foreign  element  from  Greek  philosophy.4 
Dogmatic  development  is  for  him  not  a  change  in  form  but  a 
change  in  the  content  of  Christian  teaching.  He,  and,  in  com¬ 
mon  with  him,  the  scholars  of  the  Tubingen  school,  proceeded 
on  certain  premises  or  theories,  according  to  which  they  include 
in  their  evidence  not  only  the  teachings  of  Orthodox  Christian¬ 
ity,  but  those  of  all  the  sects.  So  Harnack  regards  Ebionism 
as  being  nearest  to  Gospel  Christianity.5  While  the  repre¬ 
sentatives  of  the  German  School  acknowledge  the  element  of 
development  in  the  history  of  Christian  dogma,  they  make  two 
mistakes :  they  attempt  to  seek  order  in  chaos  without  assuming 
any  point  of  view  from  which  to  orientate  themselves  in  rela¬ 
tion  to  the  evidence,6  and  in  consequence  of  this,  they  attempt 


1  C.  22,  23,  quoted  by  Rhosse,  p.  98;  of.  p.  54.  n.  2,  of  this  Lecture. 

2  Androutsos,  p.  1G;  Rhosse,  p.  107,  note. 

3  Dogmengesehichte,  3d  ed.  1894,  1,  p.  12,  pp.  16-18. 

4  D.G.  3,  1,  p.  18  and  p.  22,  note  1:  “Dogma  in  its  conception  and 
formulation  is  the  work  of  the  Greek  spirit.” 

*  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  98-99  (note). 

6  Ibid. }  p.  101  (note). 


42 


I.— PROLEGOMENA 


to  discover  the  central  and  essential  teaching  of  Christianity 
by  analyzing  the  data  till  they  discover  the  common  teachings 
of  all  bodies  calling  themselves  Christian.1 2  Such  is  the  case, 
for  example,  in  Dorner’s  Dogmatik,  and  the  author  is  driven 
to  regard  this  central  idea  of  Christianity  as  being  subject 
not  only  to  change  in  form,  but  more  or  less  in  essence  also/ 
Since  dogmas  are  a  result  purely  of  the  human  effort  to  intel- 
lectualize  the  teaching  of  Christianity,  they  have  no  perma¬ 
nent  value.3 * 

In  answer  to  Harnack,  who  speaks  of  the  superstructure  of 
Christian  dogma  being  built  “on  the  ground  of  the  Gospel’ V 
Khosse  claims  that  the  phrase  is  absolutely  misleading.  Chris¬ 
tianity  is  not  built  up  as  an  edifice  on  the  foundation  of  a  Book, 
but  it  has,  on  the  contrary,  used  a  totally  different  figure  ;  it 
has  always  regarded  the  Gospel  as  the  germ  or  bud  in  which 
Christian  doctrine  is  contained,  awaiting  full  development 
and  growth.5  Harnack’s  figure  is  unhappy,  as  it  bespeaks  a 
mechanistic  instead  of  a  biological  conception  of  the  life  of 
Christianity.  Furthermore,  it  is  so  loosely  employed  in  differ¬ 
ent  connections6  as  to  empty  it  of  real  value.  Biological  meta¬ 
phor  is  the  most  appropriate  vehicle  to  describe  a  vital  process. 
A  mechanical  figure  is  one  which  proceeds  on  the  premise  that 
the  subject  which  it  is  used  to  describe  is  not  living,  but  dead — 
not  organic,  but  mechanical.  So  the  Liberal  School  reads  the 
history  of  Christianity  as  a  succession  of  phases,  a  continuous 
series  cf  acts  and  deeds  and  thoughts  having  no  essential  organic 
relationship  one  with  the  other,  and  not  being  the  various  man¬ 
ifestations  of  a  single  stream  of  vital  and  living  truth.  “The 
denial  of  the  legitimacy  and  truth  (of  dogmatic  formulations) 
proceeds  from  the  philosophical  and  theoretical  preconceptions 
and  presuppositions  of  Harnack  and  the  theological  school  of 
Bitschl,  to  which  he  belongs ;...  .from  these  results  a  denial 


1  Pp.  103-4  (note. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  107,  (note). 

s  Ibid.,  p.  108,  (note)  and  p.  112. 

*D.G.  3,  1,  p.  18,  note  1,  p.  22. 

6Rh0sse,  op.  cit.,  p.  62,  note. 

6  Of.  D.G.  3,  1,  pp.  18,  22  (note),  46,  50,  etc. 


FAITH  AND  REASON 


43 


of  all  true  development  and  progress  in  history,  and  most  of 
all  in  the  history  of  dogmas.’71 

As  instances  of  false  development,  Rhosse  gives :  the  ad¬ 
dition  of  the  Filioque  clause  to  the  ancient  Mcene-Constan- 
tinopolitan  creed,  the  change  in  the  essential  character  of  bap¬ 
tism  as  practised  in  the  Roman  Church,  and  the  utterly  arbi¬ 
trary  and  unhistorical  dogma  of  Papal  Infallibility.1 2  “While 
the  Western  theologians  in  theory  have  never  taught  that  the 
Church  is  justified  in  creating  new  dogmas,  yet  in  practice  they 
regard  tradition  as  a  depositum  fidei  from  which  they  bring 
forth  new  dogmas,  manipulating  them  arbitrarily,  and  appar¬ 
ently  not  concerned  whether  or  not  they  are  founded  on  Holy 
Scripture  and  Tradition.”3  The  Roman  Church,  while  holding 
a  proper  theory  of  development,4  still  “remodels”5 6  and  “man¬ 
ipulates”  the  material  at  her  disposal,  to  issue  new  and  novel 
teachings,  which,  not  having  the  authority  of  the  true  sources 
of  dogmatic,  are  without  validity,  void,  and  instances  of  vicious 
and  false  development  of  doctrine.  In  fact,  the  false  devel¬ 
opment  of  doctrine  in  the  Roman  Church,  which  in  reality  is 
a  change  in  the  substance  of  dogmatic  content,  does  not  pro¬ 
ceed  from  true  theological  insight  and  speculation,  and  is  not 
founded  upon  the  Bible  and  Tradition.  It  is  arbitrary  and  self- 

1  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  63.  Tn  regard  to  the  position  of  conserva¬ 
tive  Protestantism  in  relation  to  the  Development  of  Doctrine,  Androut- 
sos  says:  “Protestants,  dating  from  the  16th  century  and  splitting  away 
from  the  Church,  are  incapable  of  having  the  Faith  which  was  taught 
throughout  the  years,  for  they  deny  in  principle  the  equal  validity 
of  Tradition  as  a  source  of  Christian  Truth,  and  reject  the  Church 
as  supreme  interpreter  of  Holy  Scripture.”  They  attempted  to  re¬ 
store  the  ancient  form  of  Christianity,  and  inevitably  lost  contact 
with  its  matter,  (op.  cit.,  p.  16). 

2  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  95-96,  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV,  pp.  17-56;  Ain- 
braze,  'H  ’0 p068o^os  'EKKX-rjaia,  pp.  19-57 ;  Anastasius,  On  the  Unity  of 
the  Churches,  gives  a  list  of  other  departures  of  Rome  from  true 
biblical  teaching  and  traditional  doctrine  and  practice. 

3  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  16. 

4  Cf.  Newman’s  Essay  on  the  Development  of  Doctrine,  chapter 

I,  and  V;  discussion  of  “profectus”  or  “progressus  secundum  quid” 
in  Tanquerav,  Wilhelm  and  Scannell,  and  other  standard  works  of 
Roman  Catholic  theology. 

6  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  note,  p.  16. 


44 


I.— PROLEGOMENA 


willed,  and  is  on  a  par  with  other  rationalistic  systems.1  It 
follows,  then,  that  the  only  ecclesiastical  system  which  qualifies 
according  to  the  test  of  the  Vincentian  canon,  is  that  of  the 
Orthodox  Church,  which  alone  has  kept  the  true  Tradition, 
and  the  full  teaching  of  the  Holy  Scriptures.  It  alone  has  form¬ 
ulated  them  according  to  the  true  standard  of  legitimate  doc¬ 
trinal  development.2 3 

Reason  is,  then,  the  organ  for  the  formulation  of  Christian 
doctrine,  as  well  as  the  means  of  its  appropriation  and  realiza¬ 
tion  by  the  mind  both  of  the  individual  and  the  Church.  It 
has  a  third  function.  It  is  preeminently  useful  in  the  vindica¬ 
tion  of  Christian  truth  from  attack.  Its  function  is  prima¬ 
rily  negative,  in  that  reason  can  never  demonstrate  the  neces¬ 
sity  of  the  dogmas  of  the  Faith, — either  theoretically,  logically, 
or  practically.  They  are  beyond  the  compass  of  the  intellect, 
as  they  are  supernaturally  revealed.  No  matter  how  far  legiti¬ 
mate  theological  speculation  may  be  developed,  the  dogmas  of 
the  Faith  “always  bear  their  mysterious  character”  in  this  life. 
Many  futile  attempts  have  been  made  to  put  the  dogmas  on  a 
rational  basis,  so  that  they  may  seem  to  be  inevitable  and  neces¬ 
sary.  Such  attempts  have  never  succeeded,  nor  can  they  suc¬ 
ceed.  “Even  though  the  dogmas  (of  the  Faith)  cannot  be 
shown  to  be  inevitable  and  of  binding  obligation  logically  upon 
all  rational  human  beings,  yet  they  may  be  demonstrated  as 
possible  and  probable."8  Reason  can  show  that  it  is  not  in¬ 
consistent  either  with  science  or  philosophy  to  be  a  devout 
Christian.  “Christian  truths  issue  from  supernatural  Revela¬ 
tion,  and  exceed  man’s  comprehension,  yet  at  the  same  time 
they  are  not  antagonistic  to  human  reason.  .  .  .While  reason  can 
never  show  dogmas  as  necessary  and  of  universal  obligation.  .  .  . 
it  can  demonstrate  that  they  are  consonant  with  rational  thought ; 
.  .  .  .nor  can  Unbelief  show  them  to  be  impossible,  by  substitut- 

1  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  96. 

2  Ibid.,  pp.  102-104,  and  p.  491.  ‘‘Die  Orientalische  Kirke  be- 
streitet  die  Continuitat  der  Tradition  in  der  romischen  Kirche  nach 
dem  Schisma”, — note  1,  in  Bericht  (Reu&ch)  for  1874,  p.  34;  cf.  also 
pp.  24,  56,  101,  ibid.,  and  the  Letter  of  Timothy  Anastasios  On  the 
Union  of  the  Churches,  Ilepi  rijs  evilxrews  rdv  ’E/c/cX^crtwr,  to  Max,  Prince 
of  Saxony,  Athens,  1910. 

3  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  18. 


THE  RELATION  BETWEEN  FAITH  AND  KNOWLEDGE  45 


ing  for  the  teachings  of  the  Faith  something  of  human  origin 
only,  Unbelief  cannot  claim  such  substitutes  as  probable,  or 
logically  necessary,  much  as  it  may  reject  the  dogmas  of  the 
Faith  as  not  obligatory,  and  logically  contingent.”1 

The  three  functions  of  reason  in  relation  to  dogma  are  then, 
(a)  that  it  is  the  organ  for  the  formulation  of  dogma,  (b)  the 
means  for  the  realization  and  appropriation  of  Christian  Truth 
by  the  individual  and  the  Church,  and  (c)  the  protagonist  for 
dogma,  defending  it  from  assault,  and  vindicating  it  in  the 
face  of  hostile,  insidious,  and  subversive  attacks. 

(A)  Additional  Note  on 

THE  RELATION  BETWEEN  FAITH 
AND  KNOWLEDGE 

The  three  writers,  Androutsos,  Rliosse,  and  Dyobouniotes, 
all  seem  to  disagree  on  the  relation  of  faith  and  knowledge. 
Mesolora  does  not  deal  directly  with  this  problem,  but  by  in¬ 
dicating  the  necessity  of  the  moral  element  in  theological  knowl¬ 
edge'  implies  that  all  knowledge  of  God  is  only  by  faith. 
Reason  is  the  means  for  formulating  and  developing  what  faith 
has  accepted,  and  is  the  organ,  not  the  source,  of  the  knowledge 
of  God.3  The  will  is  necessary  to  enable  man  to  find  God :  one 
may  look  and  not  see.  Those  who  do  not  wish  to  find  Him  do 
not  find  Him.4  Faith,  as  such,  depends  on  the  will.  If  it  were 
demonstrably  and  probably  certain  that  its  postulates  were 
true,  there  would  be  no  faith.  So  we  may  say  that  Mesolora 
distinguishes  faith — that  it,  acceptance  on  authority  of  what  is 

1  Ibid.,  p.  10.  But  Rhosse  says:  “From  faith  based  on  the  authen¬ 
ticity  of  the  Church’s  claims  to  authority,  and  using  religious  certi¬ 
tude  as  a  means through  practical  and  experimental  relation 

with  Christianity,  we  can  obtain  scientific  certainty  about  it  ( i.  e. 
the  Faith),  through  the  definition  and  classification  of  the  content 
of  the  Faith,  and  knowledge  of  its  inner  truth,  its  reasonableness,  and 
its  necessity”  (pp.  85-6,  italics  mine).  “Religious  certainty  becomes 
scientific  certainty ”,  “by  the  discovery  of  the  reason  of  faith,  and 
by  the  resolution  of  the  phenomena  of  the  world.  .  .  .into  their 
ultimate  cause  in  the  demonstrations  of  the  existence  of  God.”  {ibid.,  p. 
132)  Religious  certainty  therefore  is  a  means  for  achieving  scientific 
certainty — ibid. 

2 Mesolora,  Se/i/SoXt/c?),  Ill,  p.  79. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  81. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  91. 


46 


I.— PROLEGOMENA 


revealed — from  knowledge — the  action  of  the  mind  in  apprehend¬ 
ing  and  formulating  the  content  of  what  is  believed.  He  does 
not  attempt  to  grapple  with  the  problem  as  to  the  possibility  of 
faith  being  transformed  into  knowledge  in  this  life. 

Androutsos’  two  propositions  (a)  that  dogmatic  truths  are 
founded  on  the  Divine  authenticity  and  are  not  based  on  human 
reason,  and  (b)  that  reason  is  the  means  for  the  formulation, 
appropriation,  and  negative  vindication  of  them,  involve  his 
conclusion  that  faith  and  knowledge  always  remain  two  dis¬ 
tinct  and  different  things.1  The  theologian  believes  in  the  same 
way  as  the  simple,  uneducated  Christian;  he  may  know  more 
about  what  he  believes  and  may  more  thoroughly  grasp  bis  be¬ 
lief  in  its  rational  and  philosophical  bearings,  but  still  the  knowl¬ 
edge  he  has  of  it  is  not  a  sublimated  faith.  He  is  still  funda¬ 
mentally  certain  of  what  he  holds  on  the  same  basis  as  the 
simple  peasant,  and  the  basis  of  his  faith  is  the  authenticity 
of  God’s  own  word.  His  reason  may  show  him  the  probability 
of  what  he  holds  by  faith,  and  it  may  justify  and  vindicate 
that  faith  against  hostile  attack,2  but  it  will  still  be  reason  jus¬ 
tifying  faith ,  not  presenting  scientific  demonstration  of  a  com¬ 
pelling,  universal,  and  scientific  character. 

Dyobouniotes,  in  his  “Criticism”  of  Androutsos,  work  ('H 
Aoy/xaTiKrj  ro{5  k.  A vSpovraov  Kpivo/Acvr ;)  attacks  this  view  and 
maintains3  that  it  is  inevitable  that  man  as  a  rational  being 
should  have  his  faith  lifted  up  into  knowledge,  the  denial  of 
which  “change  of  faith  to  knowledge,  is  a  denial  of  the  rational 
constitution  of  man”.  This  he  develops  at  considerable  length 
(some  twelve  pages)  in  his  “Heeded  Answer”  ( yO<t>eL\opevrj 
aTravTTjcns)  to  Androutsos’  response  (Aoy/mriKcu  McAerat  A*)  to 
liis  criticism.4  The  Church,  lie  says,  is  the  divinely  guided 
teacher  who  leads  the  individual  to  the  knowledge  of  God.  One 

1  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  12-13.  So  also  Kephala,  Xpi<TTo\oyia, 
p.  46:  “Faith  is  the  means  for  the  knowledge  of  truth;”  cf.  pp.  38- 
99,  on  Faith  as  “Illumination.” 

2  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  18-20. 

3  Dyobouniotes,  'H  Aoyp..  ’A v5p.  Kpcv.,  pp.  5-6. 

4  First  came  Androutsos’  “Dogmatic,”  then  Dyobouniotes’  “Criti¬ 
cism”  (68  pp.)  followed  by  Androutsos’  rejoinder  entitled  “Dogmatic 
Studies,  1”  (148  pp.),  which  elicited  a  response  of  160  pages  from 
Dyobouniotes,  to  be  followed  by  a  second  rejoinder  of  Androutsos 
(“Dogmatic  Studies,  2”). 


THE  RELATION  BETWEEN  FAITH  AND  KNOWLEDGE  47 

believes  on  the  basis  of  external  authority,  the  authority  of  God, 
the  Guardian  of  the  Church.  By  means  of  her  “the  individual 
may  raise  his  faith  into  knowledge — the  conviction  based 
upon  external  authenticity  into  that  founded  as  well  upon  in¬ 
ternal  witness  and  experience.”1  He  distinguishes  the  faith  of 
the  simple  believer,  whose  assurance  is  only  that  of  the  external 
order,  from  that  of  the  advanced  theologian,  whose  conviction 
is  grounded  as  well  on  certainty  of  an  interior  and  personal 
kind.  It  is  a  difficult  and  baffling  adventure  but  one  well  worth 
persisting  in,  and  the  conditions  of  the  quest  involve  moral 
elements :  “a  corrupt  man  may  become  a  good  scientist,  but  a 
good  theologian,  never.”2  The  change  from  faith  to  knowledge 
comes  by  the  effecting  of  the  transition  from  the  certainty 
based  on  external  authority  to  that  based  as  well  on  internal 
experience.  The  resultant  knowledge  is  not  complete,  yet  it 
is  knowledge.  Faith  furnishes  the  means  for  making  the  ex¬ 
periment,  the  result  of  which  is  knowledge.  Just  as  we  admit 
scientific  conclusions  even  when  the  necessity  of  the  various 
steps  of  the  experiment  is  not  demonstrable  in  advance,  so  we 
are  scientifically  justified  in  admitting  the  conclusions  of  relig¬ 
ious  knowledge.  That  these  are  open  to  question  and  dispute  is 
not  surprising,  since  many  of  the  conclusions  of  science  have 
been  and  still  are  so  regarded.3 

This  whole  position  Androutsos  vigorously  combats4  sav¬ 
ing  that  reason  never  furnishes  the  content  of  religious  know¬ 
ledge.  It  is  never  the  organ  for  the  knowledge  of  religious 
truth.  Faith  which  furnishes  this  content  depends  on  reason 
for  its  assimilation.  The  two  go  on  together  side  by  side.  As 
man  develops  in  faith  so  his  knowledge  grows.  “The  element 
of  knowledge,  which  is  always  present  in  faith,  is  developed  into 
a  further  knowledge  along  with  (the  development  of)  faith.  It 
is  not  that  in  this  development.  .  .  .faith  is  left  behind  ;  on  the 
contrary,  the  reason  the  simple  believer  and  the  profound  theo¬ 
logian  alike  accept  the  truths  of  the  faith,  remains  always  the 
same — the  Divine  authenticity.”5  He  maintains  that  faith 

1  ‘0</>ei\o/zej'77  <z7rcbT?7<7ij,  p.  2. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  4. 

3  ’OcfreiXofievri  ai ravTri<us,  Dyobouniotes,  pp.  7-8. 

*  C-f.  his  A07 /xartKat  MeXerat,  A’,  pp.  8-18. 

6  Ibid.,  p.  11. 


48 


I.— PROLEGOMENA 


never  becomes  anything  else  and  never  loses  its  character,  con¬ 
sequently  cannot  become  knowledge. 

Androutsos’1  reply  impugns  Dyobouniotes’  claim2  that  his 
view  is  founded  on  Rhosse,  for  Androutsos  says  Rhosse  does  not 
says  what  Dyobouniotes  says  he  says.  Rhosse3  distinguishes 
immediate  or  religious  certainty,  based  on  the  authority  of  the 
Church,  from  mediate  or  scientific  certainty,  based  on  exper¬ 
iment  and  reasoned  conclusions.  Faith  is  the  basis  and  point 
or  departure  for  knowledge.4 *  From  “religious  certainty”  we  can 
come  to  personal  assurance  and  conviction  based  on  practical 
and  vital  contact  with  Christianity,  and  thus  to  “scientific  cer¬ 
tainty”.8  As  a  result  of  this  process  of  appropriation  and 
realization  of  the  faith  in  the  case  of  the  individual,  religious 
certainty  becomes  scientific  certainty.6 7 

The  solution  of  these  divergent  views  would  have  been  facili¬ 
tated  if  each  or  any  had  defined  his  terms.  It  is  true,  faith  was 
defined  by  Rhosse,'  as  the  assent  of  man,  grounded  on  its  di¬ 
vine  authentication,  to  the  truths  of  the  Christian  religion,  and 
knowledge ,  as  the  content  of  what  we  know  about  God  through 
faith  and  reason  reflecting  on  and  speculating  about  what  this 
faith  tells  us.8  According  to  Androutsos,  faith  is  a  more  or 
less  automatic  and  convulsive  grasp  after  God  which  really  lays 
hold  of  Him,  and  it  constitutes  the  consciousness  of  God’s  Pres¬ 
ence  in  the  natural  and  rational  world.9  “Scientific  knowledge’’ 
is  of  such  a  character,  both  as  to  method,  as  to  the  nature  of 
the  material  it  deals  with,  and  as  to  the  kind  of  proof  it  de¬ 
mands,  that  it  is  utterly  impossible  in  relation  to  God.10  Con¬ 
sequently,  we  cannot  say  we  can  possibly  have  any  “scientific 
knowledge”  of  Him.  To  summarize  and  compare  the  above 
theologians,  it  may  be  said  that  Rhosse  does  not  discuss  the 

1  Ibid,.,  p.  17. 

1  'H  Aoyp..  ’Avdp.  Kpiv.,  pp.  5-6. 

3  AoypaTiKrj,  p.  65. 

4  Aoy fiariKifi,  p.  70. 

6  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  85-86. 

«Ibid.,  p.  312. 

7  Ibid.,  p.  66. 

*Ibid.,  p.  132. 

9  Androutsos,  AoypaTucrj,  p.  37. 

10  Ibid.,  p.  35. 


THE  RELATION  BETWEEN  FAITH  AND  KNOWLEDGE  49 

problem  of  the  relation  of  faith  to  knowledge  in  the  sense 
Dyobouniotes  uses  these  words.  ‘'Certainty”  does  not  mean 
“knowledge”.  Rhosse  says  religious  “certainty”  may  become 
scientific  “certainty,”  which  means  simply  that,  in  his  view, 
the  evidence  for  the  truth  of  the  complex  which  we  call  the 
“Faith”  is  sufficiently  complete — as  a  cumulative  nexus  of  ar¬ 
gument,  faith,  experience,  and  reason — to  justify  the  convic¬ 
tion  which  a  believer  holds.  Dyobouniotes  means  by  “faith”, 
acceptance  and  assent  on  authority ;  when  such  assent  is  tested 
and  vindicated  by  experience,  he  calls  the  content  of  that  which 
is  realized  by  personal  or  religious  experience,  “knowledge”. 
(It  may  be  noted  that  conviction  is  conviction,  and  is  the  same 
in  quality  whatever  be  its  reason,  authority,  or  basis.)  Since 
Androutsos  means  by  “knowledge”  a  scientific,  adequate,  ex¬ 
haustive  acquaintance  with  all  the  phenomena  together  with  a 
consistent  theory  of  the  whole,  which  has  universal  application 
and  can  prove  itself  and  demand  consent  from  all  rational  crea¬ 
tions,  it  is  obvious  that  such  can  never  be  said  of  our  knowledge 
of  God;  nor  does  what  we  come  to  know  about  Him  through 
faith,  dispense  with  faith  as  a  means;  nor  do  we  ever  cease  to 
know  about  Him  and  come  to  know  Him.  The  four  theologians 
really  agree  in  these  fundamental  theses:  that  through  faith 
man  can  know  God ;  faith  based  on  a  claim  which  is  regarded  as 
valid  and  authentic  generates  conviction,  which  is  deepened 
and  developed  by  experience;  experience  does  not  ever  dispense 
with  faith  as  this  necessary  means  of  coming  to  know  God ;  our 
knowledge  is  not  of  the  same  quality  as  that  we  have  of  math¬ 
ematics.  or  of  physics,  or  any  other  science,  though  our  convic¬ 
tion  of  the  truth  of  any  of  these  may  be  equally  strong,  and 
identical  in  its  nature. 


50 


I.— PROLEGOMENA 


(B)  Additional  Note  on 

THE  RELATION  OF  DOGMATIC  TO  THE  OTHER 
THEOLOGICAL  DISCIPLINES 

Dogmatic  is  the  center  of  all  the  theological  disciplines.1 
These  may  be  divided  into  two  categories,  theoretical  and  prac¬ 
tical,  each  of  which  is  in  turn  further  subdivided.  Since  the 
sources  of  dogmatic  are  the  Bible  and  Tradition,  dogmatic  has 
an  intimate  relationship  to  Bible  study,  exegesis,  interpretation , 
and  biblical  theology.  Biblical  scholarship  assists  in  ascertain¬ 
ing  the  true  text  and  its  interpretation  in  the  light  of  the  orig¬ 
inal  meaning  and  content.  Biblical  theology  presents  in  mass 
the  results  of  detailed  study  of  the  content  of  Holy  Scripture, 
and  is,  in  consequence,  of  the  utmost  importance  to  dogmatic. 
For  Tradition,  dogmatic  uses  both  the  history  of  the  Church 
and  the  history  of  dogmas.  Symbolic  summarizes  and  arranges 
the  results  of  the  study  of  Church  history  and  the  history  of 
doctrine,  codifying  the  decrees  of  the  councils,  the  creeds,  and 
the  confessions  of  faith  in  systematic  and  historical  order.  The 
relation  of  dogmatic  to  the  practical  branches  of  theological 
discipline  is  even  more  intimate.  The  principle,  lex  orandi,  lex 
credendi,  establishes  the  close  connection  of  dogmatic  with 
liturgies.  As  the  content  of  the  Faith  is  supernatural  revela¬ 
tion  both  in  relation  to  dogma  and  ethics,  ethics  draws  upon 
dogmatic  for  its  sources.2  The  natural  for  homiletics  is  sup¬ 
plied  from  dogmatic,  and  all  the  branches  of  practical  theology 
are  directly  dependent  upon  it.  The  premises  of  dogmatic  are 
demonstrated  as  reasonable  and  acceptable  to  man’s  rational 
nature,  by  apologetic,  while  polemic  and  controversy  are  con¬ 
cerned  with  wrong  conceptions  of  the  Faith  and  attacks  upon 
the  Orthodox  doctrines. 


1  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  20.  On  this  topic,  cf.  ibid.,  §  6.  of  his 
Introduction;  Rhdsse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  23-25,  note,  pp.  24,  29-36,  114-124. 

2  The  Orthodox  Catechism  is  divided  into  two  parts,  “dogmatic” 
and  “ethic”,  cf.  e.  g.,  that  of  Balanos  (Athens  1920). 


THE  ORTHODOX  VIEW 


51 


(C)  Additional  Note 

PALMIERI  ON  THE  ORTHODOX  VIEW  OF  THE 
DEVELOPMENT  OF  DOCTRINE 

Conspicuous,  unique,  and  outstanding  as  is  the  historical 
work1  of  the  Augustinian,  Aurelio  Palmieri,  among  scholars  who 
have  concerned  themselves  with  matters  Orthodox,  there  is  no 
single  writer  to  whom  we  are  more  indebted  for  both  achieved 
and  promised  studies  in  Orthodox  theology-  His  monographs 
on  the  tangled  and  difficult  problem  of  the  Filioque 2  controversy 
constitute  perhaps  the  most  valuable  recent  contributions  to  the 
subject.  Few  men  know  the  Russian  Church  as  he  does,  and 
his  work  on  it,3  always  sympathetic,  understanding,  and 
thorough,  is  as  Kattenbusch  says  ein  recht  unpart eiisches 
Bild .4  This  text  is  an  extraordinarily  valuable  contribution, 
frank  and  relentlessly  honest  in  aim  and  method,  profound  in 
its  intimate  knowledge  of  the  subject  matter,  and  particularly 
significant  at  this  time  for  the  final  chapter  on  the  problem  of 
reunion  between  the  Slavs  and  the  Roman  See.  The  approba¬ 
tion  it  received  in  many  quarters  is  as  eloquent  a  testimony  to  its 
value  as  is  the  bitter  opposition  it  elicited  from  certain 
“Panpoles”,5  who  are  very  caustic  in  their  criticism  of  it. 

For  our  purposes,  however,  two  other  works,  his  Digest  of 
Orthodox  Theology,6  of  which  only  two  volumes,  of  Prolegomena, 
have  appeared,  and  his  essay  on  Doctrinal  Development7  in 

1  E.  g.,  his  Dositeo,  patriarca  greco  di  Oerusalemme,  contribute)  alia 
storia  della  teologia  nel  secolo  XVII,  pp.  1-130,  Florence,  1909. 

2  La  consustanzialitd.  divina  e  la  processione  dello  Spirito  Santo, 
Rome,  1900;  La  missione  delle  divine  persone  e  la  processione  dello 
Spirito  Santo,  Rome,  1900;  L'argomento  ontologico  del  Filioque  e  le 
obbiezioni  di  un  teologo  Russo f  Rome,  1902. 

3  La  Chiesa  Russa,  le  sue  odierne  condizioni  e  il  suo  riformismo 
dottrinale,  Florence,  1908,  pp.  XV. — 759. 

4  Theologische  Rundschau,  XIII.  1910,  pp.  103-110. 

5  E.  g.,  Count  A.  Mohl,  cf.  criticism  in  Potwarz  czy  nieporozumienie, 
Warsaw,  1900;  De  Totli  in  Unitd  Cattolica ,  and  Le  armonie  della  Fide, 
IV.  1910,  pp.  340-365. 

6  Theologia  Dogmatica  Orthodoxa  (Eaclrsiae  Graeco-Russicae)  ad 
lumen  Catholicae  Doctrinae  examinata  et  discussa;  Prolegomena,  vol. 
I.  Florence  1911,  pp.  XXV — 815;  vol.  II.  Florence  1913,  pp.  1-198. 

7 11  Progresso  Dommatico  nel  Concetto  Cattolico  (No.  1  in  the  Bib- 
lioteca  di  Apologia  Cristiana )  Florence,  1910,  pp.  XX — 303. 


I.— PROLEGOMENA 


Roman  and  Orthodox  thought,  are  of  fundamental  importance. 
The  former  is  undoubtedly  his  magnum  opus;  it  has  the  same 
breadth  of  view,  exhaustiveness  of  treatment,  sympathy,  and 
comprehension  as  his  earlier  works,  and  is  animated  by  the  best 
spirit  of  honesty  and  fairness,  seeking  always  to  find  grounds 
of  agreement  rather  than  points  of  difference  between  the 
Orthodox  and  Roman  teaching.  It  treats  of  the  ground  work 
of  Orthodox  Dogmatic,  definitions,  method,  sources,  polemic, 
the  Roman  controversy,  and  prospects  of  reunion.  No  other 
book  known  to  the  writer  presents  so  thorough  and  exhaustive 
a  bibliography,  nor  so  full  and  clear  an  exposition  of  the  sub¬ 
ject  matter.  Of  particular  interest  to  the  writer  is  the  concep¬ 
tion  of  the  development  of  doctrine,  to  which  Palmieri  devotes 
the  third  chapter1 *  of  volume  1  of  his  Theologia  Dogmatica,  and 
the  whole  of  the  Italian  essay  on  the  same  subject.  He  refutes 
the  four  types  of  false  theories  of  development,  presents  in  brief 
the  Roman  contention,  and  lastly  the  Orthodox  position,  with 
especial  reference  to  the  Roman  views.  It  is  to  be  noted  that 
he  works  to  the  same  conclusion  as  does  Newman  in  his  epoch 
making  essay/  that  the  Roman  Pontiff  is  the  center  of  unity,  the 
organ  for  enunciating  the  developed  doctrine,  as  well  as  the 
means  for  guiding,  checking,  and  directing  this  development. 
Palmieri  sums  up  his  argument  in  the  words  “development  of 
doctrine  demands  for  its  actualization  in  fact  a  principle  of  vis¬ 
ible  authority/’  and  shows  to  his  own  satisfaction,  the  indirect 
argument  for  this  conclusion  from  the  absence  of  any  organ  of 
unity  and  definition,  infallibly  functioning  within  its  own  proper 
scope,  in  Orthodoxy.3  The  three  theses  which  embody  the 
Roman  view  of  the  development  of  doctrine  may  be  summarized 
as  follows:  (a)  that  development  in  the  content  of  Revelation 
which  characterized  God’s  method  of  dealing  with  men  before 
our  Lord's  Incarnation,  (b)  gave  way  to  the  final  and  complete 
Revelation  in  Him,  which  allows  of  no  further  development  in 

1  Pp.  31-88. 

*  “On  the  Development  of  Doctrine.”  From  the  Anglican  and  Or¬ 
thodox  point  of  view  both  arguments  are  subject  to  the  same  strictures 
— cf.  e.  g.,  The  Development  of  English  Theology  in  the  Nineteenth  Cen¬ 
tury,  V.  F.  Storr,  Longmans,  1913,  pp.  VIII — 486.  Chapter  XVI.  pp. 
294-316  treats  of  this  work  of  Newman. 

3  Progresso  Dommatico,  pp.  127-130. 


THE  ORTHODOX  VIEW 


53 


substance,  (c)  Nevertheless  a  relative  development  ( progressus 
secundum  quid)  in  accordance  with  St.  Anselm’s  phrase :  pro- 
fectus  f  delis  in  fide  potiu-squam  fidei  in  fideli,  is  both  possible 
necessary,  and  demonstrably  a  fact.1 

Palmieri  treats  of  various  Orthodox  theologians’  views  of  the 
matter,  and  sums  up  his  conclusions  as  follows “(1)  Generally 
speaking,  Orthodox  Theology  holds  and  teaches  the  theory  of 
relative  development  of  doctrine.  .  .  .  (2)  This  they  deny 
in  practice,  while  refusing  to  acknowledge  they  do  so,  and  this 
denial  comes  about  ....  by  reason  of  the  inherent  defect  of 
Orthodoxy  in  .  .  .  .  lacking  the  authority  of  the  supreme 
magisterium.  (3)  In  certain  individual  instances  hatred  ot 
Catholicism.  ..  .has  brought  out  a  denial  of  development 
in  any  sense  of  the  word.  (4)  Because  of  the  contradiction 
which  maintains  between  theory  and  fact,  which  involves 
the  denial  in  practice  of  what  is  acknowledged  in  theory,  Catho¬ 
lic  doctrine  is  subject  to  slander  and  misrepresentation.”  As 
indicating  the  appreciation  of  Orthodox  theologians  of  the  theory 
of  development  of  doctrine,  Palmieri  adduces  Macarius, 
Malinovsky,  Chostin,  Solovev,3  Silvester  of  Ivanev,4  Sokolov,5 
the  Patriarchs’  letter  to  the  Synod  of  Petrograd  (1723) 6  and 
"both  Rhosse  and  Androutsos,7  whose  views  were  developed  in  the 
body  of  Lecture  1.  His  conclusion  is  as  follows:  “We  can  cer¬ 
tainly  say  that  theoretically  the  teaching  of  Orthodox  Greek  and 
Russian  theology  is  fully  in  line  with  Catholic  doctrine:  (a) 
Orthodox  theology  maintains  that  the  Christian  Revelation  is 
completed  and  closed  with  the  preaching  of  our  Lord  and  the 
Apostles,  (b)  It  contends  that  there  are  no  dogmas  of  the 
Faith  not  contained  in  Holy  Scripture  and  Tradition,  (c) 
Since  the  truths  of  the  Faith  are  not  a  buried  treasure,  it  is  nec¬ 
essary  to  concede  a  relative  doctrinal  development,  (d)  which 

1  Theol.  Dogm.  Orth.  vol.  I.  pp.  37-54. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  56. 

3  Theol.  Dogm.  Orth.  vol.  I.  pp.  56-61,  cf.  also  on  Macarius  and 
Malinovsky,  Prog.  Dom.  pp.  81  IT. 

4  Progresso  Dom.  pp.  67-76. 

Ibid.,  pp.  76-81. 

0  Ibid.,  pp.  84-85,  which,  however,  espouse  la  dottrina  ortodossa  dell’ 
unmobilita  dei  dommi. 

7  Ibid.}  pp.  85-87. 


54 


I.— PROLEGOMENA 


progressive  development  is  a  corollary  to  the  indefectible  and 
perfect  life  of  the  Church.  .  .  .  So  it  is  evident  that  Catholic 
and  Orthodox  theology  are  in  theory  in  perfect  accord  on  the 
subject  of  doctrinal  development.’’1 

This  theoretical  agreement  is  of  very  great  value,  for  it 
means  the  possibility  of  envisaging  the  great  issues  and  problems 
in  the  same  idiom  of  thought.  The  importance  of  this  fact  can 
hardly  be  over  emphasized.  There  is  no  more  vital  concep¬ 
tion  in  modern  day  thinking  than  this  idea  of  growth  and  de¬ 
velopment.  It  is  the  fundamental  thesis  of  the  historico-critical 
school  that  human  thought  and  the  history  of  ideas  is  a  kind  of 
unified  organic  whole.  The  rationalist  would  find  difficulty  in 
postulating  in  the  concrete  the  existence  of  the  central  unity 
and  identity  of  life  under  the  various  forms  of  Catholic  thought ; 
he  would,  as  Harnack  does  so  often,  see  rather  the  episode  as  a 
unit  in  itself,  and  apart  from  the  whole  stream  of  which  it 
forms  a  part,  rather  than  as  an  integral  element  in  a  larger 
stream  of  vital  thought.  But  so  far  as  concerns  Catholic  Chris¬ 
tianity,  the  conception  of  the  development  of  doctrine  is  central ; 
its  adoption  is  no  new  thing  to  which  modern  x4pologetic  has 
had  recourse,  for  it  has  prevailed  in  varying  degrees  of  explicit 
and  articulate  formulation  from  St.  Vincent2  till  to-day.  I  re¬ 
peat,  the  very  great  value  of  this  fact  can  hardily  be  exaggerated  ; 
Anglo-Catholic,  Roman  Catholic,  and  Orthodox  agree  funda¬ 
mentally  in  the  way  all  three  conceive  of  the  history  of  Revela¬ 
tion,  and  the  progress  of  Christian  doctrine. 

It  is  beside  my  point  to  present  Palmieri's  conclusions  in  de¬ 
tail.  He  argues  on  the  basis  of  the  theoretical  agreement  of 
Roman  and  Orthodox  theology  on  the  matter  of  doctrinal  de¬ 
velopment,  for  the  need  of  an  organ  of  articulation  and  formu¬ 
lation  now  and  in  these  days;  namely,  he  contends  that  Ortho- 


1  Progresso  Dommatico,  pp.  87-90;  Theol.  Dogm.  Orth.  vol.  I.  pp. 
60-63. 

2  St.  Vincent  of  Lerins  enjoys  quite  as  high  a  position  among  Ortho¬ 
dox  as  among  Western  theologians.  Cf.  Anthimus  VII,  Encyclical ,  p. 
18,  No.  24:  cocpu s  /cat  6pdo56£us  xaPaKTrlP^ei  TVV  aX-rjOrj  rijs  Trlcreus  /cat 
rijs  ’E Kn\T](rias  KadoXiKorrjTa;  cf.  Sylvester,  Filevsky,  Janychev,  Bieliaev, 
in  Theol.  Dogm.  Ortho,  vol.  I.  pp.  81-82;  and  especially  Chapter  VII., 
“II  Canone  di  Vicenzo  Lirinese  e  il  progresso  dommatico”  in  Progresso 
Dommatico,  pp.  255-274. 


THE  ORTHODOX  VIEW  55 

doxy  needs  the  Roman  Pontiff  as  a  legitimate  consequence  and 
application  of  her  very  principles  of  theological  thought.  He 
attempts  to  prove  the  breaking  down  of  the  Orthodox  principle 
in  the  concrete.  In  practice,  he  says,  the  Orthodox  Church  can¬ 
not  do  for  Orthodoxy  what  she  claims  to;  claiming  to  have  as 
the  organ  of  her  explicit  utterance  the  agreement  of  her  Bishops 
and  Councils,1  she  has  conspicuously  failed  in  using  the  means  of 
expressing  her  mind.  Contradictory  decrees  and  the  necessity 
of  subsequently  revising  and  abrogating  decisions  of  local 
synods2  have  made  necessary  the  denial  of  any  legislative  or  an- 
thoritative  power  in  matters  of  faith  to  local  councils.3 4 5  So  he 
concludes  iprogressus  igitur  dogmaticus  secundum  'quid  per 
synodos  particulares  non  exstitit  in  Ecclesiis  orientalibus ,  ac, 
docent e  experientia,  neque  in  posterum  dabitur .*  Equally  fu¬ 
tile,  he  argues,  is  the  attempt  to  lodge  this  power  of  defining 
and  promulgating  the  more  explicitly  defined  teaching  of  the 
Church  in  the  Patriarch  of  Constantinople,  with  the  free  agree¬ 
ment  with  him  of  the  autocephalous  Churches."  Hence,  reason¬ 
ing  by  a  kind  of  method  of  elimination,  Palmieri  focuses  his 
argument  in  the  conclusion  that  the  Orthodox  Church  needs 
the  Roman  See,  according  to  its  own  principles,  and  according 
to  the  facts  of  history.6  With  his  conclusions  neither  Orthodox 
nor  Anglican  can  agree,  but  for  his  spirit,  his  zeal,  his  honesty, 
and  the  brilliance  of  his  achievement,  in  clearly  showing  this 
essential  unity  of  conception,  we  may  all  thank  him  and  give 
him  honor. 


1  Macarius,  quoted  in  Theol.  Dogm,  Orth,  vol  I.  pp.  63-64. 

■  E.  g.,  the  Council  of  Moscow  in  1620  decreed  that  Latins  were  to 
be  rebaptized,  and  36  and  47  years  later  the  decision  was  completely 
reversed;  cf.  op.  cit.,  pp.  65-66,  notes  ad.  loc.  In  1660  a  council  at 
Moscow  decreed  that  God  had  put  His  Church  in  the  power  of  the 
Czar ! 

3  Cf.  Pavlov,  op.  cit.,  p.  64,  and  A.  Christodoulos,  in  his  A oidpiov 
:EKK\Ti<jiaaTtKov  AiKaiov,  Constantinople,  1896,  p.  50: 

At  TOTTiKai  avvodoi  ir avrore  tcpepov  xaPaKTVPa  avp(3ov\evTiK<j!jv  p6vov  aojpa- 
tcluv,  at  dvocpaaeis  airuv,  %xovffai  aTjpaalav  xetPa7w7t,fw^  dpxuv  5ia  tovs 
TrapevpujKop^yovs  iwuTKOTrovs  dev  t)<to.v  vop.cn  iv  tji  evvoia  eKeivQ  biroiav  e\a(3ov 
ai  arrofidcreis  ruv  olKOvpevLKuv  c tvvoScjv. 

4  Op.  cit.,  p.  67. 

5  Ibid.,  p.  68. 

6Prog.  Dom.  pp.  172  ff. 


LECTURE  II. 

THE  DOCTRINE  OF  GOD 


LECTURE  II. 

THE  DOCTRINE  OF  GOD 

Contents 


Pages  Pages 

1.  God  as  Object  of  Knowledge  60-70 


(1) 

“Existence”  and  “Being” 

60-61 

(2) 

Possibility  of  knowing  God 

61-63 

(3) 

Sources  of  our  Knowledge 

63-66 

(4) 

Method  of  our  Knowledge 

66-68 

(4) 

Character  of  our  Knowledge 

68-69 

(6) 

Our  conception  of  God 

69-70 

2.  The  Argument  for  the  Existence  of  God,  and  its 


Bearing 

on  our  Knowledge  of  Him 

71-80 

(1) 

Cosmological 

71-72 

(2) 

Psychological 

72-73 

(3) 

Teleological 

73-75 

(4) 

Ontological 

75-78 

(5) 

Historical 

78-79 

(6) 

Survey  of  Argument 

79-80 

Content 

of  Our  Knowledge  of  God 

80-107 

(1) 

Arrangement  of  material 

80-82 

(2) 

The  Attributes  of  God 

82-84 

A  Physical 

84-91 

B  Logical 

91-101 

Problems  of  Foreknowledge 

and 

Free  Will 

95-100 

C  Ethical 

101-107 

The  Doctrine  of  the  Holy  Trinity 

•/  i 

107-136 

(1) 

In  the  Bible 

108-114 

(2) 

In  the  Church 

114-124 

(3) 

Properties  of  the  Persons 

124-132 

The  Procession  of  the  Holy  Spirit 

126-132 

(4) 

Theological  Theory 

132-136 

Additional  note:  On  the  Filioque  controversy. 

136-143 

1.  GOD  AS  OBJECT  TO  KNOWLEDGE 

The  subject  matter  of  dogmatic  theology  is  God — as  He  is, 
and  as  He  works.1  From  the  fact  of  His  existence  and  His  na¬ 
ture  wre  go  on  to  consider  His  acts  in  eternity  and  in  time;  so 
the  starting  point  of  all  dogmatic  theology  is  the  Existence  and 
Being  of  God.  Logically  w^e  may  distinguish  between  God’s 
existence,  that  He  is — the  fact  of  His  being — and  His  “Being” 
or  “Nature”,  wliat  He  is.  The  'words  essence,  nature,  character . 
all  belong  to  this  second  categor}'.  While  we  may  logically 
distinguish  “Existence”  and  “Being”,  yet  the  Existence  of  God 
is  inseparable  from  His  Being,  “since  every  concrete  conception 
of  His  existence  is  united  with  these  or  those  qualities.”2  While 
the  scholastics  have  claimed  that  His  existence  may  be  proved 
clearly  and  evidently,  though  the  conception  of  God  may  be 
very  incomplete,  yet  every  such  proof  shows  Him  to  be  such  and 
such,  that  is,  it  involves  His  qualities  or  characteristics.  The 
intimate  and  inseparable  character  of  these  two  conceptions  be¬ 
longs  to  the  nature  and  limitation  of  our  minds,  and  is  inevit¬ 
able  because  of  the  way  in  'which  the  human  mind  operates.3 
In  any  case,  the  highly  abstract  conception  of  God’s  Existence 
apart  from  His  Being,  would  be  completely  useless  and  inade¬ 
quate  for  affording  us  any  conceptions  of  His  character.  From 
such  an  abstract  idea  of  His  existence  we  could  not  derive  any 
conception  of  His  being  and  nature.  It  is  then  inevitable,  if 
we  are  to  have  any  notion  of  His  character,  that  the  idea  of  His 
Existence  involve  that  of  His  nature.4  The  fundamental  char¬ 
acter  of  the  belief  in  His  unity  and  oneness  is  expressed  in  all 
the  formularies  of  the  Faith.5  The  Being  of  God  is  the  abso- 


1  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  23  et  al. 

2  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  32. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  33. 

4  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  129-130. 

5  1st  article  of  Creed;  Gennadius,  in  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  I.  p.  73; 
Metrophanes,  ibid.,  p.  280. 


GOD  AS  OBJECT  TO  KNOWLEDGE 


61 


lute  unity  of  His  attributes  and  properties,  in  one  living  whole, 
without  contradiction  or  actual  distinction  of  parts.  The 
attributes  are  the  manifestations  of  His  one  eternal  Energy  or 
Being.1  When  we  use  the  word  “absolute"  of  God,  it  is  not  as  a 
property  or  attribute  of  Him,  but  as  constituting  His  Being, 
as  revealing  Him  as  the  absolutely  eternal  Being,  and  this  ab¬ 
solute  or  infinite  character  is  involved  by  all  the  attributes  we 
predicate  of  Him.  “Absolute”  and  “infinite”  are  practically 
synonymous,  and  express  the  same  idea,  that  He  is  not  deter¬ 
mined  by  anything  other  than  Himself,  that  is,  He  is  absolutely 
self-determined.2 

Is  it  possible  to  have  a  really  true  and  adequate  knowledge  of 
God?  In  a  very  true  sense  we  cannot  have  anv  scientific  knowl- 
edge  of  Him:  (a)  Science  deals  with  the  data  of  perceived 
phenonema.  God,  in  His  essence,  is  not  the  object  of  our  per¬ 
ception,  so  we  cannot  use  Him  as  the  subject  of  scrutiny  and 
investigation,  (b)  Science  proceeds  according  to  a  fixed 
method  of  observation,  analysis,  and  synthesis,  to  investigate 
and  correlate  its  data,  and  to  derive  and  state  the  nature  of  the 
forces  operating  under  the  phenomena  which  constitute  its  sub¬ 
ject  matter.  If  God  is  what  He  is  said  to  be  by  religion  and 
revelation,  such  data  about  Him  cannot  be  so  examined  and 
investigated,  with  the  result  of  acquiring  a  satisfactory  and 
veridical  conception  of  His  character,  (c)  Scientific  proof 
is  the  only  criterion  which  is  admissible,  and  we  “cannot  dem¬ 
onstrate  either  God's  Existence  or  His  character  scientifically.” 
Hence  it  is  impossible  to  obtain  this  kind  of  scientific  knowl¬ 
edge  of  God.  He  cannot  be  made  the  object  of  our  scrutiny, 
nor  are  our  minds  capable  of  grasping  Him.3 

Since  the  subject  matter  of  our  knowledge  is  One  whose 
character  and  essence  are  such  as  to  constitute  an  entirely  dif¬ 
ferent  category  of  data,  we  cannot  expect  to  have  a  demonstra¬ 
tion  or  proof  concerning  Him,  of  the  same  quality  as  that  pre¬ 
sented  in  the  exact  sciences.4  If  He  is,  He  is  unique.  If  God 

1  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  130. 

-  RhSsse,  op.  cit.,  p.  131,  and  cf:  note  1,  quotation  from  St.  Basil 
ad  loc.,  ibid. 

s  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  33. 

4  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  33-34. 


62 


II.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  GOD 


exist,  then  knowledge  of  Him  involves  a  different  mode  of  pro¬ 
cedure.  As  the  subject  matter  of  our  investigation  of  His 
character  is  so  utterly  different  from  that  of  any  ordinary  scien¬ 
tific  quest,  we  shall  need  to  employ  a  different  method  in  obtain¬ 
ing  our  data.  On  this  hypothesis  we  can  obtain  an  essentially 
scientific  knowledge  of  God.  It  is  limited,  as  we  shall  see,  but  so 
are  the  other  sciences  and  their  conclusions.  In  every  scientific 
experiment  we  have  an  idea  or  conception  of  that  which  we  are 
seeking  to  investigate,  before  we  engage  on  the  process.  The 
innate  notion  of  God  furnishes  us  with  a  sufficient  incentive  and 
suggestion  of1  Him.  With  the  data  given  us  by  Faith,  “the 
foundation  and  point  of  departure  for  knowledge”  of  God,2  we 
put  ourselves  in  the  way  of  obtaining  and  observing  the  data 
of  religion.  The  objective  and  subjective  factor  of  religious 
certainty,  developed  and  stimulated  by  the  Christian  life,  both 
in  its  corporate  relation  with  the  Church  as  embodying  and 
guaranteeing  the  teachings  of  Christianity,  and  in  its  personal 
and  intimate  communion  with  God,  generate  a  degree  of  cer¬ 
tainty3  which  by  the  exercise  of  reason,  and  the  scientific  method, 
can  become,  as  well,  scientific  certainty.4  Scientific  certainty 
and  knowledge  develop  on  the  basis  of  religious  knowledge  and 
certainty.  We  can  know  about  God,  and  the  character  of  our 
certainty  is  not  less  scientific  than  that  generated  by  any  other 
science. 

This  scientific  certainty  is  neither  superfluous  nor  impious.5 
It  is  justifiable  to  seek  and  achieve  it.  It  is  especially  useful 
and  necessary  in  these  days,  when  agnostic  views  are  so  preva¬ 
lent.  From  Plotinus6  to  Schleiermacher  men  have  denied  the 
possibility  of  God’s  self-knowledge,  and  in  consequence,  that  of 
man’s  knowledge  of  God.  Schleiermacher  holds  that  knowledge 
involves  antitheses.  We  compare  two  things,  and  come  to  know 
them  by  detecting  their  qualities  and  characteristics.  Self- 
knowledge  on  God’s  part  would  involve  antitheses  in  His  quali- 


1  On  which  see  below  pp.  63-65. 

2  RhSsse,  op.  cit.,  p.  70. 

*Ibid.,  pp.  72-85. 

4  Ibid.,  pp.  85,  132. 

5  Ibid.,  p.  133. 

6  Cf.  Plotinus,  Ennead.,  5,  1,  3;  5,  1,  6;  5,  3,  10;  6,  9,  6,  etc. 


GOD  AS  OBJECT  TO  KNOWLEDGE 


ties,  and  our  knowledge  of  Him  would  demand  that  He,  a  sub¬ 
ject  of  that  knowledge,  be  limited  by  the  compass  of  our  ca¬ 
pacity  for  knowing.  Since  self-knowledge  would  involve 
antitheses  in  His  essence,  and  knowledge  on  our  part  of  Him 
would  demand  limitation  of  His  character,  no  knowledge  of  God 
is  possible,  and  He  is  only  to  be  perceived  by  the  feelings.  But, 
on  the  contrary,  knowledge  does  not  postulate  antitheses,  but 
only  differences.  God  as  the  one  knowing  subject  and  the  one 
Object  Self-known  can  know  Himself  as  both  Knower  and 
Known,  without  any  detriment  to  His  Unity.  “So  man  as  sub¬ 
ject  knows  God  as  object,  as  not  altogether  other  than  himself 
(since  God  created  man,  and  knows  Himself  as  Creator)  but 
as  his  own  Highest  Cause,  limited  neither  by  our  knowledge  nor 
by  our  existence.  Therefore  God,  as  the  Highest  Cause  of  us 
and  of  the  universe,  contains  us  and  the  world  as  known,  inas¬ 
much  as  He  is  the  cause  of  our  existence  and  of  the  possibility 
of  our  knowledge.”1 

We  derive  our  knowledge  of  God  from  our  innate  feeling 
and  conviction  of  His  existence,  developed  by  our  contact  with 
the  world  of  experience,  and  by  the  use  of  our  rational  faculty 
seeking  to  discover  the  reason  of  this  innate  “faith",  “actuated 
by  the  desire  to  know  the  content  of  our  Faith,  and  to  resolve 
the  various  phenomena  or  energies  of  the  world  and  their  con- 
secpiences  into  their  Ultimate  Cause.”2  The  conclusions  of 
“natural  religion’’  are  corrected,  supplemented,  and  completed 
by  the  revelation  made  by  God  in  Jesus  Christ.  We  begin 
with  an  innate  instinct  about  God,  as  St.  John  Damascene 
says :  “A  knowledge  of  the  existence  of  God  is  sown  in  our  very 
nature."3  It  is  “the  organ  for  the  apprehension  of  God  which 
He  engraved  in  man”,4  that  is,  it  is  a  means  for  knowing  Him, 
a  propensity,  a  capacity,  and  an  impulse  to  know  God,  not  a 
complete  knowledge  of  Him,  nor  even  a  ready  formed  concep¬ 
tion  of  His  Xature.1 *  It  is  a  common  heritage  of  all  men,8  as 

1  Rhdsse,  op.  cit.,  p.  135. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  132. 

3  "E/cSocrts,  1,  1,  9,  and  12. 

4  Androutsoa,  op.  cit.,  p.  34. 

*  Ibid.,  pp.  34-5. 

’  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  III.  p.  88. 


II.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  GOD 


(54 

we  know  from  the  history  of  the  religious  instinct  in  man/  yet 
as  such  it  is  only  “a  kind  of  innate  feeling  about  God”.1 2  It  is 
part  of  man’s  logical  faculty,  this  impulse  Godwards,  and  pro¬ 
vokes  in  him  a  recognition  of  dependence  upon  a  Higher  and 
supernatural  Power.3 4  It  cannot  be  maintained  that  “we  have 
in  us  an  instinctive  conception  of  God  which  is  complete  and  per¬ 
fect”/  We  do  have  an  innate  desire  and  impulse  to  know  Him, 
but  the  development  of  it  is  a  moral  matter.  Faith  and  reason 
are  both  essential  for  its  growth  and  development.  This  “in¬ 
nate  feeling  of  the  existence  of  a  Higher  Power”5 6  leads  and 
precedes  the  action  of  the  reason :  the  <rheart”  leads  the  “head”. 
The  conception  of  God  is  a  result  of  the  impulse  given  by  this 
instinct  of  man’s  mind  and  soul,  and  “is  formed  by  the  observa¬ 
tion  of  His  works,  man  naturally  being  inclined  towards  Him”.* 
“The  power  by  which  man  perceives  God,  revealed  in  general 
and  in  part  (in  Nature)  is  Faith, — the  feeling  by  which  man 
is  led  to  name  and  acknowledge  the  presence  of  God  in  the 
natural  and  ethical  world.  ...  As  such  an  attitude  of  accept¬ 
ing  the  unknown  and  mysterious,  it  is  a  necessary  phenomenon 
of  the  natural  constitution  of  man  on  its  psychological  side, 
and  not  a  peculiarity  of  Christianity.  ...  In  Christianity  this 
faith,  purged  and  made  living  by  divine  Grace,  both  gains 
certainty  about  its  divine  authenticity,  and  develops  its  vital 
character,  becoming  the  living  power  of  the  religious  and  eth¬ 
ical  life.”7  Faith,  as  moral  and  not  completely  rational,  is 
a  matter  of  the  will.  Consequently  the  innate  instinct  for  God 
may  be  denied  its  place  in  man’s  moral  life,  and  may  never  be¬ 
come  a  dynamic  force  as  means  of  approach  to  God.8  It  cannot 
then  be  the  one  means  leading  inevitably  to  a  certain  and  full 
conception  of  His  character,  as  the  existence  of  atheism  shows. 

“Man  must  then  have  an  idea  of  God  in  himself  if  Nature 

1  Cf.  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  Ill,  p.  88-89.  n.  2,  the  evidence  from  all  an¬ 
cient  authors  from  Cicero  on,  and  cf.  the  “historical  argument”  below. 

2  RhOsse,  op.  cit.,  p.  132. 

3  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  35. 

4  Dvobouniotes,  'H  Aoyixar.  ’Avdpovraov  KpivopevT),  pp.  11-12. 

5  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  III.  p.  90. 

6  Androutsos,  p.  42. 

7  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  37. 

8  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  35. 


GOD  AS  OBJECT  TO  KNOWLEDGE 


65 


is  to  speak  through  it  of  God.  Nature  is  a  book  made  only  of 
elements  in  accord  (avfuf>wv<ov) ,  and  we  must  offer  that  which  we 
bear  in  us  of  these  accords  in  order  to  be  able  to  read  this  book. 
Nature  both  hides  and  reveals  God.  She  is  a  veil,  but  it  is 
diaphanous.  But  we  must  wish  to  seek  God  in  order  to  find  Him. 
Those  who  do  not  desire  to  seek  Him,  do  not  find  Him  in  Nature. 
As  all  things  give  testimony  of  God  to  those  who  love  and  seek 
Him,  so  all  things  hide  Him  from  those  who  do  not  wish  to  know 
Him.”1  We  know  God  only  through  His  revelation  of  Himself 
in  Nature,  and  through  our  Lord.  “Christian  knowledge  of 
God  is  based  on  these  two  factors,  the  natural  apprehension  of 
Him  in  Nature,  and  the  certainty  which  the  authenticity  of 
Revelation  affords.”2 3  By  reason,  we  search  back  of  the  visible 
things  of  Nature  to  the  unseen  Cause  behind  them.8  Nature  is 
a  mirror  which  reflects  the  greatness  of  God,  for  she  reveals  the 
might  and  glory  of  Him  who  created  her.4  To  His  revelation  in 
Nature  we  owe  the  knowledge  of  His  attributes  and  properties, 
as  Almighty,  All-present,  Transcendent,  and  the  like.  Revela¬ 
tion  changes  the  motive  of  man’s  religious  desires  so  that  they 
are  not  only  feelings  based  on  a  conviction  of  creature-hood, 
and  on  gratitude  for  existence,  but  “natural  religion  is  elevated 
into  spiritual  and  ethical  devotion,  as  God  reveals  Himself  to 
man.  His  creature,  as  Love.  .  .  .and  man  is  drawn  to  Him  under 
the  impulse  of  reverence  and  filial  devotion.”5  By  the  Divine 
Revelation  we  are  told  nothing  of  the  Divine  attributes,  but 
Revelation  serves  to  purge  our  conceptions  of  error,  and  to  com¬ 
plete  the  knowledge  of  God  gained  from  external  nature.6  In 
summary,  we  mav  say  that  we  derive  our  knowledge  of  God 
from  the  observation  of  nature,  supplemented  by  Revelation, 
and  that  this  process  is  initiated  by  the  innate  instinct  of  man7 

1  Mesolora,  op.  tit.,  III.  p.  91. 

2  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  37. 

3  St.  Greg.  Xaz.,  Discourse  28,  10. 

4  St.  John  Damascene,  "Ek-Soo-is,  I,  quoted  by  Androutsos,  p.  36. 

5  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  36. 

6  Androutsos,  loy  nar  ucr] ,  pp.  42-43. 

7  RhSsse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  125-6,  cf.  pp.  126-129,  for  Patristic  evidence 
for  this  view.  “The  innate  feeling  about  God  is.  .  .  the  psychological 

principle  and  basis  of  our  natural  knowledge,  which  man  acquires 
through  the  examination  of  the  world”  (p.  128). 


66 


II.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  GOD 


reaching  Godwards,  and  in  a  vague  way  feeling  the  conviction 
of  His  existence.  Faith  furnishes  the  means  for  the  experi¬ 
ment,  and  through  it  only  are  the  data  made  available. 

Since  our  knowledge  of  God  is  based  on  His  relations  with 
the  world,  recognizing  them  we  postulate  certain  qualities  of 
Him,  saying  that  He  is  Almighty,  Eternal,  All-Wise,  Every¬ 
where  Present.  Consequently  our  knowledge  of  Him  will  neces¬ 
sarily  be  imperfect.  “Since  the  infinite  God ....  cannot  be  the 
(direct)  object  of  our  scrutiny,  but  is  manifested  only  in  Rev¬ 
elation,  the  conceptions  which  we  form  of  Him  cannot  pre¬ 
sent  Him  as  He  is,  but  only  imperfectly  and  by  analogy  with 
the  perfections  of  the  finite  world.”1  On  the  basis  of  the  works 
of  His  creation  our  knowledge  is  imperfect,  incomplete,2 3  “rel¬ 
ative  and  limited  both  in  form  and  content.”  It  is  limited  in 
form,  for  human  knowledge  is  not  absolute,  since  man  cannot 
probe  the  depths  of  the  nature  of  God  on  this  earth.8  It  is 
limited  in  content,  since  his  finite  mind  cannot  compass  the  ab¬ 
solute  and  infinite  essence  and  knowledge  of  God.4 5  “We  do  not 
know  clearly  what  He  is  according  to  His  Nature,  since  it  sur¬ 
passes  our  comprehension.’”  We  only  see  in  part,  as  “through 
a  glass,  darkly”.6  His  Revelation  of  Himself  was  conditioned 
and  gauged  by  the  capacity  of  man  to  receive  it,7  and  conse¬ 
quently  it  is  only  a  partial  manifestation  of  Himself.8  We  may 
not  know  God,  we  can  only  know  about  Him ;  so  we  can  speak 
more  easily  of  what  He  is  not,  than  of  what  He  is.9  “What 
God  is  in  His  Nature,  cannot  be  known  by  any  creature.”10  The 
silences  of  Revelation  are  as  significant  as  its  statements,  since 
they  leave  the  vast  questions  of  His  essence  outside  the  bounds 
of  the  possibility  of  human  knowledge.11 

1  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  40. 

2  Androutsos,  ^oyixariK-q,  pp.  52,  45-6. 

3Cf.  1  Cor.  2,  10. 

4  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  136. 

5  Orth.  Cat.  (Bal.)  p.  10. 

6  1.  Cor.  13,  9,  12. 

7  St.  John  Damascene,  "E/cSocris,  1,  1,  12. 

8  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  III.  p.  98. 

9  St.  Athanasius,  Epis.  V.  ad  Monachos,  2.,  and  cf.  St.  Augustine 
facilius  dicimus  quid  non  sit,  quam  quid  sit  (on  Psalm  8,  5). 

10  Mogila,  in  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  I.  p.  379. 

11  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  41. 


GOD  AS  OBJECT  TO  KNOWLEDGE 


67 


Nevertheless  our  knowledge  of  God  is  a  true  knowledge,  of 
a  growing  and  developing  character,  and  this  progress  only  sug¬ 
gests  the  impossibility  of  an  adequate  and  exhaustive  knowl¬ 
edge  on  man’s  part.1  We  have  no  perfect  and  actual  knowl¬ 
edge  of  Him  as  He  is,2  for  this  is  one  of  the  errors  the  Church 
condemned  in  Eunomius.  At  the  same  time  we  must  admit 
that  we  can  have  an  adequate  and  sufficient  knowledge  about 
Him,  in  contradiction  to  the  error  of  Arius  who  said  that  we 
can  have  no  knowledge  of  Him.3  While  our  knowledge  cannot 
be  exhaustive,  from  the  point  of  view  of  God  as  its  object,  still 
it  is  essential  for  us  and  of  the  greatest  value  to  us.  Our  knowl¬ 
edge  of  Him  as  expressed  by  the  attributes  and  properties  we 
predicate  of  God,  cannot  be  said  to  constitute  actual  and  ade¬ 
quate  representations  of  the  Divine  attributes,  for  it  is  expres¬ 
sed  in  statements  which  are  only  valid  by  analogy.  They  are 
only  incomplete  statements,  representing  actual  relations  of 
God  with  His  universe,  and  by  no  means  adequately  and  ex¬ 
haustively  sum  up  the  actual  properties  of  God  viewed  from  the 
point  of  His  Nature  in  itself.  They  are  adequate  for  us,  but 
not  exhaustive  and  complete  in  their  content  or  in  their  form.4 

In  our  knowledge  of  the  revelation  of  God  as  presented  in 
Nature,  our  minds  develop  certain  statements  of  the  attributes 
of  God  as  shown  in  His  relations  with  the  universe,  by  the 
three  following  methods  of  reasoning.  We  distinguish  them 
by  our  attitude  toward  and  reaction  from  the  phenomena  of  Na¬ 
ture.  If  we  postulate  that  God  is  infinitely  removed  from  the 
imperfections  of  this  world,  we  likewise  affirm  of  Him  all  the 
perfections  that  are  suggested  by  all  that  is  best  in  Nature. 
This  latter  attitude  presupposes  Him  as  the  Cause  of  all,  for  He 
is  thought  of  “as  the  Cause  which  has  within  it  perfectly,  what¬ 
ever  is  shown  as  result  and  effect  in  the  world”.  Thus  may  be 
distinguished  the  three  methods  of  the  knowledge  of  God  devel¬ 
oped  by  the  scholastics,  and  by  them  called  via  negationis,  via 
emineniiae,  and  the  via  affirmations  (causalitatis) .  Pseudo- 

1  RhOsse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  136-137,  Androutsos,  p.  41. 

2  Cf.  Dyobouniotes,  'H  ^07/x.  ’A vdpovTaov  Kpivopevri,  p.  14. 

3  RhOsse,  op.  cit.,  p.  137,  Androutsos,  ^07^0x1/07,  p.  43. 

4  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  41-2. 

5  Androutsos,  ibid.,  p.  47;  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  III.  p.  98;  Rhosse,  op. 
cit.,  p.  139. 


68 


II.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  GOD 


Dionysius  the  Areopagite  says  that  we  may  come  to  the  knowl¬ 
edge  of  the  Unknown  and  Transcendent  God  from  the  world 
which  shows  Him  forth  “by  the  abstraction  of  Him  from  all 
things,  by  postulating  of  Him  His  eminence,  and  by  regarding 
Him  as  cause  of  all.”1 2 3  As  was  suggested,  these  three  methods 
really  are  reducible  to  two,  since  the  via  eminentiae  is  only  a 
correction  and  completion  of  the  via  affirmations  ( causali - 
tatis).'  So  the  denial  of  any  imperfections  in  God  is  closely 
linked  with  the  affirmation  of  perfections,  and  the  via  affrma- 
tionis  is  intimately  bound  up  with  the  via  negationist  we  at¬ 
tribute  to  God  in  the  highest  degree  a  perfection,  which  may 
also  be  regarded  as  a  removal  of  an  imperfection,  in  the 
building  up  of  our  conceptions  of  Him. 

Our  conceptions  of  God  are  then  subjective,  inasmuch  as 
they  are  the  conclusions  of  our  reason  guided  by  faith  and  in¬ 
spired  by  the  innate  feeling  of  God.  They  do  however  corres¬ 
pond  to  true  relations  of  God’s  Nature  to  His  universe.  As 
statements  and  ideas  they  are  only  imperfect  and  analogous,  as 
is  our  knowledge  of  God  in  general.  “They  are  subjective  rep¬ 
resentations  of  actual  relations  of  the  infinite  God  toward  His 
finite  world.”4 5 6 *  (a)  One  false  view  of  the  attributes  of  God  re¬ 
garded  them  as  actual  divisions  of  the  Divine  Essence.  This 
took  for  granted  the  hypothesis  that  His  Essence  could  be  known 
by  us  immediately  and  directly.  Against  this  gross  conception 
Eunomius  reacted,  and  as  the  one  attribute  of  the  Divine  Es¬ 
sence  postulated  his  theory  of  the  “unbegottenness”  of  God  as 
constituting  His  Essence.  He  was  right  in  rejecting  the  lineal 
demarcation  of  God’s  Essence  into  attributes,  as  if  it  were  an 
area  subject  to  measurement  and  scrutiny/  but  wrong  in  deny¬ 
ing  the  possibility  of  any  knowledge  of  God.8  (b)  A  second 
wrong  view  is  that  of  the  Nominalists,  who  held  that  the  at- 

1  De  divinis  nominibus,  7,  3. 

2  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  48. 

3  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  139. 

4  Androutsos  A07.  Me\.  A’,  p.  43. 

5  For  this  destroys  the  fundamental  notion  of  God’s  unity  and 
simplicity. 

6  This  is  an  argument  of  those  who  hold  that  our  conceptions  of 

the  attributes  are  mere  ideas  of  our  own,  which  have  no  objective 

reality. 


GOD  AS  OBJECT  TO  KNOWLEDGE 


69 


tributes  of  God  are  simply  figments  of  our  own  imagination, 
actually  revealing  to  us  nothing  of  the  Divine  Nature.  They 
said:  “The  acceptance  of  (these  conceptions  as  describing)  actual 
attributes  in  God’s  Nature  (1)  involves  the  danger  of  import¬ 
ing  secondary  and  temporal  elements  into  the  Divine  Essence; 
(2)  takes  away  the  unity  and  simplicity  of  God,  making  Him 
into  a  bearer  of  different  attributes,  and  (3)  imperils  His  ab¬ 
soluteness,  by  converting  God  into  the  attribute  we  predicate  of 
Him.”  Both  Holy  Scripture  and  the  Fathers  regard  the  at¬ 
tributes  they  ascribe  to  God  as  not  mere  empty  words,  or  as 
synonyms,  or  metaphors,  but  as  describing  actual  qualities  in 
Him.  If  we  take  the  attributes  simply  as  our  conceptions  of 
Him,  without  the  conviction  that  they  represent  actual  rela¬ 
tions  on  His  part  with  His  world  independent  of  our  own  view 
of  them,  the  conception  of  Revelation  is  destroyed,  religious 
feeling  is  brought  to  naught,  and  faith  is  deprived  of  all  truth. 
“The  religious  longing  for  some  form  of  conceiving  God  cannot 
be  driven  back  to  and  satisfied  by  the  general,  abstract,  and 
lifeless  notion  of  Him  as  the  Absolute  and  Infinite,  but  is 
drawn  toward  Him  as  to  a  Father  full  of  all  ethical  perfections.”1 
In  answer  to  the  Nominalist  arguments,  (a)  it  may  be  said 
that  nothing  contingent  or  secondary  is  introduced  into  the  con¬ 
ception  of  His  attributes,  as  they  are  only  statements  of  His 
Essence  as  functioning  in  His  Creation  and  known  through 
it.  (b)  They  do  not  take  away  His  unity,  as  the  attributes 
are  only  the  expression  of  His  one  Nature  in  relation  to  the 
world,  (c)  We  do  not  think  of  God  as  a  partaker  of  right¬ 
eousness,  but  view  righteousness  as  actually  complete  in  Him 
alone,  predicating  it  of  Him  not  synthetically,  but  analyti¬ 
cally.2  The  attributes  of  God  are,  as  it  were,  the  refraction  of 
the  rays  of  light  of  one  diamond,  mirrored  by  lesser  jewels 
ranged  round  about  it.s 

The  attributes  then  consist  of  actual  relations  of  God  with 
His  world,  expressed  in  our  own  terms.  Our  terms  are  incom- 

1  Androutsos,  AoypariKTi,  p.  43,  and  cf.  Rhosse,  op.  cit pp.  298-300. 
Spinoza’s  omnis  determinatio  est  negatio  is  one  instance  of  this  type 
of  argument  (Nominalist). 

1  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  43-44. 

“Scheeben,  Handbuch  der  Katholischen  Dogm-atik ,  I,  p.  507,  quoted 
by  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  47. 


70 


II  — THE  DOCTRINE  OF  GOD 


plete,  and  our  knowledge  relative  only,  nevertheless  such  “an 
acknowledgement  of  that  which  is  truly  present  to  God’'1 2 *  is 
both  sufficient,  valid,  and  true.  These  terms  are  not  adequate 
in  relation  to  Him,  as  they  do  not  encompass  His  Nature,  but 
they  are  the  sufficient  and  best  means  of  conceiving  the  actual 
action  of  the  Divine  Essence  as  it  penetrates  through  to  our  un¬ 
derstanding.  Though  they  are  subjective,  we  must  not  under¬ 
stand  them  to  be  “an  arbitrary  and  unsubstantiated  creation 
of  our  understanding,  but  as  reproducing  faithfully  the  actual 
relation  and  rapports  of  God  with  His  world.”'  We  mean  by 
“eternal”  that  this  is  the  most  adequate  description  of  His  rela¬ 
tion  to  time;  by  “almighty  ’,  the  expression  of  His  actual  infin¬ 
ite  might  in  contrast  to  the  limited  power  of  the  finite  creation. 
As  St.  Basil  says:  “We  know  our  God  from  His  operations,  but 
are  unable  to  draw  near  to  His  Essence.  For  His  operations 
come  down  to  us,  while  His  Essence  remains  unapproachable”.* 
What  we  predicate  of  Him  is  true,  though  its  form  be  that  of 
our  subjective  conceptions.  These  do  sufficiently  represent  ac¬ 
tual  and  real  relations  of  the  infinite  God  to  His  world.4 

The  human  mind  under  the  prompting  of  its  innate  feeling 
for  God,  through  faith  and  reason  develops  its  knowledge  of 
God  into  certain  terms  called  His  qualities,  attributes,  and  the 
like.  These  represent  true  insight  into  His  dealings  with  His 
world,  and  are  sufficient  descriptions  of  Him  as  He  is  revealed  in 
them.  We  may  not  know  Him  directly,  but  we  may  know  about 
Him,  through  His  Revelation  of  Himself  in  Nature  and  in  our 
Lo rd.  Such  knowledge  is  truly  scientific,  and  is  adequate  for 
our  needs. 


1  at.  Basil,  adversus  E-unomium,  1,  13. 

2  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  45. 

8  Epist.  234  ad  Amphil.,  2. 

4  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  46-47.  cf.  controversy  of  Androutsos  and 
Dyobouniotes :  Dvobouniotes  A07.  ’Avd.  xpiv.,  pp.  14-15,  and  Androutsos, 
Aoyp.  MeXerat,  A’,  pp.  43-48.  St.  Thomas  separates  the  distinctio  rationis 
ratiocinantis  from  the  distinctio  rationis  ratiocinatae, — the  former 
being  purely  subjective  conceptions,  the  latter,  subjective  conceptions  of 
objective  realities. 


2.  THE  ARGUMENT  FOR  THE  EXISTENCE  OF 
GOD  AND  ITS  BEARING  ON  OUR 
KNOWLEDGE  OF  HIM 

The  existence  of  God.  has  been  treated  of  in  philosophy  and 
theology  nnder  several  different  “proofs”,  more  properly  called 
“arguments”.  We  may  distinguish  seven  of  them :  the  cos¬ 
mological,  psychological,  physico-teleological,  ethical,  ontolog¬ 
ical,  and  historical,  in  one  group,1  and  the  apologetic  argument 
from  miracle.  As  the  last  takes  for  granted  the  existence  of 
God,  already  believed  in  on  different  grounds,  it  cannot  be  con¬ 
sidered  here  as  one  of  the  arguments  to  show  His  existence  and 
to  furnish  us  with  data  as  to  His  attributes.2  After  presenting 
each  argument  in  turn,  and  examining  its  contribution  to  our 
knowledge  of  God's  existence  and  the  data  it  furnishes  as  to 
His  Nature  and  attributes,  we  shall  consider  them  as  a  whole, 
and  show  their  intimate  relation  to  each  other. 

(1)  The  cosmological  argument,  recognizing  the  cause  and 
effect  relation  of  all  tfratris  in  the  world,  and  showing  each 
cause  to  have  been  the  effect  of  a  preceding  cause,  reasons  back 
to  a  “Prime  Mover”  or  “First  Cause”,  which  is  God.8  He  is 
not  only  the  First  Cause  but  also  the  only  uncaused  Cause, 
the  Cause  of  causes.  All  causes  in  the  phenomenal  world  are 
then  contingent  and  secondary ;  He  only  is  necessary  and  pri¬ 
mary.4  The  existence  of  this  Cause  is  necessary  to  explain 
and  order  the  phenomena  of  Nature.  Reasoning  from  the 
same  data  the  materialist  may  work  towards  a  first  Cause 
which  is  itself  subject  to  the  law  of  necessity  which  governs 
the  physical  universe,  and  may  be  a  cause,  even  the  cause,  but 
it  is  not  necessarily  free  or  unlimited.  The  law  of  necessity 
which  prevails  in  the  physical  cosmos  may  be  conceived  of  as 
governing  the  initial  cause  as  well.  Hence,  the  attributes  of 
the  highest  power — in  relation  to  the  powers  in  the  physical 

1  Following  RhQsse’s  division,  op.  cit.,  p.  137.  That  of  Mesolora 
is  slightly  but  not  essentially  different — cf.  op.  cit.,  III.  pp.  91-95; 
Androutsos,  ad  loc.  cf.  below. 

2  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  140  (§  70). 

3  Aristotle,  Physics  8,  5;  Metaphysics,  12,  6. 

*  St.  Augustine,  Conf.  X,  6.,  and  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  Ill,  p.  92:  “The 
whole  of  the  finite  energies  of  the  world  are  only  secondary  causes, 
not  the  first  and  chief  Cause.” 


II.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  GOD 


world,  the  greatest  life — in  relation  to  the  living  forms  of  the 
universe,  and  the  most  eminent  good — in  relation  to  the  con¬ 
tingent  good  of  visible  and  phenomenal  nature,  are  all  we 
can  postulate  of  this  cause,  by  the  via  affirmationis ,  negationis, 
et  eminentiae.  Such  *a  development  of  attributes  is  circum¬ 
scribed,  as  “the  efficient  Cause  of  the  world,  the  Highest 
Power,  and  Dynamic  Energy  is  subject  to  the  law  of  neces¬ 
sity.”1 2 3  So  this  argument  from  the  world  as  a  result  of  chance 
and  as  contingent"  is  strictly  limited.  It  reasons  from  motion 
to  a  Prime  Mover,8  from  causes  and  results  to  the  Cause,4 5  pos¬ 
tulates  of  this  Cause  the  highest  of  those  qualities  which  char¬ 
acterize  the  phenomena  of  the  physical  world,  but  is  so  incom¬ 
plete  and  unsatisfactory  in  itself  that  it  demands  being  sup¬ 
plemented  by  the  subsequent  arguments.6 7 

(2)  The  psychological  argument  notes  the  fact  that  self- 
conscious  thought  distinguishes  in  man  the  material  body  from 
the  perceiving  and  knowing  faculty,  which  is  not  material. 
Man  comes  to  recognize  his  resemblance  physically  to  other 
organisms  in  the  world,  to  compare  his  body  with  theirs,  and 
in  the  realization  of  his  relative  perfection,  to  reason  toward 
a  cause  more  perfect  than  himself,  of  his  thinking,  willing, 
and  perceiving  faculty.  As  the  preceding  argument  tended 
to  suggest  the  necessity  of  a  First  Cause  of  physical  phenom¬ 
ena,  so  the  psychological  development  of  man  points  him 
toward  a  Cause  of  his  spiritual  faculties.  Man  comes  to  $ee 
himself  as  a  microcosm,6  and  to  reason  that  since  he  is  not 
self-caused,  there  must  be  a  Cause  both  of  him,  material  and 
immaterial,  and  of  the  rest  of  the  universe,  physical  and 
spiritual.  So  soon  as  he  comes  to  the  consciousness  of  the 
existence  of  persons/  he  comes  as  well  to  the  realization  that 
they  were  not  self-caused,  any  more  than  is  he.  His  con* 

1  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  144  (§  82). 

2  Androutsos,  AoypaTiKri,  p.  37. 

3  Aristotle,  Met.  12. 

4  Cf .  St.  John  Damascene,  who  reasons  from  the  created  (or  caused) 
to  the  Creator  (or  Cause)  in  "E/cSocm  1,  3;  in  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  92. 

5  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  141-145. 

6  Rhdsse,  note  pp.  145-148;  cf.  p.  147. 

7  “Person”  distinguishes  living  organisms  with  self-consciousness 

and  self-direction,  from  living  things  lacking  it;  ibid.,  note  2,  pp.  148-149. 


THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD 


73 


sciousness  of  his  own  self-determination  and  self-direction 
brings  him  to  postulate  of  this  Cause  the  like  qualities  which 
he  possesses,  only  in  an  eminent  degree.  This  rational  pro¬ 
cess  serves  but  to  confirm  his  natural  and  innate  tendency 
toward  the  recognition  of  the  Cause  of  himself,  (the  innate 
instinct  for  God  mentioned  above)  and  he  then  postulates  of 
that  Cause  all  the  qualities  which  exist  in  him, — of  self-de¬ 
termination,  self-direction,  forethought,  reason,  and  will.1  Two 
forms  of  this  psychological  argument  link  it  closely  with  the 
teleological  argument:  (a)  The  imperfect  human  spirit  seeks 
an  adequate  object  of  its  intellectual  faculty  in  the  knowledge 
of  the  highest  spiritual  Being,  who  is  the  Cause  of  the  physi¬ 
cal  and  psychological  world,  itself  Mind,  Thought,  Will;  and 
(b)  the  recognition  of  the  psychological  demand  for  the  exis¬ 
tence  of  God  is  so  much  a  part  of  human  psychology  that  a 
denial  of  its  claim  is  tantamount  to  a  denial  of  one’s  own  reason. 
The  attributes  accorded  to  this  Cause  by  the  psychologi¬ 
cal  argument,  are  those  of  reason,  free  will,  conscious  and  self¬ 
directing  life,  and  of  being  the  highest  good  (together  with  the 
possession  of  these  qualities).2 3 * 

(3)  The  teleological  argument,  on  the  basis  of  the  two  pre¬ 
ceding,  develops  the  evidence  for  design  and  purpose  in  the 
material  and  immaterial  world.  Observation  descries  in  the 
material  and  physical  world,  both  inorganic  and  organic,  an  ar¬ 
rangement  and  order,  working  (it  is  true,  under  a  law  of  neces¬ 
sity,  but  yet)  for  some  object  and  end.  The  phenomena  of  the 
visible  world  may  be  arranged  in  orders,  of  which  the  lower  in 
each  case  subserves  the  purpose  of  the  higher,  inorganic  matter 
that  of  non-sentient  living  things,  plants  that  of  animals,  and 
animals  of  man.  Aristotle  saw  this  relation  of  the  parts  to 
the  whole,  of  the  functions  of  this  hierarchy  of  creation  in  the 
relation  of  one  part  to  the  others.5  Back  of  this  necessary  or¬ 
der  and  inevitable  sequence  of  cause  and  effect  lies  a  purpose 
or  aim,  the  presence  of  which  demands  a  mind  to  think  it. 
This  mind  is  the  Reason  of  all  the  physical  phenomena,  and  as 

1  RhOsse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  145-150. 

2  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  150-151. 

3  Aristotle,  Pol.  1,  1.  19-29;  Plato,  Soph.,  37;  Phileb.,  16,  28,  C-E., 

etc.;  pp.  153-4,  note  1,  Rhosse. 


74 


II.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  GOD 


well  an  attribute  of  the  Cause  initiating  and  overseeing  them. 
This  Reasoning  and  Determining  Cause  must  be  outside  the  world 
of  matter  and  not  only  resident  in  it;  man  is  driven  to  this 
conclusion  by  the  observation  of  blind  necessity,  conflict,  and 
mutual  antagonism  in  this  world.  A  purely  mechanical  ex¬ 
planation  of  the  phenomena1  does  not  account  for  all  of  the 
facts.  The  physical  world  is  not  perfect,  though  it  is  purpose¬ 
ful,  and  an  examination  of  it  alone  will  not  be  adequate  to  ex¬ 
plain  all  the  phenomena  of  the  universe,  unless  we  continue 
with  it  the  evidence  of  purpose  in  the  world  of  consciousness.2 

The  material  world  stands  as  a  whole  in  the  same  relation  to 
the  world  of  consciousness  and  mental  life,  as  its  own  lower 
orders  do  to  the  higher  whose  purposes  they  serve.  It  is  a 
means  and  vehicle  for  the  use  of  the  conscious  world.  Man  is 
the  master  of  the  world,  as  its  highest  developed  form,  and  in 
his  relations  to  it  sees  that  what  he  realizes  as  highest  and  most 
essentially  characteristic  of  his  fundamental  nature,  the  notion 
of  the  good,  is  not  actually  realized  in  the  world.  In  contrast 
to  the  law  of  necessity  ruling  in  the  phenomenal  world,  he  rec¬ 
ognizes  in  himself  the  power  of  self-determination  and  free 
will.  Since  his  highest  good  and  the  exercise  of  his  will  at 
its  noblest  are  frustrated  and  nullified  in  this  created  world, 
and  the  best  and  most  characteristic  element  in  him  lacks  ful¬ 
fillment  and  satisfaction,  he  is  “impelled,  as  it  were  by  neces¬ 
sity,  toward  some  higher  Good  as  the  End  of  the  world  and 
man”.  His  life  of  feeling,  thought,  and  will,  demands  some¬ 
thing  which  he  does  not  obtain  within  the  limits  of  the  world 
of  creation,  and  he  postulates  the  existence  of  a  Highest  Good 
as  the  End  and  Purpose  of  all.3 

1  RhSsse,  note  1,  pp.  156-158. 

2  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  151-159. 

3  Ibid.,  pp.  160-165.  cf.  St.  John  Damascene,  ’'E/c5ocm  r.  ’0 pd. 
IltVreajs,  1,  3,  quoted  in  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  III.  p.  93.  The  ethical 
argument  may  also  be  stated  as  follows:  (Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  38, 
note)  (a)  There  is  an  ethical  law  in  the  world,  but  an  ethical  act  in¬ 
volves  the  existence  of  free  will,  and  a  law,  of  a  Giver.  Hence  the 
Highest  Good  is  Giver  of  ethical  law.  (b)  This  ethical  law  involves 
a  harmony  of  acts  (virtue)  and  of  their  consequences  or  results 
(happiness).  The  conflict  and  opposition  of  the  world  to  these  and  its 
lack  of  ethical  harmony,  suggest  the  existence  of  One  to  effect  them, 
outside  the  world. 


THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD 


75 


The  cosmological  argument  pointed  to  the  existence  of  a 
First  and  Prime  Cause,  who  was  at  once  the  Highest  Being  and 
the  Greatest  Power.  The  psychological  argument  tended  to 
show  this  Cause  as  possessing  the  highest  and  best  mental  fac¬ 
ulties  of  self-determination,  self-consciousness,  self-direction, 
and  free  will.  The  teleological  argument  indicated  that  this 
Highest  Cause  or  Power,  and  Highest  Mind  or  Wisdom,  was 
also  the  greatest  Good  and  Purpose,  in  relation  to  Creation. 
The  limitations  of  these  conceptions  of  the  Divine  energy  are 
obvious :  they  outline  those  elements  which  we  recognize  as  true 
in  Pantheism ;  God  is  not  necessarily  above  and  beyond  His 
creation;  they  do  not  anywhere  indicate  His  character  as  Ab¬ 
solute,  and  they  constitute  only  certain  qualities  of  God,  with¬ 
out  suggesting  the  necessity  and  character  of  His  Essence  apart 
from  them,  as  the  unifying  principle  of  them  all.1 

(4)  The  ontological  argument  shows  the  Highest  Cause 
or  Power,  the  Highest  Mind  or  Will,  and  the  Highest  Good,  to  be 
as  well  the  Absolute.  Since  we  perceive  everything  in  this 
world  as  imperfect  and  finite,  we  necessarily  have  some  concep¬ 
tion  of  the  Infinite  and  Perfect,  or  Absolute,  by  which  we  meas¬ 
ure  and  judge  everything  in  this  world  as  finite  and  imper¬ 
fect.2  This  notion  is  not  the  result  of  experience,  but  exists 
of  itself.  It  “is  not  a  mere  abstraction  devoid  of  any  real¬ 
ity.''  It  exists  for  itself  and  of  itself  alone,  and  is  a  necessary 
notion.  We  then  postulate  this  note  of  the  absolute  and  in¬ 
finite,  of  God  “as  the  infinite  Power  and  Cause  not  only  of  the 
world,  but  of  Himself.”3 

The  first  basis  of  this  argument  is  in  Plato's  idealogy.  St. 
Gregory  Xyssa  used  to  show  the  eternity  of  God,4  and  St.  Au¬ 
gustine5  and  Boethius6  followed  him.  St.  Anselm  developed  it  in 
his  Proslogium  as  follows:  the  idea  of  the  existence  of  God  is 

1  RhOsse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  166-167. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  168,  and  note  2.  “Indefinite’’  and  “infinite”  had  a  dif¬ 
ferent  use  in  Plato  and  Aristotle,  who  applied  the  latter  in  the  sense 
of  the  former,  to  “formless  matter”.  For  our  purposes  “infinite”  and 
“absolute”  are  synonymous.  Cf.  also  p.  131,  note  1,  p.  177  (§  109). 

3  Ibid.,  p.  169. 

*  In  his  Catechetical  Discourse  (Prologue). 

5  De  libero  Arbitrio  11,  3-5. 

*  De  consolatione  phil.,  1,  111,  10. 


76 


II.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  GOD 


a  notion  quo  rnajus  cogitari  non  potest.  If  it  existed  only  in  the 
mind,  then  objective  existence  would  be  quid  majus.  Hence 
God  does  exist.  Furthermore  it  is  certain  that  nothing  greater 
can  be  conceived  than  this  existence,  than  which  anything 
which  did  have  existence  would  be  greater  if  that  did  not. 
Hence  God  must  exist.  The  value  of  St.  Anselm's  theory  is 
that  it  shows  that  the  notion  of  God  as  the  highest  notion  must 
involve  His  existence  in  fact.  Its  limitations  are  that  it  shows 
God's  existence  relatively  with  regard  to  His  universe,  and  not 
absolutely.  St.  Anselm  regards  God’s  existence  as  it  were  a 
quality  of  God,  and  as  something  not  necessarily  existing  in 
concept,  but  derivative1  and  by  implication,  and  he  does  not  show 
that  the  conception  is  necessary.2 

“A  perfect  formulation  of  the  ontological  argument  in¬ 
volves  the  demonstration  of  the  necessity  of  the  conception  of 
God  and  of  its  existence.”3  Descartes  showed  it  as  necessary, 
by  demonstrating  that  as  it  was  not  caused  by  reflection,  but 
was  innate,  it  could  only  be  caused  by  an  Infinite  Cause  itself. 
With  its  presence  was  bound  up  the  necessity  of  its  existence. 
According  to  Spinoza,  substantia — or  absolute  conception — is 
causa  sui ;  if  it  were  caused  by  anything  else,  it  would  not  be 
absolute.  As  cause  of  itself  this  absolute  conception  exists  of 
necessity.  When  it  is  known,  it  is  known  as  existing  necessarily, 
and  the  existence  of  the  Absolute  is  as  necessary  as  its  concep¬ 
tion.  Spinoza  agrees  with  Descartes  that  the  innate  idea  is  not 
fortuitous  but  necessary,  and  goes  beyond  him  in  thinking  that 
with  this  necessary  conception  of  it,  the  existence  of  the  Abso¬ 
lute  is  correspondingly  inevitable  and  necessary.4  Kant  held 
the  necessity  of  the  conception  or  idea  of  the  Absolute,  but 
denied  the  conclusion  that  it  must  necessarily  therefore  have 
objective  reality.  But  if  this  idea,  which  admittedly  gives  co¬ 
herence  and  unity  to  thought,  involves  no  contradictions,  but 
rather  is  essential  to  right  thinking,  how  is  it  possible  that  it 
has  not  objective  reality?  If  we  admit  the  possibility  of  a  con¬ 
tradiction  between  our  reasoning  and  our  necessary  concepts,  we 
are  on  the  way  to  a  scepticism  which  cuts  the  ground  from 

1  He  corrects  this  in  his  Monologium. 

2  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  170-171. 

3  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  172  (§  102). 

4  Ibid.,  p  .173. 


THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD 


77 


under  any  process  of  thought.  “If,  according  to  Kant,  the 
logical  process  of  thought  is  impossible  without  the  idea  of  God, 
this  idea  as  a  necessary  hypothesis  and  premise  of  every  mental 
process  cannot  be  based  only  on  the  subjective  conception  of 
the  human  consciousness,  but  being  independent  of  every  sub¬ 
jective  view,  makes  thought  logical  and  gives  unity  to1  it.”  Kant 
is  in  error  in  maintaining  that  it  does  not  follow  that  because 
we  necessarily  think  it,  an  idea  necessarily  represents  an  objec¬ 
tive  reality.  This  sceptical  view  is  opposed  by  subsequent  Ger¬ 
man  thinkers  such  as  Fichte,  Schelling,  Hegel,  and  Schleier- 
macher,  who  sustain  the  principle  that  “whatever  is  necessarily 
thought  as  existing,  does  actually  exist.” 

The  notion  of  the  Infinite  or  Absolute  does  not  take  away 
the  notes  of  self-begottenness,  self-determination,  self-contain¬ 
edness,  and  self-consciousness,  for  it  means  not  determined  by 
any  outside  agent.  So  “self-determined”  signifies  in  its  true 
meaning  what  is  meant  negatively  by  “Absolute”  or  “Infinite”, 
in  relation  to  determination.2  The  former  is  a  positive  and  the 
latter  a  negative  term  for  the  same  idea.  Furthermore,  this 
notion  of  God  as  Absolute,  indicated  by  the  ontological  argu¬ 
ment,  is  no  empty  and  abstract  conception  devoid  of  content,  or 
out  of  relation  with  the  preceding  arguments.  God,  as  First 
Cause,  was  the  Cause  of  Himself  as  of  all  creation,  and  as  self- 
caused  is  Absolute:  the  Cause  of  His  own  existence,  and  of  that 
of  all  existing  things.  This  same  relation  of  the  ontological 
argument  maintains  in  regard  to  the  others — God  as  First 
Cause  is  the  Infinite  and  Absolute  Cause;  as  Wisdom  and  Will, 
the  Infinite  and  Absolute  Wisdom  and  Will;  as  Good,  not  only 
the  Highest,  but  the  Absolute,  Good.  So  the  ontological 
argument  harmonizes,  summarizes,  and  unifies  all  the  preceding, 
which  serve  to  lead  up  to  it  and  to  prepare  the  material  and 
method  of  its  contention.3  In  general,  the  other  arguments 
deal  only  with  the  attributes  of  God  in  relation  to  this  world, 
while  the  ontological  arguments  postulate  their  several  conclu¬ 
sions  of  God’s  Essence  in  an  absolute  and  infinite  degree.4  In 

1  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  170  (§  107). 

-Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  297,  p.  177. 

3  Ibid.,  pp.  177-179. 

4  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  180-181,  and  note. 


78 


II.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  GOD 


relation  to  His  Creation  “the  absolute  attributes  of  God  take 
on  the  character  of  relative  attributes,  inasmuch  as  through 
them  God  comes  into  contact  with  the  world.”1 

The  conception  of  God  as  Infinite  or  Absolute  is  negative 
only  in  form,  not  in  content,  for  a  negative  conception  states 
what  a  thing  is  by  defining  what  it  is  not:  for  example,  “im¬ 
mortality”  expresses  a  positive  conception  of  eternal  life,  “in¬ 
corruptibility”,  an  affirmation  of  eternal  integrity  of  character 
subject  to  no  corruption.2  Man  has  of  necessity  to  have  recourse 
to  conceptions  thus  negative  in  form  to  express  an  affirmation 
of  content,  because  of  the  limited  experience,  power,  and  ca¬ 
pacity  of  the  finite  mind.  The  content  of  the  absolute  per¬ 
fections  of  God  is  not  supplied  by  the  ontological  argument,  but 
by  the  others  preceding  it.3  The  relations  of  the  Infinite  to  the 
Finite  have  been  regarded  in  three  ways:  as  antagonistic,  as 
identical,  or  as  causal  and  interrelated.  If  the  relation  of  In¬ 
finite  to  Finite  be  thought  of  as  antagonistic,  a  dualistic  prin¬ 
ciple  is  developed.  When  Finite  and  Infinite  are  regarded  as 
identical  then  a  pantheistic  system  results.  The  theistic  system 
views  the  Finite  as  caused  by  the  Infinite,4  who  stands  as  Creator 
in  an  intimate  and  constant  relation  toward  it  as  His  creature.5 6 

(5)  The  “historical”  argument,  showing  the  consensus  of 
opinion  of  mankind  in  favor  of  the  existence  of  God,8  with  the 
common  conviction  of  the  great  thinkers  and  philosophers  on 
this  point,  is  really  not  a  demonstration — far  less,  a  proof.  So 
far  as  it  bears  witness  to  the  innate  notion  or  feeling  of  God's 
existence,  its  evidence  was  taken  into  consideration  above.  The 
existence  of  this  conviction,  deeply  ingrained  in  human  nature,7 
is  only  a  proof  of  the  prevalence  of  the  notion,  not  a  demonstra¬ 
tion  of  its  validity.  Its  universality  is  dubious,  as  no  one  can 

1 P.  184. 

2  Cf.  St.  Gregory  Naz.,  Discourse  37,  9;  de  Anima  et  Resurr.,  p.  194. 

3  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  186. 

4  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  186-187. 

5  “Deism  stands  midway  between  dualism  and  theism,  as  regards 
the  only  and  sole  relation  of  the  Infinite  to  the  Finite  as  having  been 
that  of  First  Cause.  For  the  rest,  the  relationship  is  neither  neces¬ 
sary  nor  a  matter  of  concern.”  ibid. 

6  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  Ill,  p.  94,  and  note  2. 

7  Rhbsse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  137-8. 


THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD 


79 


sav  that  there  may  not  be  a  people  discovered  who  have  no  no¬ 
tion  of  God,  and  no  religion.1 

In  the  above  analysis  of  the  arguments  for  the  existence 
and  nature  of  God  we  reduced  the  original  number  (six)  to 
five,  as  the  physico-teleological  and  ethical  arguments  really 
generate  only  one  contention.  They  may  further  be  reduced  to 
the  four  main  arguments,  as  the  so-called  “historical”  argument 
is  without  force  or  connection  with  the  rest.  These  four  in 
turn  really  constitute  one  single  argument  or  proof,  of  which 
each  contributes  one  part.  They  are  not  four  proofs,  but  one 
cumulative  argument  “constituting  a  proof  of  the  exis¬ 
tence  of  God,  which  in  reference  to  His  one  Essence  according 
to  His  different  attributes,  is  a  sufficient  and  true  proof.”3 
Each  in  turn  is  refutable.  Ivant  assailed  the  cosmological  ar¬ 
gument  by  saying  it  was  only  another  form  of  the  ontological  ar¬ 
gument,  for  the  conception  of  a  Highest  Cause  is  not  derived 
from  experience  but  only  developed  from  the  mind.  He  also 
criticised  the  teleological  argument  as  containing  the  same  sort 
of  logical  “jump”  from  the  knowledge  of  a  part  of  the  world, 
to  a  general  conclusion  of  a  purposeful  principle  underlying 
the  universe.  The  same  objection  may  be  brought  to  bear  with 
great  force  against  the  psvchologico-ethical  argument.  The 
ontological  argument  may  be  criticised  as  a  “sophism  or  simple 
juggling  of  words" — particularly  in  its  Anselmic  form.  On 
the  whole,  however,  the  general  conclusion  developed  by  these 
four  arguments  though  it  is  “not  a  scientific  demonstration,  yet 
justifies  faith  in  God,  and  presents  the  aspects  in  which  the 
world  is  not  knowable  without  the  Absolute.  The  cosmological 
demonstration  shows  the  religious  conviction  ingrained  in  the 
human  conscience,  of  God  as  Cause  of  all ;  the  teleological,  God 
as  the  All-governing  Mind;  and  the  ontological  argument  says 
that  the  relation  of  man  to  God  presupposes  the  relation  of  God 
to  man.”3  “All  created  things  and  our  reflections  upon  them 
may  serve  as  guides  to  show  us  the  way  beyond  them  to  Him 
who  is  above  Nature,  God.  We  say  'guides’  only,  because  all 

1  Ibid.,  140.  For  evidence  cf.  Cicero,  Quaest.  Tuscul.  1,  13;  Clem. 
Alex.  Strom.  V,  14;  Lactantius,  Divin.  Instit.,  1,  2.  cf.  Androutsos 
op.  cit.,  note,  p.  39. 

2  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  138,  180. 

3  Androutsos.  op.  cit.,  pp.  37-39,  note  2.  (following  Nitzsch). 


so 


II.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  GOD 


the  proofs  of  the  existence  of  God  are  only  indirect,  not  direct 
demonstrations.  But  to  him  who  wishes  to  believe,  these  indirect 
proofs  are  sufficient..”1  So  they  come  to  substantiate  and  vindi¬ 
cate  the  faith  which  a  man  holds  on  other  grounds,  and  to  show 
it  as  logically  defensible,  as  argumenta  ad  hominem.  They 
are  useful  in  suggesting  the  only  right  relation  of  man  to  the 
universe,  yet  are  not  necessary  to  practising  Christians,  who 
come  by  their  faitli  through  a  different  channel.  They  sub¬ 
serve  a  useful  purpose  in  reestablishing  faith  when  one  has 
difficulties  and  doubts.  Properly  speaking  they  do  not  belong 
to  Dogmatic,  since  they  beg  the  question :  dogmatic  concerns  the 
exposition  of  the  Church’s  Faith,  which  it  takes  for  granted.2 

3.  CONTENT  OF  OUR  KNOWLEDGE  OF  GOD 

From  our  knowledge  of  God  as  partly  revealed  in  Nature 
and  perfectly  in  Jesus  Christ,  we  make  certain  statements  about 
Him,  saying  that  He  is  good,  just,  mighty,  and  the  like.  Such 
qualities  of  God  we  call  attributes  in  distinction  to  the 
properties  of  the  three  Persons  of  the  Godhead,  and  to  the 
predicates,  by  which  we  characterize  Him  as  the  subject  of 
various  acts — Creator,  Judge,  Redeemer,  and  the  like.  The 
Fathers  called  the  attributes  by  various  names :  idioms,  dig¬ 
nities,  representations,  virtues,  prerogatives,3  but  the  above  di¬ 
vision  will  be  found  simplest.  By  attributes  we  mean  subjec¬ 
tive  conceptions  of  actual  relations  of  the  Infinite  God  to  the 
finite  world.4  Various  methods  of  arranging  the  attributes 
have  been  followed  by  different  theologians,  which  may  be  re¬ 
solved  into  two:  (a)  an  arrangement  of  all  the  attributes  about 
some  central  idea,  such  as  love,  personality,  absolute  character, 
or  spirit;  and  (b)  the  empirical  arrangement  of  the  attributes 
under  some  principle  of  distinction,  for  example,  the  division 

1  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  III.  p.  92. 

2  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  37-40.  Cf.  Dyobouniotes,  Aoyti.  'A vSp. 
Kpivopevrj,  pp.  14-16,  and  Androutsos,  Aoyp..  MeXerat,  p.  49:  “These  proofs 
of  the  existence  of  God  looked  at  logically,  do  not  demonstrate  God’s 
existence  as  necessary  and  received  by  all”.  Androutsos  distinguishes 
between  proofs  and  argumenta  ad  hominem,  as  belonging  to  which 
class  alone  he  regards  the  above  arguments. 

3  Androutsos,  boynariKifi,  p.  42. 

4  Ibid.,  p.  44,  46;  Aoy/tartKat  MeXerat  A’,  p.  42,  etc. 


CONTENT  OF  OUR  KNOWLEDGE  OF  GOD 


SI 


into  “absolute”  and  “relative”  attributes.  The  first  method 
is  unsatisfactory,  except  as  an  exigency  of  arrangement,  “since 
every  quality  of  God  shows  His  Being  in  relation  to  the  world ; 
from  the  point  of  view  of  the  subject  matter  we  cannot  relate 
these  qualities  as  ‘higher’  or  ‘lower’.”1  As  a  matter  of  fact  this 
method  simply  implies  that  the  writer  considers  this  or  that 
attribute  as  central.  An  arrangement  of  all  the  attributes 
about  “Love”  as  central  is  far  from  satisfactory :  (a)  it  does 
not  distinguish  God  from  man,  except  the  note  of  fore-knowl¬ 
edge  be  added  to  this  conception;  (b)  it  takes  personality  for 
granted;  (c)  it  is  parallel  to  the  other  attributes  of  God,  and 
they  cannot  be  developed  from  Love.  So  “Personality”  as  a 
central  point  of  the  arrangement  of  the  attributes  is  not  ex¬ 
plicable  of  itself,  and  is  useless  as  a  source  from  which  to  de¬ 
rive  the  others,  a-s  it  is  of  itself  as  much  of  an  abstraction,  as  is 
the  conception  of  the  “Absolute”.  The  latter  cannot  be  used  as 
a  central  point  for  the  presentations  of  the  other  attributes  as  it 
is  of  itself  barren  of  content,  and  is  no  real  attribute  but  a 
characteristic  of  the  Divine  Essence  and  of  every  one  of  its 
attributes.2 3 *  The  arrangement  of  the  Eussian  theologians  who 
take  “Spirit”  as  the  focus  of  the  attributes  is  subject  to  the  same 
criticism.8 

ATarious  empirical  divisions  have  been  made:  (1)  “positive” 
and  “negative”  attributes:  as  this  is  only  a  formal  distinction, 
and  not  one  of  content,  it  is  not  valid.  The  negative  attributes 
affirm  a  perfection  of  God  by  denying  an  imperfection,  and  vice 
versa;  (2)  “absolute  and  relative”,  “eternal  and  temporal”, 
“quiescent  and  active”, — all  distinguish  the  attributes  on  the 
basis  of  the  relation  of  the  Divine  Being  to  the  world.  “But, 
there  are  no  absolute  attributes  belonging  to  the  Divine  Essence 
without  any  relation  to  the  world,  nor  can  the  absolute  attri¬ 
butes  be  thought  of  as  not  revealed  in  the  relation  of  God  to  the 
world,  nor  the  relative  attributes  as  not  founded  on  the  abso- 

1  Androutsos,  ^oyy.aTLKT],  p.  49,  cf.  Rhbsse,  op.  cit.,  p.  302.  Rhdsse  re¬ 
gards  this  ordering  of  the  attributes  as  only  possible  in  relation  to 
the  “absolute”  attributes  from  which  we  derive  the  “relative”  attri¬ 
butes,  in  which  case  we  can  speak  of  the  latter  as  “lower”. 

2  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  51. 

3E.  g.,  Antonius  and  Maearius,  cf.  note  3,  op.  cit.,  p.  48  (Androut¬ 

sos). 


82 


II.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  GOD 


lute  attributes.”1  We  cannot  speak  of  “relative”  in  the  sense  of 
“secondary”,  and  apply  it  to  the  Being  or  attributes  of  God,  any 
more  than  we  can  divide  His  attributes  into  “active”  and  “qui¬ 
escent”,  as  this  distinction  is  based  only  on  phenomenal  life, 
and  cannot  be  applied  to  Him  who  is  actus  purus,  semper  agens 
et  semper  quietus. 

Any  distinction  is  purely  the  result  of  the  action  of  our 
minds  in  so  ordering  the  material  as  to  make  it  most  intelli¬ 
gible  to  us.  We  cannot  distinguish  in  God  between  His  nature 
and  His  mind  or  His  Will,  hence  in  the  following  arrangement 
of  attributes  it  must  be  kept  in  mind  that  the  attributes  of  one 
class  are  really  those  of  the  other  as  well.  We  distinguish  the 
attributes  of  God  into  physical :  omnipresence,  eternity,  omnipo¬ 
tence  ;  logical :  omniscience,  wisdom ;  and  ethical :  holiness, 
justice,  love.2 


(b)  The  Attributes  of  God 

On  the  basis  of  the  cumulative  argument  for  the  Existence 
of  God,  as  well  as  by  the  ordinary  threefold  process  of  the  viae 
negationis,  affirmationis  vel  causalitatis,  et  eminentiae,  we  predi¬ 
cate  of  God  and  ascribe  to  Him  certain  qualities,  the  acme  of 
the  development  of  which  is  the  notion  of  the  Absolute.  This 
argument  with  its  content  and  conclusions  is  sustained,  verified, 
and  validated  by  the  evidence  of  Revelation.  We  have  come  to 
know  God  as  the  Greatest  Cause,  and  Might;  as  the  Greatest 
Reason,  Intellect,  Will,  and  Purpose;  as  the  Greatest  Life,  the 
Greatest  Justice,  and  the  Highest  Good.  All  of  these  qualities 
are  heightened  to  the  degree  of  “Absolute”,  which  conception 
affirms  their  infinite  character  and  also  unifies  them  as  the  sev- 

1  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  51;  and  Rhdsse,  op.  cit.,  p.  297. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  52 ;  and  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  305.  This  is  the  division  of 
Androutsos,  which  seems  to  commend  itself  more  than  that  of  RhOsse, 
who  postpones  the  discussion  of  the  attributes  and  properties  of  God 
until  after  his  treatment  of  the  Doctrine  of  the  Trinity  {op.  cit.,  pp. 
305  ff).  He  then  treats  of  the  absolute  attributes  (aseity,  indepen¬ 
dence,  self-determination,  self-sufficiency,  blessedness,  life,  harmony, 
good,  knowledge  and  wisdom,  will,  holiness,  righteousness,  spaceless¬ 
ness,  eternity,  unchangeability,  immateriality,  simplicity,  unity  — pp. 
305-310)  and  then  of  these  attributes  in  relation  to  the  world  (pp.  311- 
329).  On  his  view  of  the  attributes  cf.  pp.  297  ff. 


CONTENT  OF  OUR  KNOWLEDGE  OF  GOD 


83 


eral  aspects  of  a  single  Absolute  or  Infinite  Essence  or  Nature. 
While  in  a  sense  this  Infinite  character  is  an  idiom  of  God,  it  is 
more  properly  applied  to  His  Essence,  and  predicated  of  the 
quality  of  His  attributes.1  They  in  turn  serve  to  give  the  con¬ 
ception  of  the  Absolute  content  and  specific  meaning.  In  one 
sense  we  come  to  ascribe  this  absolute  character  to  His  Essence 
and  to  the  attributes  in  their  self-directed  mutual  relation 
alone,  conceiving  of  the  various  qualities  of  God  in  relation  to 
the  world  as  manifestations  of  these  attributes,  and  as  energies 
of  the  Divine  Essence  directed  toward  the  finite  universe,  and 
in  consequence,  in  this  sense  speak  of  them  as  “relative”.2  But 
if  we  come  to  any  knowledge  of  His  attributes,  and  hence  in 
some  degree  of  His  Essence,  we  do  so  from  our  knowledge  of 
His  world  and  His  relations  with  it  ;  hence  if  we  predicate  this 
Absolute  Character  of  His  Nature  and  attributes  we  cannot, 
save  by  reverent  theological  speculation,  postulate  it  of  any 
other  than  the  Nature  of  God  and  His  Attributes,  as  we  have 
come  to  know  them.3 

“Absolute”  or  “Infinite”  does  not  mean  “indefinite”  or  “un¬ 
determined”.  There  are  determinations  in  God,  but  they  are 
self-determinations.  God  is  not  in  Himself  undetermined,  un¬ 
defined,  and  indefinite.4  He  has  in  His  Infinite  Unity,  physical, 
logical,  and  ethical  determinations,  self-created  and  self-recog¬ 
nized.5  There  can  only  be  one  such  Infinite  or  Absolute.  He 
has  a  unique,  peculiar,  and  sole  character.  The  existence  of  the 
world,  which  is  contingent  and  finite,  does  not  affect  His  Abso¬ 
lute  Character,  for  it  was  caused  by  Him  and  owes  its  preser¬ 
vation  to  Him.6  His  self-determinations  are  neither  limita¬ 
tions  nor  negations,  but  affirmations  and  self-imposed  distinc- 

1  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  302-3. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  304. 

3  “There  are  no  attributes  belonging  to  the  Divine  Essence  without 
relation  to  the  world”.  .  .“We  cannot  omit  a  single  attribute  of  Him 
and  consider  that  we  have  rightly  conceived  of  His  Essence,  in  which 
all  things  are  determined  in  relation  to  each  other  and  mutually  de¬ 
pendent,  so  there  is  nothing  fortuitous  or  capable  of  being  omitted.” 
cf.  Dorner,  in  Nitzsch,  Lehrbuch  der  Evangelischen  Dogmatik,  p.  387, 
in  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  51-52. 

4  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  305,  131,  177,  180-1. 

6  Ibid.,  p.  306. 

6  Ibid.,  p.  310. 


84 


II.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  GOD 


tions  in  His  Essence.  These  attributes  are  infinite,  but  are 
known  to  us  in  their  relations  with  the  world.  “When  God  as 
absolutely  Good,  and  having  Absolute  Might,  Knowledge, 
Wisdom,  did  not  will  to  be  alone  good  in  Himself,  nor  alone 
to  be  Almighty,  All-knowing,  All-Wise  ....  by  Himself, 
but  as  Good,  willed  to  share  Himself  with  some  other  entity, 
.  .  .  .  having  the  knowledge,  wisdom,  and  power  to  effect 
this  Will,  ....  He  freely  with  this  motive  of  Infinite  Be¬ 
nignity  brought  it  about  and  realized  it  in  Creation.”1 

A.  The  Physical  Attributes 

The  basis  of  the  physical  attributes — Omnipresence,  Eter¬ 
nity,  and  Omnipotence — is  the  Absolute  Character  of  God.2 3 
Our  source  of  knowledge  is  His  revelation  of  His  presence,  His 
eternity,  and  His  might  in  creation,  and  in  relation  to  the 
finite.8  The  two  limitations  of  finite  creation  are  space  and 
time.  Because  God  is  Absolute  He  is  spaceless  and  timeless.4 
We  predicate  these  three  attributes  of  Him  as  Absolute,  in  His 
relations  with  His  world,  and  as  determining  all  things. 
Omnipresence  may  be  conceived  negatively  as  meaning  “un¬ 
limited  by  space”,  or  ‘‘incomprehensible”  in  the  theological 
sense,  and  positively  as  meaning  “everywhere  present”.5 * 
“Spacelessness  may  be  conceived  of  as  an  absolute  idiom,  of 
which  omnipresence  is  regarded  as  the  relative  idiom”,  accord¬ 
ing  to  Rhosse.0  “Since  space  is  the  limitation  of  beings  having 
a  parallel  existence,  and  matter,  a  composition  or  synthesis  and 
division  of  space”,7  God  cannot  be  included  under  these  cate¬ 
gories.  Hence  we  derive  His  immateriality,  simplicity,  and 
incorporeality.8  He  is  spaceless  and  placeless,9  without  body 

1  Ibid.,  pp.  311,  312. 

-  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  Gl-2.  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  III.  p.  102.  St. 
John  Ghrys.  vE/c5o<rts  1,  15;  Gennadius,  in  Mesolora,  I,  p.  73. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  52;  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  182-18G. 

4  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  308. 

5  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  53. 

0  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  313. 

7  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  53. 

8  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  53. 

:jIsaiah,  66,  1;  1  Kings,  8,  27. 


CONTENT  OF  OUR  KNOWLEDGE  OF  GOD 


85 


and  having  no  material  constitution  however  attenuated,1 — 
Pure  Spirit.2  His  simplicty  is  that  of  Simple  Being,  having 
Infinite  Self-identity.  It  is  not  “an  abstract  simplicity;  an 
absence  of  all  distinction  .  .  .  whether  of  hypostasis  or  qual¬ 
ities  .  .  .  but  negatively,  the  absence  of  every  synthesis,  di¬ 
vision,  and  antithesis  .  .  .  and  positively,  the  absolutely 
harmonious  unity  of  all  the  self-determined  distinctions  of 
hypostases  and  attributes  in  His  Essence.”3 

As  “everywhere  present"  we  do  not  say  of  God  that  He  has 
a  potentiality  of  making  His  presence  known  in  space,  as  it 
were  actio  in  distorts,  which  would  simply  be  an  energy  of  God, 
but  we  mean  an  actual  essential  quality.4  Not  only  is  He  “not 
far  away  from  every  one  of  us”5  but  He  has  continual  and  con¬ 
stant  present  intercourse  with  His  world.  “Spacelessness  signifies 
the  essential  difference  of  God  in  relation  to  the  world  as  su- 
pramundane  Being,  and  His  attribute  of  being  everywhere 
present  constitutes  His  relation  with  His  world,  as  God  in  the 
world  ( eyKoa/juov  V0v)  without  being  confused  with  any  of  the 
things  in  the  world.”6 7  Through  His  transcendent  character  as 
incomprehensible  the  Pantheistic  conception  is  avoided;  by  that 
of  His  Presence  everywhere,  dualistic  and  deistic  conceptions 
are  removed.  “As  spaceless  and  incomprehensible,  God  is 
transcendent  Being,  and  through  His  presence  everywhere  He  is 
also  immanent  Being.”'  “As  both  incomprehensible  and  every¬ 
where  present,  He  is  neither  circumscribed  and  enclosed  in  any 
one  of  the  things  of  the  world,  nor  is  His  Presence  precluded 
from  any  other.  Present  in  each,  not  in  part  but  whole,  and 
filling  all,  there  is  a  difference  ...  in  the  manner  of  His 
Presence  in  each  case  contingent  upon  the  capacity  of  each 
thing  in  which  He  is  present  ;  so  He  is  present  in  one  way  in 

1  As  the  Clementine  Homilies  and  Recognitions,  and  Tertullian  con¬ 
ceived  Him.  He  is  spaceless,  but  fills  all  space;  cf.  Psalm,  139,  8-10, 
and  St.  John  Chrysostom  ad  loc. 

*  2  St.  John  4,  24;  cf.  Theophilus,  Ad  Autolycum,  11,  1;  Clem.  Alex. 
Strom.  11,  2. 

3  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  309. 

4  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  54. 

5  Acts,  17,  27. 

6  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  313. 

7  i bid.,  p.  314. 


86 


II.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  GOD 


heaven,  in  another  on  earth;  one  way  in  spiritual  creatures, 
another  in  material  and  soulless  creation;  one  way  in  the  souls 
of  the  righteous  and  virtuous,  another  in  those  of  sinners  and 
the  impious  .  .  .  His  presence  can  be  revealed  in  all  sorts 
of  different  ways.  Preeminently  and  in  a  unique  fashion  was 
God  present  in  Jesus  Christ."1  Hence  the  scholastics  dis¬ 
tinguish  three  different  modes  of  the  Divine  Presence:  (a) 
“localiter  vel  circumscriptive,  or  potential  presence,  but  not  as 
if  the  portions  of  the  occupied  space  corresponded  to  divisions  of 
the  Divine  Essence  as  being  identical  with  them;”  (b)  “definite”, 
by  way  of  indwelling — God's  presence  in  the  saints  and  sinners, 
and,  as  was  said  above,  preeminently  in  our  Lord,  and  particu¬ 
larly  in  the  Blessed  Sacrament :  “as  the  soul  in  the  body  is  lim¬ 
ited  by  it,  and  yet  everywhere  present  in  each  part,  so  God’s 
Presence  is  everywhere  entire  within  those  limits;”  and  (c)  “re- 
pletive”,  or  hypostatically,  the  Presence  modo  divino,  unbounded 
by  space.  Neither  the  first  nor  the  second  mode  exhausts  God's 
presence,  and  neither  is  the  same  as  the  third  mode,  which  alone 
is  that  of  God  as  “everywhere  present”.2  Some  have  tried  to 
conceive  of  God’s  presence  as  substantially  and  essentially  in 
Heaven,  and  only  energetically  on  earth.3 4 5  But  “every  theory 
putting  God  outside  the  cosmos  and  accepting  only  a  potential 
or  dynamic  presence  in  it  orders  Him  in  space  and  takes  away 
His  Absolute  Character.”*  Of  the  mystery  of  the  Presence  of 
God  everywhere  it  can  best  be  said  in  summary :  “God  is  found 
everywhere  and  always,  and  wTe  can  never  escape  His  Presence.'” 

The  Eternity 6  of  God  means,  negatively,  that  He  is  above 
the  limitations  of  time,  and,  positively,  that  He  “fills  it  with 
His  Presence  at  every  instant,  without  succession  or  periods". 

1  Ibid.  p.  314. 

2Androutsosi,  AoypaTiKrj,  pp.  54-55. 

3  As,  e.  g.,  the  Socinians  viewed  it,  in  order  to  render  it  intelligible 
to  the  mind  of  man.  Such  attempts  are  fruitless,  and  refutable. 

4  Cf.  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  55. 

5Nitzsch,  Lehrbuch  der  Evangel ischen  Dogmatik,  p.  393,  quoted  by 
Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  55. 

6  Rh6sse  uses  the  term  atSios,  which  is,  as  Androutsos  admits,  more 
correct  than  aiuvios,  which  the  latter  employs.  AIuvi6tt]s  implies  of 
the  past  “indefinite”,  “countless  succession”,  but  of  the  future  as 
unending  and  involving  permanence”.  Cf.  “eternal”  and  “everlasting”. 
Androutsos,  note  I.  p.  56. 


CONTENT  OF  OUR  KNOWLEDGE  OF  GOD 


87 


Since  time  is  “the  law  of  the  constant  motion  of  beings  having 
beginning  and  end,  and  changing  at  every  instant,"  the  Absolute 
God  is  necessarily  not  limited  by  it.  He  has  neither  beginning 
nor  end,  nor  is  there  any  period  of  succession,  and  no  alternation 
in  Him.  As  the  Holy  Scriptures  bear  witness1  to  this,  our 
reason  and  its  conclusions  are  reinforced  in  the  truth  of  the 
principle  that  He  who  is  Absolute  is  above  the  limitation  of 
time.2  “As  the  Absolute  and  Infinite,  we  predicate  of  God 
aseity  and  self-existence  ....  for  He  has  in  Himself  the 
reason  or  cause  of  His  own  being,  and  the  End  or  Purpose  of 
His  existence.  ...  As  such  He  is  lacking  in  nothing,  self- 
contained,  independent,  and  self-sufficient3  .  .  .As  Abso¬ 

lute,  He  is  ...  .  absolutely  timeless,  for  neither  His  Es¬ 
sence  nor  His  energy  is  limited  by  time  ....  As  timeless 
He  is  absolutely  eternal,  without  beginning,  without  end  .  .  . 
for  only  things  in  time  have  a  beginning  and  end  of  their  ex¬ 
istence,  and  undergo  gradual  development,  with  a  transition 
from  potential  to  actual,  and  with  change  or  alteration  and 
decay.’''4 5  “Time  in  relation  to  eternity  is  an  instant  in  which 
there  is  no  transition  from  present  to  past,  or  future  to  pres¬ 
ent."1  In  God’s  sight  a  long  period  of  time  or  the  briefest  mo¬ 
ment,  is  alike  nothing.6  Eternity  is  a  permanent  quality  of 
God ;  in  Him  is  no  change  or  alternation.  He  is  therefore  im¬ 
mutable,  unswerving,  and  unchanging.7  St.  Augustine  uses  the 
figure  of  a  tree  on  the  edge  of  a  running  brook  to  illustrate  the 
relation  of  God’s  unchanging  and  eternal  character,  indepen¬ 
dent  of  the  ebb  and  flow  of  things  in  time.8 

God  is  as  well  the  Master  and  Creator  of  Time.  “As  He 
being  beyond  all  space  is  yet  everywhere  present,  yet  not  locally, 
so  the  eternal  God  outside  time  is  yet  present  in  every  instant 
of  it.”9  Yet  this  presence  of  God  in  time  does  not  subject  Him 

1  Psalm,  90,  2-4;  Rev.  1,  8;  10,  6:  15,  7;  1  Tim.  0,  10. 

2  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  56. 

3  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  306. 

4  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  308-9. 

5  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  56. 

6  2  Peter  3,  8,  and  cf.  Psalm  90,  4. 

7  RhOsse,  op.  cit.,  p.  309. 

8  De  Vera  Religione,  49,  and  Conf.  XI.  16. 

8  Androutsos,  op.  cit.f  p.  57;  cf.  Rev.  1,  4. 


88 


II.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  GOD 


to  the  conditions  of  time,  as  if  the  time  relations  were  defined 
in  Him,  but  He  includes  time  without  being  part  of  it.  As 
there  is  no  alternation  or  succession  in  Him,  He  is  immutable, 
unchanging,  and  ever  the  same.1  The  converse  is  equally 
true — since  time  is  the  measure  of  change,  if  there  be  no  change 
in  God,  He  must  be  eternal.  In  His  dealings  with  men  He  does 
submit  to  “esoteric'’  changes,  as  for  example,  in  the  Divine 
Economy.2  He  may  seem  to  man  to  change  and  alter  His  atti¬ 
tude.  This  is  only  our  way  of  viewing  His  unalterable  and  un¬ 
swerving  character,  as  compared  to  our  changing  relations  with 
Him.  When  we  say,  “God  repented  Him  of  the  evil’'  it  is  a 
“human  expression  of  the  relation  of  God  to  man,  correlative 
(as)  in  the  case  of  a  plan  or  deed,  to  what  we  do  when  we 
ascribe  (in  the  Holy  Scriptures)  to  the  Unseen,  hands,  feet,  or 
eyes.”3 * *  He  is  the  same,  and  His  purpose  remains  unchanging 
though  He  appear  to  one  mind  benignant  and  kindly,  and  to  an¬ 
other  harsh  and  angry.  As  St.  Augustine  says:  Quern  ad  modum 
sol  oculos  puros,  sanos,  vegetos,  fortes  habenti  tranquillus  appar- 
et,  in  oculos  autem  lippos  quasi  tela  aspera  jaculatur ;  intuentem 
ilium  vegetat,  hunc  excruciat,  non  mutatus,  sed  mutatum :  sic 
cum  coeperis  esse  perversus,  et  tibi  Deus  perversus  videbitur ; 
tu  mutatus  es,  non  ille.  . Erit  .  .  .  tibi  poena,  quod  bonis 
gaudiuni. 

His  energy  is  as  eternal  as  His  Essence,6  for  His  Essence  as 
timeless,  is  eternal.6  As  His  Eternity  involves  not  only  His 
being  above  the  limitations  of  time,  but  as  well  His  immediate 
presence  in  every  instant  of  it,  His  energy  may  be  considered 
to  alter  its  objective  flow  with  the  development  and  change  in 
mankind.  His  eternal  presence  operates  in  each  individual 
case  according  to  a  different  fashion  and  is  in  a  sense  conditioned 
by  the  capacity  and  responsiveness  of  the  individual,  in  the  ebb 

1  Cf.  St.  James,  1.  17;  Psalm  102,  2G-27.  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  57. 

-  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  III.  p.  102;  Gennadius,  in  Mesolora,  I.  p.  73;  St. 
John  Damascene,  vE/c5ocris  1,  15. 

3  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  58-59. 

*  Enarr.,  in  Psalm  72,  7.  Cf.  Dyobouniotes  Aoy.  ’AvSp.  tcpivo/j,.,  p.  16 
and  Androutsos  Aoyp.  MeXercu,  A',  pp.  50-52;  St.  John  Damascene, 

Dial,  contra  Manichaeos,  79. 

6  RhOsse,  op.  cit.,  p.  314. 

6  Ibid.,  p.  309. 


CONTEXT  OF  OCR  KNOWLEDGE  OF  GOD 


89 


and  flow  of  human  history.  Hence  it  is  not  possible  for  God 
to  regard  all  times  as  a  present,  but  He  must  preserve  the  same 
relation  to  the  past,  present,  and  future,  as  prevails  in  the  af¬ 
fairs  of  finite  man.  Else  were  “history  a  mere  phantasy  and 
appearance,  not  a  reality  and  actuality.’'1  St.  Augustine  held 
that  to  God  all  times  were  an  eternal  present.  According  to 
Rhosse,2  if  God  deals  with  the  world  in  its  necessary  limitations 
of  time,  these  must  be  known  to  Him  in  their  real  character  of 
past,  present,  and  future.  The  distinctions  of  time  are  then 
real  to  God  in  His  dealings  with  the  world.  According  to 
Androutsos,  God  is  not  subject  to  the  conditions  of  time  in  the 
sense  that  “certain  events  are  distinguished  by  Him  as  past, 
others  as  present,  and  others  as  future,”3  for  “He  knows  future 
events,  seeing  them  as  present.”4  Each  of  these  positions  is 
tenable,  for  there  is  no  dogmatic  decree  about  the  matter.6 

The  Omnipotence  of  God  is  shown  in  the  Creation  of  the 
world  from  nothing,  in  God’s  preservation  of  it,  and  sustaining 
it  in  being,  in  God’s  wonders  of  Revelation  and  Miracle,  and  in 
His  governance,  administration,  and  oversight  of  the  Universe. 
Consequently  His  omnipotence  is  regarded  as  creative,  preserva¬ 
tive,  and  governing.6  The  sphere  of  the  functioning  of  His 
Almighty  Power  is  the  all,  or  everything.7  The  theological  doc¬ 
trine  of  the  Omnipotence  of  God  is  embodied  in  the  statement : 
‘‘God  can  do  all  that  He  can  will.”8  This  takes  for  granted  the 
truth  of  the  commonly  accepted  theological  formula  that  “there 
is  no  distinction  between  the  power  and  will  of  God.”9  For 

1  Ibid.,  pp.  314-315. 

-Op.  cit.,  p.  57.  Dyobouniotes  says:  “God  knows  the  future  as  fu¬ 
ture,  the  present  as  present  and  past  as  past,  .  .  otherwise  there 

could  be  no  right  administration  of  the  world  .  .  .  God  will  see  the 
sinner  who  is  going  to  repent  as  good,  while  the  good  man  who  is  to 
fall  into  sin,  as  evil”  (p.  18,  A07/H.  ’Av5p.  Kpi.v.).  Androutsos  answers 
this,  p.  55  of  his  pamphlet  (Aoyp..  MeXerat,  A'  ).  He  objects  that  this  view 
involves  the  theory  of  time  as  not  real  but  only  apparent,  and  the 
deduction  that  all  things  are  Eternal. 

s  Androutsos,  Ao^p.ariKri,  p.  57. 

4  Androutsos,  ibid.,  p.  66;  Acr/^art/ccu  MeXe'rat,  A',  pp.  54-55. 

5  Cf.  below  on  the  Knowledge  and  Wisdom  of  God,  pp.  93  ff. 

6  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  312-313,  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  59. 

7  ibid. 

8  Androutsos,  Aoy/iaroccu  MeX.,  A’,  p.  53. 

8  Simar,  Lehrbuch  der  Dogmatik,  I,  p.  138,  quoted  ibid. 


00 


II.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  GOD 


the  purposes  of  human  thought,  however,  it  is  useful  to  dis¬ 
tinguish  will  and  power  in  God,  so  we  may  resolve  the  above 
statement  into  the  two  propositions:  (a)  God  does  whatever  He 
wills,  and  (b)  He  wills  what  is  consistent  with  His  Nature. 
The  first  conception  of  the  Will  of  God  is  called  the  “actual” 
or  “pragmatic”  will  (irpayixaTiKrj  OeX-qcn^)  and  the  second  con¬ 
ception  is  termed  that  of  the  “absolute  power  of  His  will” 
( a7ro\vTo<i  SiVa/xi?  Tr;?  #eAecrea>? ) .  e  distinguish  the  actual  will 
of  God  in  fact  from  the  possible  content  of  what  He  could  have 
willed.1  The  limits  of  His  power  to  Will  are  the  self-deter¬ 
mined  limits  of  His  Nature.2 

(a)  When  we  say  that  God  does  whatever  He  wills,  we  mean 
that  the  compass  of  His  Power  to  realize  and  make  a  fact  what 
He  wills  is  commensurate  with  the  content  of  that  Will.  Just 
as  power  involves  will,  so  will  involves  personality.  We  cannot 
conceive  of  His  omnipotent  power  being  exercised  apart  from 
His  directing  will,  nor  this  will  as  the  result  of  anything  less 
than  the  action  of  His  whole  Personality.  Any  more  precise 
or  any  less  wide  conception  of  His  Power  reduces  it  to  a  me¬ 
chanical  and  blind  force,  which  is  utterly  repugnant  to  the 
notion  of  the  absolute  Perfection  of  God.  In  Him,  further¬ 
more,  we  may  not  apply  the  distinction  (based  on  finite  human 
experience)  between  will  and  power,  as  if  they  in  Him  could 
ever  be  in  contrast  or  antithesis.3  Whatever  He  wills  He  can  do. 

(b)  “God  wills  whatever  He  is  able  to  will.”  The  limita¬ 
tions  of  His  will  are  those  of  His  own  Essence.  Because  He  is 
Himself,  He  necessarily  wills  what  He  wills.  His  will  is  not 
arbitrary;  it  is  no  whim  whereby  He  sets  out  to  perform  the 
impossible  in  the  natural,  rational,  or  ethical  spheres.  As  St. 
John  Damascene  says,  “God  can  do  whatever  He  wills,  but 
does  not  will  all  He  can  do.”4  He  could,  for  example,  destroy 
the  world,  but  does  not  will  to  do  so.  “His  power  extends  not 
only  to  the  extent  of  His  pragmatic  Will,  but  to  everything — 
even  to  those  things  which  He  neither  wills  actually,  nor  would 
be  able  to  will.”5  “Multa  potest  Deus  et  non  vult ;  nihil  autem 

1  Androutsos,  A oy/juxTiKT] ,  p.  59. 

2  Androutsos,  Aoy/xaTiKri,  pp.  59-60. 

3  Ibid.,  cf.  Aoyfj..  MeXercu,  A',  pp.  52-54. 

4  St.  John  Damascene,  ’'E/cSocns,  1,  13. 

5  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  60. 


CONTENT  OF  OUR  KNOWLEDGE  OF  GOD 


91 


vult  quod  non  potest:'1  “The  might  of  God  underlies  His 
actual  Will,  and  the  one  bound  which  it  may  not  exceed  is  that 
of  the  physically,  logically,  or  morally  impossible."2  “God  can¬ 
not  do  what  is  repugnant  to  His  Nature,”3  and  this  impossi¬ 
bility,  a  seeming  limitation  of  His  Omnipotence,  is  not  an  in¬ 
stance  of  weakness  but  a  testimony  to  His  might.4 5  “God  can¬ 
not  do  other  than  what  He  wills”  is  another  statement  of  the 
complete  identity  of  will  and  power  in  the  Divine  Nature. s 
A  view  of  the  Divine  omnipotence  which  sees  it  only  in  the 
world  of  Creation,  governed  and  regulated  by  God,6  takes  away 
from  the  absolute  quality  of  God’s  omnipotence,  for  it  regards  i: 
as  exhausted  in  the  achievement  of  the  universe,  and  conse¬ 
quently  precludes  the  possibility  of  miracle.7  The  world  is  not 
of  necessity,  but  of  God's  Free  Will.8 

B.  The  Logical  Attributes  of  God 

For  the  attributes  of  God  now  to  be  considered,  we  take  per¬ 
sonality  for  granted.  In  fact,  as  we  have  seen,  the  notion  of 
personality  is  really  essential  to  the  conception  of  God’s  om¬ 
nipotence,  as  well  as  to  that  of  the  other  attributes.  The  log¬ 
ical,  rational,  or  intellectual  attributes  of  God  even  more  defi¬ 
nitely  involve  this  notion,  for  “only  one  who  has  self-conscious¬ 
ness  and  the  power  of  free  self-determination  can  be  holy,  just, 
or  wise."9  There  are  those  who  claim  that  the  note  of  person¬ 
ality  as  applied  to  God,  “limits  Him  and  reduces  Him  to  the 
level  of  finite  things,”  for  the  notion  of  personality  involves 

1  St.  Augustine,  Enchiridion,  95. 

2  “For  this  he  could  neither  will  nor  accomplish”,  Androutsos, 
op.  cit.,  pp.  60-61. 

3  RhOsse,  op.  cit.,  p.  313. 

4  Cf.  Theodoret,  ’E paviar.  dca\.  3,  and  cf.  Augustine,  Be  Civitate 
Dei,  V.  10.  note  1,  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  313. 

6  Abelard,  in  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  61. 

5  Schleiermaeher,  in  Androutsos,  ibid. 

7  Cf .  note  on  miracle,  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  119-120, 

8  As  versus  Pantheism  and  Deism, — God  knows  Himself  as  of  neces¬ 
sity,  for  the  Divine  Essence  and  Attributes  are  necessary.  His  knowl¬ 
edge  of  the  world,  since  the  world  was  not  necessary,  is  a  free  knowl¬ 
edge.  The  Creation  was  a  free  act  of  God.  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  302; 

Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  64. 

*  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  61-62. 


92 


II.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  GOD 


as  a  necessary  premise  the  existence  of  other  personalities  in 
contrast  to  which  alone  may  self-consciousness  be  developed, 
and  in  contrast  to  the  acts  of  whom  the  consciousness  of  the 
freedom  of  one’s  own  acts  may  be  realized.  This  conception, 
they  say,  is  incompatible  with  the  Absolute  Character  of  God. 
In  answer  to  this  it  may  be  said  that  the  Absolute  can  not  be 
other  than  He  is;  by  His  Absolute  Knowledge  of  Himself  He 
can  be  said  “to  know  absolutely  His  own  necessary  Existence, 
or  His  Essence  seen  bv  God  existing  necessarily  ...  It  is  a 
knowledge  ...  of  His  one  Absolute  Essence  in  its  absolute 
Necessity,  Rationality,  and  Freedom.  .  .  But  if  He  is 
necessarily  what  He  is,  and  necessarily  knows  Himself  as  such, 
lie  must  know  Himself  as  necessarily  free  as  well.  His  Reason 
or  Wisdom,  as  absolute,  is  both  the  power  and  the  energy  of 
knowing  and  recognizing.  Hence  nothing  can  prevent  the  ex¬ 
ercise  of  this  Absolute  Reason  to  know  whether  within  or  with¬ 
out  God,  whatever  can  be  known.  The  former  knowledge,  in 
contrast  to  that  of  the  world,  is  called  “necessary”,  and  the 
knowledge  of  the  world,  viewed  as  a  relative  attribute ,  is 
termed  “free”.1 2 

Every  category  that  we  can  make  in  regard  to  God  brings 
Him  into  the  realm  of  the  finite,  without  which  process  we 
could  have  no  conception  of  Him  which  would  have  any  con¬ 
tent.  The  negations  we  employ  of  Him,  based  on  our  reasoning 
from  the  finite,  seem,  as  it  were,  limitations  which  we  impose 
on  the  character  of  God,  as  we  must  distinguish  Him  from  the 
world.  If  God  escapes  all  categories  then  our  conception  of 
the  Absolute  would  be  barren,  sterile,  and  empty  of  all  content 
for  us.  The  view  which  rejects  all  such  categorization  of  God, 
leads  to  the  rejection  of  any  notion  of  Him.3  If  we  conceive 
of  Him  at  all,  we  must  conceive  Him  in  the  only  way  we  can 
conceive  of  anything.  The  basis  of  our  consciousness  of  person¬ 
ality  is  obviously  the  recognition  of  the  non-ego.  As  such  it 
is  not  ultimately  necessary,  but  only  empirical  and  pragmatic. 
The  recognition  of  personality  in  ourselves  is  the  culmination 
of  a  process  of  observation,  comparison,  and  contrast,  which  is- 


1  RhSsse,  op.  cit.,  p.  307. 

2  RhSsse,  op.  cit.,  p.  316. 

3  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  62. 


CONTENT  OF  OUR  KNOWLEDGE  OF  GOD 


93 

sues  in  self-consciousness.  In  Him  in  whom  is  no  change,  no 
process  of  knowledge,  no  beginning,  no  end,  who  is  self-existent, 
self-contained,  and  independent,  recognition  of  His  Personality 
and  His  Freedom  is  an  eternal,  necessary,  and  immediate  fact. 
It  is  not  based  upon  contrast  with  other  personalities,  nor  is  the 
consciousness  of  God’s  Freewill  founded  on  experience  with 
other  wills.  Hence,  philosophically,  the  conception  of  God  as  a 
Person  is  not  impossible.  It  is  fundamental  and  necessary, 
theologically.  Religiously,  the  conception  of  a  Deity  who  does 
not  care  about  the  events  in  the  world,  but  who  only  “wound  it 
up  and  started  it  going”,  or  the  conception  of  the  helpless  God 
involved  by  necessity  in  the  finite  world,  is  absolutely  inadequate 
to  meet  the  needs  of  men.  Man,  as  having  self-consciousness 
and  free  will,  cannot  be  satisfied  either  with  Deism  or  Panthe¬ 
ism  :  God  must  needs  be  at  least  a  Person.  His  Reason  and 
Will  are  recognized  without  reference  to  man  and  the  finite 
world.  “Everything  constituting  the  imperfections  and  defects 
of  our  will  and  nature  is  irreconcilable  with  the  simplicity,  im- 
mutabilitv,  and  Absolute  Perfection  of  God.”1 

The  course  of  the  speculation  about  the  necessity  of  the  Will 
of  God  willing  Himself,  and  His  will's  freedom  in  willing  the 
Universe,  it  is  not  necessary  to  touch  upon.  It  is  a  mystery  in¬ 
accessible  to  our  reason.  We  must  distinguish  between  the  will 
of  God  willing  Himself  and  that  willing  the  Universe,  but  can¬ 
not  investigate  more  closely  the  relation  of  the  two  aspects  of 
the  Absolute  Will.2 

God  is  All  Knowing  in  that  He  knows  all,  and  this  Om¬ 
niscience  is  absolute  both  in  form  and  content;  in  form,  because 
“He  knows  all — timelessly,  perfectly  and  immediately,  not  as  a 
transition  from  past  to  present,  and  in  sequence,  but  in  one  in¬ 
stant  of  immediate  insight  ( intuitio )  ;  in  content,  as  He,  com¬ 
prehending  all,  both  Himself  and  the  Universe,  knows  the  actual 
and  real  possibilities  and  impossibilities  of  past,  present,  and 

1  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  63. 

2  On  this  point  cf.  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  64,  quoting  Strauss  and 
Simar,  and  RhOsse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  287-304,  et  al.  Rhosse  is  more  ex¬ 
plicit  on  the  necessary  character  of  God’s  self-knowledge  than  is  An¬ 
droutsos,  whom  I  have  followed  above. 


94 


II.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  GOD 


future.”1  The  Absolute  Reason  or  knowledge  of  God  includes, 
as  we  have  seen,  both  the  power  and  the  energy  of  knowing,  and 
is  an  attribute  of  His  Essence.  He  recognizes  in  Himself  “His 
One  x4bsolute  Essence  in  its  Absolute  Necessity,  Reason,  and 
Freedom,  together  with  all  the  fulness  of  its  powers  as  ordered 
in  one  .  .  .  harmonious  unity.  In  Him  are  all  the  Eternal 
Truths  and  Eternal  Laws  of  Nature,  Reason,  and  Ethic,  .  .  . 
decreed  by  His  Absolute  Reason  and  Free  Will,  .  .  .and 
these  He  knows  and  recognizes  by  His  Absolute  Knowledge  and 
Reason.”2  His  knowledge  of  the  world  is  as  immediate  and 
complete  as  that  of  Himself,  but  it  is  different,  in  that  it  is  not 
gained  from  the  latter.3  It  is  not  absolute  in  this  sense,  and 
the  idea  of  the  world  in  the  mind  of  God  is  different  from  that 
idea  realized  and  actualized  in  Creation.  Hence  His  Knowledge 
of  the  world  is  different  in  quality  from  that  of  Himself,  as  He 
knows  “about  the  world  as  it  is  in  itself,  about  its  causes  and 
effects,  the  energies  in  the  world  and  their  results  in  fact.  .  . 
The  object  of  His  knowledge  of  the  world  is  not  only  that  which 
results  by  the  action  of  the  law  of  necessity  in  the  physical  sphere 
ordained  by  Himself,  but  as  well  ....  the  results  issuing 
from  the  free  causes  He  has  created'’  .  .  .  (Their  freedom  is 
not  absolute,  but  only  relative  and  created,  hence  it  is  dependent 
upon  Him.)  “He  knows,  through  the  knowledge  of  His  Own 
energy  which  brought  into  being  the  free  causes  of  the  Universe, 
their  existence,  capacities,  and  limitations,  but  not  ....  the 
actual  content  of  their  deeds.”4  If  He  did,  these  acts 
would  only  proceed  from  Him  as  source,  their  relative  liberty 
would  be  destroyed,  and  He  would  be  author  of  resulting  evils. 
He  does  know  all  the  acts  of  man  nevertheless,  and  their  con¬ 
sequences,  even  as  free.5  This  knowledge  may  be  called  the 
relative ,  in  distinction  to  the  absolute,  knowledge  of  God.  He 
does  not,  however,  know  them  by  sensation,  as  the  subject  of 
knowing,  as  if  He  had  a  “certain  characteristic  of  passively  re¬ 
ceiving  sensations”,  but  by  immediate  intuition  regarding  man- 

1  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  64-65. 

2  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  307-308. 

3  Rhosse,  op.,  cit.,  p.  316. 

4  Ibid.,  p.  317. 

5  “Free”,  that  is  relatively  and  createdly,  not  “absolutely”,  cf. 
Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  319. 


CONTENT  OF  OUR  KNOWLEDGE  OF  GOD 


95 


kind.1  “Nothing  can  happen  by  the  free  action  of  independent 
agents  in  the  world  .  .  .  without  God  having  knowledge 

of  it  as  possible  and  capable  of  occurring,  through  His  ever¬ 
present  Might  and  Will  in  the  world.”2 

We  distinguish  then  two,  possibly  three,  objects  of  Divine 
Knowledge:  (a)  that  which  necessarily  exists — God,  and  the 
possibilities  existing  in  the  idea  of  the  Divine  Nature,  the 
knowledge  of  which  is  called  “natural”  knowledge;3  (b)  that 
which  exists  of  God’s  Free  Will — the  created  world,  and  its  pos¬ 
sibilities,  the  knowledge  of  which  is  called  “free”  ;  and  a  pos¬ 
sible  third  (c)  category,  relating  to  that  which  is  hypothetical 
and  conditional,  “including  that  possible  on  the  basis  of  the 
occurrence  of  certain  conditions,”  to  which  contingent  type  the 
name  “middle”  knowledge  is  applied  ( scientia  media,  scientia 
conditionaia,  scientia  conditionaia  futurorum) .*  According  to 
Androutsos,  “the  introduction  of  this  kind  of  knowledge  is  su¬ 
perfluous.  Since  God  knows  what  happens  at  any  point  in 
time.  .  .  and  also  all  possible  things  not  to  be  realized  in 
the  event,  the  facts  thus  conditioned  relegated  to  this  category 
of  scientia  media  already  belong  to  the  possible,  not  to  be 
realized  in  fact.”  Hence  it  is  unnecessary  to  make  this  cate¬ 
gory.  Rhosse,  however,  seems  to  accept  it.5 

God  as  Omniscient  knows  all  things.  He  knows  Himself, 
His  creation  as  under  the  law  of  necessity,  and  as  well  what  He 
has  created  with  the  capacity  of  free  choice  and  self-direction. 
His  knowledge  is  eternal  in  quality;  hence  He  knows  in  advance, 
humanly  speaking,  what  is  going  to  happen.  As  we  saw  above, 
the  problem  of  the  relation  of  time  to  Eternity  is  for  us  in¬ 
soluble.  The  problem  of  the  relation  of  the  prescience  or  fore- 

1 Ibid .,  pp.  316,  318. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  319. 

3  Also  called  ‘‘necessary”  knowledge,  according  to  RhCsse,  pp.  307- 
308,  316,  note  1. 

4  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  65;  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  320-321  (§ 

188).  The  authors  of  this  theory  were  the  Jesuits  Fonseca  and  Mo¬ 
lina,  and  the  classical  text  illustrating  the  basis  of  this  notion  is  St. 
Matt.  11,  21.  ‘‘Woe  unto  you  Chorazin !  ..  and  Bethsaida!  for  if 
the  mighty  works,  which  were  done  in  you,  had  been  done  in  Tyre  and 
Sidon,  they  would  have  repented  long  ago”  .  .  .  cf.  Dyobouniotes, 
Aoyp.  ’Av8p.  Kpiv.,  p.  15,  and  Androutsos,  A07.  MeA.  A’,  p.  54. 

6  Ibid.,  op.  cit.,  p.  324. 


96 


II.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  GOD 


knowledge  of  God  to  events  in  His  world  is  one  of  the  aspects  of 
that  problem.  If  God  knows  all  that  is  going  to  happen,  how  can 
any  free  agents  exist  beside  Himself  ?  His  foreknowledge  in  re¬ 
lation  to  the  material  universe  presents  no  difficulty.  As  God 
knows  all  causes,  their  possible  effects,  and  the  relation  of  all 
causes  to  their  certain  effects,  He,  as  the  Source  of  all  Natural 
Law,  knows  beforehand  the  inevitable  sequences  of  cause  and  ef¬ 
fect.  There  is  nothing  fortuitous  or  accidental  in  the  natural 
world,  and  if  we  cannot  predict  the  results  and  consequences 
subsequent  to  the  action  of  a  nexus  of  causes,  it  is  only  because 
of  our  limited  knowledge.  The  material  world  acts  mechani¬ 
cally,  and  God's  foreknowledge  of  its  operations  and  their  results 
belongs  to  Him  as  Creator,  Ordainer  of  its  laws,  and  Determiner 
of  its  End,  as  well  as  to  Him  as  the  Omniscient.1 

It  is  otherwise  with  the  relation  of  foreknowledge  to  the  ac¬ 
tions  of  free  agents,  whom  God  has  created  with  free  will  and 
the  power  of  self-determination.  Their  freedom  is  not  absolute, 
hut  still  it  is  real  though  relative;  they  are  not  self-caused,  hut 
creatures  brought  into  existence  by  God.  Hence  “this  relative 
and  created  freedom  remains  in  a  sense  always  dependent  upon 
God.  .  .  The  free  agents  of  the  world  at  every  moment  re¬ 

ceive  from  the  ever-present  and  continuous  energy  of  the  Power 
of  God  the  power  for  the  exercise  of  their  own  free  energy. 5,2 
So  “the  Foreknowledge  of  God  and  the  freedom  of  men’s  acts 
seem  contradictory  and  mutually  exclusive”3  for  if  God  knows 
all  that  man  not  only  can,  but  will  do,  “free  acts  become  im¬ 
possible.”4  If  his  freedom  is  destroyed,  his  responsibility  ceases 
as  well.  Of  the  solutions  of  this  difficulty  one  type  limits  the 
foreknowledge  of  God,  saying  that  God  does  not  know  the  free 
acts  of  man,  and  another  sacrifices  the  freedom  of  man,  by  say¬ 
ing  that  it  is  only  apparent  not  real,  and  that  man  alike  with 
the  natural  creation,  functions  under  a  law  of  necessity.5 

A  form  of  the  first  type  of  solution  is  developed  in  the  state- 

1  Rh6sse,  op.  cit.,  p.  322  (§  190). 

3  Ibid.,  pp.  317,  318-319. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  322  (§  190). 

*  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  65. 

8  Ibid.,  and  Rhdsse,  op.  cit.,  p.  323 ;  Weisse,  Philosophische  Dog- 
viatik,  1,  §  509,  follows  the  second  view. 


CONTEXT  OF  OUR  KNOWLEDGE  OF  GOD 


1)7 


ment  that  God  knows  human  acts  only  as  possible,  not  as  actual. 
That  is,  when  God  willed  to  create  men  as  free  agents,  for  the 
sake  of  that  freedom  He  deliberately  restricted  His  own  fore¬ 
knowledge.1  This  view  rests  on  a  deistic  basis,  that  knowledge 
of  the  world  as  part  of  the  manifestation  of  the  power  of  an 
omnipresent,  immanent,  and  transcendent  God,  would  be  a  re¬ 
striction  of  man,  and  that  to  secure  man's  free  exercise  of  the 
power  wherewith  God  has  endowed  him,  God  must  cease  to  in¬ 
fluence,  interfere,  or  concern  Himself  with  human  acts.  It  also 
rests  on  a  false  conception  of  human  freedom  as  being  absolute 
in  its  nature.  “Only  in  the  case  of  the  freedom  of  created 
agents  being  regarded  as  absolute,  and  in  consequence  the  estab¬ 
lishment  of  a  principle  of  absolute  independence  of  God,  and 
of  existence  outside  of  and  apart  from  Him,  can  it  be  maintained 
that  God  could  not  know  the  actual  acts  of  free  agents.”2 

The  second  type  of  solution  suggested  above  denies  the  reality 
of  human  freedom  bv  a  wrong  conception  of  God’s  Foreknowl¬ 
edge  as  Absolute.3  “If  the  acts  of  free  agents  were  initiated 
according  to  Absolute  Foreordination,  the  Omniscience  of  God 
would  include  all  future  acts  of  man  by  an  act  of  Divine  Will 
exercising  the  Divine  Reason  .  .  .  toward  that  outside 
God.  But  the  Divine  Reason  and  Foreknowledge  do  not  concur 
with  the  action  of  the  Divine  Will:  God  knows  evil  as  possible 
.  .  .  but  does  not  will  it  as  actual  in  the  world.”4  Hence 
the  necessary  distinction  between  God's  Absolute  Omniscience 
as  knowing  all  things  absolutely,  whereby  He  necessarily  knows 
Himself,  and  the  direction  of  that  knowledge  outwardly  toward 
Creation,  whereby  He  freely  knows  all  things  concerning  it. 
If  God's  knowledge  knew  the  content  of  human  acts  by  knowing 
Himself,  then  God  would  he  the  source  of  all  those  acts,  since 
His  Self-knowledge  is  a  result  of  His  Will  necessarily  and  freely 
acting  with  His  Power,  and  with  all  the  other  attributes  of  His 
Xature.5  So  there  would  be  no  freedom  in  man’s  acts,  but  they 

1  Rhbsse,  op.  cit.,  p.  3*23. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  324. 

3  His  knowledge,  as  absolute,  relates  to  the  possibilities  and  cap¬ 
acities  of  free  agents,  not  to  the  content  of  their  acts,  according  to 
Rliosse. 

4  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  323. 

'Ibid.,  pp.  317-318. 


98 


II.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  GOD 


would  be  the  result  of  necessity,  following  out  the  laws  of  their 
own  being,  and  these  laws  would  be  only  the  decrees  of  the  Di¬ 
vine  Being.  God  would  then  be  the  Cause  and  Creator  of  evil, 
and  man  would  be  no  more  responsible  than  is  inorganic  matter 
under  natural  law.  Another  aspect  of  this  same  argument  is 
that  God  necessarily  knows  not  only  all  we  can  do,  since  He  is 
the  Source,  Cause,  and  Creator  of  our  being  and  knows  its  laws, 
but  also  knows  what  we  will  do,  as  Omniscient.  We  believe  that 
we  act  freely,  and  we  do  act  as  if  we  were  conscious  of  choosing 
freely,  but  our  actions  and  our  choice  are  determined  by  our 
education,  environment,  heredity,  and  character.  As  our  choice 
is  determined  by  our  character,  we  choose  consciously  but  not 
freely.  It  is  our  ignorance  on  which  is  based  the  conviction  we 
have  of  our  freedom ;  God,  as  knowing  all  things,  knows  the 
causes  of  our  actions,  both  as  a  whole  and  in  detail,  and  can 
predict  infallibly  our  course  of  action.  He  does  not  cause  it, 
nor  does  His  Foreknowledge  as  such  compel  us  to  choose  what 
we  do  choose;  nevertheless  our  choice  is  determined  by  other 
things  than  our  will.  His  knowledge  is  exact  and  inerrant  as 
to  our  choice,  but  this  does  not  determine  it.  Our  choice  is  not 
a  consequence  of  His  knowledge,  but  neither  is  it  free.  Funda¬ 
mentally  this  is  not  essentially  different  from  the  preceding 
aspect  of  the  same  argument. 

We  must  then  distinguish  between  the  Foreordaining  knowl¬ 
edge  of  God  as  Absolute — that  is,  as  an  active  cooperation  of  all 
the  attributes  of  His  Essence  functioning  together,  in  relation  to 
human  acts — and  His  Foreknowledge  as  in  a  sense  passive  and 
not  determining  the  content  of  those  acts.  It  is  along  this  line 
that  the  Orthodox  presentation  of  the  solution  of  the  problem 
lies.  Bhosse  denies  any  possibility  of  a  passive  character  in  God’s 
Knowledge,  as  if  it  were  subject  to  impressions,  in  other  words 
disavows  the  human  method  of  knowing  as  the  method  of  God’s 
Knowing.1  To  him  the  distinction  of  Absolute  and  Kelative 
is  the  means  of  the  solution  of  the  problems  arising  from  the  re¬ 
lation  of  the  Infinite  God  to  His  finite  world.  God’s  Omnis¬ 
cience  is  both  Absolute  and  relative.  As  Absolute,  it  is  neces¬ 
sary,  and  its  subject  matter  includes  all  that  has  its  source  in 


bhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  318. 


CONTENT  OF  OUR  KNOWLEDGE  OF  GOD 


99 


Him.  As  Absolute,  it  concerns  the  world  of  necessity  and  law, 
and  the  world  of  possibility.  As  relative,  it  has  contact  with 
the  world  actually  as  it  is,  realized  in  fact,  and  the  scope  of 
this  Omniscience  of  God  as  relative  is  not  only  the  possible  but 
the  actual — whether  past,  present,  or  future — in  the  world  of 
Creation.  “As  the  Power  of  God,  essentially  of  itself  Abso~ 
lute  .  .  .  has  a  certain  relative  character  as  the  Highest 
Power  in  the  world  ...  so  the  Reason  or  Wisdom  of  God, 
and  His  Power,  rightly  termed  Absolute  in  relation  to  His  Es¬ 
sence,  .  .  .  receive  a  certain  relative  character  as  the  High¬ 
est  Wisdom  and  Power  of  God  in  the  world.  .  .  Essentially 
it  is  one  and  the  same  Power  and  Wisdom  viewed  in  two  as¬ 
pects:  in  relation  to  the  essential  Nature  of  God,  and  in  rela¬ 
tion  to  something  other  than  Himself.”1  Rhosse's  solution  of 
the  problem  of  the  relation  of  the  Foreknowledge  of  God  to  the 
free  acts  of  men,  is  to  deny  the  Absolute  character  of  both  the 
freedom  of  man  and  the  knowledge  of  God  in  relation  to  the 
actual  content  of  human  acts. 

Androutsos  bases  his  solution  on  a  distinction  in  the  charac¬ 
ter  of  God's  knowledge,  essentially  the  same  as  that  of  Rhosse. 
Following  St.  John  Damascene,  he  holds  that  “the  Foreknowl¬ 
edge  of  God  ...  is  not  the  cause  of  everything  that  may 
happen.  But  He  knows  that  we  are  going  to  do  this  or  that. 

.  .  As  a  physician  is  not  the  cause  of  the  disease,  if  he  knows 
in  advance  that  some  one  is  to  fall  ill,  but  the  disease  is  the  re¬ 
sult  of  some  other  cause,  and  the  foreknowledge  of  the  physician 
(is)  his  skill  in  recognizing  this  cause,  so  God  is  not  the  cause 
or  reason  of  the  acts  done  by  us,  but  our  own  will  acting  freely 
in  determining  them.”2  “God  knows  what  is  going  to  happen, 
seeing  all  events  as  present  without  His  knowledge  exercising 
any  influence  upon  them.”3  So  God  sees  all  things,  but  His 
knowledge  of  the  results  of  necessary  or  free  causes  does  not 
cause  these  results.  They  come  about  as  if  they  had  not  been 
seen  in  advance.  This  knowledge  is  not  “creative”  but  as  it 
were  “passive  or  receptive”,  is  limited  by  the  events  possible  in 
themselves,  and  “the  events  are  known  bv  God  because  they  ex- 


1  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  319. 

2  Contra  Manichaeos  dialogus ,  79. 

8  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  66. 


100 


II.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  GOD 


ist,  and  do  not  exist  because  He  knows  them''.1  In  a  sense  He 
is,  as  it  were,  a  spectator  of  the  acts  of  man.  This  limitation 
of  the  Knowledge  of  God  concerning  the  free  acts  of  man  does 
not  derogate  from  His  Absolute  Character,  for  He  created  man, 
knows  all  his  possibilities  and  capacities  and  “orders  all  things 
so  that  human  free  will  may  not  foil  the  purpose  of  the  world. 
Otherwise  the  existence  of  evil  cannot  be  explained  .  .  . 
than  that  God  knows  it  as  a  consequence  of  man  and  free  will, 
and  not  as  a  subject  of  His  Own  Knowledge,  for  it  would  then 
be  necessary,  and  have  God  as  its  Creator.”2  Essentially  these 
two  solutions  do  not  differ.  They  both  ascribe  a  different  char¬ 
acter  to  God’s  Knowledge  of  all  matters  concerning  free  will 
and  its  consequences,  in  the  concrete,  than  they  do  to  God’s 
self-knowledge,  and  His  Knowledge  of  the  possible.  They  are 
both  designed  to  secure:  (a)  omniscience  on  God’s  part  and  (b) 
free  will  on  man’s  without  postulating  (c)  the  absolute  charac¬ 
ter  of  either  in  relation  to  the  other. 

God  is  All  Wise  in  that  “He  knows  the  best  means  for  the 
best  ends.”  The  element  of  knowledge  is  essential  to  the  defi¬ 
nition,  since  the  Wisdom  of  God  as  shown  in  nature,8  in  man¬ 
kind,  and  especially  in  Christ,  is  a  result  not  only  of  His  Wis¬ 
dom  as  a  noetic  faculty,  but  of  His  Will  and  Power  as  well.  It 
is  not  enough  to  define  it  as  the  sublime  skill  or  art  of  adapting 
means  to  ends,4  for  it  is  a  logical  prerequisite  of  Divine  Om¬ 
nipotence.8  It  is  closely  allied  to  the  Divine  Will  and  the  Di¬ 
vine  Reason,  willing  and  determining  the  end  of  Creation,  for 
by  it  all  things  are  ordered  each  severally  to  its  own  end,  and 
each  to  subserve  as  well  a  greater  End.  Foreseeing  evil  as  a 

1  For  otherwise  they  would  be  caused  by  Him  necessarily,  and 
there  would  be  no  free  will,  ibid.;  Dyobouniotes  ('H  Aoyg.  ’A vSpovraov 
Kpivo/x.,  p.  18)  objects  to  this  distinction  as  “removing  the  Absolute 
Character  of  God,  and  the  possibility  of  His  governing  the  world,  if 
God  does  not  know  what  is  going  to  happen;”  for  Androutsos’ 
answer,  cf.  Aoy/xariKal  MeXerai,  A',  p.  56  (his  reply  to  Dyobouniotes). 

2  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  66-67,  and  on  his  discussion  of  the  prob¬ 
lem  of  evil,  cf.  pp.  117-119. 

3  Prov.  3,  19,  8.  (esp.  22-30)  ;  Ps.  104,  24. 

4  Cf.  Macaire,  Theologie  Dogmatique  Orthodoxe,  Paris,  1860,  vol.  1. 
p.  157. 

6  They  are  coupled  together  in  Job  9,  4;  12,  13;  Jer.  10,  12;  Dan. 

2,  20. 


CONTENT  OF  OCR  KNOWLEDGE  OF  GOD 


101 


consequence  of  the  wrong  use  by  man  of  his  freedom,  the  Divine 
Wisdom  planned  in  advance  the  means  of  the  removal  of  evil 
from  the  world — through  the  Redemption  of  man.  Divine 
Wisdom  in  its  prevision  has  provided  as  well  that  nothing  hu¬ 
man  or  creaturely  shall  mar  the  plan  of  God  for  His  world.1 
Divine  Wisdom,  says  Rhosse,  as  an  Absolute  Attribute  is  predi¬ 
cated  of  the  Divine  Essence,  and  as  relative  is  such  because  of 
the  content  of  its  energy  and  not  by  reason  of  the  manner  nor 
of  the  end  for  which  it  operates." 


C.  The  Ethical  Attributes 


Holiness,  Justice,  and  Love  are  the  three  ethical  attributes 
of  God.  As  in  the  natural  world  the  Almighty  Power  of  God  is 
manifested,  and  in  the  rational  order,  His  Wisdom,  so  in  the 
ethical  attributes  of  Holiness  and  Justice  or  Righteousness,  each 
of  these  attributes  is  lifted  to  its  Highest  Personal  Perfection. 


Love  is  the  characteristic  of  all  the  aspects  of  God’s  Activity 
and  Being.  “Holiness”  may  be  termed  the  “full  accord  of  the 
Divine  Will  for  God;”  Righteousness,  “the  stabilizing  factor  of 
the  ethical  order  in  its  administration,”  and  Love,  “the  attribute 
according  to  which  God  shares  His  good  things  with  His 
creatures,  and  Himself  with  mankind.” 

Holiness.  As  one  aspect  of  Holiness  means  separation  from 
the  world  and  from  every  earthly  thing  and  imperfection  (thus 
in  the  Old  Testament)  so  the  ethical  aspect  includes  this  same 
note  of  separation,  inasmuch  as  things  earthly  are  contaminated 
and  unclean.  Hence  Holiness  may  be  defined  as  “that  property 
according  to  which  the  Divine  Will  is  perfectly  identified  with 
the  Good  which  it  seeks;  in  relation  to  man,  this  object  is  moral 
cleanness,  and  the  carrying  out  of  the  ethical  law  implanted  in 
man’s  conscience.”  This  good  with  which  the  Divine  Will  is 
equivalent  may  not  be  understood  as  something  outside3  the 
Divine  Nature,  as  if  the  Will  of  God  were  to  be  conformed  to 
some  higher  Good  external  to  It,  for  this  would  take  away  the 
Absolute  Character  of  His  Will,  but  this  Good  is  “the  expres- 


1  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  67. 

2  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  319. 

3  See  below,  pp.  105-106  on  this  phrase  “outside  God”  in  relation  to 
the  Divine  Essence. 


102 


II.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  GOD 


sion  of  the  internal  identity  of  the  Divine  Nature  with  it.”1 2 
The  scholastic  question  as  to  “whether  good  is  good,  hence  God 
wills  it”,  or  “because  He  does  will  it,  it  is  good,”  creates  an  un¬ 
necessary  distinction.  God  can  only  by  His  Nature  will  what 
is  good,  and  what  He  wills,  as  proceeding  from  His  Nature  must 
be  only  what  He  is,  that  is,  good. 

Righteousness.  As  having  implanted  in  us  His  ideal  of 
Goodness,  God  is  known  also  as  Guardian  and  Administrator  of 
the  Ethical  Law.  The  Divine  Will  is  known  as  Righteous  when 
God,  judging  and  administering  according  to  the  Eternal  Law 
of  Righteousness  and  Justice,  recompenses  the  obedient,  and 
punishes  the  transgressor."  In  His  Eternal  Essence  are  the 
eternal  truths  and  the  Eternal  Laws  of  Nature,  Reason,  and 
Ethic,  eternally  self-originated,  and  self-determined  in  the  Di¬ 
vine  Essence.  These  are  the  object  of  the  Divine  Knowledge 
and  Reason,3  and  are  the  basis  of  the  relations  of  God  as  Holy 
and  Just,  to  His  Creation.  “God  as  the  Absolute  Good  hates 
evil  and  is  absolutely  Holy.  As  He  accords  to  each  of  His 
powers  or  determinations  and  properties — physical,  logical,  and 
ethical — what  is  fitting  and  proper  to  it  in  His  Absolute  Life 
and  Energy,  and  maintains  all  in  Absolute  balance,  proportion, 
and  harmony,  He  is  viewed  in  relation  to  His  Eternal  Self,  as 
absolutely  Just  or  Righteous.  .  .  .4  As  God  wills  not  only 
Himself  and  His  Own  Absolute  Essence,  but  also  something 
other  than  Himself,  .  .  .  through  His  wisdom  and  Might 
He  realizes  this  Will  outside  Himself  in  the  world.  .  .  His 
Will  in  relation  to  the  world  desires  Good,  not  as  it  exists  in  God 
seen  by  Himself,  but  as  it  exists  and  is  manifest  in  His  world, 
as  its  highest  Good.  So  He  is  the  Cause  of  this  sharing  of  all 
Good  with  Creation,  and  also  (is)  its  highest  End,  to  which  all 
goods  in  the  world  tend — physical  and  material  as  well  as  spiri¬ 
tual.  ...  As  He  hates  and  turns  away  from  all  evil  in  the 
world,  and  is  promoting  all  good  in  it,  He  is  Holy.  .  .  The 
Righteousness  of  God  as  directed  to  this  world  in  each  of  its 
several  units  ....  accords  what  is  fitting  to  the  nature  and 

1  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  G8. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  69. 

3  Rliosse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  307-308  (§  177). 

*  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  308  (§  177). 


CONTENT  OF  OUR  KNOWLEDGE  OF  GOD 


103 


scope  of  its  being,  and  both  recompenses  good  and  punishes 
evil.”1 

Tlie  relation  between  His  Holiness  and  Righteousness  is  that 
between  God  as  Creator  and  Originator  of  the  ethical  order,  and 
God  as  “impartial  Administrator  of  it  ...  .  ordering  all 
things  to  their  Highest  End.”  Righteousness  is  not  an  element 
of  Holiness,  related  as  species  to  genus,  as  the  Alexandrines 
thought,  nor  a  mere  objective  property  of  it,  as  Marcion  thought. 
The  former  mistaken  view  “exercised  a  disastrous  influence  on 
the  question  of  Eternal  Punishment,  and  the  dogma  of  the 
Atonement”,  while  the  latter  gave  rise  to  the  Marcionite  doc¬ 
trine  of  the  double  Principle,  in  the  relations  of  God  and  His 
world.  As  by  His  Holiness  God  promulgates  His  eternal  Laws 
( justitia  legislative)  so  by  His  Righteousness  He  actively  up¬ 
holds  and  administers  this  Law.2 

In  the  conception  of  the  Righteousness  or  Justice  of  God  pre- 
ed  above  it  was  said  that  God  as  Righteous  recompenses  good 
and  punishes  evil.  It  may  be  objected3  that  it  is  not  the  func¬ 
tion  of  the  Divine  Administrator  of  His  own  Law  to  reward 
anyone  for  his  attempts  to  observe  it.  It  does  not,  it  is  said, 
come  within  the  province  of  judicial  function  to  reward  or 
recompense  anyone  for  obedience  to  law.  Man  really  cannot 
claim  anv  reward  for  obedience  to  God  with  any  show  of  right 
on  his  side.  This  objection  is  really  not  valid.  It  is  a  wrong 
conception  of  God  as  Just  to  conceive  of  Him  as  a  human 
magistrate  exercising  his  office  in  the  punishment  of  crime  and 
law  breaking.4  God’s  sphere  as  the  Righteous  and  Just  Ad¬ 
ministrator  of  His  Ethical  Order  is  much  wider  than  man's, 
in  his  capacity  of  judge  and  magistrate.  Man  can  claim  no 
reward  as  by  his  right.  God  concedes  rewards  and  recompense 
of  His  bounty.  As  being  self-caused  and  self-sufficient, 
lacking  nothing,  eternally  independent,  God  possesses  abso¬ 
lute  Beatitude.5  But  this  Beatitude  or  Blessedness  God  wills 
to  share  with  man.  His  own  Happiness  as  a  Divine  Attribute 

1  Ibid.,  pp.  324-325. 

2  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  G9-70. 

3  E.  g.,  Dyobouniotes,  'H  A07/X.  ’ Apdpovraov  Kpu>.,  p.  18. 

*  Androutsos,  Aoyp.  Me\.,A\  p.  57. 

0  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  30G  (§  175). 


104 


II.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  GOD 


is  the  source  of  His  Will  to  have  men  come  to  know  and  share 
it.1  He  desires  men’s  happiness,  to  secure  which  He  freely 
rewards  righteous  men  who  seek  the  good,  “ordering  things  ac¬ 
cording  to  His  Holiness  together  with  His  Blessedness.”  Fur¬ 
thermore,  inasmuch  as  the  bad  are  punished  because  of  the 
bad  use  of  their  free  will,  the  good  should  be  rewarded  for 
their  right  use  of  it.  Any  attempt  to  be  more  precise  in  the 
analysis  of  the  relation  of  the  different  rewards  and  punish¬ 
ments  received  by  men  here — for  the  evil  ofttimes  seems  to 
prevail,  and  virtue  seems  to  go  unrewarded  on  this  earth — can¬ 
not  be  satisfactory.  Disease  and  misfortune,  and  the  gnawings 
of  conscience  are  external  and  internal  punishments  respec¬ 
tively.  In  general,  “while  to  the  impious,  sufferings  may 
serve  as  punishment  for  sin,  for  the  righteous  they  may  be 
means  of  testing,  purification,  and  perfecting  in  the  ethical 
life.”2 

Love.  “The  property  by  which  God  shares  His  own  good 
things  with  the  world  and  mankind,  constituting  created  things 
sharers  of  His  own  Blessedness,  is  Love.”8  God  as  Eternally 
Perfect  and  Absolute  did  not  will  to  remain  alone  in  the  enjoy¬ 
ment  of  His  Perfections  “but  as  Good,  willed  to  share  Himself 
with  something  other  than  Himself”.4  All  that  was  Himself 
He  recognizes  as  Necessarily  Existing,  but  the  “other-than- 
Himself”  He  knew  as  non-being  and  non-existing  of  itself. 
Hence  the  reason  and  cause  of  the  existence  of  the  other- 
than-Self,  that  is,  the  world,  existed  in  the  goodness  and 
love  of  God,  together  with  His  Reason,  Wisdom,  and  Might. 
His  Love  or  Goodness  in  this  aspect  is,  then,  the  “quality 
of  imparting  and  giving,  directed  to  that  without  Him”.s  It 
is  the  opposite  and  antithesis  of  selfishness  or  egoism.  As  self- 
love  is  always  turned  in  upon  itself  and  regards  other  entities 
only  as  contributing  to  self,  so  love,  focusing  its  desires  not  on 
self,  but  impelled  to  go  without,  seeks  the  other  than  self, 

'Ibid.,  pp.  311-312. 

2  Androutsos,  Aoy/xaTucri,  p.  70.  Evil  and  suffering  may  by  God’s 
grace  be  diverted  to  serve  a  good  end,  cf.  Rom.  8,  28.  This  is  the  prac¬ 
tical  solution  of  the  problem  of  evil. 

3  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  71. 

4  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  311. 

6  Ibid.,  p.  326. 


CONTENT  OF  OUR  KNOWLEDGE  OF  GOD 


105 


to  share  with  it  what  it  has,  and  of  course,  takes  for  granted 
the  existence  of  that  toward  which  interest  is  directed. 
Self-love  focuses  all  things  on  itself;  love's  interest  converges 
in  other-than-self.1 *  So  the  love  of  God  issues  in  a  continuous 
and  eternal  Energy  between  the  Persons  of  the  Blessed  Trinity, 
and  His  Love  to  creatures  issues  in  all  His  relations  with  His 
world — from  His  eternal  plan  of  Creation,  through  the  Re¬ 
demption,  and  now  in  the  life  of  His  Church/ 

In  His  Eternal  Being  God  knows  and  recognizes  not  only 
Himself,  but  also  the  conception  of  other-than-self.  This  He 
first  knew  as  non-being,  then  as  the  “whole  of  the  ideas  and 
conceptions  of  the  possible  and  actual  outside  Himself",  with 
relation  to  His  Will,  Might,  and  His  Nature  in  general.3  As 
this  idea  of  the  world  may  be  conceived  of  as  being  antecedent 
to  its  realization  actually,  we  may  say  that  this  idea  of  the 
cosmos  existed  in  the  mind  of  God  from  before  time.4  As  God 
knew  each  of  His  Attributes  as  being  something  that  the  others 
were  not,  so  He  knew  the  conception  of  “non-being"  in  rela¬ 
tion  to  His  own  necessary  Being.5 6  This  idea  of  “non-being" 
in  relation  to  His  Absolute  and  Infinite  Being,  included  both 
the  notions  of  free ,  as  contrasted  with  necessary,  and  finite 
and  contingent,  in  relation  to  His  Infinity.  “Since  God  is 
Absolute  Good  .  .  .  He  wills  to  endow  non-being  with  existence 
according  to  the  prototype  in  His  Nature,  in  order  to  consti¬ 
tute  it  capable  of  sharing  His  Goodness".  So  He  regarded 
non-being  as  not  completely  non-being,  that  is,  in  contrast  to 
actual  Being,  Himself,  but  as  other-than-Being.  The  poten¬ 
tial  being,  then,  of  the  world  was  made  actual  by  His  Will 
cooperating  with  His  Wisdom  and  Almighty  Power,  since 
it  was  capable  of  becoming,  and  was  not  non-being  in  the 
sense  of  “impossible",  according  to  His  eternal,  natural,  ra- 

1  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  71. 

-  Ibid.,  and  RhOsse,  op.  cit.,  p.  326. 

3  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  327  (§  193). 

4  That  is,  it  is  not  eternal,  in  the  sense  that  God’s  Self-knowledge 

is,  nor  is  it  in  time,  since  the  Creation  made  actual  the  content  of 
the  idea.  “The  conception  of  ‘before  time’  lies  between  .  .  that  of 
eternity  and  .  .  .  time'’  (Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  327,  note  2;  cf.  p.  86, 
note  6,  and  p.  152,  note  2,  following). 

6  Ibid.,  p.  327. 


100 


II.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  GOD 


tional,  and  ethical  laws.1  “The  idea  of  the  world,  having 
noetic  existence  in  the  mind  of  God,  received,  through  His 
creative  Power,  relative  self-existence  and  self-containedness.”2 
This  is  what  we  mean  by  existing  “outside  God”,  that  is, 
relative  self-existence  and  self-containedness;  not  as  by  opposi¬ 
tion  and  contrast  to  real  Being,  but  as  consisting  in  other  than 
that  Being.  This  phrase  requires  to  be  supplemented  by  the 
statement  that  the  world  is  as  well,  “in  God”,3  which  signifies 
its  union  and  fellowship  with  Him  who  caused  it,  sustains  it, 
works  in  it,  and  orders  it  to  His  own  End.  It  was  His  Love 
which  lay  back  of  the  idea  of  the  world  generated  before  time, 
together  with  the  plan  of  the  Creation  of  man,  the  Incarna¬ 
tion,  the  Redemption  of  man,  and  the  consummation  of  all 
in  the  sharing  by  man  of  the  Beatific  Vision.4  “Since  Love 
is  the  attribute  by  which  God  imparts  His  own  Goods,  the 
joy  arising  from  this  sharing  of  them,  and  especially  that 
proceeding  from  the  contemplation  of  their  own  Divine  Per¬ 
fection,  constitutes  the  Blessedness  of  God."" 

This  attribute  of  God  is  a  peculiarly  Christian  contribu¬ 
tion  to  the  knowledge  of  God.  It  is  the  climax  of  all  perfec¬ 
tions,  and  the  bond  uniting  all  the  attributes  of  God  into  one.® 
The  Will  of  God  as  desiring  the  sharing  of  God's  Blessedness 
with  man  is  actuated  by  Love.  The  Wisdom  of  God  as  dis¬ 
cerning  the  means  of  knowing  this  End,  is  directed  by  Love. 
The  Power  of  God  as  making  actual  what  was  potential  in  the 
Mind  of  God,  in  Creation,  Redemption,  Sanctification,  is  guided 
by  Love.7  In  its  relation  to  Creation  we  may  distinguish  dif¬ 
ferent  methods  of  the  operation  of  Divine  Love:  (a)  in  re¬ 
lation  to  creatures, — giving  them  existence,  guiding,  and  gov¬ 
erning  all  with  benevolence ;  (b)  toward  mankind  in  general — 
by  causing  them  to  exist,  supplying  them  with  necessities, 
and  with  the  equipment  of  physical,  rational,  and  ethical  facul¬ 
ties,  as  philanthrophy  and  kindliness;  (1)  toward  sinners — 

'Ibid.,  p.  328. 

2  Ibid.,  note  1,  pp.  328-329. 

3  Cf.  Acts  17,  28. 

4  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  328-329. 

5  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  72;  cf.  Rhosse,  p.  30G  (§  175)  and  Acts 
17,  25;  Tim.  6,  15,  et  al. 

6  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  72. 

7  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  311-312,  327,  328. 


THE  HOLY  TRINITY 


107 


by  giving  them  Grace,  whereby  God  is  shown  as  merciful, 
and  forgiving;  by  helping  the  unfortunate  and  sinful,  He  is 
shown  as  compassionate  and  of  great  pity;  toward  the  obdu¬ 
rate,  God  is  revealed  as  patient,  and  long-suff ering ;J  (2)  toward 
Christians, — by  giving  them  Himself  in  His  Son,  and  through 
Him,  all  of  the  spiritual  Goods  of  Christianity.2  The  Reve¬ 
lation  par  excellence  of  the  Nature  of  God,  is  in  His  attribute 
of  Love3  toward  His  Creation. 4 

4.  THE  HOLY  TRINITY 

“The  dogma  of  the  Holy  Trinity  is  the  most  important  of 
the  mysteries  and  dogmas  of  the  Christian  religion,  not  only 
that  because  of  it  we  are  distinguished  from  the  Heathen, 
from  Jews,  and  Mohammedans,  but  because  it  constitutes  the 
fundamental  divine  verity  on  which  is  based  the  true  Knowl¬ 
edge  of  God,  and  through  which  we  come  to  know  the  rela¬ 
tion  of  God  to  the  world.  Through  this  mystery  we  perceive 
how  God  is  One,  and  operates  as  Creator  and  Saviour.  In 
consequence  it  is  of  the  utmost  necessity  for  Salvation,  since 
as  St.  Gregory  of  Nyssa  says  :5  CA  Christian  is  characterized 
by  his  faith  in  the  Father,  Son,  and  Holy  Ghost'  ”.6  “Accord¬ 
ing  to  the  Faith  of  the  Orthodox  Church,  God,  One  in  Es¬ 
sence,  is  Three  in  Hypostasis — Father,  Son,  and  Holy  Ghost — 
which  three  Persons  are  neither  aspects  nor  manifestations  of 
the  One  Divine  Essence.  .  .  .nor  do  they  form  three  gods  in¬ 
stead  of  One,  as  if  they  were  self-existent  centers  or  forms  of 
Revelation  in  which  the  whole  Divine  Essence  were  partitioned 
off  and  expressed  without  distinction  in  each  of  them,  but 
thev  are  modes  of  the  Eternal  Existence  of  the  One  God,  bv 
which  the  Godhead  is  at  once  distinguished  or  divided  and 

1  Ibid.,  p.  325. 

2  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  71. 

3  1  St.  John,  4,  8. 

4  ‘‘The  Fathers  .  .  distinguished  an  antecedent  and  a  consequent 
aspect  of  the  Will  of  God.  The  former  is  the  Good  and  the  Salva¬ 
tion  of  rational  creatures.  The  latter  is  the  spiritual  death  of  the  un¬ 
repentant.  The  former  is  founded  on  the  Goodness  of  God,  the  latter 
on  His  Justice”  (Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  325-326). 

s  De  Spiritu  Sancto,  8,  11;  cf.  St.  John  Damascene  wE/(5o<m,  1,  8. 

6  Mesolora.  op.  cit.,  III.  pp.  103-104. 


108 


II.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  GOD 


also  united  together”.1  Each  of  the  Persons  is  God  entire, 
and  all  of  the  Divine  attributes  in  God  the  Father  are  as  well 
in  God  the  Word  and  God  the  Holy  Spirit.  Yet  neither  are 
there  three  gods,  nor  are  the  Persons  intermingled  or  blurred 
into  each  other.  The  Father  is  distinguished  from  the  other 
Persons  as  eternally  begetting  from  His  Nature  God  the  Son, 
and  as  breathing  forth  the  Spirit;  the  Son  is  distinguished  as 
being  eternally  begotten  of  the  Father;  and  the  Holy  Spirit, 
as  eternally  proceeding  from  the  Father.  The  Three  Per¬ 
sons  of  the  Godhead  are  joined  with  each  other  as  being  con¬ 
tained  in  each  other  and  subsisting  in  each  other,  without 
being  confused — so  the  Father  is  in  the  Son  and  in  the  Holy 
Spirit,  the  Son  in  the  Father  and  in  the  Holy  Spirit,  and 
the  Holy  Spirit  is  in  the  Father  and  in  the  Son.2 

(1)  Sources  of  the  Doctrine  in  Holy  Scripture 

The  sources  of  the  doctrine  of  the  Holy  Trinity  are  in 
God's  supernatural  Revelation  of  Himself  in  Holy  Writ.  In 
the  Old  Testament  we  find  the  teaching  about  the  Triune 
God  suggested  “enigmatically  and  briefly”  only,  since  “the 
Divine  Revelation  of  supernatural  truths  is  progressive  and 
gradual,  according  to  the  spiritual  and  moral  development 
of  those  who  are  receiving  it."  Furthermore  “since  the  Jews 
were  already  too  prone  to  fall  into  the  seductions  of  polythe¬ 
ism,  not  being  able  to  understand  the  tri-personality  of  the 
Godhead,  they  might  easily  slip  into  error.”3  These  “dark 
hints  and  suggestions”  in  the  Old  Testament  are  not  a  few  in 
number.  The  Fathers  alluded  to  Gen.  1,26;  3,22,  and  11,7 
where  the  Godhead  is  expressed  in  the  plural,  and  to  Isaiah 
6,3  where  the  three-fold  Sanctus  suggests  a  three-fold  Person¬ 
ality  in  the  Godhead.4  God  is  called  “Father”,  with  reference 
to  all  men  (Mai.  2,10),  especially  to  Israel  (Deut.  32,6; 
Jer.  31,9;  Mai.  1,6),  and  eminently  in  relation  to  the  devout 
in  Israel  (2  Sam.  7,14;  Wisd.  2,18),  and  Father  of  the  Messiah 
in  Psalm  2,7.  On  the  passage  “It  is  I.... who  blot  out  thy 
transgressions  for  my  own  sake”5  Rhosse  says  that  God  is 

CA-ndroutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  72-73. 

2Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  73. 

3Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  III.  p.  104,  and  cf.  ibid.,  note  2. 

4Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  73. 

5Isaiali  43,  25. 


THE  HOLY  TRINITY 


109 


here  “distinguished  as  efficient  and  as  final  cause’’.1  The 
“Spirit’’  of  God  is  referred  to  in  Gen.  1,3;  Ps.  51,  13-14;  and 
as  in  the  world,  in  Ps.  104,  29-30;  Job  27,3;  33,14;  Ezek. 
36,27;  39,29.  The  three  conceptions  in  the  Old  Testament 
of  the  “Word”,  “Angel”,  and  “Wisdom”  of  God,  are  much 
more  clear  suggestions  of  the  truth  of  the  Triune  God,  and 
“certain  indications  of  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity  adumbrated 
in  the  Old  Testament.”2  The  “Word”  is  the  means  of  God’s 
work  in  Creation,  (Gen.  1,1)  :  “by  the  word  of  the  Lord  were 
the  heavens  made,  and  all  the  host  of  them  by  the  breath 
(7 n'evna)  of  his  mouth"  (Ps.  33,6).  In  commenting  on  Exodus 
3,  vs.  2,  4,  6,  14,  Rhosse3 4 5  says :  “This  angel  cannot  be  conceived 
as  something  created,  though  ‘angels’  usually  means  created 
beings.’”  The  phrase  “face  to  face”0  means  that  God  revealed 
Himself  as  a  Person,  under  the  guise  of  an  angel.  O11  the  basis 
of  the  notion  of  “Wisdom"  in  the  Old  Testament6  and  that 
of  the  “Word”,  Philo  conceived  of  the  latter  as  almost  a 
hypostatic  intermediate  between  God  and  man.7 

The  teaching  in  the  New  Testament  of  the  doctrine  of  the 
Holy  Trinity  is  both  explicit  and  implied.  Such  passages  as 
St.  Ala tt.  3,13-17;  St.  Mark  1,9-11;  St.  Luke  3,21-22;  St. 
John  1,32,  imply  the  doctrine  of  the  three  Persons  of  the 
Godhead — (“my  beloved  Son  in  whom  I  am  well  pleased.  .  .  . 
the  Spirit  of  God  descending  like  a  dove").  So  too,  does  the 
account  of  the  Transfiguration.8  The  explicit  command  of 
Our  Lord  to  baptize,  in  the  name  of  the  Father,  Son,  and  Holy 
Ghost,9  is  a  clear  and  unmistakable  declaration  of  the  doctrine 
of  the  Blessed  Trinity,  “in  which  the  Son  and  the  Spirit  are 
put  parallel  to  the  Father,  in  relation  to  whom  they  are  deemed 


1  Op.  lit.,  |>.  1S8. 

2  Androutsos.  op.  1  it.,  p.  74. 

3  Op.  cit.,  p.  189. 

4C'f.  Gen.  18,  20.  2(3. 

5  Gen.  24,  40;  Exodus  33,  11;  Xura.  12,  8;  Deut.  34,  10;  Judges, 
6,  12-14. 

8  Cf.  Prow  1,  24-26;  Ben  Sir.  1. 

7  Rhosse.  op.  cit.,  p.  189-190. 

8  St.  Matt.  17.  1-8;  St.  Mk.  9.  2-7;  St.  Luke  9,  28-36;  2  St.  Peter  1, 
16-18;  cf.  also  St.  John  12,  20-32. 

9  St.  Matt.  28,  19. 


110 


II.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  GOD 


equal.”  There  is  no  possible  suggestion  of  subordination  to 
the  Father,  and  the  formula  itself  involves  Divine  worship  of 
the  Son  and  Holy  Spirit  along  with  the  Father.1  The  inter¬ 
pretation  of  this  text  in  a.  Sabellian  sense — that  is,  that  these 
words  do  not  mean  to  express  the  work  of  salvation  as  done 
by  three  Persons,  but  only  a  triple  work  of  one  Person — is  im¬ 
possible.  The  text  does  not  deal  with  the  unity  of  the  three 
works,  but  concerns  itself  with  the  one  act  of  Baptism  which 
is  referred  to  all  three  Persons,  equal  to  each  other.  Further, 
the  words  “Son"  and  “Father”  express  a  relation  between  Per¬ 
sons  in  the  Godhead,  not  of  that  Godhead  to  Creation ;  the 
“Father”  is  Father  of  the  “Son”.  This  means  to  ascribe 
equality  of  rank  to  each  of  the  three  Persons  of  the  One  God. 

St.  John  in  many  places  teaches  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity 
(3,3-18;  lb,  14;  and  the  like),  but  the  great  text  (St.  John 
15,  26)  expresses  it  most  completely:  “When  the  Comforter 
is  come,  whom  I  will  send  you  (having  received  him)  from 
the  Father,  the  Spirit  of  Truth,  which  proceedeth  from  the 
Father,  he  shall  testify  of  me.”  (It  is  necessary  to  insert 
the  bracketed  words  to  make  the  meaning  clear2).  This  ex¬ 
plicitly  teaches  the  mission  of  the  Holy  Spirit  in  time  by  the 
Son,  who  had  received  Him  from  the  Father  from  whom  the 
Spirit  eternally  proceeds.  In  2  Cor.  13,  13,  the  Father,  Son, 
and  Spirit  are  explicitly  joined  together  as  equal,  and  One. 
It  is  not  as  man  that  Jesus  is  thus  made  of  equal  rank  with 
the  Father,  hence  the  Sabellian  interpretation  of  this  text  is 
futile.  “The  word  God  alone  signifies  the  hypostasis  of  the 
Father,  for  from  Him  is  begotten  the  Son  who  was  sent  into 
the  world,  and  from  Him  proceeds  the  Spirit  sent  into  the 
world.”3  The  words  in  the  Prologue  of  St.  John's  Gospel 

15  Even  the  Ebionites  used  this  formula.  The  same  contention 
given  above  applies  equally  to  the  baptism  “in  the  name  of  Jesus 
Christ”  (Acts  2,  32,  33,  35-38,  and  Romans  6,  3.  Cf.  Rhosse,  op.  tit., 
pp.  190-191.) 

2  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  192.  Cf.  the  discussion  below  on  the  Procession 
of  the  Holy  Spirit  (pp.  126,  ff. ). 

3  Ibid.,  p.  193.  Such  passages  refer  to  the  “economic”  Trinity,  i.  e., 
“as  appearing  in  history,  but  the  basis  of  it  is  the  eternal  distinction 
of  Persons”,  i.  e.,  the  “transcendental”  Trinity.  Cf.  Androutsos,  op.  cit., 
p.  74,  84;  Aoy fi.  MeXerat,  A’,  pp.  57-58;  Dyobouniotes,  ’O0eiX.  airavr., 
pp.  53-54. 


THE  HOLY  TRINITY 


111 


“the  Word  was  with  God’’  mean ....  “with  the  Father”,  and 
cannot  be  taken  in  an  Arianizing  sense,  since  “the  Word  was 
God”.  In  verse  18  the  Father  is  called  “God”,  and  often  in 
the  New  Testament  “more  clearly  to  reveal  the  First  Hyposta¬ 
sis  ..  .  the  word  ‘Father’  follows  the  word  ‘God’  ”/  Since 
we  received  the  adoption  of  Sons,  God  is  our  Father  (St.  James 

1,  27;  Eph.  4,  6)  but  more  preeminently  the  Father  of  Jesus 
Christ,  whom  He  is  eternally  begetting.  Hence  the  phrase, 
“God  and  Father  of  Jesus  Christ”  (1  Cor.  15,24;  2  Cor.  1,3; 
11,  31;  Eph.  1,  3;  5,  20;  Col.  1,  3;  3,  17;  Pev.  1,  6).  The 
Prologue  of  St.  John  forbids  not  only  the  Arian,  but  also  the 
Sabellian  construction,  since  the  verse  “the  Word  was  with 
God”  shows  conclusively  that  the  “Word”  was  “no  mere  prop¬ 
erty  or  act  of  revelation  of  God,  but  a  Hypostasis  distin¬ 
guished  from  the  Father’s,  and  subsisting  in  an  eternal  rela¬ 
tion  with  Him.  Averse  18  says  that  the  same  Eternal  Only- 
begotten  Son  has  declared  what  God  is.  Hence  these  words 
show  the  relation  of  God  to  Himself,  seen  in  and  by  Himself.”2 

The  differentiation  of  function  in  1  Cor.  12,  4-6,  involves 
the  distinction  of  God  the  Father  as  Creator  and  Muster  of 
the  “operations”,  the  Son  as  “Lord”  of  the  “administrations”, 
and  the  “Spirit”  as  Sanctifier  of  the  “gifts”.  The  text,  how¬ 
ever,  does  not  deal  with  the  distinction  of  the  Persons  in 
themselves,  but  with  the  revelations  of  God  in  the  world  or  in 
His  Church,  which  are  referred  to  the  three  Hypostases  in  the 
One  Being  of  God.3  “Of  Him,  through  Him,  and  to  Him”, 
in  Pom.  11,  36,  shows  a  distinction  of  beginning,  means,  and 
end,  which  is  referable  to  the  three  Hypostases  in  God  as 
seen  by  Himself.  In  1  Cor.  8,  6,  “One  God,  the  Father”, 
means  the  Father  as  Origin  and  Principle  of  everything;  “One 
Lord  Jesus  Christ*’,  the  Son  as  Mediating  Principle;  and  “we 
unto  Him”  implies  the  Holy  Spirit  as  Final  Principle  or  End.4 

1  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  193.  Cf.  Gal.  1,  1,  3;  Eph.  3,  14;  6,  23;  Phil. 

2,  11;  1  Thes.  1,  1;  2  Tim.  1,  2;  Tit.  1,  4;  St.  James,  3,  9,  etc. 

2  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  194. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  194. 

4  Ibid.,  p.  195;  Rhosse  (ibid.)  refuses  to  attempt  to  found  the 
Trinitarian  teaching  on  1  St.  John  5,  7,  as  “its  genuineness  has  been 
called  into  question”;  so  also  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  75.  Mesolora 
(op.  cit.,  III.  p.  105,  and  note  1,  incorrectly  printed)  quotes  it — one 
of  the  two  texts  given  in  full. 


112 


II.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  GOD 


In  many  places  the  New  Testament  ascribes  to  each  of  the 
Three  Persons  properties  which  postulate  the  Triune  God.1 
In  connection  with  the  second  Person  of  the  Blessed  Trinity 
it  is  said  that  He  may  have  had  an  existence  prior  to  Crea¬ 
tion,  but  this  was  only  a  pre-existence  in  the  mind  of  God, 
and  not  an  eternal  hypostatic  existence.  St.  John  8,  56  re¬ 
futes  this  notion  of  a  merely  noetic  pre-existence  of  the  Word. 
It  has  been  objected  that  “Son”  was  applied  to  Our  Lord  only 
after  the  Incarnation,  and  that  it  expresses  not  an  eternal 
but  a  temporal  relation.  St.  Athanasius  and  St.  Gregory  of 
Nyssa  ( Catech .  Discourse  2)  refute  this  view,  on  the  basis 
of  Eph.  3,14:  human  relations  are  only  analogous  to  the  eternal 
Divine  relations,  but  the  Divine  are  not  analogous  to  our 
own  relations  of  father  and  son  in  time.  The  same  type  of  argu¬ 
ment  is  used  to  show  (on  the  basis  of  1  Cor.  1,4,9  and  Heb. 
11,26)  that  the  name  “Christ”  was  referred  back  to  the  Di¬ 
vine  Nature  from  the  Human,  which,  at  His  Baptism,  was 
anointed  by  the  Divine  Nature  as  Son  of  God.  So,  too,  it 
is  said  that  the  name  “Word”  was  applied  to  His  Divine  Na¬ 
ture,  reasoning  back  from  His  revelation  of  Himself  in  history 
(Rev.  19,13).  “But  as  He  who  was  the  eternal  Son  of  God.  . 

.  .  took  human  shape  in  Christ  Jesus  born  of  the  Virgin  Mary, 
so  He  who  was  the  Eternal  Word  in  God  as  viewed  by  Himself, 
as  His  Son  was  revealed  in  Christ  Jesus,  the  Incarnate  Word.”2 
The  Hypostasis  of  the  Son  did  not  come  into  being  with  or 
because  of  the  appearance  of  Christ  in  the  world.  From  Gal. 
4,4,  it  is  clear  that  the  Son  existed  before  His  Mission  into 
the  world,  and  before  His  Incarnation  and  Redemptive  work. 
Since  it  was  He  by  whom  Creation  was  wrought  (Heb.  1-3;  Col. 
1,  13-20),  He  had  a  distinct  hypostatic  existence  previous  to 
Creation.  The  distinction  of  the  Hypostases,  Father  and  Son,  is 
then  eternal  and  not  temporal.  The  latter  text  ascribes  to  Him 
properties  by  which  His  eternal  existence  is  manifested  dis¬ 
tinctly:  “Image  of  the  invisible  God,  the  first-born  of  every 
creature ;  by  Him  were  all  things  created ....  He  is  before  all 

*St.  John  1,  1-3;  8,  56-59;  17,  5;  3,  13;  6,  33-46;  1  Cor.  1,  4-9;  Gal. 
4,  4;  Heb.  1,  1;  4,  12;  Col.  1,  13-20;  1  St.  John,  1,  1,  ff.;  Rev.  9,  13; 
22,  16.  None  of  these  are  capable  of  an  Arian  or  Sabellian  construction,’ 
according  to  Rhosse  (p.  195). 

2  Rh6sse,  op.  tit.,  pp.  205-207. 


THE  HOLY  TRINITY 


113 


things,  and  by  Him  all  things  consist.”  The  word  “Son”  ex¬ 
pressed  the  actual  pre-existence  of  the  hypostatis  of  the  God¬ 
head1  which  appeared  in  Jesns  Christ.  That  Christ  is  God 
is  evident  from  Heb.  1,1-3;  Tit. 2, 13;  and  Rom.  9,5.  The 
evidence  of  the  Hew  Testament  on  this  point  may  be  summa¬ 
rized  in  the  words :  “The  Son  is  distinguished,  in  God  viewed 
in  Himself,  from  the  Father,  and  both  constitute  in  Essence 
one  God”.2 

In  1  Cor.  2,  10-14,  St.  Paul  tells  us  explicitly  that  only 
the  Spirit  of  God  knows  the  things  of  God.  According  to 
these  words  God  knows  Himself  through  His  Spirit,  who 
knows  “the  deep  things  of  God”.  The  revelation  of  the  Spirit 
in  the  world  has  as  premise  His  Existence  in  God.  The  dis¬ 
tinction  between  Son  and  Spirit  has  been  denied  on  the  basis 
of  1  Cor.  3,  17,  but  it  is  clear  that  in  St.  Matt.  28,  19;  2  Cor. 
13,13  ;  Gal.  3,6;  St.  John  15,26;  16,7,  there  is  a  real  distinc¬ 
tion.  Though  God  is  called  “Spirit”  (St.  John  4,24)  yet  the 
use  of  this  word  with  special  reference  to  the  third  hypostasis 
of  the  One  Essence  is  not  thereby  precluded.  Furthermore, 
where  the  word  seems  to  mean  “emanation”,  “power”  or  any 
other  thing  less  than  personal,  it  is  to  be  construed  with  the 
third  Person  as  Source.  “  “Paraclete”  is  certainly  not  an  im¬ 
personal  notion  (Rom.  8,  16;  Eph.  4,  30;  1  Cor.  12,  11),  but 
may  stand  for  “the  self-determined,”  being  applied  to  God 
as  Holy  Spirit.”'3 

The  evidence  of  the  Holy  Scripture  for  the  dogma  of  the 
Holy  Trinity  may  be  summarized  under  the  following  heads: 
(1)  “Each  Person  is  the  Bearer  of  the  Divine  Nature  and 
Power  and  is  God  entire,”  since  the  attributes  of  the  Godhead 
are  ascribed  to  the  Father,  at  other  times  to  the  Son,  and 
equally  to  the  Holy  Spirit;4  (2)  “this  unity  of  Essence  for¬ 
bids  any  subordination  of  Persons  in  time  or  in  rank,5  and  is 
shown  in  the  simplicity  of  the  common  energy  of  the  three 

'Ibid.,  p.  197. 

7  Ibid.,  p.  198. 

3  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  199-200. 

*  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  75. 

s  Cf.  Dyobouniotes  'II  A07/1.  ’A vSp.  Kpi.vop.evri,  p.  19;  and  Androutsos, 
Aoyp.  MeX.  A’,  pp.  58-59;  Dyobouniotes,  ’O^eiXopevij  dvavTrjais,  pp.  50-51. 


114 


II.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  GOD 


Persons  operating  toward  that  without  ;”*  (3)  "if  this  one  energy 
proceeding  from  the  one  Will  is  common  to  all  three  Per¬ 
sons,  still  certain  properties  and  special  functions  are  ascribed 
to  each  of  the  Persons:  the  Father  is  the  Creator  of  all;  .  .  . 
the  Son,  He  by  whom  all  things  were  made,  and  through 
whom  Kedemption  was  wrought;  the  Holy  Spirit,  being  the 
life-giving  and  sanctifying  principle,  completes  the  action  of 
the  energies  alike  of  Father  and  Son,  was  the  Factor  prepar¬ 
ing  the  way  for  Redemption  by  speaking  through  the  Pro¬ 
phets,  .  .  .  fulfils  the  work  of  Salvation  by  bringing  home  to 
the  individual  the  appropriation  of  the  fruits  of  the  Passion, 
and  sanctifies  men  in  union  with  the  Father  and  the  Son.  .  . 
This  same  energy  of  the  Persons  is  not  to  be  conceived  of 
abstractly,  as  if  each  operated  apart  from  the  others,  for  opera 
ad  extra  sunt  communia  indivisa  .  .  .  and  they  are  the  multi¬ 
ple  effects  of  the  one  Divine  Will.”2 

(2)  Definition  of  the  Doctrine  of  the  Holy  Trinity. 

The  development  and  formulation  of  this  doctrine  by  the 
Church  was  a  process  extending  over  several  centuries.  The 
Fathers  loved  to  meditate  and  ponder  over  the  great  mystery 
of  the  Holy  Trinity,  to  expound  it  philosophically  and  theo¬ 
logically,  in  which  work  "they  used  not  only  biblical  illustra¬ 
tions  and  figures,  but  in  order  to  give  the  faithful  a  clearer 
conception  of  it,  and  to  refute  the  .  .  .  contention  that  the 
dogma  was  entirely  comprehensible  to  our  limited  minds”3  they 
employed  certain  other  non-biblical  figures  and  analogies.  Such 
figures  always  contained  groups  of  three — as  for  example : 
"Sun,  ray,  light” ;  "Root,  branch,  fruit” ;  "three  lamps  mak¬ 
ing  one  single  light”;  "Spring,  brook,  river”;  "Fire,  glow, 
heat”;  "Mind,  reason,  will”;  "Consciousness,  knowledge,  de¬ 
sire”;  "Loving,  Beloved,  Love”.4  The  occasion  of  the  formula¬ 
tion,  as  distinct  from  the  cause  (which  is  the  mind  of  the 
Church  exercising  itself  on  the  content  of  the  Faith),  was  the 
rise  and  development  of  heretical  teaching.  When  part  of 

1  Androutsos,  AoynaTiKr),  p.  76. 

2  Androutsos,  Aoy/iariKri,  pp.  76-77;  cf.  A oyp.  MeXerat,  A’,  pp.  59-60; 
’O0etX.  airavTT]<jLS,  pp.  51-52. 

3  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  III.  p.  105. 

4  Cf.  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  III.  note  4,  pp.  105-106. 


THE  HOLY  TRINITY 


115 


her  heritage  of  revealed  Truth  was  impugned,  the  Church  im¬ 
mediately  developed  a  formulation  of  the  portion  of  the  Truth 
under  attack,  which  would  distinguish  explicitly,  clearly,  and 
without  possibility  of  misunderstanding,  and  would  affirm 
and  define  her  faith  in  such  terms  as  would  exclude  the  un¬ 
orthodox  interpretation.  The  theological  controversies,  first 
with  the  Gnostics,  then  more  definitely  with  the  Sabellians, 
Arians,  and  Macedonians,  served  as  occasions  to  formulate 
the  doctrine  of  the  Holy  Trinity  as  defined  above,  while  the 
controversy  about  the  Filioque  clause  is  chiefly  negative,  in 
denying  the  truth  of  this  addition  to  the  originally  formulated 
dogma.  Gnosticism  attacked  the  Christian  doctrines  of  God  in 
general,  and  in  so  doing  had  a  bearing  on  the  definition  of  the 
dogma  of  the  Holy  Trinity.  Sabellianism,  Arianism,  Macedon- 
ianism,  and  the  Western  heresy  of  the  double  procession  were 
each  aimed  against  certain  definite  aspects  of  the  Orthodox 
teaching.  The  course  of  development  and  formulation  of  the 
dogmas  began  in  the  simple  baptismal  creed,  the  expansion  of  St. 
Matt.  28,19,  and  “the  teaching  therein  proclaimed  ....  was 
developed,  consolidated,  and  affirmed  by  the  Fathers,  the  great 
champions  of  the  Faith.”1 

While  Greek  philosophy — Stoic,  Platonic,  and  then  the 
Aristotelian, — did  exercise  a  great  influence  on  the  form  and 
terminology  of  the  dogma  of  the  Trinity,  the  latter,  as  we 
have  seen,  was  founded  on  biblical  doctrine.  The  great  strug¬ 
gle  of  nascent  Christianity  was  between  the  ideas  of  the  ab¬ 
stract  monotheism  of  Judaism,  and  the  polytheistic  concep¬ 
tions  of  paganism,  which  had  their  logical  outcome  in  pan¬ 
theism.  In  the  second  century  arose  Gnosticism,  in  its  two 
forms — Judaic  and  Hellenic.  The  former  type  exalted  and 
magnified  the  conception  of  a  God  of  Righteousness,  who  was 
immeasurably  above  and  beyond  the  world.  The  latter  type, 
revolting  against  this  sterile  and  inhumane  conception  of  a 
purely  transcendent  Deity,  proclaimed  His  presence  in  the  world. 
Of  this  second  type,  with  its  origins  in  Greek  philosophy  or 
heathen  speculation,  Marcion  developed  a  kind  of  dualism, 
taking  away  the  absolute  nature  of  God,  teaching  the  opposi¬ 
tion  of  love  to  justice,  and  of  spirit  to  matter.  So  his  con- 


1  Androutsos,  loy/xanKri,  p.  77. 


116 


II.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  GOD 


ception  of  God  was  of  Love,  but  justice  was  not  ascribed  to 
Him.  Basilides  and  Valentinus  developed  the  immanent  prin¬ 
ciple  of  their  notion  of  God  into  a  monism  or  pantheism, — 
whether  by  the  theory  of  ‘emanations’,  or  by  that  of  the  syzy- 
gies  evolving  from  the  abyss,  that  is,  God.  In  opposition  to 
the  exaggerated  notions  of  a  sterile,  abstract,  and  transcend¬ 
ent  Monotheism,  having  only  the  quality  of  righteousness 
and  justice,  the  Fathers  of  the  early  Church  emphasized  the 
love  and  omnipresence  of  God.  In  contra-distinction  to  the 
dualistic  or  pantheistic  notions  of  Greek  Gnosticism,  they 
taught  God’s  changelessness,  His  transcendence,  and  His 
righteousness.  Through  Christ  man  receives  the  fellowship 
of  God,  transcendent  and  immanent,  loving  and  righteous, 
in  and  yet  not  identical  with  the  world.  It  was  the  work  of  St. 
Irenaeus,  Clement  of  Alexandria,  Hippolytus,  Tertullian,  and 
others  to  roll  back  the  tide  of  Gnostic  speculation,  and  state 
in  a  unified  system  the  separate  truths  in  which  each  type  of 
Gnostic  heresy  had  some  share.1 

As  Gnosticism  served  to  clear  the  mind  of  the  Church  as 
to  the  doctrine  of  God,  so  Sabellianism,  essentially  Greek  in 
origin,  and  Arianism,  of  a  more  Judaistic  character,  elicited 
the  further  statement  of  the  doctrine  of  the  Holy  Trinity.  In 
about  220,  Sabellianism,  based  on  the  earlier  doctrines  of 
Praxeas  and  Noetus,  became  defined  as  a  fully  developed  sys¬ 
tem.  Basing  his  thought  on  Stoic  speculation,2  Sabellius  de¬ 
scribed  God  as  an  abstract  Monad,  without  utterance  and 
without  energy.  This  Monad  had,  however,  the  property  of 
separation  or  disintegration,  of  expansion,  and  then  of  re-in¬ 
tegration.  As  expanded,  the  Monad  acquires  utterance,  self- 
expression,  and  energy.  Consequently  we  know  it  as  the 
“Father”  in  the  Old  Testament,  as  the  “Son”  in  the  work  of  Re¬ 
demption,  and  as  the  “Holy  Spirit”  in  the  Church.  These 
three  phases  are  not  distinctions  in  God  as  He  knows  Him¬ 
self,  but  only  our  conceptions  of  Him  as  He  comes  into  con¬ 
tact  with  the  world.  As  rays  of  light  converge  in  their  source, 
so  do  the  energies  of  God  unite  and  focus  in  the  one  Monad. 
This  process  of  disintegration  and  expansion  is  only  a  phase 

1  Rhosse,  op.  tit.,  pp.  200-204. 

2  So  St.  Athanasius  says,  adv.  Arianos  orat.,  4,  13. 


THE  HOLY  TRINITY 


117 


and  a  period  in  the  eternal  changelessness  of  the  Monad,  and 
will  be  followed  by  re-integration  into  its  normal  character 
as  silent  and  energyless.1  Ilis  revelation  of  Himself  in  the 
world  is  only  a  temporary  and  passing  phase  of  His  character, 
and  not  of  His  real  Essence  as  the  abstract  Monad.2  “Sabel- 
lianism,  regarding  the  Persons  of  the  Blessed  Trinity  as  the 
several  manifestations  of  God  in  the  world’s  history,  and 
only  as  it  were  masks3  by  which  the  Godhead,  in  itself  im¬ 
personal,  is  revealed  to  the  world  as  personal,  perverts  the 
Christian  conception  of  God  in  two  ways :  by  stripping  the 
work  of  the  world’s  salvation  from  the  essential  vital  princi¬ 
ple  of  Divine  Love,  and  .  .  .  by  denying  the  transcendent 
majesty  of  God  apart  from  His  world,  since  it  holds  that  in  God 
Himself  there  is  neither  life  nor  energy,  and  confounds,  like 
heathen  pantheism,  God  in  His  world.”4 

St.  Athanasius  demonstrated  the  impossibility  of  recon¬ 
ciling  Sabellianism  either  with  reason  or  with  the  words 
of  Holy  Scripture.  The  “Monad”  must  have  been  capable  of 
becoming  something  which  it  was  not  before  ; — if  it  were  the 
Father  alone,  then  He  must  have  become  Son  and  Spirit;  if 
it  were  not  the  Father  alone,  then  the  Monad  was  really 
Triad.5  If  the  Monad  is  essentially  “without  utterance'’  it 
could  not  have  achieved  creation.  If  it  acquired  speech,  it 
must  have  received  the  Word  from  without,  or  else  have  had 
the  Word  in  it  always.  If  the  Word  was  in  God  before  it  was 
begotten,  afterwards  it  must  have  been  outside  of  Him,  which 
contradicts  the  text:  “I  am  in  the  Father  and  the  Father  in 
me/"6  If  God  as  the  silent  Monad  were  without  energy  and 
incapable  of  creating,  then  He  must  be  less  than  we  who 
often  in  silence  still  possess  energy.7  What  is  the  reason,  he 

1  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  206. 

2  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  205-207. 

3  npoauTTov :  used  first  by  Hippolytus,  then  by  Tertullian,  then  mis¬ 
used  by  the  Sabellians  (cf.  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  243  §  144). 

4  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  78;  Marcellus  of  Ancyra  attempted  to  avoid 
this  pantheistic  conclusion,  and  said  that  the  expansion  was  not  of 
the  Essence  of  God,  but  only  of  His  Mind  and  Energy.  His  system 
results,  however,  in  Deism;  cf.  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  note  1,  pp.  207-208. 

5  St.  Athanasius,  Adversus  Arian.  orat.,  4,  13. 

6  Ibid. 

7  Ibid.,  4,  14. 


118 


II.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  GOD 


asks,  for  the  manifestation  of  the  Monad  as  we  know  it,  as 
Triad,  if  the  Monad  could  have  done  all  it  has  without  the 
necessity  of  this  development  into  three?  If  the  Triad  evolved 
from  the  Monad  by  reason  of  Creation  and  its  relation  to 
it,  then  when  it  ceases  to  be  manifested  as  Triad,  the  world 
should  cease  to  be  as  well.1 

While  Sabellianism  followed  Gentile  Pantheism,  Arianism 
was  based  on  a  Jewish  conception  of  God.  According  to  it, 
God,  not  having  as  Cause  either  Himself  or  something  other 
than  Himself,  is  the  Highest  Uncaused  Cause  of  the  world. 
The  one  attribute  of  God  is  then  “unbegottenness”,  and  God 
knows  Himself  as  cause  of  all — Creator  of  the  Son,  and  of  the 
Universe — but  not  as  self -caused  or  self-determined.  The 
“Son71  is  an  intermediary  between  other  creatures  and  God,  and 
other  creatures  wTere  formed  through  Him,  their  Prototype.2 
(In  so  far  as  Arianism  held  to  the  strict  abstract  monotheism 
of  this  type  it  had  a  Jewish  origin,  but  in  encouraging  worship 
of  the  Son,  it  followed  a  heathen  model).3 4  The  Son,  then, 
according  to  Arian  teaching,  was  a  creature  who  had  his  begin¬ 
ning  in  time :  “God  was  not  always  ‘Father’,  but  became  such 
afterwards,  nor  was  the  Son  Eternal,  for  He  was  not  before  He 

was  begotten . He  is  not  the  same  in  essence  as  the 

F ather,  for  He  is  a  creature,  .  .  .  and  not  truly  God’’ 

God  called  Him  “Son”  whom  He  had  made,  who  was  “Son” 
only  in  Name,  but  not  in  nature,5  for  God  only  is  “unbegotten”, 
and  the  Son  was  “born”.6  He  came  into  existence  by  the  Will7 

1  St.  Ath.  Adversus  Arian.  Orat.,  4,  12;  cf.  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  pp. 
208-210. 

2  This  is  a  Platonic  conception — cf.  Timaeus,  13;  cf.  Col.  1,  15b. 

3  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  211. 

4  St.  Athanasius,  Adv.  Arian.  Orat.  1,  9. 

6  “In  name  only  was  the  Son  the  “Word”,  “Wisdom”,  “Power”  of 
God  .  .  There  are  many  powers,  but  only  that  of  God  himself  is  the 
same  and  eternal.  Christ  is  not  this  true  Power  of  God,  but  only 
the  acme  of  the  powers.”  'St.  Athanasius,  ibid. 

6  Ibid.,  1,  30. 

7  This  was,  as  St.  Athanasius  calls  it,  an  attempt  to  bind  up  the 
discussion  at  both  ends:  “If  He  was  born  by  the  Will  of  the  Father, 
the  Son  was  the  Son  of  His  Will;  if  not  by  His  Will,  then  God  is  tyran¬ 
nized  over  .  .  .  How  is  this  possible?”  (cf  Adversus  Arian.  Orat., 
3,  59,  and  St.  Greg.  Naz.,  Orat.  theol.,  3,  6). 


THE  HOLY  TRINITY 


119 


of  the  Father,  and,  being  a  creature,  is  like  other  creatures, 
changing  and  impermanent.1  “Arianism  in  attempting  to  pre¬ 
serve  unimpaired  the  majesty  of  God  .  .  .  and  accepting  the 
‘Word’  and  the  ‘Spirit’  only  in  the  sense  of  Divine  powers  by 
which  God  operates,  itself  succeeds  in  taking  away  the  super¬ 
natural  character  of  Revelation,  since  the  Revelation  tlr 
Jesus  Christ  is  not  that  of  God  Himself,  nor  is  the  Holy  Spirit 
abiding  in  the  Church  .  .  .  God  the  Paraclete/'2 

The  work  of  the  great  Fathers,  St.  Athanasius,  St.  Basil,  St. 
Gregory  of  Nyssa  and  St.  Gregory  Nazianzen,  the  champions  of 
the  Orthodox  Faith,  rolled  back  all  the  assaults  of  Arianism  and 
served  as  a  basis  for  the  subsequent  definition  and  formulation 
of  the  teaching  of  the  Church  in  the  first  two  Ecumenical 
Councils.  The  fundamental  distinction  between  the  Church’s 
doctrine  and  that  of  Arius  is  expressed  in  the  two  propositions : 
“Christ  being  God  became  man  to  make  us  Divine”,  and  “Christ 
being  man,  afterwards  became  God.”  St.  Athanasius’  argu¬ 
ment  against  Arianism  is  as  follows:  since  in  Christ  is  a  full 
and  perfect  Revelation  of  God,  He  could  not  be  less  than  God 
if  He  is  to  lead  us  to  God.  In  God  are  these  eternal  and  nec¬ 
essary  distinctions  of  three  Persons,  in  the  one  Godhead.  The 
Arians  say :  “There  was  a  time  when  the  Son  was  not.”  God  as 
eternal  Father  could  not  subsist  without  the  Son  whom  He 
eternally  begets,  nor  without  His  Word  and  His  Wisdom,  for 
without  them  He  would  be  as  a  sterile  and  dried  up  spring,  a 
barren  and  unproductive  Deity,  incapable  of  Creation.3  The 
Son  must  needs  be  Son  eternally  if  He  is  to  effect  our  being 
made  Divine,  for  He  Himself  would  stand  in  need  of  that  which 
we  lack,  and  having  received  it,  would  have  no  more  than  suf¬ 
ficed  for  Him.4  To  avoid  the  Arian  statement  that  the  Son  is 
only  “Son”,  “Wisdom”,  “Might”  figuratively,5  and  not  really, 

1  “The  Son  is  not  unchanging  as  is  the  Father,  but,  like  the  crea¬ 
tures,  changes  by  his  nature”,  St.  Ath.  Adi\  Arian.  Orat 1,  9: 
for  whole  discussion  cf.  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  211-214  (§136-137).  For 
summary  of  Arian  teaching  cf.  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  I,  pp.  40-41,  with 
references,  note  1,  ibid. 

2  Androutsos,  op  cit.,  p.  78. 

3  Adv.  Arian.  Orat.,  2,  2. 

4  De  synod  Arimin.  et  Seleuciae.,  51. 

B  Adv.  Arian.  Orat.,  2,  37. 


120 


II.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  GOD 


it  is  necessary  to  state  that  He  is  of  one  Essence  with  the  Fa¬ 
ther,  since  otherwise  He  could  be  not  a  true,  full,  and  perfect 
Image  of  Him.  “Unbegotten”  applies  not  to  God  in  relation 
to  the  Son,  but  in  relation  to  creatures.  “Father”  means  the 
eternal  Relation  of  the  First  Person  to  the  Second  as  “Son”, 
and  not  His  relation  to  creatures.1  The  Arians  attempt  to 
force  in  the  use  of  a  wrong  category  when  they  speak  of  the 
“Will”  of  God  in  relation  to  the  Eternal  Begetting  of  the  Son, 
for  the  Son  is  of  the  Father’s  Nature,  not  of  His  Will.  This 
is  an  instance  of  the  Arian  attempt  to  push  human  analogies  in¬ 
to  the  knowledge  of  God.2 3  If  the  Son  is  then  of  the  same  Na¬ 
ture  as  the  Father,  He  is  eternally  unchanging  and  unchange¬ 
able.  As  Rhosse  summarizes  the  argument :  “The  eternal  Be¬ 
getting  of  the  Son  is  known  as  eternally  existing  in  God,  before 
the  creation  of  the  world,  since  God  cannot  know  Himself  as 
Cause  of  something  else  (the  world)  unless  He  first  knows  Him¬ 
self  as  Cause  of  Himself,  through  the  eternal  generation  of  the 
Son*'/  The  essence  of  the  emphasis  of  St.  Athanasius’  doctrine 
is  on  the  identity  of  the  Father,  Son,  and  Holy  Spirit,  and  he  did 
not  attempt  to  distinguish  from  each  other  more  clearly  these 
Hypostases  or  Persons.  “Person”  had  a  bad  connotation,  as 
it  had  been  misused  by  the  Sabellians,  and  “essence”  and  “sub¬ 
stance”  he  used  as  synonymous.  Consequently  he  had  to  em¬ 
ploy  circumlocutions  to  describe  the  Person  of  the  Son,  as  com¬ 
pared  with  that  of  the  Father.4 

St.  Gregory  Nazianzen  defends  the  “monarchia”  of  God, 
but  says  that  it  is  not  of  one  Person.  The  Triad  is  the  per¬ 
fection  of  existence,  and  is  the  Monad  energized  “by  reason  of 
its  richness”.  The  eternal  energy  of  the  infinite  Nature  differ¬ 
entiates  itself  into  three,  from  one  Principle  or  Source,  the  Son 
being  Begotten  of,  and  the  Holy  Spirit  Proceeding  from,  the 
Father.  The  Triune  God  is  One — in  Essence,  Power,  and 

1  Adv.  Arian.  Orat.,  1,  33. 

2  Ibid.,  3,  59  and  62. 

3  Rliosse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  227-228. 

4  Such  as:  ‘‘The  Son  is  the  Image,  the  Character  of  the  Essence  (or 
substance)  of  the  Father.”  On  the  terms  he  uses  cf.  De  synod  Arim.  et 
Seleuciae,  41,  53,  and  cf.  note  1,  pp.  228-229,  op.  cit.,  of  Rhosse.  The 
whole  treatment  of  St.  Athanasius’  doctrine  in  relation  to  Arianism 
is  to  be  found  in  full,  pp.  214-229  (ibid). 


THE  HOLY  TRINITY 


121 


Principle,  as  we  see  from  the  one  Godhead,  the  one  Cause,  and 
the  real  and  actual  unity  in  God.  “When  we  look  to  that  in 
which  the  Godhead  subsists,  and  to  those  eternal  and  equal  ex¬ 
istences  coming  from  the  First  Cause,  there  are  three  that  are 
worshipped.”  So  the  unity  of  Essence  subsists  in  a  Trinity  of 
Persons.1  St.  Basil,  sensible  of  the  danger  to  Christian  doc¬ 
trine  of  the  Trinity  being  construed  as  Tritheism,  held  that  we 
call  God  one,  not  in  number,  but  in  essence.  He  distinguished 
Father,  Son,  and  Holy  Spirit,  but  was  loth  to  apply  numerical 
sequence  to  the  Hypostases,  each  of  whom  is  a  “confluence  of  the 
properties  of  each.”2  “The  Son  is  in  the  Father,  and  the  Father 
in  the  Son,  and  in  Him  ....  One,  so  that  according  to  the 
properties  of  each  there  is  one  and  another,  but  according  to  the 
nature  which  they  have  in  common,  both  are  one.’73 

God  is  not  an  abstract,  energyless,  barren,  and  lifeless 
monad,  but  knows  Himself  as  Cause  and  Effect — as  Cause,  the 
Father;  as  Effect,  the  Son  (“nearest  to  Him,  the  Cause”),  and 
as  Effect  also,  the  Spirit  (“through  the  nearest-to-the-Cause”) .4 
Of  the  three  Hypostases  the  Nature  is  one  and  the  same;  as  in  a 
number  of  individual  men  the  human  nature  is  one  and  the 
same,  though  the  individuals  are  each  different  persons.3  Yet, 
unlike  men,  the  number  of  personal  hypostases  has  never 
changed;  there  are  eternally  no  more  nor  less  than  three.  The 
name  “God”  tells  us  nothing  of  the  Nature  of  God,  but  only 
serves  to  name  and  express  Him  whose  energies  are  known  to 
us  in  His  world :  it  is  concerned  rather  with  His  ener£v  than 
with  His  Nature.  This  energy  is  one — the  one  energy  of  the 
One  Essence  in  three  Persons.  Theodore  of  Aboukir,  Bp.  of 
Cairo,  however,  disagreed  with  this  contention  of  St.  Gresrorv 
and  said  that  “the  name  of  God  is  used  of  a  certain  Energy  but 
really  indicates  the  Nature  from  which  that  energy  proceeds.776 

As  St.  Athanasius  emphasized  the  oneness  of  essence  of  the 
Three  Persons,  so  St.  Gregory  Nazianzen  drew  attention  to  the 

1  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  229-235,  with  authorities  and  sources  quoted 
in  footnotes. 

2  Epistola,  38,  6. 

3  De  Spiritu  Sancto  18;  on  him  cf.  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  236-237. 

‘Quoted  in  Rhoss«,  op.  cit.,  note  1,  p.  239. 

s Ibid. 

6  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  238-243. 


122 


II.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  GOD 


relations  of  the  latter  to  the  former.  St.  Basil  strongly  stressed 
the  essential  unity  of  God,  and  explicitly  taught  the  theological 
truth  that  each  dwells  in  the  other  Persons.  St.  Gregory  of 
Nyssa  went  a  step  further  in  suggesting  the  interrelation  of 
the  three  Persons  in  the  Godhead:  the  “monarchia”,  as  Cause, 
and  the  two-fold  Effect — the  Son,  Begotten,  and  the  Holy  Spirit, 
Proceeding.  Yet  he  was  careful  to  distinguish  the  three  Per¬ 
sons  from  the  conception  of  three  gods.  The  terminology 
which  these  Fathers  employed  is  worthy  of  note.  “Person”,  as 
was  said,  was  first  used  by  Hippolytus,  and  after  him  by  Ter- 
tullian  (persona),  and  since  the  Sabellians  used  it  in  the  hereti¬ 
cal  conception,  as  “mask”  and  not  to  mean  a  real  “person”,  its 
use  was  avoided  by  St.  Athanasius.  Since  the  latter  used 
“hypostasis”  as  a  synonym  for  “Essence”  or  “Being”  (the  Latin 
words  are  the  same:  “essentia’,  “substantia”) ,  for  lack  of  any 
adequate  terminology  to  phrase  his  discussion  of  the  Persons  of 
the  Godhead,  he  had  to  fall  back  on  biblical  terms  or  circumlo¬ 
cutions.1  Similarly  “nature”  and  “being”  (essence)  were  for 
the  Fathers  practically  identical  in  meaning,  though  a  slight 
difference  can  be  discerned.2  The  word  “hypostasis”  came, 
however,  to  be  employed  by  the  Greek  Fathers  to  mean  what  we 
mean  by  Person,  that  is,  “not  a  temporary  form  of  the  manifes¬ 
tation  or  revelation  of  God,  but  the  mode  of  His  Existence.”3 
As  this  term  might  easily  be  confused  with  the  word  “ousia” 
(“Being”  or  “Essence”),  either  the  discovery  of  some  new  word 
would  be  necessary,  or  the  use  of  an  old  term  with  a  new  mean¬ 
ing  attached  to  it.  For  this  reason,  the  Church  came  to  use 
“hypostasis”  not  to  mean  the  same  as  “ousia”,  or  “being”,  but 
to  “express  (one  of)  the  three  modes  of  existence  of  the  One 
Divine  Being.”  “Person”  (“prosopon”)  came  into  use  later; 
but  since  it  means  something  different  in  modern  philosophy 
from  what  the  Fathers  meant  by  it,  it  is  more  advisable  to  use 
“hypostasis”  for  “Person”,  when  discussing  the  teaching  of  the 
Greek  Fathers  and  the  Greek  Church.  “Person”  nowadays  has 
come  to  signify  “a  self-conscious  and  self-directing  being,” 

1  Cf.  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  228. 

2  Correlative  to  that  between  “nature”  and  “character” ;  cf .  note 
I,  p.  244  (RhOsse). 

3  Rhosse,  pp.  243-244. 


THE  HOLY  TRINITY 


123 


but  does  not  connote,  as  it  did  to  the  Fathers,  a  special  mode 
of  the  existence  of  such  a  being.  “  Person”  in  the  Fathers 
meant  an  “eternal  mode  of  existence  of  the  Divine  Being”. 
Hence  we  may  distinguish  a  difference  between  the  meanings 
of  the  word  then  and  now,  and  “hypostasis”  better  expresses 
the  conception  which  the  Fathers  held  of  “Person.”1 

The  “Hypostases”  represent  eternal  and  permanent  rela¬ 
tions  within  the  Godhead,2  as  seen  by  God  Himself  and  without 
reference  to  the  world.  The  Divine  Essence  and  the  whole  of 
the  Divine  attributes  are  in  each  of  the  three  Hypostases,  and 
yet  the  Hypostases  are  not  divisions  or  parts  of  that  Essence. 
The  relation  of  Essence  to  Hypostases  may  not  be  construed  as 
that  of  the  generic  conception  to  the  specific,  in  which  case  one 
would  be  real  and  actual,  and  the  other  only  apparent  or  sub¬ 
jective.  Nor  can  the  opposite  extreme  to  this  nominalistic 
view  be  held,  that  is,  a  realistic  conception  which  would  make 
four  entities:  three  Persons  +  one  Essence.  We  may  try  to 
express  the  relation  by  the  analogy  of  the  genus  to  the  individ¬ 
ual,  but  must  always  remember  that  it  is  only  a  figure,  and  that 
the  great  Truth  is  a  mystery:  the  Nature  of  God  is  utterly 
different  from  any  of  which  we  have  knowledge ;  the  Hypos¬ 
tases  are  in  each  other  and  in  the  Essence,  and  the  latter  in 
and  not  outside  them,  and  they  are  not  sundered.  When¬ 
ever  we  think  of  the  Father,  we  must  think  also  of  the  Son 
and  Holy  Spirit  :3  each  Hypostasis  involves  the  others.  “The 
three  Hypostases  are  different  from  each  other,  yet  through 
their  mutual  indwelling  ( Circuinccssion ,  7repi^wprjcns)  they  sub¬ 
sist  in  each  other  in  such  a  way  that  they  are  not  mixed 
together,  but,  united,  make  one  God  only.”  This  interac- 

1  On  the  discussion  of  the  early  terminology,  cf.  Rhosse,  op.  cit., 
228,  244,  245;  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  86.  There  seems  to  be  no  uni¬ 
formity  in  Greek  Orothodox  terminology  of  the  period  succeeding  the 
Great  Schism;  e.  g.  Gennadius’  Confession  speaks  of  three  “idioms, 
which  we  call  three  Hypostases,  that  is  to  say,  Persons”  (early  loth 
century.  Cf.  text,  Mesolora,  I,  op.  cit.,  pp.  73  ff.).  Mesolora  (III,  pp. 
100,  110),  Rhosse  (e.  g.,  pp.  248,  297,  306),  and  Androutsos  (pp.  42 
ff)  all  use  “attributes,”  “qualities”,  “properties”,  and  “predicates”  in 
slightly  different  senses. 

2  Cf.  St.  John  Damascene,  "E/cSocns  I.  2,  10;  St.  Epiphanius  says 
that  Hypostases  mean  “the  properties  of  the  ‘Persons’”  ( Haer .  73,  16). 

3  St.  Athanasius,  Ad  Serapionem,  1,  4. 


124 


II.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  GOD 


tion  and  interrelation  constitutes  the  one  Eternal  Being  of 
God,  not  “as  an  abstraction  but  as  a  concrete  Unity.”1 

(3)  The  Properties  of  the  Persons 

The  Church  teaches  that  the  hypostatic  property  of  the 
First  Person  is  Fatherhood,  and  Unbegottenness,  and,  in  rela¬ 
tion  to  the  other  Hypostases,  Cause,  Principle,  or  Source.  By 
paternity  He  begets  eternally  the  Son,  and  by  spiration  the 
Holy  Spirit  is  sent  forth  from  Him.  The  property  of  the  Son 
is  His  Sonhood,  and  His  being  Begotten  of  the  Father.  The 
property  of  the  Spirit  in  His  Procession  from  the  Father.  The 
Father  is  the  one  Source  and  Cause;2  the  Son  and  spirit,  the  Ef¬ 
fects  of  this  Cause  or  Principle.  The  Father  is  called  the  Be¬ 
getter  of  the  Son  and  the  Spirator  of  the  Spirit.  The  Son,  as 
Effect,  is  that  nearest  the  First  (that  is,  nearest  the  Father,  as 
Cause)  and  the  Spirit,  as  Effect,  that  through -the-nearest-the 
First,  according  to  St.  Gregory  of  Nyssa.3  The  ordering  of 
Father,  Son,  and  Spirit  and  the  relation  suggested  above  of 
“Cause”  and  “Effect”  do  not  mean  to  imply  any  subordination 
in  rank  in  the  Blessed  Trinity.  St.  Basil  gives  four  ways  by 
which  one  thing  can  be  greater  than  another:  (1)  ‘Ty  reason  of 
cause”;  (2)  “because  of  greater  might”,  (3)  “more  excellent 
worth”,  and  (4)  “by  reason  of  greater  weight”,4  of  which  the 
first  only  can  be  applied  to  the  order  of  Persons  in  the  Trinity. 
“Hor  can  we  think  of  the  Persons  as  the  Father  first,  the  Son 
second,  and  the  Spirit  third.  .  .  .  This  order,  given  in  Holy 
Scripture,  .  .  .  does  not  show  any  superiority  in  time  or 
rank,  since  all  three  Persons  are  co-eternal  and  co-equal,  .  .  . 
but  only  suggests  the  relation  of  the  Father,  as  Cause,  to  Son 
and  Spirit.”5  The  Son,  as  Begotten,  and  the  Spirit  as  Proceed- 

1  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  248,  and  cf.  for  the  above  discussion  pp.  245- 
248. 

2  Cf.  Androutsos:  “One  thing  remains  clear,  that  in  the  Godhead 
there  is  one  and  only  one  Cause  or  Principle,  and  it  behooves  us  to 
avoid  any  possible  expression  or  statement,  which  might  lead  to  the 
recognition  of  two  principles”  {op.  cit.,  p.  79). 

3  Ad  Ablabium,  45,  2,  quoted  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  239,  note  1. 

4  Adv.  Eunom.  1,  25. 

5  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  88-89 ;  Mesolora  seems  to  use  the  word 
Mind  for  “Principle”,  “Cause”,  or  “Source”  (cf.  op.  cit.,  Ill,  p.  108). 


THE  HOLY  TRINITY 


125 


ing  must  not  be  thought  of  in  relation  to  these  properties  as  be¬ 
ing  in  any  sense  passive,  but  as  active  and  energetic.  The  order 
then  is  simply  logical,  and  there  is  not  any  suggestion  of  sub¬ 
ordination  of  any  Person  to  the  other.1 

The  Son  is  eternally  begotten  of  the  Father's  Nature,  and 
His  origin  is  utterly  different  from  that  of  creatures  in  two 
respects:  He  is  being  eternally  begotten  by  the  eternal  energy  in 
the  Being  of  God,  and  is  begotten  “of  the  Nature  of  the  Father, 
not  without  His  Will,  but  according  to  that  Absolute  internal 
necessity  in  Absolute  harmony  with  the  rational  knowledge  and 
Free  Will  of  God  directed  towards  His  eternal  self-relation.”2 
Creatures  are  not  born  of  God's  nature,  but  only  of  His  Free 
Will.  As  we  saw  above,  the  Arians  tried  to  force  a  dilemma  on 
the  Church:  either  Christ  was  Begotten  of  the  Will  of  God,  or 
He  was  Begotten  against  His  Will.  St.  Athanasius  answered 
that  this  category  is  a  purely  human  one,  and  that  the  deduc¬ 
tions  we  base  on  the  effect,  circumstances,  and  functioning  of 
our  wills  are  in  no  wise  applicable  to  God.  As  God  is  Good, 
not  because  of  the  acceptance  of  and  obedience  to  some  imposed 
ethical  standard,  but  because  of  His  very  Nature,  His  Son  is 
begotten  of  His  Nature,  nor  is  there  any  question  of  willing  or 
not  willing.3  (He  used  “will”  in  its  relative  sense,  and  did  not 
draw  the  distinction  between  the  necessary  goodness  of  God,  as 
an  inevitable  result  of  His  Nature,  and  the  free  will  of  His  work 
in  creation.)  Because  He  is  what  He  is,  and  so  of  necessity, 
He  begat  the  Son  eternally,  “of  His  Nature”  or  “according  to 
His  Nature" — by  which  St.  Athanasius  practically  means  of 
His  self-determined  freely-defined  necessity.  This  is  deducible 
from  his  distinction  of  “something  which  lies  above  the  will 
of  God”  (that  is,  His  will,  as  relative  to  Creation).  He  did 
not  work  out  all  the  relations  of  Will  and  Nature  in  God,  and 
as  a  consequence  “there  is  a  certain  incompleteness  in  St. 

1  Rhos&e,  op.  cit.,  pp.  248-249 ;  Dvobouniotes  notes  that  this  sub¬ 
ordination  would  be  possible  if  there  were  only  unity  and  not  identity 
of  Essence  in  the  Godhead,  and  on  this  point  scores  against  Androutsos. 
(’O0ei\.  airavr.,  pp.  51-2;  Aoyp.  MeXerai,  A',  pp.  58-59;  'H  Aoyy.  ’Av8p. 
Kpivoyevij,  p.  19,  and  Androutsos  AoypiaTiKri,  p.  76.) 

2  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  249  (§  147);  ATesolora,  op.  cit.,  Ill,  p.  111. 

3  Adv.  Arian.  Orat.,  3,  59. 


126 


II.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  GOD 


Athanasius’  teaching  due  to  the  necessities  and  circumstances 
of  his  day.”1 

The  Procession  of  the  Holy  Spirit 

The  doctrine  of  the  procession  of  the  Holy  Spirit  from  the 
Father  alone  is  the  chief  dogmatic  difference  between  the  East¬ 
ern  and  Western  Churches.  It  is  the  gravamen  of  Orthodox 
polemic  against  Roman  Catholic  theological  teaching.2  Ortho¬ 
dox  Doctrine  is  summarized  in  the  Constantinopolitan  supple¬ 
ment  made  to  the  Nicene  Creed  at  the  2d  Ecumenical  Council 
in  381 :  “The  Lord  and  Giver  of  Life,  who  proeeedeth  from  the 
Father,  and  together  with  the  Father  and  the  Son  is  worshipped 
and  glorified.”3  The  great  “proof  text”  of  this  doctrine  is  that 
alluded  to  above — St.  John  15,  26-27.  The  second  Council  was 
convened  to  deal  with  the  Macedonian  heresy,  which  maintained 
that  the  Holy  Spirit  was  a  creature,  for  otherwise  He  would 
be  either  a  second  Son  of  God,  or  else  a  grandson.  St.  Athana¬ 
sius  refuted  their  doctrine,  showing  that  the  Spirit  was  of  the 
same  essence  and  nature  as  the  Son,  and  that  in  the  One  God¬ 
head  were  three  equal  Persons.  He  confuted  their  anthropo¬ 
morphic  attempt  to  grapple  with  this  Mystery,  and  wrote  stren¬ 
uously  to  uphold  the  Orthodox  Doctrine.4 

In  a  local  synod  at  Toledo  (589)  and  in  that  at  Aix-la- 
Chapelle  (809)  the  Filioque  clause  was  added  to  the  ancient 
creed,  but  as  yet  without  the  official  sanction  of  the  Bishop  of 
Pome,  and  without  the  incorporation  of  this  addition,  which 
later  (in  1014)  came  to  pass,  into  the  creed  of  the  Western 
Church  as  a  whole.  All  Orthodox  theologians  deny  its  validity 
and  truth.5 * *  “One  thing  is  evident — there  is  but  one  principle  or 
source  in  the  Godhead.  ...  To  this  the  Western  addition  of 
the  Filioque  is  diametrically  opposed.  .  .  .  The  belief  in  one 
single  principle  in  the  Godhead  is  demanded  by  a  logical  con¬ 
ception  of  the  Triune  God.”9  “It  is  not  only  technically  illegal 

1  Rhdsse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  252-253. 

2  C'f.  note  at  the  end  of  this  lecture,  pp.  136-143,  on  the  Filioque. 

3  Cf.  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  I,  pp.  45-53. 

4  Ad  Serap.  4,  1-6;  cf.  Rhosse,  pp.  255-254  (§  §  150,  151). 

6  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  I.  pp.  46-53. 

8  Op.  cit.,  pp.  78-80,  and  cf.  p.  82:  “The  addition  of  the  Filioque  is 

not  only  irregular,  but  is,  in  fact,  counterfeit  and  false.” 


THE  HOLY  TRINITY 


127 


and  illegitimate,  but  essentially  wrong.  .  .  .  Even  as  a  theo¬ 
logical  opinion  it  is  vicious  and  inadmissible.”1  Western  theo¬ 
logians  have  confused  the  “Mission”  of  the  Holy  Spirit  in  time 
with  His  “Procession"  in  eternity,  which  has  given  rise  to  their 
distorted  theology  on  the  subject.2  The  passage  in  St.  Augus¬ 
tine  (De  Trinitate,  15,17,29)  which  the  Westerns  appeal  to,  ac¬ 
cording  to  Mesolora,  does  teach  Orthodox  doctrine,  since  it  dis¬ 
tinguishes  between  procedere  principaliter  and  simply  procedere, 
showing  the  distinction  between  the  Eternal  Procession  from 
the  Father  and  the  Mission  in  time  by  the  Son.3  According  to 
Rhosse,  following  Photius,  the  passage  may  be  well  regarded  as 
spurious.4 5  We  have  three  distinct  questions  to  deal  with  in  ex¬ 
amining  Patristic  evidence:  (a)  The  Eternal  Procession  of  the 
Spirit  from  the  Father;  (b)  the  Eternal  Procession  from  the 
Father  through  the  Son  ;  (c)  the  Mission  in  time  by  the  Son  of 
the  Holy  Spirit  into  the  world. '  The  distinction  of  Mission  and 
Procession  involves  that  between  the  “Transcendental”  and 
“Economic”  Trinitv,  under  which  categories,  rather  than  those 
just  mentioned,  some  theologians6 7 8 9  prefer  to  deal  with  the  sub¬ 
ject  matter. 

Many  of  the  Greek  Fathers  taught  that  the  Holy  Spirit  pro¬ 
ceeds  from  the  Father  through  the  Son,  while  none  of  them  held 
that  He  proceeds  from  the  Father  and  the  Son.  While  they  do 
not  always  use  the  word  “proceeds”  (from  the  Father  through 
the  Son)  they  employ  almost  its  equivalents- — “shows  forth”, 
“conies  forth",  “appears”,  and  the  like.  Among  the  Fathers 
who  so  teach  may  be  numbered  St.  Gregory  Thaumaturgus,  St. 
Athanasius,'  St.  Basil/  St.  Gregory  of  Nyssa,0  St.  Epiphanius,10 


1  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  254-255. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  255;  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  Ill,  pp.  120-123. 

3  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  III.  pp.  118-119. 

*Op.  cit.,  p.  255;  cf.  Migne,  P.G.,  t.  CII,  col.  352. 

5  Clearly  distinguished  by  the  Patriarch  Jeremiah  II.  (in  Mesolora, 
op.  cit.,  I.  p.  196). 

6  E.  g.,  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  74,  85. 

7  Ad  Serap.  1,  2. 

8  Ad  Gregorium  fratrem,  38,  4.  and  cf.  Adv.  Eunomium,  5. 

9  Contra  Eunomium  1. 

10  Eaer.  73,  16;  74. 


128 


II.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  GOD 


St.  Cyril  Alex.,1  Theodoret,2 3  Maximus,  and  St.  John  Damascene.* 
These  Fathers  all  agree  in  teaching  one  sole  Principle,  Source, 
or  Cause  alone  in  the  Godhead,  and  in  stating  that  the  Father 
is  this  Principle.  Some  of  the  passages  apply  as  well  to  the 
eternal  relations  of  the  Persons  of  the  Godhead  as  to  their  re¬ 
lations  in  time  and  with  the  world,  for  example  St.  Epiphanius : 
( Haer .  73,  16)  “subsisting  from  the  Father  through  the  Son'5;, 
“the  Spirit  takes  from  the  Son,  and  proceeds  from  the  Father” ; 
St.  Cyril :  “Since  the  Spirit  is  in  nature  the  same  as  the  Son, 
He  subsists  in  Him,  and  comes  forth  through  Him”;  St.  John 
Damascene :  .  .  .  “and  the  Spirit  of  the  Son,  not  as  of  Him,, 
but  as  proceeding  through  Him  from  the  Father.  .  .  .  ”4  In 
commenting  on  this  fact,  Rhosse  notes  that  “certain  of  the 
Greek  Fathers  ....  added  as  a  theological  opinion  the  view 
that  the  Holy  Spirit  proceeds  ....  through  the  Son  from 
the  Father,  ....  which  view,  not  being  repugnant  to  true 
teaching,  ....  may  be  regarded  as  a  true  theological  opin¬ 
ion  .  .  .  ”B 

Androutsos  finds  that  in  only  two  clear  instances — 
Maximus,  and  St.  John  Damascene — does  the  phrase  “through 
the  Son”  offer  any  difficulty.  Grammatically,  the  prepositions 
“through”  and  “from”  the  Son  are  very  nearly  alike,  as  the  lat¬ 
ter  has  reference  to  a  first  or  efficient  cause,  the  former  to  a  me¬ 
diate  or  constitutive  cause.  Strictly  speaking,  the  use  of 
“through”  with  the  second  Person  suggests  Him  as  secondary 
Cause.  Yet  this  construction,  possible  grammatically,  is  for¬ 
bidden  by  the  sense  of  the  biblical  texts,  which  in  every  case 
insist  upon  one  Cause  alone,  the  Father.  Therefore  “through 
the  Son”  may  be  construed  to  apply  to  the  Mission  of  the  Spirit 
by  the  Son  into  the  world,  that  is,  must  be  referred  to  the  eco¬ 
nomic  Trinity  ( cf .  St.  John  15,  26),  or  by  reason  of  the  logical 
order  of  the  Persons  (Father  first,  Son  second,  Spirit  third)  be 
referred  to  the  transcendental  Trinity.  The  former  interpreta- 

1  Epistola  ad  Joann.  39;  De  adoratione  in  spiritu  et  veritate,  1. 

2  Cf.  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  261  for  quotations. 

3  vE/c5o<ris,  1,  13;  8;  13;  etc. 

4  vE/c5ocris  1,  13,  but  cf.  other  quotations  which  have  a  strictly  tem¬ 
poral  significance  and  Rhosse’s  comments,  op.  cit.,  p.  263 — cf.  ibid.,  pp. 
256-263,  for  fuller  quotations  and  discussion  of  the  text. 

5  Ibid.,  p.  254. 


THE  HOLY  TRINITY 


129 


tion  of  “through  the  Son”  would  make  it  a  “concise  phrase  ex¬ 
pressing  the  eternal  existence  of  the  Spirit,  and  His  appearance 
in  the  world  accomplished  through  the  Son1’.  The  second  in¬ 
terpretation  would  construe  “through  the  Son'’  to  express  “the 
middle  position  of  the  Son  in  reference  to  the  Spirit  in  the 
logical  order  of  the  transcendental  Trinity.”1  Strictly  speak¬ 
ing,  in  this  latter  sense  the  word  is  wrongly  applied,  since  it 
cannot  be  taken  to  have  any  dogmatic  meaning  in  relation  to 
the  Procession  of  the  Holy  Spirit.  Mark  Eugenicus  takes  it  to 
mean  “with  the  Son”,  as  does  Macarius.2  The  contention  sup¬ 
ported  by  the  Greeks  at  the  Bonn  Conference  in  1874  is  given 
in  the  Bericht ,  and  discussed  by  Bhosse.3 

Photius  wrote  voluminously  on  the  controversy  about  the 
Filioque  clause.  His  “Discourse  about  the  Mystery  of  the  Holy 
Spirit”,4 5  his  Encyclical,  especially  2,  15,  his  letter  to  the  Arch¬ 
bishop  of  Aquileia,  and  the  summary  of  the  whole  controversy 
by  Nicholas  Methones1'  contain  thirty-one  arguments  against 
the  Procession  of  the  Holy  Spirit  through  the  Son.  The  fol¬ 
lowing  may  serve  as  a  brief  summary  of  them:  (1)  The  Son 
cannot  be  an  intermediary  between  Father  and  Spirit,  since  the 
Spirit  is  not  the  property  of  the  Son.  (2)  The  simplicity  of  the 
Godhead  is  destroyed  if  it  have  two  Principles.  (3)  If  things 
held  in  common  by  two  Persons  may  be  predicated  of  the  Third, 
then  the  Spirit  would  become  His  own  mediating  Principle  and 
Cause.  (4)  If  the  Spirit  proceed  from  both  Father  and  Son, 
His  Procession  from  the  Father  alone  must  be  either  complete 
or  incomplete ;  if  incomplete,  the  Procession  from  the  two  Per¬ 
sons  is  rather  more  mechanical  and  incomplete  than  from  the 

1  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  82-84.  This  view  is  clearly  and  ade¬ 
quately  presented  by  Eugenius  Bulgaris,  quoted  in  Rhosse,  note  1,  pp. 
281-282  (op.  cit.). 

2  Theologie  dogmatique  orthodoxe,  Paris,  I860,  vol.  I.  p.  406.  On 
the  monk  Job,  and  the  views  of  other  Orthodox  writers,  cf.  Androutsos, 
op.  cit.,  p.  86  note  1. 

3  On  this,  cf.  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  278-287;  his  reports  to  the  Holy 
Synod  on  the  Bonn  Conference  (  1874-1876)  and  Reusch,  Bericht  iiber 
die  Unions-Conferenzen,  Bonn,  1874,  1875. 

4  In  Migne,  P.G.,  t.  CII.;  cf.  note  4,  p.  139  following. 

5  In  Vol.  I,  pp.  371  ff.,  of  the  ’l^KK^aiaariKT}  (3l/3\ioQ7]K7i,  of  A.  Deme- 
trakopoulos;  for  bibliography,  cf.  p.  87,  n.  3. 


130 


II.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  GOD 


One  alone.  (5)  If  not  incomplete,  why  was  it  necessary  for  Him 
to  proceed  from  the  Son  too?  Why  is  the  Spirit  chosen  for 
this  less  dignified  treatment  in  the  Divine  Economy?  (6)  If  a 
hypostatic  property  or  idiom  of  the  Father  is  shared  by  the  Son, 
and  Son  and  Holy  Spirit  become  indistinguishable,  the  theory 
verges  on  Semi-Sabellianism.  (7)  The  theory  of  a  double 
Principle  in  the  Godhead  takes  away  the  essential  character  of 
Christian  theism,  if  there  are  two  correlative  prin¬ 
ciples,  one  of  which  is  self-originated,  and  the  second 
receives  its  origin  from  the  former.  (8)  It  would  be 
more  consistent  to  extend  this  Double  Principle  into  a  Triple 
Principle,  in  accordance  with  our  knowledge  of  the  Holy  Trin¬ 
ity.  (9)  As  the  Father  is  “Principle”  or  “Cause"  not  because 
of  the  Divine  Xature  of  the  Godhead,  but  because  of  His  hypo¬ 
static  character,  since  that  Hypostasis  does  not  include  the  Son, 
the  latter  cannot  be  Principle  or  Cause.  (10)  The  Filioque 
practically  divides  the  Fathers  Hypostasis  into  two,  or  makes 
the  Son’s  Hypostasis  a  part  of  the  Father’s.  (11)  On  the  sup¬ 
position,  that,  if  in  comparing  two  things  one  can  he  shown  to 
have  something  which  is  not  the  property  of  another,  they  are 
shown  not  to  be  of  the  same  nature,  the  Holy  Spirit  (by  the 
Filioque  hypothesis)  can  be  shown  to  he  of  different  Xature 
from  the  Son.  Furthermore,  the  Son’s  properties  must  be  in¬ 
terchangeable  with  the  Father’s.  (12)  If  the  Procession  of  the 
Spirit  from  the  Father  were  perfect,  there  could  he  no  necessity 
for  that  from  the  Son  as  well.  (13)  The  Spirit,  according  to 
the  Filioque,  is  “twice  removed”  from  the  Father,  and  hence 
holds  a  much  lower  rank  than  the  Son.  (14)  Of  the  three  Per¬ 
sons,  the  Spirit  is  the  only  one  who  would  have  more  than  one 
Origin  or  Beginning  (a p\v)  ■  (15)  The  Father  and  Son  are 
drawn  closer  together  by  the  Filioque  hypothesis,  than  the  Fa¬ 
ther  and  the  Spirit,  since  the  Son  shares  not  only  the  Father’s 
Xature  but  the  Father’s  Properties.  (16)  The  Procession  of 
the  Spirit  from  the  Son  is  either  (a)  the  same  as  that  from  the 
Father,  in  which  case  distinction  of  Persons  is  lost  by  confu¬ 
sion  of  properties,  or  (b)  different,  in  which  case  there  is  an 
antithesis  in  the  Holy  Trinity.  (17)  With  the  principle  that 
what  is  not  common  to  all  three  Persons  is  proper  to  but  one  of 
the  three,  how  may  the  Double  Procession  be  reconciled?  (18) 


THE  HOLY  TRINITY 


131 


Why  does  not  something  proceed  from  the  Spirit  to  balance  the 
relation  between  the  Persons?  (19)  By  the  Filioque  the  Fa¬ 
ther  is  shown  to  be  partial  to  the  Son.  (20)  The  Father  is 
either  more  Canse  than  the  Son,  or  less :  if  more,  it  is  insulting 
to  the  Son’s  dignity;  if  less,  to  the  Father's.  (21)  If  the  Son 
causes  the  Spirit  to  proceed  from  Himself,  must  He  not  convey 
all  His  own  power  in  thus  emitting  an  equal  Hypostasis?  (22) 
The  Latins  make  the  Son  greater  than  the  Spirit,  because  of 
the  Cause  relation,  and  also  impiously  place  Him  closer  to  the 
Father.  (23)  By  introducing  a  secondary  Cause  into  the  Holy 
Trinity  the  Latins  insult  the  Son,  in  making  Him  a  Cause  Who 
is  already  caused,  for  as  Cause  He  is  not  needed.  (24)  They 
divide  the  Holy  Spirit  into  two  parts — that  from  the  Father, 
and  that  from  the  Son.  (25)  So  He  is  made  up  of  a  Perfect 
and  an  imperfect  Cause!  (26)  In  the  Blessed  Trinity  united 
in  indissoluble  Unity,  all  three  Hypostases  are  preserved  invio¬ 
late,  but  if  to  Sonship  is  added  the  Property  of  Spirating  the 
Spirit,  the  Sonship  is  impaired  and  the  hypostatic  properties 
marred.  (27)  If  at  the  Son's  Begetting  was  given  Him  the 
power  of  Spirating  the  Holy  Spirit,  then  how  was  not  His  very 
character  of  Son  destroyed,  if  in  being  caused  He  became  Cause 
of  another,  equal  to  and  of  the  same  Nature  as  Himself?  (28) 
According  to  the  Filioque  theory  it  is  impossible  to  see  why  the 
Holy  Spirit  may  not  be  called  “the  Grandson”.  (29)  If  the 
Father  is  Cause  of  the  Son  who  is  secondary  Cause  of  the  Spirit, 
then  the  Father  is  both  remote  and  proximate  Cause  of  the 
Spirit!  (30)  The  double  Cause — Primary  and  Secondary — in 
the  Godhead  inevitably  involves  a  double  result,  hence  the  Per¬ 
son  of  the  Spirit  must  be  double.  (31)  Since  there  are  no  time 
relations  in  the  Holy  Trinity,  the  Spirit  must  have  been  be¬ 
gotten  along  with  the  Son,  if  He  proceeds  from  Him.1 

The  arguments  of  Photius  have  formed  the  basis  of  the  dog¬ 
matic  teaching  and  controversical  writings  of  subsequent  Or¬ 
thodox  theologians.  At  the  Bonn  Conferences  the  Six  Propo¬ 
sitions,2  based  on  St.  John  Damascene,  met  with  the  approval 

1  On  these,  in  extenso,  ef.  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  263-276.  On  St.  John 
16,  14,  Photius  accuses  the  Latins  of  confusing  possessive  and  per¬ 
sonal  pronouns :  ‘*He  shall  take  of  Mine” — “the  Spirit  which  is  of 
one  essence  with  His  Son”,  etc. 

2  Reusch,  Bericht  iiber  die  TJnions-Conferenzen,  Bonn,  1S75,  pp.  91-94. 


132 


II.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  GOD 


of  the  Greeks,  who  subsequently  felt  them  inadequate,  since 
they  did  not  explicitly  exclude  the  view  that  in  some  way  the 
Spirit  may  have  had  His  origin  from  the  Son  as  well,  which  the 
Old  Catholics  held  was  a  tenable  opinion.  This  was  brought  into 
the  foreground  in  a  later  discussion  between  a  Russian  and  an  Old 
Catholic  Committee.  The  failure  on  the  part  of  the  Old  Catho¬ 
lics  to  exclude  even  an  opinion  which  allowed  of  the  possibility 
of  there  being  two  principles,  led  to  the  rupture  of  relations  and 
the  dissolution  of  these  negotiations.  The  Orthodox  Church 
held  tenaciously  to  the  position  of  Photius,  allowing  as  an  opin¬ 
ion  the  referring  of  the  clause  “through  the  Son”  to  the  tran¬ 
scendental  Trinity.  The  Orthodox  Position  is  in  brief  as  fol- 
lows:  the  Father  is  the  One  Source,  Principle,  or  Cause  in  the 
Godhead,  from  whom  alone  proceeds  the  Spirit.  It  may  be  said 
that  He  “shines  forth”,  is  “manifested”,  and  the  like,  “through 
the  Son”;  but  while  it  is  possible  for  this  phrase  to  be  referred 
to  the  transcendental  Trinity,  it  is  much  better  applied  to  the 
work  of  the  Spirit  in  relation  to  the  world,  who  was  for  this 
purpose  sent  through  or  by  the  Son.  There  can  be  no  com¬ 
promise  in  the  least,  nor  any  receding  from  this  position  on  the 
part  of  Orthodoxy.1 


(4)  Theological  Theory  in  Regard  to  the  Blessed  Trinity 

As  was  suggested  above,  in  expositions  of  the  doctrine  of 
the  Blessed  Trinity  there  is  often  embodied  an  attempt  to  il¬ 
lustrate  or  expound  it  by  the  use  of  figures,  or  to  speculate  and 
try  to  suggest  in  some  way  the  secret  of  the  great  mystery.  So 
Gennadius,  in  his  Confession  ( cir .  1450),  uses  the  figures  of 
Fire,  Light,  and  Heat  to  explain  and  illustrate  the  doctrine 
of  the  Trinity,  and  also  called  the  three  Persons  “Mind,  Reason, 
and  Will — one  God”,  just  as  mind,  reason,  and  will  in  man 

1  Cf.  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  285-287 ;  the  first  section  of  the  second 
“Answer”  of  the  Patriarch  Jeremiah  II  (1569)  contains  an  excellent 
treatment  of  the  Orthodox  Doctrine  of  the  Procession  of  the  Holy 
Spirit  (in  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  I,  pp.  195-214).  He  uses  Photius  at  length 
in  refuting  the  Filioque.  Cf.  Kritopoulos’  Confession  (1625)  in  Meso¬ 
lora,  op.  cit.,  I,  pp.  281-295;  ibid.,  pp.  378-381  for  Peter  of  Mogila’a 
Confession. 


THE  HOLY  TRINITY 


133 


constitute  one  single  soul.1  So  too,  Kritopoulos  (1625)  uses 
“Mind”  of  the  Father,  and  “Logos”  (  = Reason  and  Word )  of 
the  Son.2  “Such  distinctions  have  no  real  analogy  or  likeness 
to  the  Holy  Trinity”,  as  Androutsos  says,3  “in  which  Father, 
Son,  and  Holy  Spirit  are  not  powers  or  elements  of  the  whole 
conception  of  God,  as  these  distinctions  (mentioned  above) 
are  with  us,  but  they  are  actual  Persons.”  In  full  knowledge 
of  this  fact  St.  Gregory  of  Nvssa  observed :  “Only  by  way  of 
figure  and  not  in  any  sense  by  way  of  real  likeness  may  the 
soul  be  compared  to  the  Holy  Trinity.”4  However,  Rhosse 
builds  up  a  rather  elaborate  philosophical  theory  of  the  doc¬ 
trine  of  the  Blessed  Trinity  on  lines  similar  to  Dorner's,  to 
whom  he  pays  his  respects  in  a  note."  His  reasoning  may  be 
summarized  as  follows :  God  knows  Himself  as  Cause  and 
Caused;  as  Cause,  He  is  Father,  and  as  Caused,  Son  and  Holy 
Spirit.  The  causal  relationship  is  one  of  absolute  necessity 
in  accordance  with  the  Nature  of  God.  The  first  relation¬ 
ship  of  the  three  Persons  of  the  Blessed  Trinity  to  each  other 
is  then  that  of  the  ultimately  necessary  Divine  Nature — the 
Father  as  Cause,  Begetter,  and  Spirator.  “Since  there  is  no 
passivity  in  God,  but  only  Absolute  Energy,  that  which  is  the 
effect  is  equally  as  infinite  as  the  Cause ....  When  this  two¬ 
fold  Effect  is  seen  under  the  two  other  aspects  of  God — of 
Absolute  Reason  and ....  Absolute  Free  Will — it  is  as  that 
which  is  active  absolutely  by  Reason,  and  by  Will.  That  which 
operates  in  God  by  Reason  is  His  Eternal  Word,  and  that 
functioning  by  Will  is  the  Holy  Spirit.”  The  eternal  and 
necessary  determinations  of  the  Being  of  God  are  not  only  the 
inevitable  and  infinite  result  of  that  Divine  Nature,  but  they 
are  as  well  that  which  the  Eternal  Reason  contemplates;  that 
is,  God  knows  Himself  as  being  such  a  Nature,  and  as  being 
so  self-constituted  and  self-determined,  as  He  also  knows  Him¬ 
self  as  that  which  the  Eternal  Free  Will  wills — that  is,  God 
wills  Himself  to  be  what  He  is.  This  theory  of  the  Father 
as  Cause,  the  Son  as  Reason,  and  the  Holy  Spirit  as  Will  or 

1  Mesolora,  op.  tit.,  I.  pp.  73-74. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  281. 

s  Op.  tit.,  p.  90. 

4  In  Migne,  P.G.,  t.  XLIV,  col.  1344. 

5  Op.  cit.,  pp.  287-288. 


134 


II.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  GOD 


Love,  involves  implicates  which  preclude  the  possibility  of  a 
tritheistic  conception  of  the  Godhead.  “In  these  three  dis¬ 
tinctions  or  Hypostases  in  God — the  natural,  the  rational  or 
logical,  and  the  ethical — there  is  not  only  Unity  of  Cause,  but 
also  Unity  and  Identity  of  Essence/51 

Both  the  LTnity  of  Essence  subsisting  in  the  Trinity  of 
Persons,  and  the  Persons — each  subsisting  in  each  other,  in¬ 
separably  united  in  the  Godhead — are  objective  and  actual.  So 
the  Unity  is  not  a  generic  conception  in  relation  to  the  Hypos¬ 
tases,  as  we  know  the  relation  of  a  generic  conception  to  the 
individual,  but  it  is  the  prototype  of  all  such  created  rela¬ 
tionships.  So  the  determinations  in  the  Godhead — the  attri¬ 
butes,  properties,  qualities,  and  the  like — are  not  only  necessary 
but  also  known  and  willed.  “If  the  determinations  of  the 
Divine  Essence  existed  only  by  His  Reason  and  Will  and  not 
by  His  Nature  as  well,  they  would  be  merely  conceptual  and 
subjective,  not  actual;  they  would  he  arbitrary  and  not  neces¬ 
sary  determinations  of  His  Being.  If  they  existed  only  as 
by  His  Nature,  in  the  form  of  natural  Hypostases,  they  would 
not  be  rational  and  ethical  but  merely  natural.  .  determina¬ 
tions.'5  “These  determinations  in  the  Father  by  Nature,  in 
the  Son  by  Reason,  are  also  (by  the  Spirit)  freely  chosen  as 
ethical  determinations,  as  freely  willed  or  as  the  object  of 
His  Love.  Through  these  three  forms  or  Hypostases  God  is 
thus  self-energized,  self-conscious,  and  self-determined  or  in¬ 
finitely  self-directed,  as  both  Cause  and  at  the  same  time  Effect 
of  Himself.552 

As  in  God,  One  by  Nature,  by  Reason,  and  by  Will,  His 
Unity  is  the  Prototype  of  all  Oneness,  so  in  Him  by  Nature, 
Truth,  as  also  such  by  Reason  and  Will,  lies  all  Truth  Abso¬ 
lutely.  By  the  same  method  of  reasoning,  His  Goodness  by 
Nature  is  Goodness  as  well  by  Reason  and  Will,  and  in  conse¬ 
quence  the  Good  exists  in  Him  absolutely  and  generically. 
So  also  with  the  conception  of  Justice:  the  idea  of  the  Good 
and  the  Just  in  Him  by  Nature,  is  also  in  the  Divine  Nature 
as  rational  Good,  or  rational  Justice,  and  at  the  same  time  as 
ethical  or  freely-willed  Good  and  Justice.  “Hence  God  as  Triune 

1  Op.  cit.,  pp.  289-291. 

2  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  292-294  (§  §  163-164). 


THE  HOLY  TRINITY 


135 


is  the  Absolute  Truth,  Justice,  Good,  and  the  like,  as  such  by 
Nature,  Reason,  and  Will,  which  severally  are  the  Principle 
and  Prototype  of  all  truth,  justice,  and  goodness  in  the  world.”1 
So,  too,  God  is  the  source  of  the  generic  conceptions  of  identity 
and  difference  :2  the  notion  of  identity  is  based  on  that  of  the 
essential  self-identity  and  unity  of  the  Divine  Being;  that  of 
difference,  on  the  distinctions  of  Hypostases  in  the  Divine 
Nature.3 

This  theory  of  the  Holy  Trinity,  Rhosse  maintains,  pre¬ 
sents  the  solution  of  two  philosophic  difficulties  which  have 
long  troubled  human  thought :  the  relation  of  necessity  to  free 
will,  and  the  problem  of  the  absolute  and  relative.  “The  har¬ 
monious  unity  of  the  archetypal  Truth,  Goodness,  and  Justice 
in  the  Divine  Nature,  in  accordance  with  both  necessity  and 
free  will  in  the  Godhead,  removes  the  antithesis  between  neces- 
ity  and  reason  or,  rather,  between  it  and  freedom. ”  If  in  the 
Divine  Nature  absolute  Truth  and  absolute  Goodness  and  abso¬ 
lute  Justice,  exist  objectively,  our  conceptions  of  these,  though 
subjective  and  relative,  are  still  conceptions  of  what  has  actual 
and  objective  reality,  quite  apart  from  ourselves  and  our  think¬ 
ing.4  In  short,  “as  the  Being  of  God  gathers  in  One  the  three 
Hypostases  which  subsist  in  It,  and  It  in  them,  so  each  of 
the  three  Hypostases  binds  up  in  one  the  attributes  correspond¬ 
ing.  Hence  the  Hypostasis  of  the  Father  gathers  into  one  the 
physical  or  natural  attributes  of  God,  or  the  natural  determi¬ 
nations  of  His  Essence,  that  of  the  Son  or  the  Word  sums 
up  the  rational  or  logical  attributes,  and  that  of  the  Spirit 
the  ethical  attributes  or  determinations.  ...  Since  the  Hypos¬ 
tases  subsist  in  each  other  in  such  a  way  that  in  each  one  of 
them  subsists  the  other  two,  ...  so  all  the  attributes  subsist  in 
each  Hypostasis,  and  the  Good,  Justice,  and  Truth  are  not 
only  such  by  Reason,  but  as  well  by  Nature  and  by  Will.”5 

The  difficulties  arising  from  philosophic  speculation  in  re- 

1 Ibid .,  pp.  294-296  (§  165). 

2  These  exist  in  actuality  in  God,  but  in  man  only  in  mind  or  con 
cept.  Cf.  'St.  John  Damascene,  '"Ek5octls  1,  8,  and  Androutsos  Aoyfx. 
Me\.,  A’,  p.  63. 

3  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  289,  note  1. 

4  Ibid.,  pp.  296-297  (§  166). 

5  Ibid.,  pp.  302-303. 


136 


II.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  GOD 


gard  to  the  relation  of  the  One  Divine  Nature  to  the  Three 
Hypostases,  on  the  basis  of  attempts  to  reduce  the  problem 
to  a  merely  rational  basis,  elicited  and  developed  in  ancient 
times  a  four-fold  defence  of  the  Orthodox  doctrine  on  the 
part  of  the  Fathers.  They  maintained  the  Unity  of  God  as 
against  Tritheism;  they  contended  that  the  generic  concep¬ 
tion  of  Unity  in  Trinity  was  not  a  mental  abstraction  made 
by  human  reasoning,  but  an  objective  reality  in  the  eternal 
identity  of  the  One  Divine  Essence;  they  taught  that  the  God¬ 
head  was  undivided  in  the  Trinity  of  Persons;  and  asserted 
that  the  Persons  are  distinguished,  but  not  separated  or  divided 
from  each  other.1  Androutsos  contends  that  all  the  attempts 
to  realize  and  illuminate  the  mystery  of  the  Holy  Trinity 
through  illustrations  and  figures  have  been,  and,  by  the  nature 
of  the  question,  must  always  be,  futile.  Whether  such  illustra¬ 
tions  be  taken  from  human  psychology,  or  from  nature,  or 
from  the  study  of  comparative  religion,  or  even  in  such  an 
ethical  division  as  “Lover,  Beloved,  and  Love”,  they  are  all 
alike  useless  and  futile.  This  last  illustration  he  characterizes 
as  an  “explanation  of  the  unknown  by  the  unknown”.  “Such 
analogies  carried  out  logically  empty  the  mystery  of  the  Holy 
Trinity  of  its  supernatural  content.”2  So  we  must  be  content 
with  the  Truths  of  Revelation,  and  never  press  a  figure,  illus¬ 
tration,  or  analogy  too  far.  The  Mystery  is  in  its  fundamental 
character  insoluble  for  our  minds,  says  Androutsos. 


Additional  Note  on  the  Filioque  Controversy 

It  is  not  within  the  scope  of  these  lectures  to  attempt  any 
detailed  treatment  of  the  difficulties  connected  with  the 
Filioque  clause  as  regards  the  relations  of  the  Western  and 
Eastern  Churches.  At  this  time  when  the  urge  of  the  desire 
for  reunion  is  so  strong  in  men’s  minds,  it  is  above  all  necssary 
to  think  clearly  and  not  to  be  swung  about  by  any  sentimental 
or  irrational  appeal,  towards  judgments  and  decisions  which 
must  needs  be  subject  to  revision  in  the  light  of  subsequent 

1  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  87-88. 

2  Ibid.,  pp.  89-92. 


THE  HOLY  TRINITY 


137 


study  and  investigation.1  Before  abandoning  the  clause  in  use 
in  the  Western  Church  for  ten  centuries  and  more,  it  is  well 
to  discover  what  it  means,  why  it  is  there,  and  what  losses 
and  gains  there  might  accrue  by  its  excision. 

In  the  discussion  of  any  controversy  of  long  standing  it  is 
above  all  necessary  to  investigate  origins  with  every  care  as  to 
historical  accuracy.  This  is  particularly  true  in  all  ecclesiasti¬ 
cal  matters,  and  preeminently  the  case  with  regard  to  this 
vexed  question  of  the  Filioque.  In  order  to  come  to  an  under¬ 
standing  now  we  must  first  get  clear  in  our  minds  at  least  two 
important  facts  which  the  history  of  the  controversy  indicates. 
(1)  While  it  is  true,  as  we  all  shall  see,  that  the  whole  ques¬ 
tion  bulks  very  large  in  the  minds  of  the  Orthodox  as  the 
fundamental  cause  of  the  separation  of  the  East  and  West,  the 
blame  for  which  is  attributed  universally  to  the  attitude  of 
the  Roman  Church  and  the  Pope,2  nevertheless  it  is  not  without 
significance  that  Ambraze  can  say :  “The  Filioque  clause  existed 
for  many  years  in  certain  Western  Churches  before  the  sepa¬ 
ration  of  the  two  Churches,  without  the  Eastern  Bishops  con¬ 
cerning  themselves  about  it  or  pronouncing  those  churches 
heretical.  .  .  .The  Creed  was  sung  in  all  the  churches  of  Gaul 
with  the  Filioque  addition,  from  the  end  of  the  8th  century.  . 

.  .But  the  Easterns  certainly  did  keep  on  in  communion  with 
the  Gaulish  and  Spanish  Bishops,  whose  churches  used  the 
additional  clause,  and  they  were  all  in  intercommunion,  for 

1  Cf.  G.  B.  Howard.  The  Schism  between  the  Oriental  and  Western 
Churches,  London,  1892,  p.  88  et  al;  on  him,  Hall,  The  Trinity ,  New 
York,  1910,  p.  96  note  1,  and  Palmieri,  Theologia  Dogmatica  Ortho- 
doxa,  vol.  I,  pp.  346  ff.  and  note  3;  also  Overbeek,  The  Filioque  and 
the  American  Church  in  The  Orthodox  Catholic  Review  for  1867, 
vol.  I.  pp.  246-252;  Howard,  An  English  View  of  the  Filioque  Ques¬ 
tion,  as  bearing  on  the  Reunion  Movement  in  Revue  Internationale 
de  theologie,  vol.  V.  1897,  p.  67. 

2  Cf.  Demetraeopoulos,  'II  iaropia  to v  S^tVywaTos,  Leipzig  1867,  and 
the  unanimous  verdict  of  Orthodox  controversialists  that  the  Roman 
See  in  its  insistence  on  the  Filioque  was  the  chief  cause  of  the  Schism; 
Palmieri,  Theologia  Dogmatica  Orthodoxa,  vol.  II,  whole  text  passim. 
This  was  Neale’s  opinion;  cf.  his  History  of  the  Holy  Eastern  Church, 
London,  1850,  vol.  II.  p.  1168:  “Its  insertion  in  the  creed  was  an  act 
utterly  unjustifiable,  and  throws  on  the  Roman  Church  the  chief  guilt 
in  the  horrible  schism  of  1054.” 


138 


II.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  GOD 


the  Church  was  one."1  The  fact,  as  Palmieri  notes,2  that  some 
three  centuries  elapsed  before  any  breach  of  unity  occurred, 
is  sufficient  to  indicate  that  the  cause  of  the  separation  lay 
elsewhere  than  in  the  Filioque  clause.  (2)  A  second  comment 
that  naturally  formulates  itself  upon  investigating  the  course 
of  the  controversy  and  its  theological  consequences,  is  that  the 
question  involved  is  largely  speculative  and  theoretical.  Had 
the  doctrine  involved  in  the  Filioque  been  so  radically  and 
substantially  untrue,  there  certainly  would  have  emerged  in 
the  history  of  the  last  ten  centuries  in  the  Western  Church, 
some  definite  evidence  of  falsity  in  theory  incurring  evil  con¬ 
sequences  in  practice,  whether  in  dogma,  doctrine,  or  the  spir¬ 
itual  or  moral  life  of  Western  Catholicism.  By  no  stretch  of 
the  wildest  theological  imagination  has  any  controversialist 
ever  been  justified  in  attempting  to  magnify  the  Filioque  ques¬ 
tion  into  the  proportions  of  a  heresy  of  the  dimensions  of 
Arianism  or  Sabellianism.  Controversy  has  entirely  warped 
Orthodox  perspective  in  the  matter. 

Ho  single  difference  between  East  and  West  has  aroused 
so  much  bitterness  on  the  part  of  Orthodox  writers  as  has 
the  matter  of  the  Filioque.  It  is  to  the  fore  in  every  con¬ 
troversial  and  polemic  work  of  Eastern  writers  since  the 
Schism.3  The  Protosynkellos  Chrysostom  calls  it  “an  arbitrary 
opinion,  an  heretical  novelty,  an  impious  and  perverse  doctrine, 
false,  untrue,  contrary  to  the  Gospel,  revealed  by  the  Devil, 
the  father  of  lies.”4  A  priest-monk,  Constantius,  says :  “The 
Roman  Church  has  committed  the  mortal  sin  of  blasphemy  in 
saying  that  the  Holy  Ghost  proceeds  also  from  the  Son  .  .  . 
She  has  fallen  away  from  the  YII  Councils  by  this  addition, 
separated  herself  from  the  Church,  and  incurred  anathema.”3 
“The  addition  of  the  Filioque  is  both  in  letter  and  spirit  con¬ 
trary  to  Holy  Scripture.”0  The  mere  presence  of  the  words 

1  'H  ’O p968o£os  ’EKKXrjaia,  Athens,  1902,  p.  52-53. 

2  Op.  cit.,  vol.  I,  pp.  338  ff. 

3  Even  a  cursory  examination  of  the  course  of  Orthodox-Roman  con¬ 
troversy  as  given  in  Palmieri’s  second  volume  {op.  cit.)  would  prove 
this  abundantly. 

4  Ilept  ’E/c/cX^fTtas,  Athens,  1896,  vol.  II.  pp.  382,  389. 

5  'I epa  Bi/3Aos,  KaXovpe vp  'KpparopdeLa  tCjv  ~KpLaTiavu>v,  Constantinople, 
1898,  vol  I.  pp.  65,  68. 

6  Mesolora,  2i^/3oAi/o7,  vol.  I.  Athens,  1883,  p.  51. 


THE  HOLY  TRINITY 


139 


in  the  Athanasian  creed  vitiate  it;  “the  purpose  of  the  Fil- 
ioque  and  its  uncanonical  addition  reduce  largely  its  signifi¬ 
cance*'.1  One  writer  finds  the  Anglican  use  of  this  Symbol  a 
great  difficulty  in  establishing  relations  between  us  and  the 
Orthodox,  since  the  Athanasian  creed  “was  forged  by  Papist 
theologians  to  uphold  their  own  false  teaching  as  to  the  Filio- 
que.”2  In  earlier  times  certain  Greek  confessions  of  Faith 
required  an  explicit  repudiation  of  the  doctrine  of  the  Filioque.3 
In  the  main,  the  controversy  has  not  been  illuminated  by  any 
further  contributions,  save  in  acrimony  and  vilification,  than 
those  of  Photius,4 5  beyond  whom  there  has  been  no  advance  in 
theological  acumen  or  insight.  When  the  progress  of  the  con¬ 
troversy  is  read  in  the  light  of  history  one  thing  is  abundantly 
evident :  Western  theologians  certainlv  do  not  teach  what  the 

v_> 

Orthodox  claim  they  do,  as  they  do  not  hold  to  two  principia 
(o.pxa l,  Trrjyat, )  in  the  Godhead/'  Furthermore,  even  so  partial 
and  pro-Orthodox  a  scholar  as  Neale,  after  fully  investigating 
the  whole  question  from  the  Fathers  on,  concludes:  “The  in¬ 
direct  testimony  preponderates  incomparably  on  the  Greek  side ; 
the  direct  testimony  preponderates  on  the  Latin  side.”6 

Quite  rightly  Pusey7  distinguished  two  distinct  questions 

1  Ibid.  p.  63,  and  cf.  note  1,  p.  374  of  vol.  I.  of  Palmieri,  op  cit. 

-  N.  Teehnopoulos,  writing  in  the  "E vwgls  tCjv  ’EKKXyaiuv,  London, 
1904,  note  40,  pp.  638-644,  on  'H  boy par lktj  decris  rps  ayyXLKris  "E/c/cX^crtas 
K.a.0 ’  eavrpv  e^era^oyovy.  On  the  general  position  of  Orthodoxy,  cf. 
Palmieri,  op.  cit.,  I.  pp.  336-407. 

3  E.  g.,  Miklosicli  and  Yliiller,  Acta  Patriarchatus  const.  (1315-1402) 
e  codicibus  manuscriptis  'bibliothecae  palatinae  vindobonensis,  Vienna, 
1872,  vol.  II.  p.  8,  and  ef.  vol.  I.  pp.  501,  506,  550;  vol.  II.  pp.  84, 
160,  etc. 

4  Liber  de  Spiritus  Sancti  II ystagogia,  in  Migne,  P.  G.,  t.  Oil,  cols. 
279-392;  edited  with  critical  notes,  by  Hergenrother,  Ratisbon,  1867; 
Encyclical  Letter  to  the  Eastern  Archbishops,  Yfigne,  P.  G.,  t.  CII, 
cols.  721-742;  Letter  to  the  Archbishop  of  Aquileia,  in  Jiiger, 
Histoire  de  Photius,  patriarche  de  Constantinople,  Paris,  1845,  pp.  452- 
464,  and  Yaletta,  Acot iov  'E7 naroXal,  London,  1864,  pp.  181-200.  Cf. 
Rhalle  and  Potle,  Zcvrayya,  Athens,  1854,  vol.  IV,  pp.  407  ff. 

5  Cf.  F.  J.  Hall,  The  Trinity,  N.  Y.  1910,  p.  94-96;  Palmieri,  op.  cit., 
1.  p.  342. 

6  Op.  cit.,  I.  p.  1131. 

7  Cf.  On  the  Clause  “ And  the  Son ”  in  regard  to  the  Eastern  Church 
and  the  Bonn  Conference,  Oxford,  1876,  pp.  33  ff. 


140 


II.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  GOD 


as  to  the  Filioque.  One  is  that  of  the  legality  or  regularity  of 
the  addition.  The  other  is  in  regard  to  the  truth  or  falsity  of 
the  doctrines  involved.  As  to  the  former  Hall  says1  that 
“modern  conditions  have  caused  (the  canonical  questions  in¬ 
volved  in  the  Filioque  controversy )  to  have  only  an  academic 
interest.”  As  to  the  dogmatic  truth  he  says :  “The  Filoque  has 
come  to  serve  in  the  West  as  a  practically  indispensable  safe¬ 
guard  of  two  leading  particulars  of  the  catholic  doctrine  of  the 
Trinity;  and  its  abandonment,  even  in  the  interests  of  canoni¬ 
cal  regularity  and  reunion  with  the  East,  may  not  be  permitted 
until  sufficient  provision  has  been  made  for  a  continued  main¬ 
tenance  and  assertion  of  the  truths  which  the  clause  in  question 
protects.  These  truths  are  the  co-equality  of  the  Son  with  the 
Father,  obscured  by  modern  and  semi-pantheistic  interpreta¬ 
tions  of  the  Ojuoovcnos ;  and  the  eternal  relation  of  the  Holy  Spirit 
to  the  Son,  which,  by  reason  of  their  controversial  attitude  in  be¬ 
half  of  the  Father’s  sole  principatus ,  the  Easterns  are  inclined  to 
disregard.”2  Dr.  Pusey’s  hope  that  mutual  explanation  might 
serve  to  clear  up  misunderstanding  is  not  yet  justified:  “If  the 
Greeks  come  to  understand  our  Western  terms,  all  difference  dis¬ 
appears.”3  Despite  Lyons,  Florence,  and  the  Bonn  conferences,4 
theological  misconception  still  persists  and  maintains.  One  is 
tempted  to  quote  here  some  rather  sharp  words  of  Palmieri: 
“Contro  il  Filioque  insorge  unicamente  l’anemica  teologia  greco- 
russa,  che  dopo  la  scissione  delle  Chiese,  langue  affetta  da  senile 
marasmo.  Ragionado  a  fil  di  logica,  per  dar  ragione  all’ 
ortodossia,  noi  dovremmo  ammettere  che  una  minorita  infima 
nel  cristianesimo,  una  minorita  la  quale  non  personifica  ne  la 
scienza,  ne  l’erudizione,  ne  l’onesta  letteraria,  in  un  difficilissimo 
problema  teologico  imbrocchi  la  soluzione  vera ;  dovremmo 
ammettere  che  i  grandi  teologi  del  cattolicismo  .  .  .  per- 

1  Op.  tit.,  pp.  236-7. 

2  Op.  cit.,  p.  237,  and  cf.  ibid.,  pp.  230-237. 

3  Op.  cit.,  p.  171,  and  cf.  pp.  106-7,  and  172  ff. 

4  On  the  two  former,  cf.  Palmieri,  op.  cit.,  11,  pp.  87-101;  Pusey, 
op.  cit.,  pp.  102-108;  on  the  Bonn  Conferences,  cf.  Reusch  Bericht 
uber  die  vom  10  bis  16  August  1875  zu  Bonn  gehaltenen  Unionscon- 
ferenzen,  Bonn.,  1875,  and  that  for  the  subsequent  year;  Reports  on 
the  same,  edited  by  the  Rev.  H.  P.  Liddon,  1875  and  1876,  and  Rhosse’s 
reports  to  the  Holy  Synod  of  Athens,  same  years. 


THE  HOLY  TRINITY 


141 


correndo  gli  annali  della  tradizione  cristiana,  hanno  avuto  le 
traveggole  agli  occhi,  scoprendo  in  essi  le  prove  storiche  dell’ 
antichita  del  Filioque,  laddove  nn  nucleo  di  retori  bizantini  e 
di  monaci  fanatici1  sono  gli  araldi  della  verita,  quando  affer- 
mano  che  queste  prove  storiche  non  esistono  !"2 3 

In  the  recent  pamphlet,  Terms  of  Intercommunion  suggested 
between  the  Church  of  England  and  the  Churches  in  Communion 
with  Her  and  the  Eastern  Orthodox  Church f  Sections  VII  and 
VIII  are  concerned  with  the  Doctrines  of  the  Holy  Spirit  and 
the  Filoque  Clause.  The  latter  says:  “We  agree  in  acknowledg¬ 
ing  that  this  addition  (to  the  Creed)  was  not  made  ‘in  an 
ecclesiastically  regular  manner/  and  that  in  assemblies  of  East¬ 
erns  and  Westerns  the  one  Creed  of  the  Universal  Church  ought 
to  be  recited  without  those  words;  but  we  are  also  agreed  that, 
since  the  added  words  are  used  in  an  orthodox  sense,  it  is  law¬ 
ful  for  any  Church  which  has  received  the  Creed  as  containing 
these  words  to  continue  so  to  recite  it  in  the  Services  of  the 
Church/'4 5  The  first  statement  is  No.  II  of  the  Preliminary 
Eesolutions  of  the  Bonn  Conference,  and  is  still  subject  to  the 
same  criticism  as  Pusey  brought  against  it,  that  it  is  a  truism, 
useless  as  the  basis  of  an  Eirenicon,  clears  up  nothing,  but  al¬ 
lows  the  imputation  that  the  Filioque  clause  was  a  wilful  inter¬ 
polation.0  This  suggested  emendation  is  given  in  Note  1 
to  his  Essay,  which  is  very  worthy  of  consideration  in  view 
of  present  negotions,  as  are  all  the  “proposed  amendments” 
to  the  Bonn  Propositions.6  In  every  way  we  must  guard  against 
parting  with  “what,  through  so  many  centuries,  has  been  the 

1  Gerlach  reported  that  Zygomalas,  when  questioned  about  the 
Filioque,  answered:  “Etsi  Christus  ipse  de  coelo  descenderet,  dicens 
Spiritum  Sanctum  a  Patre  et  Filio  procedere,  tamen  Graecos  id  non 
esse  credituros.,”  in  Geisius,  Destinata  inter  Gonstantinopolitanum 
patriarchum  Ieremiam,  et  tkeologos  witembergenses  conjunctio,  Wit- 
temberg,  .1705,  XX. 

2 II  Progresso  Dommatico,  Florence,  1910,  p,  171.  For  his  treat¬ 
ment  of  the  subject  here,  cf.  pp.  165-172,  and  his  monographs,  cf. 
above  p.  51. 

3  London,  S.  P.  C.  K.,  1921. 

4  Ibid.,  p.  7. 

5  Cf.  op.  cit.,  pp.  33-90,  and  note  1,  pp.  182-184;  and  Terms  of  In¬ 
tercommunion,  pp.  7  and  13-14. 

6  Pusey,  Eirenicon,  pp.  263-266. 


142 


II.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  GOD 


expression  of  our  common  faith,  (while)  we  might  still  reject 
with  Anathema  the  heresy  which,  since  Photius,  has  been  im¬ 
puted  to  it,  and  which  the  Greek  Church  now  seems  by  an  in¬ 
veterate  prejudice,  to  think  to  be  involved  in  it .  .  .  .  We  only 
ask  to  continue  to  use  the  formula,  which  without  any  act  of 
our  own,  has  been  the  expression  of  our  faith  immemorially  .  . 
If,  on  such  terms  and  on  such  explanations  of  our  belief  as  she 
(the  Greek  Church)  may  require  and  we  could  give,  communion 
should  he  restored  between  us,  a  great  step  would  have  been 
gained  towards  the  reunion  of  all  Christendom.” 

In  conclusion  we  may  note  that,  aside  from  the  entangle¬ 
ments  of  controversy  in  the  past,  the  economic,  political,  racial, 
and  social  causes  working  for  the  cleavage  between  Eastern  and 
Western  Christendom,  two  outstanding  comments  on  the 
Filioque  difficulty  deserve  consideration:  (a)  The  radical  differ¬ 
ence  in  point  of  view  between  Eastern  and  Western  theologians 
in  envisaging  the  doctrine  of  the  Holy  Trinity.  The  Eastern 
mind  would  conceive  of  the  relations  of  the  Persons  in  and  by 
the  Divine  Life  within  the  Godhead,  while  the  Western  idea 
of  the  relations  of  the  Persons  is,  as  it  were,  more  from  without. 
The  former  looks  constantly  towards  the  great  theological  truth 
of  the  one  Source  or  principium  in  the  Godhead ;  the  latter  sees 
the  results  of  the  Divine  activity  as  springing  from  the  One 
Fount  and  Cause,  (b)  The  radical  difference  in  language.  We 
do  not  use  the  words  to  mean  what  the  Easterns  consider  them 
to  mean.  On  this  Dr.  Pusey  has  an  excellent  comment:1  “Dr. 
Dollinger  (at  the  Bonn  Conferences)  rightly  insisted  that  the 
Greeks  attached  to  the  Greek  expression,  Iktto peveaO at,  a  meaning 
which  we  do  not  attach  to  our  Western,  ‘proceed  from’  .  .  . 
It,  in  itself,  only  signifies  ‘to  proceed  out  of.  It  does  not  in 
itself  signify  ‘to  proceed  out  of  as  the  original  source  of  Being / 
Xo  one  questions  their  right  to  ascribe  to  it,  for  themselves, 
what  meaning  they  please.  .  .  Nor  have  they  any  authority 
to  blame  us  for  not  attaching  that  meaning  to  our  Lord’s  word 
in  Holy  Scriptures,  or  to  our  own  substitute  for  it,  ‘to  proceed 
from’.  It  does  not  lie  in  the  word  itself ;  nor  has  the  Church 
authoritative^  so  limited  its  use.  We  do  not  speak  Greek,  nor 

1  On  the  Clause  “ and  the  Son”,  in  regard  to  the  Eastern  Church 
and  the  Bonn  Conference,  pp.  106-107. 


THE  HOLY  TRINITY 


143 


require  the  Greeks  to  use  our  language.  But  we,  Westerns,  are 
the  judges  of  what  we  mean  by  our  own.  In  fact,  as  Dr.  Dol- 
linger  pointed  out,  the  case  is  parallel  to  the  confusions,  which 
there  were,  in  the  Arian  period,  about  the  word  ‘Hypostasis’, 
‘Prosopon’,  and  ‘Persona’.  When  the  misapprehension  was 
cleared  up,  each  went  on  using  his  own  terms.” 


LECTURE  III. 


SIN  AND  SALVATION 


LECTURE  III. 


SIN  AND  SALVATION 

CONTENTS 

I 

Pages 

CREATION,  MAN,  AND  THE  FALL 


1.  Creation: 

The  Orthodox  dogma  involves  the  doctrine 

that  148-150 

(a)  God  freely  created  the  world  from 

nothing,  150-151 

(b)  in  time,  152-153 

(c)  with  a  definite  aim  and  purpose,  153-154 

(d)  according  to  a  certain  method  and 

order;  155 

(e)  His  Providence  rules  over  His  creation  155-158 

2.  Man :  his  constitution  and  nature 

3.  The  Fall 

4.  Original  Sin: 

(a)  Material  aspect  166-168 

(b)  Formal  aspect  168-169 

(c)  Consequences  170-171 


II 

SALVATION  AND  THE  SAVIOUR 

1.  The  Causes  and  Purpose  of  the  Incarnation 

2.  The  Doctrine  of  Our  Lord’s  Person : 


A. 

The  Person  of  Christ 

179-183 

B. 

Corollaries  and  Implications: 

184-189 

(a) 

The  communicatio  idiomatum 

184-186 

(b) 

The  B.  V.  M.  is  Ocotokcts 

187 

(c) 

Worship  of  Jesus  Christ 

187 

(d) 

Sinlessness  of  Christ 

187-189 

The  Doctrine  of  Our  Lord’s  Work 

A. 

The  three-fold  Office  of  Christ: 

190-201 

(a) 

High  Priest 

191-197 

(b) 

Prophet 

197-198 

(c) 

King 

198-201 

B. 

Redemption,  Atonement,  and  Salvation 

201-202 

Pages 

148-171 

148-158 


158-165 

165- 166 

166- 171 


171-202 

171-179 

179-189 


190-202 


SIN  AND  SALVATION 


The  Orthodox  teaching  concerning  the  Office,  Person,  and 
work  of  the  Saviour  involves  the  doctrines  of  Creation,  Anthro¬ 
pology,  the  Fall,  and  Sin.  As  the  logical  presuppositions  of 
Orthodox  Christology,  the  doctrine  of  the  Orthodox  Church  may 
be  divided  into  these  four  heads,  of  which  the  exposition  in 
summary  follows. 


I.  CREATION,  MAN,  AND  THE  FALL 

As  we  have  seen,  God,  who  is  all  good,  wished  to  give  exis¬ 
tence  to  non-being,  in  accordance  with  the  prototype  existing 
in  Him,  in  order  that  He  might  constitute  other  entities  cap¬ 
able  of  sharing  His  goodness.1  The  actualization  and  realiza¬ 
tion  of  this  plan  of  God,  whether  the  plan  be  regarded  as  exist¬ 
ing  “eternally”  or  only  “before  time”  in  His  mind,  was  effected 
by  the  Creation  of  the  “world”.2  By  bringing  to  bear  His  Al¬ 
mighty  Power  in  conjunction  with  His  Love  and  His  Will,  He 
brought  about  the  existence  of  the  world  in  fact,  which  had  had 
existence  potentially  in  His  Mind.  “The  reason  and  cause  of 
the  existence  ...  of  the  world  lies  in  God  Himself.’'3  “The 
goodness  of  God  .  .  .  gives  us  the  reason  of  Creation.  Crea- 


3  Rhosse,  op.  tit.,  p.  326. 

2  “The  word  ‘world’  (  koc/xos  )  signifies  the  same  as  the  ancient  use 
of  it  would  imply,  i.  e. — the  system  of  heaven  and  earth,  and  all  they 
contain’’  (Mesolora,  Zu/z/SoXi/o),  III.  p.  129).  The  term  is  practi¬ 
cally  equivalent  to  our  word  “universe”. 

1  Rhosse,  AoyfjLaTiKri,  p.  328. 


CREATION,  MAN,  AND  THE  FALL 


149 


tion  is  the  work  of  great  wisdom  and  might  and  proceeds  forth 
from  the  hands  of  the  Allwise  and  Almighty.”1  Since  the  world 
is  God’s  work,  each  of  the  Persons  in  the  Godhead  had  His 
own  share  in  it :  God  the  Father  is  the  Primary  Cause,  God 
the  Son,  the  Effective  Cause,  and  God  the  Holy  Ghost,  the  Per¬ 
fecting  Cause.2  So  “that  by  the  will  of  the  Father  (the  min¬ 
istering  spirits)  have  their  existence,  by  the  cooperation  of  the 
Son  they  are  brought  into  being,  and  by  the  presence  of  the  Holy 
Spirit  they  are  perfected.”3  Creation  has  not  only  God  as  its 
Cause,  but  Orthodox  teaching,  founded  on  Holy  Scripture4  and 
the  united  teaching  of  the  Fathers,  claims  that  it  was  His  free 
act,  and  that  He  created  it  from  nothing.  Such  theories  as  hold 
Him  to  have  created  of  necessity,  or  from  pre-existent  matter, 
are  entirely  opposed  to  the  Orthodox  doctrine,  which  is  “in 
direct  opposition  both  to  the  pantheistic  notions  (held  by  neo¬ 
platonic  philosophy  and  by  some  of  the  gnostic  heresies)  of  em¬ 
anations  from  God,  as  well  as  to  the  dualistic  and  materialistic 
hypothesis.”6  “It  is  superfluous  to  show,”  says  Androutsos,0 
“that  the  Christian  Faith,  postulating  as  it  does  the  dependence 
of  the  world  upon  God,  at  the  same  time  preserves  whole  and  in¬ 
tact  the  conception  of  God  as  transcending  matter  and  all  ‘be¬ 
coming’,  and  the  conception  of  the  world  as  absolutely  depen¬ 
dent  upon  God;  and  also  .  .  .  opposes  every  cosmological  and 
philosophical  speculation  about  the  origin  of  the  world,  of  an¬ 
cient  and  modern  times — whether  it  be  the  Hylozoism  of  the  an¬ 
cients,  according  to  which  all  things  came  into  being  from  pre¬ 
existent  chaotic  matter,  or  Pantheism,  which  intermingles  God 
and  the  world  and  regards  the  world  as  a  natural  emanation 
from  the  Divine  substance  as  from  an  overfull  cup,  or  the  Plato- 


1  Kephala,  XpiaToXoyia,  p.  124. 

2  The  Holy  Spirit  is  “the  informing  Principle  of  matter;”  cf.  An¬ 
droutsos,  A07 fiar iK-f) ,  p.  93. 

3  ITepi  ayiov  Uuev/j.aTos,  St.  Basil,  eh.  16  ;  in  Mesolora,  XvpfioXiKT),  III. 
p.  325,  and  p.  131.  Cf.  St.  John  Damascene,  ’,E>c5o<m  2,  17 ;  Gennad- 
ius,  in  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  vol.  I.  pp.  73-74;  1st  Answer  of  Jeremiah 
II.  ibid.,  p.  126;  Metrophanes  Kritopoulos,  ibid.,  p.  297.,  Mogila,  ques¬ 
tion  6,  ibid.,  p.  385;  Conf.  of  Dositheus,  §  4  ibid.,  p.  105,  etc. 

4  For  a  catena  cf.  Rhosse,  A07 par lkt] ,  pp.  331-333. 

5  Ibid.,  p.  334. 

8  Op.  cit.,  p.  93. 


150 


III.— SIN  AND  SALVATION 


nistic  dualism  which,  while  it  views  God  as  the  informing  and 
ordering  Principle,  does  not  hold  Him  to  be  the  Creative  Prin¬ 
ciple.”1 

The  dogma  that  God  is  the  Creator  of  the  world  “both  as 
to  its  substance  as  well  as  to  its  form,  .  .  is  a  mystery  of  the 
Faith  .  .  .  God  has  only  revealed  to  us  what  is  of  most  im¬ 
portance  for  our  needs,  and  what  is  sufficient  for  our  salvation.”1 3 
It  is  like  the  apprehension  of  the  truth  of  God’s  freedom,  of 
His  Essence,  or  of  His  Will — beyond  our  comprehension.8 
“Though  it  is  in  a  measure  intelligible  to  us, ...  .  it  still  has  a 
mysterious  and  incomprehensible  side.  .  .  .and  remains  in  a  sense 
a  miracle — the  greatest,  the  primal,  miracle.”4  Like  any  other 
truth  of  Revelation,  it  is  not  in  all  its  bearings  subject  to  our 
scrutiny,  nor  entirely  within  the  range  of  our  capacity  to  dis¬ 
cover  or  ascertain  by  the  use  of  unaided  reason  and  human  ex¬ 
perience.  The  Orthodox  doctrine  of  Creation  may  be  analyzed 
into  four  subheads:  (a)  God  created  the  world  from  nothing, 
by  the  exercise  of  His  own  free  will;  (b)  He  created  it  in  time; 
(c)  with  both  an  adequate  aim  and  end;  and  (d)  orders  and 
guides  it  according  to  His  own  Almighty  Will  and  Wisdom. 

That  God  created  the  world  from  nothing  is  clear  from  Holy 


1  Cf.  Androutsos,  'H  rou  nXarwj'os  deupia  tt?s  ypcjcreus,  Athena,  1912, 
p.  113.  Rhosse  points  out  (op.  cit.,  pp.  336-337)  that  the  Platonic 
and  Aristotelian  conception  of  the  Infinite  is  not  that  of  the 
unlimited,  but  that  of  the  undetermined.  Matter  without  form  does 
not  exist  save  as  an  abstraction,  and  the  conception  of  form  as  “other¬ 
ness  from  God  as  pure  Spirit”  and  as  being  determined,  is  an  antithesis 
to  the  idea  of  God.  But  the  opposition,  RhOsse  says,  is  really  not  be¬ 
tween  form  and  God  as  Spirit,  but  between  Infinite  spirit  and  finite 
spirit,  nor  logically  that  between  spirit  and  matter.  God,  therefore, 
to  be  Infinite  must  be  the  Creator  of  form,  as  well  as  of  matter.  For 
matter  is  admittedly  not  absolute,  but  imperfect  and  subject  to  change, 
and  so  it  could  not  be  self-originated.  The  same  reasoning  holds  as 
regards  form  as  such,  for  the  finite  is  not  one,  but  many,  and  s<o  not 
infinite,  being  other-than-God.  “The  finite  number  of  the  multiplicity 
of  entities  and  things  in  the  world,  ordered  to  an  end,  and  the  world, 
the  actualization  of  divers  genera  and  species  (i.  e.,  from  out  of  their 
existence  in  the  Divine  mind)  constitutes  an  ordered  and  simple 
whole”  (Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  340-341). 

2  Mesolora,  Si/A/SoXt/oj,  III.  p.  130. 

3  Androutsos,  Aoyp.aTiKri,  p.  96. 

4  Rhbsse,  op.  cit.,  p.  338. 


CREATION,  MAN,  AND  THE  FALL 


151 


Scripture.1  He  did  not  bring  it  into  being  from  pre-existent  mat¬ 
ter2.  .  .  This  is  the  teaching  of  both  the  Fathers  and  the 
Symbolic  Books  as  well3 ....  “The  teaching  of  the  Church  about 
Creation  from  nothing  is  not ....  opposed  to  reason ....  for  it  re¬ 
gards  God  as  the  sufficient  reason  or  Highest  Cause  of  the 
world’s  existence  both  as  to  matter  and  form.”4  “The  principle 
ex  nihilo  nihil  fit  strengthens  rather  than  destroys  the  dogma  of 
Creation ;  since  if  by  it  one  understands  matter  to  be  something 
necessary,  because  of  God  as  Creator,  and  because  of  the ....  en- 
erg}" ...  of  natural  powers  in  general,  he  then  falls  into  the  well- 
known  blunder  in  logic  of  begging  the  question ;  if  he  holds  that 
there  is  a  cause  by  or  from  which  everything  has  come  about, 
then.  .  .  .this  cause  must  be  God  Himself.”5  It  follows  then  that 
“'there  was  no  reason  compelling  God  to  create  the  world.  It  was 
not  a  work  of  necessity.”6  Since  what  God  does  as  the  Infinite 
and  Almighty  He  does  consonant  with  His  nature  as  free  of  any 
external  limitations,  Creation  could  neither  have  been  of  neces¬ 
sity  nor  could  it  have  been  the  result  of  chance,  or  of  something 
fortuitous.7  The  former  hypothesis,  that  the  world  was  neces¬ 
sary  and  inevitable,  either  is  based  upon  pantheistic  premises, 
or  logically  leads  to  Pantheism.8  Furthermore,  if  matter  had 
existed  before  Creation,  from  which  God  formed  the  world, 
it  would  have  involved  an  external  limitation  on  His  Eternity 
and  Almightiness ;  in  short,  this  theory  would  militate  against 
His  Character  as  Absolute  and  Infinite.9  Another  consequence 
of  the  denial  of  the  truth  that  Creation  was  a  free  act  on  God's 
part,  would  be  the  cutting  of  the  ground  from  under  the  pos¬ 
sibility  of  religion,  which  consists  of  a  free  relationship  between 
God  and  man.10 

^Cf.  2  Mac.  7,  28;  Job  38,  4;  Ps.  8,  3 ;  33,  6. 

2  Heb.  11,  3;  Wisd.  11,  17. 

3  E.  g.,  St.  Athanasius,  de  Incarnatione  Yerbi,  2;  contra  gentes,  39; 
Gennadius,  in  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  I,  pp.  73-4;  1st  Answer  of  Jeremiah  II, 
ibid.,  p.  126,  etc.;  cf.  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  331-335. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  336. 

5  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  95-96. 

6  Kephala,  op.  cit.,  p.  124. 

7Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  III.  pp.  137-138. 

8 Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  96. 

9 Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  339. 

10  Androutsos,  ibid. 


152 


III.— SIN  AND  SALVATION 


Linked  with  the  above  is  the  truth  that  Creation  took  place 
in  or  with  time,  and  not  from  eternity.1  “Since  eternity  is  the 
undetermined  and  absolute  form  of  God’s  existence  and  energy 
as  viewed  in  relation  to  Himself,  and  time  is  the  finite  form  of 
the  energy  of  the  finite  world,.  .  .  .the  existence  of  the  idea  of 
the  world  in  the  mind  and  will  of  God  may  not  be  conceived  as 
eternal,  as  is  God's  own  existence  (in  Himself),  but  as  before 
time.  .  .  .  Time  took  its  beginning  with  Creation.7’2  Since  matter 
is  finite  it  must  have  had  a  beginning,  and  the  words  “in  the  be¬ 
ginning”3  mean,  according  to  the  Fathers,  “in  the  beginning 
of  time”*  Origen's  difficulty,5  according  to  Rhosse,6  lay  in 
his  not  distinguishing  between  the  relative  and  absolute  attri¬ 
butes  of  God;  according  to  Androutsos,  in  his  having  failed 
to  distinguish  between  God’s  creative  power  in  Himself,  and  its 
exercise  in  fact,  in  Creation — between  His  idea  of  the  world 
and  its  realization  and  actualization  in  Creation.7  The  relation 
of  time  to  eternity  is  suggested  in  the  foregoing.  “Since  Crea¬ 
tion  is  the  calling  forth  from  non-being  into  being,  it  is  clear 

1  Cf.  St.  Augustine:  Mundus  non  in  tempore  sed  cum  tempore  f actus 
est,  and  St.  Thomas  Acquin.,  Summa,  1,  9,  46  (§2). 

2 Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  342-343;  he  has  a  three-fold  distinction,  (a) 
“temporal”  (tov  xp°vov) ,  (b)  “eternal”  (aiStov) ,  and  (c)  “pretemporal” 
( irpoauovLov ) .  God’s  idea  of  the  world  was  not  “eternal”,  but 
only  “before  time”.  The  conception  of  “pretemporal”  is  in¬ 
termediate  between  that  of  time  and  eternity  (p.  327  note  2).  Time, 
according  to  him,  is  the  “finite  form  of  finite  energy”;  according  to 
Androutsos,  it  is  “properly  the  measure  of  the  sequence  of  created 
energy  and  is  naturally  bound  up  with  creatures”  (op.  cit.,  p.  98). 
While  Rhosse  would  not  call  the  world  eternal,  it  may  yet  be 
described  as  being  everlasting  ( cuWi6T77s=“everlastingness” ) ,  and 
though  it  had  a  beginning  in  time  yet  may  be  “without  end” 
(dTeXevTrjTos) ,  op.  cit.,  p.  343.  Androutsos  does  not  agree  with  Rhosse’s 
three-fold  distinction  and  says  that  “God’s  will  concerning  the  world 
is  clearly  bound  up  with  His  eternal  character”  otherwise  He  would 
not  be  conceived  as  simple  or  unchanging  (op.  cit.,  p.  101).  “There 
is  no  mean  between  time  and  eternitv.  Besides,  it  introduces  a  former 
and  a  latter,  i.  e.,  a  time  relation,  into  the  Being  of  God”,  p.  102,  note 
2.  On  space  and  time,  cf.  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  344,  note  1. 

3  Gen.  1,  1;  St.  John  1,  1;  cf.  also,  Ps.  90,  2;  Ps.  93,  2;  St.  John 
17,  5;  Eph.  1,  4. 

4  Androutsos  op.  cit.,  p.  98. 

5  Cf.  Hepl  apxuv  1,  2,  10. 

6  Op.  cit.,  pp.  341-342. 

7  Op.  cit.,  p.  97. 


CREATION,  MAN,  AND  THE  FALL 


153 


that....  the  creative  energy  of  God.  ..  .must  needs  be  mani¬ 
fested  in  the  temporal  beginning  of  the  world”.1  Because  time 
began  with  Creation  it  cannot  be  thought  to  have  existed  before 
the  world,  else  the  world  would  be  older  than  itself.  But  God 
as  eternal  is  “antecedent  to  the  world  not  chronologically,  but 
logically.  . .  .Yet  while  the  world  is  only  logically  later  than  He 
it  does  not  follow  that  it  is  coeval  with  Him,”2  for  this  would 
impair  His  absolute  character.3  That  His  will  and  plan  for  the 
world  were  either  “eternal”,  according  to  Androutsos, 
or  “before  time”  acording  to  Rhosse,  does  not  involve  the 
corollary  “that  this  will  should  have  an  eternal  fulfilment, 
nor  that  God  became  the  Cause  of  the  world  only 
when  He  created  it.”4  There  must  be  a  sharp  distinction  in 
our  thinking  between  the  conception  of  God's  will  for  Creation 
and  His  plan  and  design,  which  were  in  Him  before  Creation, 
and  the  carrying  out  and  realization  of  His  will  in  the  fact  of 
Creation.  It  is  an  essential  and  valid  distinction,  even  though 
the  Platonic  envisagement  of  the  idea  “on  the  part  of  some  of 
the  Fathers  led  them  into  metaphysical  speculations  unsup¬ 
ported  by  Revelation.”'5 

“The  reason  of  the  world's  existence”,  in  the  words  of  Ke- 
phala,  “is  the  goodness  of  God.  .  .  .which  of  its  own  great  abun¬ 
dance  imparted  itself  in  Creation,  that  it  might  externalize  its 
richness,  and  even  constitute  other  beings  sharers  in  this  Good¬ 
ness  and  Blessedness.”'1 7  This,  as  was  said  in  Lecture  II  under 
the  “Ethical  attributes  of  God”,8  is  the  characteristic  Orthodox 
interpretation  of  God's  Love,  in  this  aspect  of  that  attribute. 
“The  world  is  a  result  of  a  cause  beyond  (and  outside  of)  it¬ 
self,  a  consequence  of  God's  free  knowledge  and  will.  ...  (It  is) 

1  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  100.  He  notes  that  the  very  conception 
of  a  beginningless  creation  ( dvapxov  d^p.Lovpytas)  is  a  contradiction 
of  predicates,  (ibid.) 

2  Ibid.,  pp.  98-99;  Rhosse.  op.  cit.,  p.  343. 

3  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  100,  and  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  339. 

4  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  102. 

5Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  103-104. 

8  Op.  cit.,  p.  124. 

7  Cf .  on  this,  Gennadius,  in  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  I.  p.  74;  Kritopoulos, 
ibid.,  p.  297;  Dositheus,  ibid.,  pp.  105-106;  Mogila,  pp.  378-379;  a 
summary  of  this  doctrine  in  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  361. 

8Cf.  pp.  101-102. 


154 


III—  SIN,AND  SALVATION 

• 

His  work,  both  as  to  matter  and  form, ....  made  with  ease  by 
His  Omnipotent  power,  and  in  accordance  with  the  Divine  fore¬ 
knowledge  and  wisdom,  wisely,  and  in  graduated  and  purpose¬ 
ful  order.”1  As  was  said  above,  the  world  was  freely  created 
by  God,  and  was  not  the  result  of  either  chance  or  accident.  So 
it  follows  that  He  who  freely  created  it  had  an  object  or  aim  in 
view.  This  end  which  God  had  in  view  (the  causa  finalis)  con¬ 
stitutes  at  the  same  time  the  efficient  cause  ( causa  impulsiva) 
of  Creation,  since  both  refer  to  the  same  thing.2  Since  we  may 
not  conceive  God  as  incomplete  or  lacking  in  anything,  by  rea¬ 
son  of  which  external  need  He  must  have  created  the  world,  we 
may  not  seek  the  aim  and  purpose  of  the  world  save  in  His  own 
Nature.  The  content  of  this  aim  and  purpose  of  God  in  Creation 
is  resolvable  into  the  proximate  end,  the  happiness  of  rational 
creatures,  and  the  final  end,  the  glory  of  God.3  Furthermore, 
since  the  aim  of  the  Bedemption  is  the  perfection  of  Creation, 
and  may  be  defined  as  “the  foundation  of  the  Kingdom  of  God, 
to  His  Glory,4  it  is  clear  that  the  purpose  of  the  world  cannot 
be  different  from  (that  of)  the  Bedemption  in  Christ.  .  .  . 
Hence  ....  the  proximate  end  of  Creation  may  not  be 
sundered  from  the  final  end,  but  constitutes  together  with  it 
one  unique  and  indivisible  whole.”5  It  is  in  relation  to  its  end 
that  the  world  is  said  to  be  “good”,  that  is,  in  agreement  with 
the  plan  of  God  concerning  it.6  God  will  not  allow  His  final 
end  to  miscarry.  It  is,  however,  unjustifiable  to  say  that  it  is 
“the  best  possible”  world,  as  do  the  absolute  optimists,  or  to 
assert  that  it  is  the  “only  possible”  world,  reasoning  that  God 
might  have  created  or  might  not,  but  that  since  He  did,  this 
was  the  only  possible  effect  of  His  will  in  Creation.  This  spec- 


^lesolora,  op.  cit.,  III.  pp.  134-135. 

2 Causa  finalis:  ...  id  cujus  gratia  aliquid  fit;  causa  im¬ 
pulsiva  vel  efficiens :  id  a  quo  aliquid  fit.  Cf.  Manual  of  Modern  Scholas¬ 
tic  Philosophy,  Card.  Mercier,  (Eng.  transl.)  2  vols.  London  1919; 
vol.  II.  p.  508. 

3Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  104-105;  cf.  Ps.  19,  1;  Prov.  16,  4;  Rom. 
11,  36;  Heb.  2,  10;  Song  of  the  Three  Children,  vs.  35;  St.  Luke  2, 
14;  Rom.  1,  19-20;  Deut.  10,  21. 

4Cf.  St.  John,  17,  4;  Eph.  1,  5-6;  Col.  1,  16. 

6Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  105-106. 

6Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  III.  pp.  138-139. 


CREATION,  MAN,  AND  THE  FALL 


155 


illation,  Anclroutsos  says,1  both  limits  God’s  freedom,  and  trans¬ 
gresses  the  limitations  of  our  reasoning,  since  the  mystery  of 
Divine  free  will  is  not  subject  to  our  scrutiny  nor  within  the 
compass  of  our  comprehension. 

Of  the  order  of  Creation  we  know  that  there  was  a  progress 
from  the  simple  to  the  complex,  from  the  general  to  the  particu¬ 
lar,  from  the  imperfect  to  the  more  perfect,  from  the  inorganic 
to  the  organic,  and  from  the  unrational  to  the  rational,  “with 
man  as  the  link  uniting  visible  and  invisible  nature,  the  micro¬ 
cosm  embracing  both  matter  and  spirit.”2  The  biblical  account 
teaches  us  that  each  new  species  was  a  separate  creation  of  God.3 
The  various  speculations  and  problems  connected  with  Genesis, 
the  meaning  of  the  “six  days”,  reconciliation  of  this  account 
with  the  results  of  scientific  investigation,  and  the  like,  form  no 
part  of  Dogmatic,  according  to  Androutsos,4  though  Rhosse 
devotes  some  attention  to  them.5  A  right  view  of  Holy  Scrip¬ 
ture  helps  to  clear  away  misconceptions,  for  “Holy  Scripture 
is  not  a  book  on  natural  science,  but  presents  its  content  in  a 
form  and  language  agreeable  to  the  ideas  and  comprehensions 
of  those  for  whom  it  was  written.  It  has  in  view  the  purpose 
of  ascribing  the  genesis  of  the  world  to  God.”6  It  is  not,  says 
Mesolora,  “either  a  work  on  nature,  nor  on  geology,  nor  on 
geography,  but  a  religious  text,  exactly  fulfilling  the  end  for 
which  it  was  designed” ....  He  goes  on  to  say  that  “it  is 
certainly  true,  furthermore,  that  we  cannot  interpret  every¬ 
thing  in  it  literally.”7 

Closely  connected,  in  Orthodox  theology,  with  the  doctrine 
of  Creation,  is  that  concerning  the  Providence  of  God.  Since 
the  world  was  a  result  and  consequence  of  God’s  overflowing 
goodness  and  bounty,  it  is  impossible  that  He  should  have 

1  Op.  cit.,  pp.  107-109. 

2 Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  III.  pp.  135-136;  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  109. 

3  Androutsos,  ibid.,  p.  110. 

4  Op.  cit.,  pp.  110-111. 

5  Op.  cit.,  pp.  371-382.  According  to  him  the  Darwinian  hypothesis 
is  certainly  not  proven,  for  (a)  there  is  no  evidence  proving  the  origin 
of  species  in  the  Darwinian  sense  and  according  to  that  theory,  nor  (b) 
does  man’s  nature  allow  the  possibility  of  the  origin  Darwin  and 
Haeckel  postulate,  {ibid.) 

'Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  111. 

7  Op.  cit.,  Ill,  p.  136  and  note. 


156 


III.— SIN  AND  SALVATION 


abandoned  it  after  having  brought  it  into  being.1  God’s  Provi¬ 
dence  ( TrpovoLa )  is  shown  in  two  ways:  in  His  oversight  and 
preservation  of  His  Creation  (ovvTrjprjorLs) ,  and  in  His  gover¬ 
nance  and  direction  of  it  (Kvftepvrjcns)  *  Androntsos  and  Rhosse 
both  agree  in  this  division.  Some  theologians  add  a  third  type 
of  Divine  Providence,  “cooperation”  (oWpyeia),3  which,  ac¬ 
cording  to  Androntsos,  does  not  constitute  a  genuine  third  ele¬ 
ment,  but  only  refers  to  the  manner  by  which  God  governs  and 
preserves  His  world  through  the  powers  of  Nature.4  God’s 
preservation  and  fostering  care  of  His  universe  is  His  coopera¬ 
tion  in  the  laws  and  powers  with  which  He  has  endowed  the 
world,  not  as  by  a  new  creation,  nor  as  solely  by  a  negative  pro¬ 
tection  against  dissolution  and  destruction,  but  by  a  positive 
and  immediate  exercise  of  His  Will  and  Might  in  His  world.* 
God  rules  the  whole  of  His  universe,  sustains  it  in  being,  and 
oversees  it  in  whole  and  in  part.  So  far  as  concerns  the  physi¬ 
cal  world,  His  oversight  is  “to  be  referred  to  it  as  a  whole,  and 
in  relation  to  its  substance,  rather  than  ...  to  its  form”.6 
This  preservation  and  oversight  may  not  rightly  be  understood 
as  a  kind  of  creatio  continua,  but  “as  a  cooperation  of  the  omni¬ 
present  Highest  Cause”  of  the  world  in  its  every  detail.  It  is 
extended  to  each  and  everything  in  the  world,  and  especially  to 
man,  “the  center  of  creation”,  who  is  the  peculiar  care  and  con¬ 
cern  of  God’s  oversight  and  preservation.7 

As  all  and  each  are  within  the  scope  of  God’s  oversight  and 
protection,8  so  His  direction  and  governance  extend  throughout 
His  universe,  ordering  and  guiding  it  to  its  highest  end — the 

^ephala,  op.  cit.,  p.  124. 

2  That  this  is  the  doctrine  of  both  Holy  Scriptures  and  the  Fathers, 
Rhosse  {op  cit.,  pp.  346-347)  shows  from  texts,  e.  g.  St.  John  5,  17;  St. 
Matt.  6,  26;  10,  29;  Col.  1,  17;  Heb.  1,  3;  St.  Matt.  12,  28;  1  Cor.  12,4. 
The  Confession  of  Dositheus  asserts  it  clearly  (in  Mesolora  op.  cit.,  vol. 
I.  p.  106,  and  Kimmel,  op.  cit.,  II.  p.  461). 

3  E.  g.,  Macarius,  op.  cit.,  vol.  I.  p.  629. 

4  Op.  cit.,  pp.  112-113. 

6  Ibid.,  pp.  113-114,  and  Rhbsse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  348-349. 

6RhSsse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  350  ff.  He  explains  this  restriction  by  refer¬ 
ence  to  the  extinction  of  certain  species. 

7Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  116. 

8Cf.  Gen.  45,  5;  50,  20;  Exod.  9,  15-16;  Prov.  16,  33;  Acts,  2,  23; 
Rom.  9,  22-23. 


CREATION,  MAN,  AND  THE  FALL 


157 


salvation  of  man  and  the  glory  of  God.  The  denial  of  God’s 
oversight  and  guidance  of  His  world  issues  in  the  denial  of  all 
religion  and  morality,  and  in  a  loss  of  faith  in  prayer.1  This 
governing  and  overruling  of  His  world  may  be  presented  as 
immediate ,  in  revelation  and  miracle,  and  as  mediate ,  in  the 
functioning  of  the  laws  and  powers  of  nature.2  God,  as  Gover¬ 
nor  of  the  universe,  displays  His  directive  and  governing  energy 
in  relation  to  man,  in  two  ways — external  and  internal :  the 
former  refers  to  God's  ordering  and  directing  the  circumstances 
and  environing  influences  of  man’s  life,  and  the  latter,  to  God’s 
part  in  man's  thoughts,  memory,  and  plans.3  While  He  guides 
and  manages  inanimate  creation  to  the  end  proposed  by  means 
of  His  laws  and  the  circumstances  and  conditions  of  natural 
life,  He  assists  rational  beings  towards  their  end,  cooperates 
and  strengthens  them  toward  the  good,  hut  not  towards  evil, 
for  at  the  most  God  may  be  said  only  to  tolerate  evil  within 
determined  limits.  While  man’s  motives  and  choices  are  free, 
the  consequences  of  his  acts  are  directly  under  God's  providen¬ 
tial  care,  oversight,  and  direction.  He  makes  the  consequences 
of  evil  serve  His  end,  and  overrules  evil  for  good.4  His  Divine 
governing  activity  “does  not  take  away  the  relative  self-directed 
activity  of  beings  in  the  natural  order,  nor  the  relative  freedom 
of  self-directing  rational  creatures  of  the  spiritual  order,  hut 
only  directs  them  in  accordance  with  the  final  end  in  view.”5 * 
(The  problem  of  the  relation  of  God's  foreknowledge  and  fore- 
ordination  to  man's  free  will  has  been  considered  in  Lecture  II,8 
and  does  not  call  for  extended  treatment.  Mesolora7  in  his 
chapter  on  “'Foreknowledge  and  Foreordination”  presents  the 
evidence  of  the  teaching  of  the  symbolic  texts.)  God's  Provi¬ 
dence  extends  to  everything  in  His  Creation,  yet  saves  man's 
free  will.  Man’s  acts  are  not  pre-determined,  for  God  knows 
his  free  acts  as  free,  and  His  knowledge  does  not  affect  them. 

1  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  116-117. 

2  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  III.  p.  185,  note  1;  he  gives  patristic  and 
symbolic  sources  for  the  whole  subject,  pp.  185-191,  ibid. 

3Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  356. 

4Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  117-118. 

6Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  358. 

9Cf.  pp.  95-100. 

7  Op.  cit,  III.  pp  192-199,  and  cf.  Rhbsse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  356-370. 


158 


III.— SIN  AND  SALVATION 


“As  concerns  the  way  in  which  human  acts  are  woven  into  the 
divine  scheme  of  governing  and  directing  the  universe,  we  are 
not  able  to  understand  in  all  its  bearings.”1  Moral  evil,  that  is, 
evil  in  man’s  will,  is  an  inherent  possibility  involved  in  the  free¬ 
dom  of  man’s  will,  and  physical  evil  is  a  consequence  of  it. 
Neither  the  dualistic  nor  neoplatonic  systems  are  philosophically 
satisfactory,  and  neither  is  justified  in  practice.  Evil,  ac¬ 
cording  to  human  experience,  is  not  something  merely  apparent, 
but  positive  in  the  world,  to  combat  and  conquer  which  only  our 
Kedemption  in  Jesus  Christ  and  the  foreordination  of  man  to 
glory,  are  effective.* 


2.  MAN 

“The  result  of  the  creative  and  providential  energy  of  God 
is  the  world,  an  ordered  whole  ordained  to  a  definite  end .... 
Man  is  the  link  joining  the  spiritual  and  material  orders  of 
the  world,  ....  the  capstone  and  end  of  material  creation, 
belonging  in  body  to  the  physical  order,  and  in  soul  or  spirit 
to  the  spiritual  order.”3  Yet  man  is  not  two,  but  one — a  unity, 
consisting  of  body  and  soul,  between  which  there  is  no  dualistic 
antagonism.  Over-emphasis  in  either  direction  leads  to  a  denial 
of  the  truth.  “The  right  doctrine  of  man”,  says  Androutsos,4 
“protests  on  the  one  hand  against  Materialism  and  the  false 
hypothesis  of  the  Darwinian  theory,  and  as  strongly,  on  the  other 
hand,  against  the  over-emphasized  stress  of  certain  ‘spiri- 
tualistics’5  theories,  which  maintain  that  the  body  is  a  kind  of 
mere  representation  and  prison  of  the  soul.  .  .  .  The  body 
does  not  over-shadow  the  soul,  nor  imprison  the  spirit,  .  .  . 
but  is  the  divinely  created  organ  forever  united  with  it.”  So 

Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  117. 

-Ibid.,  pp.  118-119.  Here  Androutsos  follows  with  a  note  on  miracle 
with  reference  to  God’s  Providence,  on  which  cf.  above,  Lecture  1,  Sec. 
3,  especially  note  2,  p.  15  (cf.  pp.  119-120  Androutsos,  ibid.). 

3Rh6sse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  382,  398;  cf.  also  ibid.  p.  356;  Androutsos, 
op.  cit.,  pp.  104-106,  116;  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  III.  pp.  185  ff. 

4  Op.  cit.,  p.  130. 

6  “Spiritualistic”  ( spiritualism — wevfiaTLfffios)  as  applied  to  the 
philosophic  speculation  which  would  exaggerate  man’s  non-material 
endowment  at  the  expense  of  the  natural,  physical,  or  material.  Cf. 
Liljenkrantz,  Spiritism,  for  the  distinction  between  spiritualism  and 
spiritism. 


MAN 


159 


there  is  no  place  for  a  dualism  which  puts  spirit  and  matter  in 
opposition  to  each  other.  The  cpiestion  as  to  man’s  nature  and 
constitution,  whether  man  as  a  whole  is  three-fold  or  two-fold,1 2 
is  dealt  with  in  detail  by  both  Androutsos  and  Rhosse.  The 
latter,  after  examining  biblical  and  patristic  teachings,  says  that 
the  word  “spirit”  in  the  biblical  passages,  “does  not  signify  the 
higher  faculties  of  man’s  “soul",  nor  constitute  a  third  element 

O  y 

in  his  nature,  but  (means)  the  energy  and  Grace  of  the  Holy 
Spirit,  illuminating,  sanctifying,  and  quickening  the  faculties 
of  man’s  soul”.'  The  apparent  triehotomism  of  the  Fathers 
is  really  resolvable  into  dichotomism.3  So,  too,  Androutsos,4 5 6 
who  says  that  the  three-fold  division  of  man’s  nature  is  the  re¬ 
sult  of  counting  as  two  elements  the  double  aspect  of  the  spiri¬ 
tual  part  of  man — “soul”  as  applied  to  it  on  its  natural  and  vital 
plane,  and  “spirit”  as  regards  its  higher  and  spiritual  aspect. 
Rhosse  treats  the  same  ideas  in  somewhat  different  guise.0  So 
both  regard  man  as  a  unity  consisting  of  body  and  soul,  the 
latter  element  being  called  “spirit”  in  its  higher  aspect. 

The  whole  human  race  is  derived  from  a  single  pair,  our 
first  parents."  This  fact  is  borne  out  by  the  evidence  offered 
by  the  study  of  psychology,  history,  and  philology,  despite  the 
great  differences  in  men,  which  may  be  accounted  for  by  facts 
of  climate,  environment,  food,  and  other  such  conditions.  The 
solidarity  of  the  race  is  shown  not  only  in  the  fact  of  all  men 
having  sprung  from  a  single  stock  and  sharing  a  common  origin, 
but  as  well  in  the  fact  that  all  men  share  in  a  common  state  of 
sinfulness  and  in  a  common  need  of  Redemption.7  It  is  also 
indicated  in  the  relationships  of  man ;  in  the  family  as  the  unit 

1The  trichotomistic  division  says  that  man  consists  of  three  ele¬ 
ments, — body  (crdp£  or  trw/ia ) ,  soul  (i'vxv) ,  and  spirit  (7 rrei’^a).  The 
dichotomistic  division  makes  of  the  two  latter  one  single  element, 
“soul”  ('pvxy),  correlative  with  “body”,  as  constituting  man’s  nature. 

2  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  402. 

3  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  403-405. 

4  Op.  cit.,  p.  132. 

5  Op.  cit.,  p.  407.  On  the  difference  between  soul  and  body,  cf.  pp. 
408-413;  on  the  objections  to  this  view,  cf.  ibid.,  pp.  413-414;  on  the 
union  of  body  and  soul,  their  interrelation  and  effect  upon  each  other, 
pp.  414-417. 

6Rh6sse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  430-432;  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  132. 

7Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  III.  pp.  180-182;  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  133. 


160 


III.— SIN  AND  SALVATION 


of  human  life,  “the  first  form  of  the  actualization  of  God’s  .  . 
idea1  concerning  the  individual  in  his  relation  with  the  idea  of 
mankind;”2  in  the  self-consciousness  of  the  individual  in  his 
sense  of  corporate  unity  with  the  rest  of  mankind;  and  in  his 
consciousness  of  relationship  with  God,  an  indication  of  the 
working  out  of  God’s  plan  realized  in  Creation,  of  an  ordered 
whole  of  which  the  individual  forms  a  single  unit  of  relation¬ 
ship,  in  the  family  and  in  political  and  religious  fellowship.3 

The  soul  has  its  origin  direct  from  God.  This  is  the  teach¬ 
ing  of  Holy  Scripture  as  well  as  of  the  Church  Councils.4 *  The 
Fifth  Ecumenical  Council  condemned  the  theory  of  the  pre-ex¬ 
istence  of  the  soul,  but  did  not  define  any  particular  theory  of 
its  origin  as  being  de  fide.  Theological  speculation  has  exer¬ 
cised  itself  upon  this  problem,  and  the  resulting  hypotheses  may 
be  reduced  to  four:  (a)  the  theory  of  pre-existence ;  (b)  that 
of  creationism;  (c)  traducianism  or  generationism;  (d)  the 
pantheistic  theory,  which  holds  that  the  human  soul  is  a  part  of 
the  very  essence  of  the  Divine  Mature.  The  first  theory,  as  was 
said,  cannot  be  held  by  any  Orthodox  theologian,  but  there 
seems  to  be  no  unanimity,  either  in  the  use  of  terminology  or 
in  agreement  as  to  which  is  to  be  preferred  of  the  others.  As 
far  as  concerns  phraseology,  for  example,  traducianism  or  gen¬ 
erationism  is  rendered  by  Androutsos,6  /zeTa^iGewis,  by  Meso- 
lora,6  fAerdSoms  Or  jueraAa/xWSeixris,  and  Rhosse7  uses  peraSoat^, 
explaining  it  by  the  words  dTroandBes  and  Trapa<j>vd8es  {traduces). 
As  regards  preference,  Mesolora8  inclines  towards  creationism ; 
Rhosse9  is  more  favorable  to  the  theory  of  traducianism  “as  it 
seems  the  most  reasonable”,  while  the  other  theories  are  too 
one-sided  and  incomplete;  and  Androutsos,  having  discussed 

1  God’s  idea  of  man,  according  to  Rhosse,  is  a  pre-temporal  idea. 

2Rh6sse,  op.  cit.,  p.  432. 

3Rh6sse,  op.  cit.,  p.  433. 

4  For  quotations  and  references  from  the  Bible,  the  Fathers,  Coun¬ 
cils,  and  Symbolic  Books,  cf.  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  III.  pp.  181  ff;  and 

especially  Mogila  in  ibid.,  I.  p.  392. 

6  Op.  cit.,  p.  134. 

6  Op.  cit.,  III.  p.  183. 

7  Op.  cit.,  pp.  424  ff.  He  only  enumerates  the  fourth  theory,  the 
others  discuss  only  three. 

8  Op.  cit.,  III.  pp.  183-184 

9  Op.  cit.,  pp.  427-428. 


MAN 


161 


each  in  turn/  sums  up  as  follows  :1 2 3 4  “The  right  view  of  the 
origin  of  the  soul  lies  rather  in  a  combination  of  the  theories 
of  creationism  and  traducianism,  so  that  man  would  be  a  result 
of  both  Divine  and  human  activity,  and  God's  creative  power 
be  involved  and  exercised  in  the  generation  of  each  individual'7. 

Of  the  immortality  of  the  soul,  “which  constitutes  one  of  the 
fundamental  bases  and  premises  of  the  edifice  of  Christianity’7/ 
Ehosse  offers  four  proofs  in  his  Aoy panKif — the  historical,  meta¬ 
physical,  teleological,  and  moral.  Androutsos  regards  such  at¬ 
tempted  “proofs’7  as  subject  to  the  same  objections  and  stric¬ 
tures  as  those  for  the  existence  of  God.5 6  He  objects  that  they 
cannot  in  the  nature  of  the  case  achieve  their  object,  that  is — 
proof  and  demonstration  of  the  immortality  of  the  soul;  that  a 
grasp  of  this  truth  may  be  assisted  by  the  exercise  of  reason, 
but  never  attained  by  it  solely,  for  it  belongs  to  the  realm  of 
faith;  he  says  that  on  the  other  hand,  reason  cannot  demon¬ 
strate  the  impossibility  of  the  immortality  of  the  soul,  or  prove 
it  illogical,  or  disprove  it,  and  finally  views  the  whole  sub¬ 
ject  as  one  more  proper  to  philosophy  and  apologetic  than  to 
dogmatic.8 

In  the  order  of  the  creation  of  spiritual  beings,  man  fol¬ 
lows  the  angels,  the  “body-less  beings”,  of  whom  some  fell  by 
disobedience,  and  became  evil  spirits.7  Man  was  created  “with 
all  the  physical  and  spiritual  endowments  necessary  for  the  ful¬ 
filment  of  the  end  for  which  God  had  foreordained  him.778  This 
is  the  teaching  both  of  the  Fathers  and  of  Holy  Scripture.9 10 
The  words  “let  us  make  man  in  our  own  image,  after  our  like¬ 
ness7710  have  always  been  taken  to  summarize  man’s  endowment 

1Op.  cit.,  pp.  134-135. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  136. 

3 Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  409. 

4Pp.  418-424. 

'Ibid.,  pp.  39  ff. 

6  Op.  cit.,  pp.  409-410. 

7Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  382-390;  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  121-129; 
Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  III.  pp.  139-150. 

8  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  136. 

9  Cf.  Mesolora,  III.  pp.  150-161. 

10Gen.  1,  26. 


162 


III.— SIN  AND  SALVATION 


of  faculties,  powers,  and  character.  According  to  Androutsos1 
“image”  applies  to  man’s  spiritual  endowment  in  so  far  as  it  is 
referred  to  God,  and  not  solely  to  his  rational,  voluntative,  and 
self-determinative  qualities,  in  which  interpretation  Androutsos 
is  persuaded  that  he  is  more  accurate  than  are  other  Orthodox 
dogmaticians  and  the  Orthodox  Catechisms.  Under  his  inter¬ 
pretation  of  “image”  Androutsos  would  include  man’s  rule  over 
creaturedom,  which  is  the  teaching  of  the  Fathers,  notably  St. 
John  Chrysostom  (Homily  9  on  Genesis),  and  Theodoret,  on 
I  Cor.  11,  7.  According  to  Mesolora,  interpreting  the  Fathers 
and  the  Symbolic  Books,2  “image”  refers  to  the  powers  with 
which  man  was  endowed  at  Creation,  and  “likeness”,  to  that 
perfection,  potential  in  him,  and  possible  through  the  exercise  of 
these  powers.3  So  also  Rhosse  :4  “image”  applies  to  the  endow- 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  137.  Dyobouniotes  takes  exception  to  this  in  his 
'H  Aoy^ariKT]  tov  Xp-rjarov  ’AvSpovrcrov  KpLvop.evT],  Athens,  1907,  (p.  27) 
as  being  “completely  false”,  for  “the  tendency  of  man  Godward  can¬ 
not  constitute  the  ‘image’  of  God  in  him.”  He  constructs  his  criti¬ 
cism  in  syllogistic  form,  which  Androutsos  answered  in  his  Aoyp.a.TiKa.1 
MeXerat,  A’,  (Athens,  1907)  pp.  79-81.  Dyobouniotes  reiterates  his 
criticism,  saying  that  Androutsos’  view  involves  the  theory  of  the 
total  loss  of  man’s  reason  and  will  in  the  Fall  (’0 (peiXo/iev-rj  ’diravT-rjats, 
Athens,  1908,  p.  74).  He  further  accuses  Androutsos  of  having 
founded  his  argument  “on  Protestant  ideas.”  (The  two  theologians 
came  into  conflict  on  nearly  every  other  important  point  in  An¬ 
droutsos’  Dogmatic,  but  often  the  criticisms  brought  by  Dyobouniotes 
seem  captious,  and  there  is  in  the  course  of  their  disputes,  more  than 
a  mere  suggestion  of  odium  theologicum.)  In  this  connection,  how¬ 
ever  Dyobouniotes  notes  that  Androutsos’  teaching  about  the  original 
state  of  man  is  not  agreeable  with  that  of  the  Fathers,  “according  to 
which  man  came  from  the  hands  of  His  Creator,  perfect”  (’OfieiXo/xeprj 
dirdvTT)<ns,  p.  75).  He  had  previously  criticized  Androutsos’ 
conception  as  “lacking  in  clearness”  ('H  Aoy/x.  ’Av8p.  Kpiv.,  p.  29).  In 
his  Aoyp.ar.  MeXerat,  A’,  (p.  85)  Androutsos  exposes  himself  again  to 
Dyobouniotes’  criticism:  “This  idea  ...  I  call  Protestant”,  since  the 
Protestant  view  is  that  the  original  state  of  man  was  (purely)  natural, 
(cf.  ’0 0etX.  d-ndvT.,  pp.  78  ff. )  Androutsos’  position  on  these  points 
is  then  neither  above  suspicion  nor  beyond  attack,  from  certain  quarters 
in  Greece.  Cf.  the  brief  treatment  of  this  subject  in  Ambraze, 
'H  ’Op6o8o^os  ’E/c/cX^ata,  p.  202. 

2  Cf .  Kritopoulos,  in  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  pp.  299  ff ;  St.  John  Damas¬ 
cene,  "E/cSoo-is,  2,  29;  Jeremiah  II.  in  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  I.  p.  217; 
Mogila,  ibid.,  p.  387 ;  St.  Gregory  Nyssa  on  Gen.  1,  26,  etc. 

3  Op.  cit.,  III.  p.  154.  4  Op.  cit.,  pp.  433-434. 


MAN 


163 


ment  of  man’s  nature  with  reason  and  free-will,  both  as  resi¬ 
dent  faculties  and  as  functioning  energies ;  .  .  .  “the  words 
‘according  to  the  image’  as  distinguished  from  ‘according  to  the 
likeness’  indicate  the  mind  and  will  as  innate  powers;  ‘accord¬ 
ing  to  the  likeness’  (express)  the  desire  and  impulse  (or  ten¬ 
dency,  0-7 rov8?;)  which  the  first  man  would  need,  rightly  to 
employ  his  innate  powers  to  become  like  God  and  develop  as 
much  as  lay  in  him,  actual  perfection.”  Androutsos  describes 
the  original  state  of  man  as  one  of  perfect  harmony  in  a  three¬ 
fold  relationship — towards  himself,  towards  nature,  and  to¬ 
wards  God.  His  “righteousness”  was  not  a  complete  and  perfect 
thing,  for  it  was  only  potential;  the  first  man  could  be  said 
posse  non  mori,  but  this  potential  possibility  of  freedom  from 
death  depended  upon  his  freedom  from  sin  both  in  act  and  will.1 
“The  whole  state  of  the  first  man,  then  ....  was  not  one  of 
innate  and  complete  holiness  and  righteousness — for  virtue  and 
an  implanted  quality  (epu fivrov)  are  contradictory2 — nor  was  it 
a  mere  negative  and  indifferent  state  (that  is,  “unmoral”),  in 
ethical  matters,  but  one  of  goodness  and  innocence,  as  says  the 
Confession  of  Mogila.”3  The  first  man,  “according  to  1  Cor. 
15,  45-17 ;  Eph.  4,  24,  had  need  to  develop  his  own  powers,  so 
that  becoming  established  in  the  good,  he  should  become  spiri¬ 
tual.”4 

As  St.  Basil  says,5  if  the  word  “image”  implies  potential 
possession  of  the  “likeness”,  which  was  to  be  the  actualization  of 
man’s  end,  then,  Androutsos  notes,  the  endowment  of  knowledge 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  138. 

2  A  virtue  must  be  developed  in  order  to  be  a  virtue ;  “goodness” 
involves  the  right  exercise  and  determination  of  the  will  in  the  direc¬ 
tion  of  the  good,  to  become  an  ethical  or  moral  quality.  So  Androutsos 
criticises  Macarius  (Theologie  Dogmatique  Orthodoxe,  Paris,  1860, 
vol  I.  p.  563)  who  considers  the  first  man  to  have  been  endowed  with 
a  perfect  purity  and  holiness. 

3 Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  138-139;  for  Mogila,  cf.  Kimmel,  op.  cit., 
vol.  I.  p.  85. 

4  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  140-141;  cf.  St.  Gregory  Xyssa.  De  homi- 
nis  opificio  7;  St.  Athanasius,  Adv.  Arian.  Orat.,  2,  59;  St.  John 
Dam.  “EacSoo-is,  11,  29;  who  hold  that  the  final  term  of  man’s  potential 
spiritual  development,  frustrated  by  the  Fall,  was  spiritual  life  in 
Christ  (Androutsos,  ibid). 

5  Ilept  KaracKevijs  avdpunr.,  21. 


164 


III.— SIN  AND  SALVATION 


and  will  were  “the  basis  and  point  of  departure  for  the  realiza- 
tion  of  likeness  to  God.”1  These  qualities  were  not  morally  in¬ 
different,  but  naturally  disposed  toward  the  good  and  the  true; 
otherwise  man  could  neither  have  been  impelled  in  this  direc¬ 
tion,  nor  could  he  have  been  able  to  distinguish  good  from  evil, 
nor  his  will  have  been  free  to  do  the  good.  The  original  state 
of  man  was  one  of  potential,  but  not  completed  or  achieved, 
perfection.  Had  man  been  absolutely  or  completely  perfect,  the 
fall  would  have  been  impossible.2 3 

The  Orthodox  position  is  brought  out  more  clearly  in  con¬ 
trast  to  the  Protestant  and  Roman  views  of  man’s  primitive 
state.8  According  to  Roman  teaching,  original  righteousness 
( jusiitm  originalis)  consisted  in  a  supernatural  gift  of  God 
(donum  supernaturale)  which  was  not  inherent  or  resident  in 
man’s  nature  as  such,  even  potentially,  but  an  addition  to  his 
endowment  at  Creation  (an  accident  in  the  scholastic  sense — 
accidens=crvn(3ef3r)K6<;)  .4  The  Protestant  view  holds  equally 
strongly  to  the  notion  of  a  complete  and  perfect  holiness  and 
righteousness  as  the  original  state  of  man,  but  assigns  it  to  the 
natural  endowment  of  the  whole  man — unlike  the  Roman  hy¬ 
pothesis,  which  ascribes  it  to  a  perfection  by  means  of  a  special 
super-added  gift  of  God.  The  Protestant  view  holds  this  primi¬ 
tive  or  original  righteousness  to  be  resident  in  the  natural  man, 
qua  man,  and  independent  of  grace;  the  Roman  theory  would 
make  it  consist  essentially  and  solely  of  the  special  super-added 
grace.5 6 7  The  Orthodox  view — for  example,  that  of  both  An- 
droutsos  and  Rhosse — is  that  man’s  original  state  was  poten¬ 
tially  perfect,  and  “original  righteousness  was  the  result  of  the 
cooperation  of  the  Spirit  of  God  with  the  natural  powers  im¬ 
planted  in  the  human  soul  in  Creation,”  according  to  Rhosse.8 
Androutsos  disagrees  with  Rhosse  on  this  point/  saying  that 
his  meaning  is  not  clear :  “If  he  understands  original  righteous- 

1  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  142. 

2  Ibid.,  pp.  143-144. 

3  Full  discussion  in  Androutsos,  Sv/qSoXtJciJ,  pp.  138-153. 

*  Catech.  Rom.  1,  2,  18;  quoted  in  Rhosse  op.  cit.,  pp.  435-436. 

B  RhOsse,  ibid.,  pp.  436,  437,  and  Androutsos  op.  cit.,  pp.  143-144. 

6  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  434,  437,  438. 

7  On  which  Dyobouniotes  in  turn  attacks  him  as  leaning  toward  the 

Protestant  view,  cf.  ’0<pet\.  a-jravT.,  pp.  78,  et  al. 


THE  FALL 


165 


ness  to  mean  that  inhering  in  the  seed  of  man  ....  it 
would  be  merely  a  creation  of  God ;  if  he  mean  ....  a  fully 
formed  and  perfected  righteousness,  or  that  into  which  man  by 
his  spiritual  development  should  fit  himself  to  enter,  .... 
how  can  it  be  regarded  as  existing  prior  to  the  Fall,  and  as 
having  been  lost  through  it?”1  As  against  the  Roman  view, 
Androutsos  agrees  with  Rhosse  in  denouncing  it  as  “a  magical 
and  mechanical  working  of  the  Grace  of  God”.2  It  makes  of 
original  sin  “merely  a  deprivation  of  super-added  gifts,”  and 
leads  inevitably  to  Pelagianism.3  While  Mesolora  does  not  en¬ 
ter  upon  the  question  with  the  same  detail,  he  agrees  that  the 
original  state  of  man  wras  one  of  potential  perfection  of  body 
and  soul,  which  could  be  made  actual  by  the  free  cooperation  of 
man’s  will  with  the  will  and  grace  of  God,  toward  the  realiza¬ 
tion  of  the  end  for  which  he  was  designed.4  God’s  Grace  and 
cooperation  with  man  were  contingent  on  man’s  response,  and 
were  forfeited  through  the  Fall.  So  man’s  perfection  was  not 
realized  until  the  coming  of  the  Perfect  Man. 

3.  THE  FALL 

“The  first  man  did  not  remain  in  the  state  of  original  right¬ 
eousness,  but,  transgressing  the  command  of  God,  fell  away  from 
it,  and  with  him  fell  the  whole  human  race  which  descended 
from  him.”5  His  sin,  as  all  sin,  consisted  in  transgressing  and 
disobeying  the  will  of  God.6  The  natural  perfection  of  Adam 
had  need  of  trial  and  testing  to  be  transmuted  into  moral  and 
ethical  perfection,  but  by  his  own  will  he  turned  aside  from  his 
own  true  end,  at  the  instigation  of  the  Evil  One,  to  serve  his 

1 Op .  cit.,  p.  142,  note  1. 

2  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  436. 

3  Androutsos,  A o~//j.cltikti ,  p.  144. 

*  Op.  cit.,  III.  pp.  156-161. 

5 Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  145;  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  III.  p.  162. 

6  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  145;  and  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  III.  p.  163, 
for  biblical,  patristic,  and  symbolic  authority  cf.  pp.  162-170,  and 
cf.  St.  John  Dam.  "E/cSoo-ts,  47;  Kritopoulos,  in  Mesolora,  I.  p.  464; 
and  ibid.,  pp.  300-301;  Dositheus,  ibid.,  p.  105;  Mogila,  ibid.,  p.  391; 
Jeremiah  IPs  2d  Answer,  ibid.,  pp.  215-218;  Macarius,  op.  cit.,  I. 
p.  617,  etc. 


166 


III.— SIN  AND  SALVATION 


own  will  in  preference  to  that  of  his  Creator.1  Adam’s  sin,  then, 
brought  about  a  state  of  the  soul  which  became  in  itself  as  sinful 
as  was  the  act  of  sin.  The  “transgression  of  the  first  man  created 
the  state  of  sin  imparted  to  all  his  descendants”,  and  this 
entail  was  of  a  continuous  and  persisting  character.2  The  truth 
of  this  fact  is  asserted  in  Holy  Scripture,  demonstrated  by  hu¬ 
man  experience,  confirmed  by  human  testimony,  and  proved  by 
history.  So  “Adam  is  the  source  and  fount  of  the  opposite  state 
to  that  of  righteousness — sin,  and  death ...  As  the  One  Lord 
transmitted  to  us  remission  of  sins,  so  did  the  head  of  the  race 
(progenitor— yevapx^)  leave  to  his  descendents  the  heritage  of 
sin.'”  The  Church  doctrine  is  further  illustrated  by  the  prac¬ 
tice  of  infant  Baptism,4  which  is  made  necessary  “by  the  uni¬ 
versality  of  original  sin,  and  the  necessity  of  salvation  through 
Baptism.  .  .  By  it  original  sin  is  taken  away.”5 

4.  ORIGINAL  SIN 

Inasmuch  as  sin,  the  perverted  direction  of  the  will  of  man 
or  his  turning  aside  from  the  will  and  law  of  God,  involved 
losses  and  penalties,  the  sin  of  the  First  Man  may  be  regarded 
under  two  aspects,  the  formal  and  the  material,  (a)  Mate¬ 
rially,  the  sin  of  Adam  may  be  considered  negatively — the  loss  of 
original  righteousness,  and  positively — the  injury  done  to  man’s 
spiritual  and  ethical  nature,  the  blinding  and  darkening  of  the 
mind,  the  resulting  tendency  of  his  otherwise  free  will  towards 
evil,  or  the  presence  of  concupiscence  ( concupiscentia ,  tTnOvpia 
Trys  vapKos ).  But  since  original  righteousness  consisted  not 
in  the  addition  of  some  extra  super-added  gift,  but  was  inte¬ 
grally  involved  in  the  right  attitude  and  functioning  of  his 
spiritual  and  ethical  state,  these  two  aspects  of  the  material 
side  of  original  sin  may  not  rightly  be  severed,  nor  may  they  be 

1  Androutsos,  op.  tit.,  pp.  145-147. 

2  Androutsos,  op.  tit.,  p.  147. 

3  Ibid.,  pp.  149-150.  cf.  Rom.  5,  12,  the  words  iv  $  vavres  Androutsos 
interprets  as  “inasmuch  as  all  .  .  .  have  sinned”,  cf.  also  vs.  18-19. 

4  Cf.  Mesolora,  op.  tit.,  Ill,  pp.  173-174. 

6  Dyobouniotes,  Ta  Mco-TTjpia,  pp.  45-51;  Mesolora,  op.  c it.,  Ill,  pp. 
177-179;  Androutsos,  op.  tit.,  pp.  150-151.  The  latter  here  refutes 
the  Immaculate  Conception  as  a  “dogma”,  since  it  lacks  biblical  and 
traditional  support  and  foundation.  For  a  fuller  treatment  of  his 
2cp,/3oAi/c77,  pp.  173  ff. 


ORIGINAL  SIN 


167 


considered  apart  from  the  nature  of  man.1 2  Of  the  state  of  man 
after  the  Fall,  Kephala"  says:  “The  estrangement  from  God  so 
darkened  his  understanding  as  to  involve  a  loss  both  of  wisdom 
and  knowledge,  and  he  became  unable  to  discern  and  practise 
what  is  good,  well-pleasing,  and  perfect  before  God.  Sin  dark¬ 
ened  the  eyes  of  his  soul  ....  so  that  he  could  not  see  to 
read  the  law  of  God  written  in  his  heart  .  .  .  .by  his  Creator.” 

Yet  the  Fall  did  not  result  in  total  depravity,  nor  was  God’s 
image  destroyed  in  man,3  but  only  “blackened”,4 5  or  “enfeebled”.' 

CJ  s  \J  s 

While  his  mind  was  dulled  and  blinded  to  spiritual  things,  still 
not  every  ray  of  divine  light  was  extinguished  in  his  soul,  and 
it  kept  struggling  upwards  blindly.  Xor  did  the  Fall  destroy 
the  freedom  of  man’s  will,  nor  determine  its  direction  towards 
evil.6 7  Unregenerate  man  is  yet  capable  of  good  thoughts  and 
desires,  as  we  know  from  Holy  Scripture.'  St.  Augustine’s 
doctrine  of  the  splendida  vitia  of  the  heathen,  according  to  An- 
droutsos,  is  entirely  unwarranted  by  Holy  Scripture,  involves  a 
dualistic  conception  of  man’s  nature,  and  is  logically  insup¬ 
portable.8 *  “Concupiscence”  has  a  sinful  character,  and  consti¬ 
tutes  the  other  element  of  original  sin.  Sinful  passion  does 
not  inhere  in  the  nature  of  man,  but  grows  up  as  from  a  ground 
infected  and  decayed  by  sin."  It  has  a  sinful  character  in  the 
case  of  the  unbaptized  and  “natural”  man,  since  the  tendencies 
of  his  passionate  nature  resident  in  an  unregenerate  soul,  would 
be  towards  evil  and  sin.10  There  is  a  considerable  divergence 
on  this  point  in  current  Orthodox  teaching,  since  there  is  no 

1  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  152,  and  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  III.  pp.  167- 
8,  and  note  ] . 

2  XpLaToXoyia,  p.  135. 

3 Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  137:  “The  fact  of  being  £in  God’s  image’ 
was  still  the  case  even  in  the  Fall,  in  which  vestiges  of  man’s  craving 
for  Divine  things  and  of  impulses  towards  good  were  still  preserved.” 

4  Dyobouniotes  ’0 (f>ei\.  airaur.,  p.  74. 

5  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  III.  p.  168. 

6  Cf.  Confession  of  Dositheus,  in  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  I.  p.  105  or  Kim- 
mel,  op.  cit.,  I.  p.  447. 

7  Cf.  Rom.  Rom.  1,  19-20;  2.  14-15;  Ex.  1,  17;  Josh.  6,  24;  St.  Matt. 
5,  46;  7,  9;  19,  17;  Acts  28,  2,  etc. 

8  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  153-5. 

“Romans,  7,  15-24. 

10  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  155-156. 


168 


III.— SIN  AND  SALVATION 


official  pronouncement  on  the  matter :  for  example,  Damalas  re¬ 
gards  “concupiscence”  as  in  itself  morally  indifferent,  and 
Philaret  of  Moscow,  as  in  itself  actually  sinful.1 

(b)  The  guilt  of  sin,  which  is  its  formal  and  peculiar  note, 
is  the  relation  of  the  sinner  towards  God  and  the  Divine  Right¬ 
eousness  (or  Justice — ■SiKaioo-vvr? ) .  The  sinner,  by  his  infringe¬ 
ment  of  God’s  law  and  his  impairing  of  the  divine  order,  is 
guilty  before  God,  and  stands  in  need  of  making  reparation 
and  satisfaction.  Inasmuch  as  the  act  of  sin  (dpaprrjpa  or  7 rpd£i<? 
d/j.apTLa^=peccatum  actuate)  proceeds  from  and  forms  part 
of  the  state  of  sin  ( Kardoracris  dpapTias—peccatum  habituate ), 
“which  is  as  well  the  subjective  basis  for  all  sins,  .  .  .  .  it  is 
clear  that  guilt  inheres  not  only  in  the  several  sins  individually 
but  in  our  whole  sinful  state.”2  So  originat  sin  (TTponaTopixov 
dpapTr/pa)  is  imputed  to  us  not  as  the  personal  sin  of  Adam 
(immediate  imputation )  but  as  vitiositas,  the  state  of  sin  of 
each  of  us  (mediate  imputation) . .  .  Original  sin  may  be  then  de¬ 
fined  as  “the  sinful  state  of  our  nature  with  which  we  were 
born.”3  It  is,  however,  only  under  the  aspect  of  mediate  im¬ 
putation  that  Orthodox  dogmatic  treats  of  the  problem  of  orig¬ 
inal  sin.  Androutsos  devotes  two  monographs  to  the  subject, 
which  go  into  the  question  in  considerable  detail.4  He  criticises 
the  ordinary  treatment  of  the  subject  by  some  modern  writers  as 
working  out  logically  in  a  denial  of  the  dogma.5  The  punish- 


1  Their  views  and  references  to  their  works  may  be  found  in  Androut¬ 
sos,  op.  cit.,  p.  155,  note  3,  and  a  longer  discussion  in  his  Si^/SoXoo), 
pp.  109-151,  160.  Among  the  losses  by  man  in  the  Fall,  Dyobouniotes 
notes,  that  Androutsos  has  failed  explicitly  to  include  that  of  Divine 
Grace  ('H  A07 par ucrj  ’A vdpovraov  Kpivopevp,  p.  30).  In  spite  of  Androut¬ 
sos’  defense  of  his  own  position,  Dyobouniotes  attacks  him  more  sharply 
in  his  ’OfieiXopevp  dvdvTTjais,  p.  84,  saying  that  it  is  one  more 
instance  of  the  Protestant  bias  and  protestantizing  tendency  of  An- 
droutsos. 

2  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  156. 

3  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  III.  p.  170. 

4  "’Ey  padrjpa  ir epi  TpoiraropiKov  apaprifi paros,  Constantinople,  1896, 
Aevrepov  pdOppa  .  .  ibid.,  1896;  for  the  older  Orthodox  views,  cf.  Mo- 
gila,  Sec.  13.  quest.  20,  in  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  I.  pp.  465  ff. ;  Dositheus 
ibid.,  pp.  106,  112-113;  biblical  texts  and  exposition  in  op.  cit.,  III. 
pp.  173-175. 

5  AoypariKri,  p.  157. 


ORIGINAL  SIN 


169 


ment  of  sin  in  the  fact  of  having  an  impaired  nature  presup¬ 
poses  the  existence  of  inherited  sin  and  guilt. 

The  chief  problem  and  “difficulty,  by  reason  of  which  the 
dogma  becomes  incomprehensible  to  us,  is  the  lack  of  the 
element  of  free  will  in  original  sin/’1  Of  the  possible  explana¬ 
tions  offered  to  elucidate  this  problem,  three  may  be  mentioned 
here:  (a)  “God  imputed  Adam’s  sin  to  the  whole  human  race.” 
But  this  would  militate  against  our  instinctive  notions  of 
God’s  justice,  for  “God  cannot  regard  as  a  sinner  one  who  is 
not  really  so,  nor  can  He  arbitrarily  condemn  to  punishment 
one  who  is  not  guilty.”2  (b)  “Humanity  sinned  in  the  person 
of  Adam.”  This  physiological  view  propounded  and  developed 
by  St.  Augustine  has  no  support  save  in  a  wrong  interpretation 
of  Bom.  5,  12,  and  2  Cor.  5,  15.3  The  Apostle  states  a  fact,  but 
does  not  explain  it.  This  theory  would  imply  either  (1)  that 
all  men  pre-existed  in  Adam,  willing  and  thinking  along  with 
him,  or  (2)  that  the  will  of  Adam  was  not  his  own  personal 
will  but  that  of  the  whole  human  race.  The  case  for  this 
view  might  be  strengthened  if  it  be  said  that  the  will  of  man¬ 
kind  was,  as  it  were,  implicit  and  potential  in  that  of  the  first 
man,  but  vet  it  is  difficult  to  understand  how  ethical  relations 
and  states  could  be  inherited.4  (c)  “Adam  sinned  not  as  an 
individual,  but  as  the  representative  of  the  whole  race,  just 
as  Christ,  the  second  Adam,  acted  as  its  Representative  in  His 
life  of  reconciliation,  and  work  of  Redemption.”  Yet  the  paral¬ 
lel  is  neither  true  and  genuine,  nor  exact.  How  can  it  be 
conceived  that  Adam  was  given  carte  blanche  to  act  as  pleni¬ 
potentiary  for  the  whole  race  of  men?  Why  was  the  fate  of  all 
bound  up  in  that  one?  The  dilemma  which  emerges  involves 
the  alternative  of  considering  that  God  ordained  man  to  sin. 
Androutsos’  conclusion  is  that  “it  would  seem  better  to  accept 
the  dogma  in  faith,  and  to  regard  it  as  a  mystery,  rather  than 
to  attempt  such  explanations  as  only  darken  rather  than  illu¬ 
minate  the  dogma  of  original  sin.”5 

1  Androutsos,  AoynaTucf),  p.  157.  2  Ibid,  p.  158. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  149,  for  his  exegesis  of  Rom.  5,  12;  and  p.  159. 

4  Ibid.,  pp.  159-160. 

Ibid.,  pp.  161-162.  Cf.  St.  Augustine :  si  potes,  intellige ;  si  non  potes, 
crede;  and  St.  Bernard,  justum  sed  occultum  Dei  judicium  (Androut¬ 
sos,  ibid. ) . 


170 


III.— SIN  AND  SALVATION 


Transgression  of  the  Divine  Law  and  Will  involve  in  some 
manner  consequences  which  will  be  both  punishment  for  the 
sin  involved,  vindication  of  the  righteousness  of  God’s  law, 
and  satisfaction  or  reparation  for  impairing  and  infringing  His 
command  and  will.  There  is  then  inevitable  punishment  for 
sin,  original  and  actual,  which  may  be  regarded  under  two 
aspects — natural  and  positive.  The  former  includes  the  in¬ 
evitable  consequence  of  transgression,  in  the  natural  order ; 
the  latter  belongs  to  the  ethical  and  moral  plane,  in  which 
God's  immediate  justificatory  and  punitive  attitude  is  made 
known  in  a  positive  way.  Both  types  are  really  aspects  of  one 
relation  of  the  One  God,  to  whom  both  natural  and  ethical 
orders  are  referred  as  to  Source,  Ordainer,  and  Governor. 
Original  sin  itself  as  an  inheritance,  is  a  punishment  of  Adam’s 
sin.1  Other  punitive  consequences  of  sin  are  the  misery  and 
torture  of  the  conscience,  labouring  under  the  conviction  of  sin, 
with  the  torment  of  self-conviction  and  of  the  sense  of  guilt, 
as  well  as  all  the  various  ills  and  evils  in  the  world.  The 
greatest  of  these  last  is  death,  “the  wages  (oij/wvui)  of  sin”  as 
St.  Paul  calls  it,  in  its  three  degrees — natural  or  physical 
(corporalis) ,  spiritual  (spiritual is) ,  and  eternal  (aeterna).  The 
second,  “spiritual"  death,  is  the  severing  and  sundering  of  the 
bond  between  the  soul  and  God,  and  the  resultant  moral  misery, 
which  both  bears  witness  to  the  estrangement  from  fellowship 
with  God,  and  constitutes  as  well  the  matter  of  sin,  rather 
than  its  consequences.  The  third,  “eternal”  death,  means  the 
eternal  separation  of  God  and  man,  as  both  a  punishment  for 
sin  and  as  the  inevitable  result  of  it.2  “Temporal”,  “natural”, 
or  “physical”,  death  is,  according  to  Gen.  2,  17;  3,  17,  the 
consequence  of  and  punishment  for,  sin.3  Exemption  from 
this  now  inevitable  termination  of  our  life  on  earth  would 
have  been  by  a  special  act  of  God,  as  a  consequence  of  obedience 
to  His  Will.  So  we  can  say  that  posse  non  mori  belonged  to 
man’s  original  endowment  in  his  primitive  state,  and  would 
have  been  his  especial  prerogative.  The  first  man  forfeited  this, 
however,  in  the  Fall,  not  only  for  himself  but  for  all  his  de* 


1  Cf.  St.  Augustine,  Opus  imperfectum,  1,  47. 

2  Rom.  6,  16;  5,  16,  18;  1  Cor.  15,  22. 

3  Cf.  also,  Rom.  5,  12. 


SALVATION  AND  THE  SAVIOUR 


171 


scendants,  and  death  became  the  penalty  for  sin,  as  a  relation 
of  effect  to  cause,  as  is  apparent  from  Rom.  5,12.  “Yet  it  is 
clear”,  says  Androutsos  in  summing  up  his  treatment  of  the 
subject,  “that  the  penalties  and  consequences  of  original  sin 
are  relieved  of  their  penal  character  or  lose  it  completely, 
through  the  Redemption  wrought  in  Christ.  Sufferings  of 
whatever  kind,  and  the  other  resultant  miseries  of  human  life 
emanating  from  Adam,  serve  the  sons  of  God  as  opportunities  for 
discipline,  confirm  and  strengthen  them  in  the  good,  and  are 
means  for  the  manifestation  of  God’s  glory.  Eternal  death  is 
taken  away  through  Jesus  Christ,  and  physical  death,  when 
man  is  cleansed  from  sin  and  guilt  in  Him,  loses  its  dominant, 
terrifying,  and  minatory  aspect,  and  becomes  the  means  of 
passing  from  the  earthly  and  temporal,  into  the  eternal  king¬ 
dom  of  God.”1 

II.  SALVATION  AND  THE  SAVIOUR 
1.  The  Causes  and  Purpose  of  the  Incarnation 

Christian  thought  has  variously  conceived  the  work  and 
office  of  Christ  in  the  world.  From  early  times,  and  even  in 
the  pages  of  the  New  Testament  itself,  different  writers  have  em¬ 
phasized  various  aspects  of  the  work  of  our  Lord.  Not  only  is 
there  a  difference  of  emphasis  and  accent  in  the  teaching  about 
His  office  and  work,  but  there  is  as  well  a  difference  in  the 
views  of  Christian  writers  regarding  the  cause  and  aim  of  the 
Incarnation.  Of  these  different  views  two  came  into  sharp  con¬ 
trast  in  the  Scotist-Thomist  positions,  with  the  clearer  distinc¬ 
tions  brought  about  in  the  course  of  centuries  of  Christian 
thinking.  In  the  earlier  days  there  were  only  divergent  em¬ 
phases — Christ  was  regarded  either  as  a  Bringer  of  the  Great 
Revelation  of  what  God  was,  or  as  the  One  who  by  making 
propitiation  for  man,  brought  again  into  union  man  and  God. 
As  Revealer,  our  Lord  showed  us  God ;  becoming  Incarnate, 
He  portrayed  in  a  living  person  the  full  perfection  of  human 
nature  in  its  completed  whole  and  full  destiny  of  union  with 
God.  As  Redeemer  and  Saviour  He  came  to  make  salvation 
possible,  to  bridge  over  the  gulf  between  man  and  God,  and 
be  Himself  the  Atonement  for  sin,  and  the  means  of  Salvation. 

1  Op.  tit.,  p.  164,  and  cf.  pp.  161-164  for  whole  discussion. 


172 


III.— SIN  AND  SALVATION 


In  the  main  these  views  of  the  life  and  work  of  Christ  issued 
in  the  speculations  concerning  the  cause  of  the  Incarnation, 
of  which  the  Scotist  and  Thomist  theories  respectively  are 
typical  examples.  According  to  the  former  theory,  the  second 
Person  of  the  Blessed  Trinity  would  in  any  case  have  become 
Incarnate,  even  if  man  had  not  sinned.  The  Scotist  holds 
that  the  Incarnation  was  but  the  complement  and  necessary 
sequence  of  Creation,1  and  as  man  was  made  in  God's  image, 
this  fact  suggests  a  further  participation  in  His  nature2  than 
man  could  have  attained  at  any  stage  of  God's  dealings  with 
him,  short  of  the  Incarnation.  Furthermore,  the  benefits  of 
the  Incarnation  transcend  mere  salvation  from  sin  and  its 
consequences :  to  share  in  the  nature  of  One  united  with  us  on 
the  human  side,  and  being  in  Himself  God,  is  a  glory  far  ex¬ 
ceeding  that  lost  by  the  Fall.  The  Scotist  would  admit,  however, 
that  the  Incarnation,  coming  to  pass  after  the  Fall,  was  at¬ 
tended  by  suffering  and  humiliation,  which  would  not  have 
accompanied  it  had  not  man  sinned.  The  Thomist  reasons 
that  the  purpose  of  the  Incarnation  was  salvation  from  sin 
and  death,3  and  explains  the  texts  referred  to  by  the  Scotist  to 
mean  that  as  the  Fall  was  foreseen  by  God,  so  too  the  Ineama- 
tion  and  Passion  were  foreseen  from  the  beginning,  in  view  of 
sin  foreseen,  and  not  as  the  necessary  sequence  of  Creation.4 5 
Both  views  take  full  cognizance  of  all  the  facts,  but  each  re¬ 
sults  in  a  difference  of  interpretation  and  emphasis  in  what  is 
after  all  a  speculative  theological  question  and  not  a  matter  of 
faith.  Each  holds  to  a  different  cause  for  and  purpose  of,  the 
Incarnation. 

From  what  has  already  been  quoted  from  Rhosse,  it  is 
clear  that  his  definitions  of  Christianity  as  a  “mutual  rela¬ 
tionship  or  fellowship  between  God  and  man,  the  result  of 
Divine  energy  and  as  well  of  human  receptivity  and  co-opera¬ 
tion,”8  and  of  Christian  dogma,6 *  as  “the  teachings  of  the 


1  Cf.  Eph.  1,  9-12;  Col.  1,  19. 

2Cf.  2  St.  Pet.  1,  4. 

3  1  St.  John  3,  5. 

4  St.  Thomas  Aquinas,  Surrvma  III,  1-3. 

5  Op.  cit.,  p.  21. 

8  Cf.  Lecture  I,  pp.  5-6;  on  this  definition  Palmieri  makes  an  interest¬ 

ing  criticism,  in  his  Theol.  Dog.  Orth.  vol.  I.  pp.  18-20. 


SALVATION  AND  THE  SAVIOUR 


173 


Christian  Faith  concerning  the  operations  of  God”,  as  well 
as  his  whole  treatment  of  the  subject  of  Revelation,  would 
suggest  his  alignment  on  the  Scotist  side  in  the  questions  con¬ 
cerning  the  Incarnation.  “The  possibility  and  necessity  of  the 
Incarnation  of  the  Word  of  God”,  he  says,  “lies  both  in  the 
right  concept  of  God  held  in  general  by  Theism,  according  to 
which  God  is  not  only  the  transcendent  Being,  but  as  well 
the  immanent  Being,  possessing  both  absolute  and  relative 
attributes,  and  also  lies  in  the  nature  and  aim  (okottos  )  of 
man,  created  according  to  the  image  of  God,  that  in  mutual 
fellowship  with  Him  man  might  become  like  Him  and  finally 
achieve  entire  perfection.  This  perfection  of  man  is  bound 
up  with  the  perfecting  of  religion,  and  the  necessity  of  perfect¬ 
ing  religion  involves  necessarily  the  Incarnation  of  the  Word 
of  God  in  that  Person  in  which  there  would  be  not  only  a 
perfect  imparting  of  divine  truth,  power,  and  life,  but  also  a 
perfect  human  vehicle  to  receive  this  imparted  (divine  truth, 
power,  and  life) .  . .  .Hence  the  Incarnation  of  the  Word  would 
have  been  necessary  for  the  perfection  of  man  even  without 
(man’s)  sin.  Still  more  did  it  become  necessary  because  of  the 
fact  of  sin,  since  man  did  slip  into  sin  by  the  wrong  use  of 
his  reason  and  free  will.  So  because  of  this  sin  of  the  human 
race  Divine  Revelation  in  religion  (that  is,  the  Incarnation) 
attains  its  destined  end,  the  perfection  of  man,  not  directly, 
but  by  the  redemption  of  man  from  sin.  Hence  the  Divine 
Revelation,  before  leading  man  on  to  perfection,  has  first  to 
redeem  him  from  sin  by  means  of  the  Incarnation  of  the  Word 
by  whom  the  world  and  man  were  created,  and  by  whom  man’s 
perfection  is  achieved.  Hence  the  idea  of  the  God-man  and 
its  actualization  in  the  historic  person  of  Jesus  Christ  is  at 
once  the  Miracle  and  the  loftiest  miracle.  But  it  is  not  in 
opposition  to  the  human  mind  in  its  healthy  state,  but  is  rather 
demanded  by  it  as  necessary  for  man’s  perfection”.1  By  this 
Rhosse  means  that  the  Incarnation  would  have  taken  place  in 

Tthosse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  465-466s  and  see  Lecture  I,  pp.  9-16.  It  will 
be  seen  that  this  passage  is  bound  up  with  Rhosse’s  whole  contention 
as  to  the  subject  of  Revelation,  of  which  it  is  the  conclusion.  It  is  in 
line  with  one  phase  of  St.  Irenaeus’  thought,  his  doctrine  of  the 
avaxecfiaXalucns.  Cf.  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  p.  464  where  he  employs  the  chief 
text  for  this  doctrine  (Eph.  1,  10). 


174 


III.— SIN  AND  SALVATION 


any  case,  but  the  fact  of  sin  determined  some  of  the  conditions 
by  which  its  purpose  would  be  achieved.  Man  in  his  “healthy 
state”  still  required  the  completion  of  his  nature  and  capacities 
by  the  Incarnation ;  far  more  in  his  state  of  sin  did  he  require  it. 

Kephala  leans  rather  to  the  Scotist  side  in  his  interpreta¬ 
tion  of  the  Incarnation,  though  not  in  such  a  complete  and  thor¬ 
ough  way  as  does  Bhosse.  “The  coming  of  a  Saviour  and  Be- 
deemer  was  the  common  expectation  of  all  peoples”,  Jews  as  well 
as  Gentiles.1  His  coming  “appears  absolutely  necessary  .  .  . 
to  stabilize  the  shaken  hopes  of  people,  to  inspire  religious  rev¬ 
erence,  to  fill  the  void  in  men’s  hearts,  to  satisfy  the  longings  of 
the  spirit,  to  quicken  political  and  moral  life,  and  to  reform  and 
regenerate  man  corrupted  by  sin.”2  Kephala  is  not  absolutely 
Scotist  in  his  treatment  of  the  causes  and  purpose  of  the  In¬ 
carnation,  as  is  seen  in  the  quotation  above,  yet  his  emphasis 
on  the  work  of  our  Lord  as  completing  and  fulfilling  human 
needs,3  his  list  of  the  characteristic  notes  of  the  Saviour’s  char¬ 
acter  and  work,4  his  enumeration  of  the  objects  and  purposes  of 
the  Incarnation,5  are  all  consistent  with  a  Scotist  point  of  view. 
Bevelation  “is  necessary  ....  because  of  the  conditions  in¬ 
to  which  the  human  race  had  fallen,  with  man’s  spiritual  fac¬ 
ulties  darkened  and  his  highest  destiny  forgotten.  Through 
Bevelation  God  leads  the  race  into  the  way  of  truth  and  lifts  it 
from  its  prostrate  condition.”'5  Our  Lord’s  work  was  “to  give 
eternal  life  to  those  who  believed  in  Him,  and  to  teach  them  to 
know  and  worship  in  spirit  and  in  truth  the  one  true  God,  and 
Jesus  Christ  whom  He  had  sent.”'  Since  “man  without  knowl¬ 
edge  of  God  is  an  incomprehensible  mystery,  without  fellowship 

'Kephala,  XpLaroXoyia,  pp.  10,  11-17;  revelation  to  and  expecta¬ 
tion  by  the  Gentiles,  pp.  17-21. 

-Ibid.,  p.  23. 

3  “Since  the  desire  of  eternal  life  is  innate,  it  is  true”,  ibid.,  p.  29, 
and  in  Jesus  this  desire  had  its  satisfaction  and  fulfilment  {ibid., 
pp.  32-34.) 

4  E.  g.,  His  divine  character,  words,  deeds,  fulfilment  of  prophesies, 
miracles;  submission  to  Him  of  angels,  men,  and  nature;  His  Church, 
the  results  of  Faith,  etc.  {ibid.,  pp.  34-37). 

5  He  came  “to  save  man  from  ignorance,  doubt,  despair,  hatred,” 
etc.  {ibid.,  p.  37). 

G  Ibid.,  p.  129. 

7  Ibid.,  p.  175. 


SALVATION  AND  THE  SAVIOUR 


175 


with  Him  something  inexplicable1  .  .  .  (for  God  made  man 
for  the  purpose  of  constituting  him  a  sharer  in  His  own  Good¬ 
ness  and  blessedness)/  .  .  .  He  sent  His  Son  to  turn  man  from 
the  folly  of  his  way,  to  lead  him  to  his  heavenly  Father,  and 
teach  him  his  destiny  on  earth.”3  He  sums  up  our  Lord’s  pur¬ 
pose  in  the  words :  “The  mission  of  the  Saviour  w^as  the  glory  of 
God — by  making  known  the  true  God,  whom  mankind  because 
of  sin  had  forgotten,  and  by  turning  man  from  the  folly  of  his 
way.”4  Kephala  seems  then  to  waver  between  the  Scotist  and 
Thomist  theories,  but  his  greatest  emphasis  seems  to  be  on  our 
Lord  as  the  complement  and  fulfilment  of  man’s  needs  and 
aspirations,  and  as  the  complete  Revelation  supplanting  and 
fulfilling  that  which  had  gone  before.  He  does  not  deal  directly 
with  the  question  whether  or  not  God  the  Son  would  have  be¬ 
come  Incarnate  had  not  man  sinned,  but  the  implication  drawn 
from  the  general  tenor  of  his  thought,  is  that  Kephala  is  more 
Scotist  than  Thomist. 

Mesolora  is  more  explicitly  Thomist  in  his  treatment  of  the 
subject.5  “Man,  as  a  rational  creature  endowed  with  free-will, 
has  been  and  is  under  a  special  providence  of  God0  who 
does  not  desire  the  death  of  a  sinner — for  the  first  parents  did 
not  fall  of  their  own  proper  volition  nor  with  full  consciousness 
(of  their  act).  Consequently  .  .  man  did  not  lose  com¬ 
pletely  the  image  of  God,  but  there  remained  in  him  traces  of 
good.  For  this  reason  his  salvation  and  rehabilitation  were 
possible .  .  .  The  way  and  means  of  reconciliation  of  man  with 

1  Ibid.,  p.  176. 

2  Ibid,,  p.  177. 

3  Ibid. 

4  Ibid.,  p.  179. 

6  He  devotes  pp.  199-242  of  vol.  III.  of  his  ZufipoXucrj,  to  the  In¬ 
carnation.  His  definitions  (p.  204,  note  1)  are  most  valuable:  the  sub¬ 
ject  of  Our  Lord  and  His  work  may  be  termed  “divine  economy”,  for 
from  it  we  learn  that  God  in  a  divine  and  mysterious  way  arranged 
( u)Kov6fjir)<Te )  the  salvation  of  man;  “His  redemptive  work  may  also  be 
called  “the  Incarnate  economy”  (evaapKov  olKovo/iiav)  ;  Redemption 
“  (aTroXvTpwcLs)”  “in  its  wider  meaning,  signifies  all  the  means  which 
God  uses  to  effect  the  removal  of  sin”,  and  “Christology”  .  .  treats 
of  Christ  the  Saviour. 

8  This  passage  links  up  with  his  treatment  of  “the  Divine  Pro¬ 
vidence  and  Governance  of  the  world”  fpp.  185-191)  and  “Foreknowl¬ 
edge  and  Foreordination”  (pp.  192-199)  immediately  preceding. 


176 


III.— SIN  AND  SALVATION 


God  were  found  through  the  mediatorship  of  the  Son  and  Word 
of  God.”1 2  The  appearance  of  the  Incarnate  God  “was  the  great¬ 
est  evidence  of  God’s  special  providence  for  the  salvation  of 
man."'  “The  Old  Testament  describes  the  causes  of  the  sin  and 
fall  of  man,  teaching  that  man  could  not  by  his  own  powers 
(alone)  achieve  redemption  and  deliverance  from  evil,  for  the 
recognition  of  which  fact  alone  were  the  Law  and  the  Prophets 
given,  (and) to  serve  to  prepare  the  way  for  salvation  .  .  It  was 
necessary  that  the  Eternal  Word  of  God  by  whom  the  world  was 
created,  should  take  flesh  in  order  to  save  the  lost  sheep."3  Ac¬ 
cording  to  Mesolora,  sin  was  the  cause  of  the  Incarnation,  the 
purpose  of  which  was  to  save  sinful  mankind. 

This  same  doctrine  is  clearly  arid  definitely  taught  by  An- 
droutsos.  “Man  having  fallen  under  the  power  of  sin  and  the 
Devil,  was  unable  to  be  saved  and  to  have  fellowship  with  God, 
but  was  under  condemnation  to  destruction  and  eternal  death. 
This  destruction  of  the  human  race  the  Creator  would  not  allow, 
and  in  His  mercy,  His  love  for  men,  and  His  kindness4 5  (or  by 
what  other  name  His  love  for  sinful  man  may  be  called)  formed 
the  means  of  deliverance  from  evil,  and  planned  to  send  His 
Son  into  the  world  for  the  salvation  of  men.  This  plan  of  God 
was  conceived  before  the  foundation  of  the  world,  eternally.  .  . 
Hence  it  is  called  ‘foreknowledge’,  ‘foreordination’,  ‘purpose’, 
‘the  mystery  of  His  Will,’0  and  the  like.  The  conception  of 
God  as  unchanging  and  above  time  demands  that  this  will  of 
God  be  eternal — in  His  determining  the  redemption  of  the 
world  in  Christ  Jesus  in  His  eternal  aspect  in  relation  to 
Creation.  This  will  the  Son  and  Word  of  God  carried  out, 
becoming  Incarnate  ‘in  the  fulness  of  time’  ”6  .  .  .  Androutsos 
goes  on  to  say:  “The  cause  of  the  Incarnation  of  Jesus  Christ 
is  .  .  .  the  restoration  (dvao-rao-is^ “resurrection”)  of  fallen 
man,  to  which  Holy  Scripture  bears  witness  in  many  places,7 

1  Op.  cit.,  III.  p.  199. 

2  Op.  cit.,  III.  p.  200. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  204. 

4  Of .  Eph.  2,  4;  Tit.  3,  5. 

5  Eph.  1,  9,  11;  3,  9,  11;  Rom.  16,  25;  Col.  1,  26. 

6  (Gal.  4,  4.)  Androutsos,  AoyfiariKri ,  pp.  165-166. 

7  E.  g.,  St.  John  3,  16;  12,  47;  2  Cor.  5,  19;  1  Tim.  1.  15;  St.  Luke 
19,  10. 


SALVATION  AND  THE  SAVIOUR 


177 


.  .  and  which  the  Church  describes  in  the  words  ‘who  for 
us  men  and  for  our  salvation  came  down  from  Heaven’.1'1 
Androutsos  states  the  Scotist  contention  and  says  of  it : 
“This  theory  lias  no  foundation  in  Scripture,  but  has  the  explicit 
statements  of  weighty  Fathers  against  it.  The  antithesis  be¬ 
tween  the  second  Adam  and  the  first  in  the  New  Testament 
does  not  show  that  the  coming  of  the  Saviour  was  necessary 
to  complete  the  works  of  creation.  The  words  in  Eph.  1,  U> 
take  for  granted  the  disruption  of  the  unity  of  the  world 
through  sin,  and  in  1  Cor.  15,  43  Christ  is  termed  ‘the  heavenly’ 
(Adam)  because  of  the  Resurrection  and  not  because  of 
His  Incarnation.  Of  the  Fathers,  St.  Irenaeus*  says:  ‘The 
Word  would  not  have  been  Incarnate  had  it  not  been  for  the  sal¬ 
vation  of  flesh’  :  St.  Ambrose  said  that  the  causa  incarnationis 
was  ut  caro  quae  peccaverat,  per  se  redimer etur .3  Rightly 
Augustine  observed:  si  homo  non  periisset,  films  hominus  non 
vents  set. 

The  preparation  for  the  Incarnation,  whether  it  was  for  a 
completion  and  fulfilment  of  human  needs,  desires,  nature, 
and  aspiration,  or  for  the  reconciliation  of  man  with  God,  his 
deliverance  from  sin,  and  his  restoration  and  rehabilitation, 
was  a  work  of  divine  love  acting  in  many  ways  and  in  all 
peoples.  It  may  be  considered  under  two  aspects, — in  relation 
to  the  Gentile  world  and  in  relation  to  the  Jews.  The  former 
were  prepared  by  nature  and  by  the  results  of  their  thinking 
and  reflection.  Ethical  consciousness  demanded  a  standard 
of  truth  and  right,  and  human  experience  brought  about  the 
conviction  of  failure  and  helplessness  in  attaining  the  ideal 
and  norm  set  by  the  moral  consciousness  of  man.  Ignorance, 
doubts,  difficulties,  the  consciousness  of  moral  impotence,  all 
served  as  a  negative  preparation0  of  Gentile  humanity  for  the 
coming  of  Him  who  would  satisfy  the  cravings  of  the  ethical 
nature  of  man,  stabilize  his  shattered  hopes,  strengthen  his 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  168. 

2  Adv.  Haer.,  V,  14,  1. 

3  De  incarnationis  dominicae  sacramento ,  6,  56. 

4  Serin.  174,  2,  2,  and  cf.  ibid.,  175,  1.  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp. 
168-169  and  notes. 

5Kephala,  op.  cit.,  pp.  12-21,  23,  37,  38-90,  etc.;  Mesolora,  op. 
cit.,  p.  200. 


178 


III.— SIN  AND  SALVATION 


convictions  as  to  right  and  truth,  and  illuminate  and  enlighten 
the  darkness  of  his  natural  understanding.1  The  presence  of 
the  moral  and  ethical  nature  and  the  resulting  consciousness 


by  man  of  the  good  and  true,  combined  with  the  conviction  of 
his  own  helplessness  and  futility  as  regards  the  attainment  of 
the  ideal  he  knew  vaguely,  served  to  make  ready  the  road  for 
the  coming  of  one  who  was  both  the  final  Revelation,  the  Per¬ 
fect  Character,  and  the  Saviour  of  all  men.2  The  Jews  were  “a 
specially  chosen  section  of  humanity,  as  it  were  a  leaven,”3 
whom  God  prepared  in  many  ways  for  the  Incarnation:  there 
were,  first  of  all,  the  prophecies  in  the  Old  Testament,  beginning 
with  Gen.  3,  15  and  occurring  throughout  the  whole  book;  the 
revelation  of  the  Law,  and  its  whole  system  as  a  means  both  of 
effecting  the  conviction  of  sin  and  guilt,  and  of  arousing  the 
desire  and  need  for  redemption;  the  sacrificial  system,  itself  a 
prophecy  of  divine  help  and  a  witness  to  its  necessity,  its  sym¬ 
bolism  a  type  of  God’s  grace  conveyed  by  fellowship  with  Christ, 
on  which  Androutsos  observes  that  “only  through  faith  in  the 
coming  Redeemer  could  one  be  saved”.4  The  Law  acted  as 
pedagogue/’  and  the  prophecies  and  messianic  expectations  led 
the  Jewish  folk  still  further  toward  Him  who  was  Messiah, 
High  Priest,  and  Law  Giver,  the  Supreme  Antitype  and  Ful¬ 
filment  of  all  the  types  in  the  Old  Testament.6 

Of  the  place  of  the  Christological  teaching  in  Orthodox 
dogmatic,  Androutsos  says:  “Religious  doctrines  about  God  and 
man  are  nothing  else  than  the  premises  of  Redemption  in  Christ, 
and  the  knowledge  that  God  is  full  of  love  for  man  fallen  from 
his  first  destiny  through  sin,  constitutes  the  means  of  access  to 
the  mystery  of  the  Incarnation .  .  .  All  the  truths  and  facts  in 


Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  166. 

2  Cf.  St.  Justin,  Apologia  I,  63-64;  Tertullian,  Apologeticus,  47 ;  Theo- 
pkilus,  ad  Autolycum,  11,  37;  Clem.  Alex  Strom.  I,  15,  22;  V.  4, 
etc.,  cf.  St.  John  1,  9;  Heb.  11,  3.  Mesolora  notes  the  place  of  the 
Greek  language,  philosophy,  literature,  the  LXX,  etc.,  and  the  Roman 
government,  in  the  divine  scheme  of  preparation,  op.  cit.,  Ill,  pp.  201-2. 

3  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  Ill,  pp.  200-201. 

4  Op.  cit.,  p.  167. 

5  Gal.  3,  24. 

6  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  III.  pp.  201-2,  and  cf.  Mogila,  ibid.,  I.  p.  390; 
Kritopoulos  ibid.,  I,  pp.  302-304;  St.  John  Dam.,  ’'E kSoctis  3,  4, 
8;  Kephala,  op.  cit.,  pp.  34-37,  165-166,  177-179. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  OUR  LORD'S  PERSON 


179 


the  life  of  Our  Lord  have  dogmatic  and  religious  value,  for  ex¬ 
ample,  the  truths  of  His  sinlessness  and  of  His  Resurrection, 
.  .  .  which  are  necessary  bases  for  His  work  of  saving  the 
world.  Only  as  Sinless  could  the  Saviour  reconcile  God  and 
man,  and  had  He  not  risen  from  the  dead  His  death  would  not 
have  had  atoning  power  and  significance.”1  Since  all  subse¬ 
quent  exposition  depends  upon  the  work  of  the  Saviour  and  His 
Person,  and  the  doctrine  of  His  work  is  based  upon  that  of  His 
Person,  the  Greek  theologians  agree  in  aligning  their  material  in 
the  following  order:  I.  The  doctrine  of  the  Person  of  Jesus 
Christ,  with  its  implications,  and  II.  The  doctrine  of  his  work 
and  offices,  with  a  consideration  of  the  Descent  into  Hell,  the 
Resurrection,  and  the  like.2  All  Revelation  led  up  to  Him,  the 
Revelation  par  excellence;  all  miracles  pointed  to  Him,  the  Great 
Miracle;  all  prophets  pointed  to  Him,  the  Great  Prophet;  all 
priesthood  looked  forward  to  Him,  the  Great  High  Priest;  all 
religion  looked  forward  to  completion  by  Him;  all  needs  of  hu¬ 
manity  were  satisfied  in  Him,  and  sinfulness  done  away  by  Him.3 
So  the  doctrine  about  Christ  is  the  central  point  of  Orthodox 
teaching:. 

o 


2.  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  OUR  LORD’S  PERSON 
A.  The  Person  of  Christ 

“Both  Holy  Scripture  and  the  Church  teach  that  Jesus 
Christ  is  God-Man  (Qtdvdpunros)  or  true  God  assuming  human 
nature  and  becoming  like  the  human  race  in  every  respect  save 
sin.”4  “It  was  necessary  in  order  to  accomplish  the  work  of  sal- 

1  Op.  cit.,  pp.  169-170.  As  was  said  in  Lecture  I,  his  Dogmatic  is 
divided  into  two  parts,  “The  Premises  of  Redemption  in  Christ”  (pp. 
32-164)  and  “The  Redemption  in  Christ”  (pp.  165-448).  The  center 
and  heart  of  Orthodox  dogmatic  is,  as  this  division  illustrates,  the 
doctrine  of  the  God-Man. 

2  So  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  170-217;  Mesolora,  III,  pp.  205-242. 

3  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  453-466;  Kephala,  op.  cit.,  pp.  11-38,  129- 
179.  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  196-207,  168-169;  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  III. 
pp.  228-238,  et  al. 

4  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  170.  Dyobouniotes  criticises  this  phrase¬ 
ology,  saying  ('H  Aoyg.  ’Av5p.  Kpiv.,  p.  33)  :  “Christ  did  not  assume  hu¬ 
man  nature  in  general  but  a  definite  human  nature  (in  particular)  be- 


180 


III.— SIN  AND  SALVATION 


vation  that  the  Saviour  be  perfect  God,  Son  of  God,  and 

perfect  Man,  Son  of  Man, . becoming 

obedient  even  to  the  death  of  the  cross,  in  order  to  satisfy 
( iKavo7roLr)(jr))  the  divine  righteousness  rightly  requiring  the 
punishment  of  sinful  man,  and  also  to  conciliate  (cru/A^t^acn;) 
the  divine  mercy  which  did  not  desire  the  death  of  its  creature.”1 
While  the  synoptic  Gospels  emphasize  His  human  nature,  the 
Gospel  of  St.  John  “exalts  His  divine  nature,  without  passing 
over  in  silence  the  human  factor2  in  our  Lord.  The  other  ex¬ 
pressions  about  Our  Lord  used  by  the  Apostles  are  referable 
either  to  His  human  side  (fxepos),  as  man  .  .  .  suffering,  hun¬ 
gering,  thirsting,  .  .  or  to  His  divine  (side),  His  pre-exis¬ 

tence  and  His  Greatness  ...  as  Son  of  God.  So  the  names 
applied  to  the  Saviour  in  the  New  Testament  are  referred  to  His 
double  Nature — ‘son  of  man'  (Dan.  7,  13),  .  .  .  and  ‘Son 
of  God  or  simply  ‘Son’,  or  ‘Only  Begotten’.”3  “In  Christ 
were  united  unchanged  and  unconfused,  two  Natures,  human 
and  divine,  in  one  hypostatic  union,  that  is,  in  one  Person,  of 

coming  like  us  men,  not  like  the  race  .  .  .  to  which  Androutsos 
answers  in  his  Aoyp..  MeX.,  A',  ( pp.  90-91 ),  giving  St.  John  Dam.,  vE/c5o<7is, 
III,  3,  as  the  authority  for  his  language.  Cf.  Dyobouniotes’  ’O (ftetXop. 
atravT.,  pp.  87-89. 

1  Mesolora,  op.  cit..  III.  p.  205. 

2  Dyobouniotes  criticizes  the  use  of  this  word  very  sharply  ('II  Aoyg. 
'AvS p.  spiv.,  p.  33)  as  “not  being  a  theological  term”.  As  an  illustra¬ 
tion  of  the  amenities  of  such  theological  disputes,  the  discussion  may 
be  summarized  here:  Androutsos  defends  himself  by  saying  that  it 
is  in  common  use  in  scientific  theology,  together  with  other  phrases 
of  which  “it  is  not  strange  that  his  critic  (Dyobouniotes)  is  ignorant.” 
But  in  any  case  the  term  (“factor”,  irapayuv)  does  not  introduce  any¬ 
thing  novel  into  Orthodox  theology,  and  means  just  what  St.  John 
Dam.  (’'E/cSocm,  III.  4)  means  by  describing  the  “natures”  as  “parts” 
(p.ep7j,  Androutsos,  in  A07/0  MeX.,  A',  p.  92,  note).  Dyobouniotes 
says  ironically  (in  his  ’O0eiX.  anarr.,  p.  90)  :  “It  would  be  ridiculous 
for  us,  who  have  our  terms  already  fixed  by  the  ecumenical  councils, 
to  say  instead  of:  ‘in  Christ  there  are  two  natures’ — “in  Christ  there 
are  two  factors’.”  His  concluding  sentence  yerges  on  the  personal  when 
he  writes:  “That  I  do  not  know  the  term  factor  must  be  regarded  as 
one  of  those  jokes  with  which  Mr.  Androutsos  fills  up  the  void  in  the 
arguments  of  his  Dogmatic  Studies,  and  arouses  the  risibilities  of  his 
reader.” 

3  Androutsos,  Aoyp.ariK7i,  p.  170-171.  He  gives  in  his  notes  full  ref 
erences  to  scripture  passages  on  the  subject. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  OUR  LORD’S  PERSON 


181 


one  Essence  with  the  Father  according  to  His  Divinity  as  be¬ 
gotten  of  God.”1  “The  Church  affirms  His  miraculous  Birth  of 
the  Virgin  Mary,  teaching  that  His  conception  and  birth  -were 
not  according  to  the  natural  order,  for  His  conception  took  place 
through  the  Holy  Spirit,  and  His  Birth  did  not  impair  the 
virginity  of  the  Mother  of  God,  who  after  the  Nativity  remained 
ever  Virgin.”2  “As  there  are  in  Christ  two  natures  unconfused, 
thus  there  are  in  Him  two  wills  and  two  natural  operations 
(o'epyeicu),  divine  and  human,  united  unconfusedly,  inseparably, 
unchangeably,  of  which  the  latter  follows  and  is  subject  to  the 
former.  .  .  ”3  It  follows  that  “all  who  dispute  or  impugn  the 
truth  and  fulness  of  either  the  human  or  divine  nature,  take 
away  the  truth  of  the  Incarnation  and  Bedemption.”  Christ's 
divine  Nature  is  perfect  and  complete,  of  one  essence  with  the 
Father.  His  human  nature,  “formed  of  the  Virgin  Mary  mi¬ 
raculously,  was  in  all  respects  like  our  own  save  for  sin  alone. 
It  was  subject  to  all  the  bodily  and  spiritual  suffering  of  human 
flesh  which  .  .  .  have  not  a  sinful  character  or  presuppose 
sin — suffering,  thirsting,  grieving,  rejoicing,  dying,  and  being 
buried.  But  He  was  delivered  from  all  sin,  original  or  personal ; 
by  His  supernatural  birth  He  was  delivered  from  the  former,  be¬ 
cause  original  sin  is  inherited  through  physical  generation,  and 
by  the  hypostatic  union  of  His  two  Natures  He  was  delivered 
from  the  latter.”4 

The  great  problem,  which  challenged  the  theological  specu¬ 
lation  of  the  early  Church  and  provoked  the  rise  of  heresies, 
is,  as  Androutsos  notes,  “how  the  divine  and  human  natures 
which  constitute  the  Person  of  Jesus  Christ  could  be  so 
united  that  after  the  union  the  character  of  each  should  be 

1  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  III.  p.  205. 

2  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  171-2,  and  cf.  note  on  the  perpetual  virginity 
of  the  Blessed  Virgin  Mary.  While  it  “is  not  contained  in  Holy 
Scripture  yet  the  great  bulk  of  patristic  evidence  supports  it  unani¬ 
mously.”  He  refutes  the  ordinary  objections,  quoting  texts  and  author¬ 
ities.  Cf.  also  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  III.  p.  215,  note  2. 

3  Mesolora,  ibid. 

4 Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  173.  It  is  unnecessary  in  so  brief  a  sum¬ 
mary  as  this  to  go  into  detail  on  teaching  based  entirely  on  the  Ecu¬ 
menical  Councils,  and  on  which  all  branches  of  the  Catholic  Church  are 
in  accord.  For  a  brief  summary,  cf.  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  ITT.  pp.  213- 
224,  which  gives  biblical  and  symbolical  authorities. 


182 


III.— SIN  AND  SALVATION 


preserved  unimpaired?”1  The  answer  of  the  Church  to  this 
most  difficult  problem  was  the  result  of  her  action  in  combat¬ 
ing  the  heresies  which  arose  in  the  early  days  impugning  now 
the  human,  now  the  divine  nature,  falsely  reasoning  on  the 
basis  of  human  experience,  or  carrying  logic  into  the  realms 
of  faith.2  On  the  basis  of  the  Ephesine,  Chalcedonian,  and 
Constantinopolitan  decrees,  the  Church  withstood  and  contra¬ 
dicted  the  errors  of  Nestorians,  Monthelites,  and  Monophy- 
sites,  so  that  we  understand  that  “God  the  Word  took  to 
Himself  not  human  nature  in  general,  but  one  nature  in  par¬ 
ticular,  yet  not  in  the  sense  of  acquiring  thereby  a  person, 
since  the  personal  principle  of  the  assumed  human  nature  was 
that  of  God  the  Word.3  So  there  was  in  Christ  but  one  Per¬ 
son,  that  of  the  Word  of  God,  in  the  two  natures,  .  .  .  human 
and  divine.”4  This  two-fold  union  of  the  natures,  or  intimate 
indwelling  (eVSoTarryv  ivoLKr)(TLv) ,  St.  John  Damascene  calls 
7ref)ixMpr]cn<;  (“circumcession,”  “mutual  inherence”).  It  is 
not  a  consequence  of  the  hypostatic  union,  but  another  aspect 
of  it,  expressing  the  duality  of  the  natures  and  the  uniting 
principle,  God  the  Word.5  “If  I  say  that  God  the  Word  as¬ 
sumed  human  flesh  into  His  Person  (Woo-Tao-i?)  or  that  the 
two  natures  as  (being)  of  the  one  unity  of  Person  are  united 
within,  I  say  one  and  the  same  thing  under  different  aspects.”6 
The  doctrine  of  the  perichoresis  in  the  case  of  the  doctrine  of 
Christ  serves  the  same  purpose  as  it  does  in  regard  to  the 
Blessed  Trinity — as  a  touchstone  for  the  opposing  heresies, 
denying  both  Nestorian  and  Monophysite  views  of  Our  Lord’s 
Person.  “As  God,  the  Redeemer  joins  to  His  perfect  Redemp- 

1  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  173-174. 

2  On  the  heresies  concerning  the  Person  of  Christ,  cf.  Sect.  22  of 
Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  III.  pp.  208-213,  where  he  reviews  briefly  the  rise 
of  the  various  Christological  heresies  of  the  Cerinthians,  Ebionites, 
Philonists,  Docetists,  Platonists,  Gnostics,  Sabellians,  Arians,  Apol- 
linarians,  Nestorians,  Monophysites,,  Monothelites,  Socinians,  and  Ra¬ 
tionalists. 

3  Cf.  St.  John  Dam.,  ''E/c5ocm,  III.  11,  and  Dyobouniotes’  monograph 
on  St.  John  Dam.,  pp.  78  ff. 

4  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  174-175. 

6  Androutsos,  AoytiariKri,  p.  175. 

6  Androutsos,  Aoyp..  Me\.,  A',  p.  93;  cf.  Dyobouniotes,  'H  Aoyp.  ’A v8p. 
tcpiv.,  p.  34  and  ’O <pei\.  arravr.,  pp.  87-88. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  OUR  LORD’S  PERSON 


183 


tion  absolute  power  and  worth;  as  Man/  representing  the 
human  race  He  presents  the  Redemption  as  a  work  of  Man¬ 
kind.  At  the  same  time  the  union  of  the  Divine  and  human 
natures  in  Christ  is  the  type  of  our  moral  union  with  God: 
that  His  human  will  was  in  perfect  accord  with  His  divine 
will,  serves  as  the  aim  and  destiny  of  man,  that  he  be  united 
by  the  Grace  of  the  Holy  Spirit  with  the  will  of  God.  .  .  .and 
continue  to  abide  in  that  union.”2  The  human  nature  alone 
can  be  said  to  be  “perfected”  by  the  hypostatic  union,  for  no 
change  could  take  place  in  the  Divine  Nature,  nor  would  it 
be  possible  to  conceive  of  it  as  capable  of  being  perfected. 
Both  natures  are  Our  Lord’s  for  eternity,  and,  in  His  ascended 
glory,  He  has  our  nature  eternally  with  Him  in  Heaven.  Nor 
did  His  death  sever  the  bond  uniting  His  two  natures,  even 
for  an  instant,  as  St.  John  Damascene  shows.3 

1  Cf.  Kepliala:  “By  the  term  “Son  of  Man”  Our  Lord  would  show 
that  He  is  a  member  of  our  race,  one  of  us,  and  also  that  He  is  above 
all  humanity,  being  at  the  same  time  the  legitimate  and  final  Son, 
the  true  Scion  of  mankind,  Man  par  excellence,  towards  whom  all 
history  tended,  in  whom  humanity  finds  its  own  unity,  .  .  .  towards 
whom  all  previous  history  turned  as  to  its  term,  and  from  whom  all 
subsequent  history  has  its  rise.  He  is  the  epitome  and  summary 
of  humanity  and  the  purpose  of  its  history.  .  .  His,  Person  .  .  . 
has  in  it  a  universal  quality.  .  .  Each  people  has  its  heroes  .  . 
in  whom  it  sees  itself,  as  it  were,  embodied,  but  none  of  these  heroes 
sums  up  in  himself  the  fulness  of  history  .  .  Jesus  only  is  the  per¬ 
fect  and  utterly  complete  representative  of  the  whole  human  race” 
( XpicrToXoyia ,  pp.  165-166). 

2Androutsos,  Ao') iioltlkt},  p.  175. 

2  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  177.  The  two  chief  objections  brought 
against  Chalcedonian  terminology  by  certain  moderns  are:  (a)  it  as¬ 
signs  reason  and  will  but  not  personality  to  human  nature,  whereas 
reason  and  will  constitute  the  essence  of  personality;  (b)  while  the 
fulness  of  human  nature  is  ascribed  to  Christ,  yet  in  fact  it  takes 
it  away,  for  it  conceives  of  human  nature  as  impersonal.  But,  An¬ 
droutsos  says,  “person”  in  the  usage  of  the  Fathers,  did  not  mean  what 
it  does  in  this  modern  sense  as  involving  mind  and  will,  but  they  call : 
“  ‘person’,  the  ‘hypostasis’  of  the  logical  or  spiritual  essence  or  na¬ 
ture.  ‘Person’  is  what  ‘hypostasis’  is:  the  self-subsisting  essence  con¬ 
stituting  a  complete  whole.  If  ‘person’  be  distinguished  from  ‘hypos¬ 
tasis’,  the  latter  is  applied  to  the  spiritual  nature  of  the  ‘person’.  To 
know  and  to  will  are  notes  not  directly  of  the  ‘person’  but  of  the  na¬ 
ture  (of  man)  and  through  it,  of  the  ‘person’.  A  ‘nature’  does,  not 
exist  of  itself,  but  in  a  certain  ‘hypostasis’,  yet  many  natures  may 


184 


III.— SIX  AND  SALVATION 


B.  Corollaries  and  Implications 

As  corollaries  of  the  hypostatic  union  the  doctrine  of  the 
communicatio  idiom  at  uni 1  is  first  in  order.  From  the  unity 
of  His  Person  we  may  ascribe  to  His  divine  nature  the  proper¬ 
ties  of  His  human  nature,  since  the  Person  is  the  bearer  of 
both  natures.  So  when  He  is  called  “God"  we  may  yet  predi¬ 
cate  human  properties  of  Him,  and  when  He  is  called  “Man” 
we  may  predicate  divine  properties.  This  doctrine  is  founded 
on  Holy  Scripture,2  the  teaching  of  the  Fathers,  and  the 
implications  involved  in  the  Ephesine  decrees.  “To  the  Per¬ 
son  (hypostasis)  whether  we  call  Him  as  of  both  or  of  one 
only  of  His  Parts  (that  is,  natures),  we  ascribe  the  properties 
of  both  natures.  For  Christ  as  both  is  called  God  and  Man  ; 
created  and  uncreated ;  passible  and  impassible.  When  from 
one  of  the  two  Parts  He  is  called  ‘Son  of  God'  or  ‘God',  He 
receives  the  properties  of  the  other  consubsisting  nature.... 
God  is  said  to  suffer,  and  the  Lord  of  Glory  is  said  to  be 
crucified — not  as  God  but  as  man.  When  He  is  called  ‘man’ 
and  ‘Son  of  Man'  He  receives  the  properties  of  His  divine 
nature:  ...  a  child,  who  is  before  time,  a  man  without  begin¬ 
ning — not  as  child  and  man  however,  but  as  God,  is  He  before 
time,  having  become  a  child  late  in  time.  This  is  the  manner 
of  the  communion  (avriSoaLs)  or  the  sharing  (of  the  proper- 

have  but  one  ‘hypostasis’  .  .  .  Human  nature  of  itself  without  hypos¬ 

tasis,  yet  possessing  reason  and  will,  subsisted  in  the  hypostasis  of 
Jesus  Christ”.  Dvobouniotes  said  of  Aiulroutsos  that  “he  has  not 
formed  a  clear  idea  as  concerns  the  person  of  Jesus  Christ... 
On  page  187  he  identifies  ‘person'  in  the  ancient  usage 
with  ‘person*  of  modern  philosophy,  regarding  it  as  residing 
in  the  ego.”  He  says  that  Androutsos’  treatment  is  “superficial,”  and 
claims  that  he  uses  the  word  in  several  senses.  Cf.  'H  Aoy/x.  ’A v8p.  KpLv., 
pp.  32-33;  ’O0et\.  dirdi'T-rjaLs,  pp.  87-29.  Androutsos’  answer  (note 
to  p.  92  of  his  Ao7|U.  Me\.  A’),  is  that  the  Church  Fathers  used  the  word 
“person”  in  two  senses,  as  that  known  as  subsisting  in  itself,  and  as 
that  constituting  a  unified  whole  (the  continuum  of  the  Scholastics?). 

1  ’AvtiSchtis  or  KOLPOvoiTjais  riov  ibuopdruv  (Androutsos)  ;  noivuvia  r.  t. 
(Mesolora)  ;  idioroiijais  (Cyril  Alex.)  ;  rpowos  avriboae cos  St.  John  Dam.)  ; 
cf.  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  178;  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  Ill,  pp.  206,  222 
and  note  2;  Theodoret  ( Epist .  127)  uses  KOLva  voLel. 

3Cf.  Acts.  20.  28;  Rom.  6,  10;  1  Cor.  15,  47;  2  Cor.  13,  4;  St, 
John  3,  13,  et  al. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  OUR  LORD'S  PERSON 


185 


ties)  of  each  nature  with  the  other  through  the  union  of  the 
Person ....  So  we  can  say  of  Christ :  ‘this  one,  our  God,  ap¬ 
peared  on  earth  and  held  converse  with  men7,  and,  ‘this  man 
is  uncreated,  impassible,  incomprehensible’/51  The  basis 
of  the  communicatio  idiomatum  is  the  theory  of  the  union  of 
the  natures  in  one  Person,2  hence  the  criterion  is :  “God  is  man 
and  man  is  God”  but  not :  “Divinity  is  Humanity  and  Hu¬ 
manity  is  Divinity.”  That  is,  the  natures  are  viewed  in  the 
hypostatic  union  not  as  abstract  but  as  concrete,  and  the  con¬ 
crete  terms  and  names  imply  the  Person ;  the  natures  are 
united  unconfusedly  in  Christ.  It  is  not  a  mere  sharing  of 
names  and  titles,  but  an  actual  possession  and  communication 
of  properties.3  Each  nature  partakes  of  the  properties  of  the 
other,4  for  God  the  Word  appropriates  the  properties  and 
states  of  the  human  nature,  and  shares  with  it  His  own.  We 
speak  of  the  activities  and  operations  (evepyaai)  of  the  In¬ 
carnate  as  theandric,  since  in  Him  were  two  wills  and  opera¬ 
tions  proceeding  from  the  two  natures,  yet  the  Bearer  of  the  two 
natures  was  the  one  Person,  who  was  the  One  who  willed  and 
acted.  “He  did  not  do  human  acts  in  a  human  way  (only), 
for  He  was  not  only  man  but  God;  nor  did  He  perform  di¬ 
vine  acts  divinely,  for  He  was  not  only  God,  but  man.”3  “But 
it  is  to  be  noted  that  in  this  mutuality  of  sharing.  .  .  .the  di¬ 
vine  nature  energizes  and  imparts,  the  human  nature  receives, 
so  that  we  may  not  say  that  God  suffered  through  the  flesh, 
but  in  the  flesh;  the  same  Person  suffered  in  His  human  na¬ 
ture,  without  these  sufferings  being  felt  in  His  other  nature, 
— the  divine  (nature).’*6 

1  St.  John  Dam.  "E/cSoo-ts,  III.  4,  and  cf.  also  ibid.,  III.  50,  51,  52. 

2  Cf.  Mesolora’s  discussion  of  the  natures  and  wills  in  Christ,  op. 
cit.,  III.  pp.  218-224. 

3Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  179. 

4  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  Ill,  p.  206.  What  Mesolora  says  on  this  page 
is  hardly  reconcilable  with  what  has  just  been  given  in  the  text  above 
taken  from  Androutsos;  e.  g.,  “ Divinity  (y  Oeorys)  shared  with  the 
flesh”;  “All  that  Divinity  had  He  gave”;  “ Divinity  assumed  the 
humiliation”  etc.  On  the  symbolic  evidence  for  the  communicatio 
idiomatum,  cf.  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  vol.  I, — Metrophanes,  p.  304; 
Mogila,  p.  384;  Dositheus,  p.  411;  ibid.,  also  IT.,  pp.  106-107. 

1  St.  John  Dam.,  ’'E/cSocri?,  Ill,  15;  cf.  also  ibid.,  Ill,  p.  7,  19,  51. 

6 Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  180.  On  which  cf.  Dyobouniotes,  'II  Aoyy. 
'Av8p.  Kpiv.,  p.  34:  “So  one  can  say  that  the  divine  nature  of  Christ 


186 


III.— SIX  AND  SALVATION 


“The  human  nature  hypostatically  united  with  God  re¬ 
ceives  gifts,  which,  however,  did  not  destroy  its  finite  character 
but  elevated  it  to  its  greatest  possible  height ....  They  are  pro¬ 
perly  referred.  .  .  .to  the  knowledge  and  will  of  the  human  na¬ 
ture.  The  human  knowledge  of  Christ  was  preserved  from 
error  but  yet  not  transformed  into  omniscience,  which  is  a  di¬ 
vine  attribute.  What  was  the  relation  of  the  two  knowledges 
in  the  one  subject  is  beyond  our  ken.  Certainly  His  human 
knowledge  developed  in  the  same  way  as  it  does  with  other 
men, ....  by  advancing  and  making  progress.  So  we  are  to 
understand  St.  Luke  2,  52.  .  .  .not  as  a  manifestation  of  the 
undeveloped  wisdom  of  Christ,1  but  as  an  actual  increase  of 
empirical  knowledge".  .  .  . How  the  human  knowledge  (of 
Christ)  functions  in  its  own  sphere  within  the  circle  of  omnisci¬ 
ence....  is  incomprehensible  to  man.  The  will  (that  is,  the 
human  will)  which  lias  as  its  Bearer  the  Person  of  the  God- 
man,  being  guided  by  Him  in  all  its  operations  and  enriched 
through  grace  and  virtue,  was  closed  to  sin,  both  personal  and 
original,  since  the  Saviour,  conceived  by  the  Holy  Ghost,  had 
no  share  in  it."3 

is  mortal,  and  His  human  nature  immortal!”  and  p.  35.  Androutsos 
Aoyp..  MeX.,  A’,  pp.  90-94  answers  the  criticism,  but  Dyobouniotes  goes 
on  further  to  censure  Androutsos’  entire  presentation  of  the  subject, 
in  his  ’O0etX.  a-rravT.  (pp.  86-87 J  saying  that  “in  Mr.  Androutsos’ 
teaching  about  the  communicatio  we  encounter  these  three  ideas:  1. 
the  avTidoais  takes  place  mutually  between  the  natures  on  account 
of  the  hypostatic  union;  2.  it  is  given  from  both  natures  to  the 
Person;  3.  it  takes  place  only  from  the  divine  to  the  human 
and  not  from  the  human  to  the  divine.”  He  claims  the  three  are 
“contradictory”,  and  savs  that  Androutsos’  denial  of  the  fact  is 
“characterized  by  the  kind  of  dogmatic  flippancy  of  those  who  think 
they  know  everything.”  (  ! ) 

1  As  e.  g.,  St.  Athanasius  in  adv.  Arianos  Orat.,  4;  St.  John 
Dam.,  wE/c5o<m,  III.  22. 

3  So  St.  Augustine,  De  Incarnatione,  VIII.  71.  On  the  patristic 
interpretations  of  such  texts  as  St.  Mark  13,  32,  cf.  Androutsos,  op. 
cit.,  p.  181-182  and  notes  ad  loc. 

3  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  181-182.  Dyobouniotes  argued  that  if 
there  were  an  actual  increase  of  empirical  knowledge  on  Our  Lord’s 
part,  His  knowledge  could  not  have  been  even  perfect  and  ripe  human 
knowledge,  since  He  died  before  reaching  maturity.  (H  ’Aoyp..  ’Ai>8p., 
KpLPo/j..,  pp.  35-36).  Androutsos  shows  from  St.  John  Dam.  {op.  cit., 
III.  18,  14.)  that  Our  Lord  had  two  knowledges,  human  and  divine,  and 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  OUR  LORD’S  PERSON 


187 


The  second  great  corollary  and  consequence  of  the  doc¬ 
trine  of  the  communicatio  idiomatum  is  the  statement  that  the 
Blessed  Virgin  Mary  is  truly  the  Mother  of  God,,  ©coto'ko?.  She 
is  not  only  the  Mother  of  Jesus,  as  the  ISTestorians  held,  but  the 
Mother  of  God.  The  Hestorian  statement  is  opposed  both  to 
Holy  Scripture  (cf.  St.  Luke  1,  35,  43  ;  Rom.  1,  3 ;  9,5 ;  Gal.  4,4.) 
and  to  the  teaching  of  the  Fathers  and  Tradition.  The  Councils 
of  Ephesus,  Chalcedon,  and  Constantinople  II  defined  the  dog¬ 
ma1  that  the  Blessed  Virgin  is  ©cotokos. 

“It  appears  clearly  in  Holy  Scripture  and  Tradition  (and  it 
is  also  intrinsically  reasonable)  that  worship  is  due  Jesus  Christ 
even  in  His  human  nature,  since  the  divine  nature  is  not 
sundered  from  the  human  nature,  and  he  who  does  divide  them 
must  accept  two  persons.”3  This  worship  is  accorded  Christ  “as 
God-Man,  not  as  God  alone,”  as  St.  Athanasius  says.3 

Hot  only  was  Our  Lord  sinless,  according  to  Greek  Ortho¬ 
doxy,  but  He  was  impeccable,  incapable  of  sin.  The  patristic 
teaching,  founded  on  Holy  Scripture,4  is  that  not  only  did  Our 
Lord  not  sin,  but  He  could  not.  It  is  the  difference  between 
the  German  words  Unsiindigl'eit  and  Unsun dlichfceit.  His  im¬ 
peccability  is  a  consequence  of  the  hypostatic  union  and  not  of 
His  Conception  by  the  Holy  Spirit,  which  is  not  the  general 
reason  or  cause  of  His  sinlessness.  The  doctrine  of  His  utter 
sinlessness  appears  also  in  polemic  against  the  heresies  which 
denied  it  directly  or  by  implication.  This  is  the  case  in  rela- 

that  to  deny  the  validity  of  the  argument  for  the  growth  of  His  hu¬ 
man  knowledge  is  tantamount  to  denying  His  human  nature,  and  is 
counter  to  the  Ecumenical  Councils,  the  unanimous  consent  of  the 
Fathers,  and  Holy  Scripture  {Aoy/x.  MeXercu,  A',  pp.  95-99,  and  cf. 
Dyobouniotes,  ’0(pei\.  airavr.,  pp.  90-93).  On  the  Lutheran  doctrine 
of  the  omnipresence  of  the  Body  of  Christ,  cf.  Androutsos,  Aoy  fiar  iK-rj . 
pp.  182-183  (note)  and  his  Zr/i/SoXtK-?),  pp.  181  ff ;  Mesolora,  op.  cit., 
pp.  222-223  (note  2). 

1  Androutsos,  AoynaTiKr),  pp.  183-184,  with  authorities  given  in 
the  notes. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  184;  biblical  references  in  notes;  cf.  St.  Athanasius,  Epis- 
tola  ad  Adelphium,  3;  St.  John  Dam.,  ’'E/c5ocris,  III,  7  in  Migne,  P.  G. 
t.  xciv,  1013. 

3  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  III.  p.  224,  gives  St.  Athanasius,  St.  Cyril  Alex, 
and  St.  John  Dam.  ad  loc. 

4Cf.  St.  John  8.  46;  14,  30;  1  St.  John,  3,  5;  1  St.  Peter  2,  22; 
Hebrews  4,  15. 


188 


III.— SIN  AND  SALVATION 


tion  to  the  Arians,  Theodore  of  Mopsuestia  and  the  Nestorians, 
and  the  Apollinarians  and  the  Monothelites.1  “The  hypostatic 
union  demands  that  all  the  acts  of  the  Lord  be  directed  and  ef¬ 
fected  by  the  divine  nature  in  Him,  which  constitutes  the  per¬ 
sonal  hypostasis  of  the  Saviour,  as  in  a  way  all  the  external  ac¬ 
tions  of  His  bodily  members  are  also  under  the  dominion  of  His 

« / 

will.  Otherwise  there  would  be  a  communicatio  in  name  only, 
and  it  would  be  supposed  that  there  were  two  personal  prin¬ 
ciples,  two  egos  in  Christ,  which  is  counter  to  the  teaching  of 
the  Church:  the  human  nature  was  not  assumed  as  person (al) 
into  the  hypostasis  of  God  the  Word,  who  Himself  was  the  per¬ 
sonal  Bearer  ...  of  both  natures.  God  the  Word  could  not 
sin ;  the  opinion  that  His  human  nature  could  sin  would  indicate 
that  God  the  Word  could,  since  under  His  inspiration  all  the 
operations  of  His  human  will  were  brought  into  play.  Hence 
it  is  clear  that  the  hypostatic  union  demands  the  perfect  sin¬ 
lessness  of  Our  Lord.’’  The  matter  may  be  put  in  another  way: 
since  we  know  that  sin  is  the  assertion  of  self-will  in  preference 
to  God's  will  (for  sin  is  essentially  self-love  and  self-assertion) 
inasmuch  as  His  human  nature  had  no  ego  or  self  and  did  not 
love  self  as  it  loved  God,  it  is  lacking  in  the  fundamental  form 
and  basis  of  sin,  self-love.  .  .  .  “The  notion,  then,  that  Jesus 
Christ  could  sin  implies  that  He  could  have  fallen  as  did  Adam, 
and  the  Redemption  through  Him  might  have  been  brought  to 
naught ;  but  the  fall  of  the  God-Man  is  not  only  nowhere  sug¬ 
gested  in  Holy  Scripture,  but  the  very  idea  of  it  is  blasphemous 
to  those  who  hold  to  the  incarnate  economy”,2  that  is,  the 
Redemption. 

1  Against  whom  the  Fathers — e.  g.  Dionysius  Alex.,  St.  Athanasius, 
St.  Cyril  Alex.,  and  the  conciliar  decrees  brought  out  the  doctrine  of 
Our  Lord’s  sinlessness.  Cf.  Can.  XII  of  the  8th  Ecumenical  Council; 
St.  Augustine  Enchiridion ,  c*.  40.  etc. 

2Androutsos,  Aoy  gar  ikt)  ,  pp.  187-189.  In  answer  to  Dyobounio- 
tes’  strictures  ('H  Aoyg.  ’Av8p.  tcpiv.,  p.  36-37),  he  says  further: 
“There  could  be  no  doubt  that  human  nature  of  itself  can  sin,  since 
this  is  a  property  of  human  nature  ...”  but  in  the  hypostatic 
union  this  was  impossible  (Aoyg.  Me\.,  A',  p.  101,  and  cf.  pp.  ff).  Dyo- 
bouniotes  (’O0et\.  airavT.,  pp.  94-96)  says  that  this  theory  involves 
an  utter  change  in  the  human  nature  assumed  by  Our  Lord  as  a  conse¬ 
quence  of  the  union — a  view  which  is  contrary  to  the  teaching  of  the 
Fathers.  Cf.  Mesolora,  op.  nit..  Ill,  p.  215. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  OUR  LORD'S  PERSON 


189 


In  view  of  what  has  been  said,  how  shall  we  understand  the 
Temptations  of  our  Lord?  The  Fathers  agree  that  He  was  sub¬ 
jected  to  every  temptation.  “That  is,  either  from  His  interior 
nature  sin  could  in  some  way  torment  Him,  or  else  His  human 
will  could  be  externally  subject  to  the  irritation  of  temptation, 
so  as  to  be  tossed  about  or  driven  in  some  manner  by  it.  Yet 
every  such  temptation  was  external,1  and  every  one  was  immedi¬ 
ately  repulsed  so  soon  as  it  presented  itself."  Adam  stood  in 
need  of  trial  and  testing,  but  not  so  the  Lord,  who  as  Incarnate 
God  had  come  to  save  men.  The  first  Adam  had  need  of  moral 
and  ethical  probation  before  he  be  allowed  to  share  God's  blessed¬ 
ness,  but  the  second  Adam  could  not  be  touched  by  sin  nor  as 
God-Man  be  liable  to  fall.2 3 4  He  is  our  example  and  Prototype5 
in  that  He  is  the  ideal  of  divine  perfection  in  our  nature,  and 
as  well  the  example  of  the  loftiest  humility.  While  we  may  not 
discern  the  relationship  between  His  human  free-will  and  His 
sinlessness,  yet  we  may  understand  sufficiently  His  Person  and 
His  life  as  a  whole.  Though  He  could  not  sin,  yet  His  choice 
of  the  death  of  the  Cross  was  a  free  choice.  It  is  useless  to  con¬ 
struct  the  scholastic  dilemma :  hf  our  Lord  necessarily  under¬ 
went  the  death  of  the  Cross  He  could  not  have  been  free,  or  else 
if  He  were  free  He  might  not  have  done  so,  and  so  was  not  nec¬ 
essarily  sinless,  since  He  might  have  refused  to  follow  the  will 
of  God.'  ‘’But  if  one  reason  that  the  possibility  of  sin  does  not 
lie  in  the  essence  of  the  human  nature  and  that  by  the  hypostatic 
union  the  human  will  was  not  a  choice  between  good  and  evil 
but,  on  the  contrary,  illuminated  and  led  without  coercion  or 
neeessitv,  was  wholly  directed  towards  God  and  united  with  the 
divine  will,  it  is  possible  then  that  some  rays  of  light  may  shine 
upon  the  matter  of  the  self-direction  and  freedom  of  His  human 
will  and  on  the  perfect  harmony  of  the  two  wills  in  Christ.’54 

1  Cf.  Gregory  the  Great.  Horn.,  I,  16,  1  (on  St.  Matthew):  omnis 
diabolica  ilia  tentatio  foris,  non  intus  fuit,  and  St.  Leo  Epist.  35,  3. 

2  Cf.  St.  Augustine,  De  Trinitate,  I,  13,  18;  St.  Cyril  Alex.,  on 
St.  John  7,  39  (Migne,  P.  G.  t.  LXXIII,  756.)  ;  ibid.,  adv.  Nestorium, 
III.  (in  Migne,  P.  G.  t.  LXXVI,  164). 

3  Cf.  1  St.  Peter,  2,  21. 

4  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  189-191.  With  this  teaching  agree  most 
of  the  Greek  theologians — e.  g.,  Macarius,  op.  cit.,  II,  87 ;  Eugenius 

Bulgaris,  Theologikov ,  pp.  442,  544;  Damalas’  Catechism,  p.  62; — but 


190 


III.— SIN  AND  SALVATION 


3.  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  OUR  LORD’S  WORK 

A.  The  Three  Offices  of  Christ 

As  we  have  seen  in  the  exposition  given  above  of  original  sin 
and  the  ills  consequent  upon  the  Fall,  humanity  incurred  the 
guilt  and  punishment  of  sin,  the  darkening  of  the  mind  and 
judgment,  and  as  well  a  weakening  of  the  will,  so  that  there  is 
an  inclination  towards  evil  and  a  turning  towards  earthly  things. 
As  there  is  a  three-fold  loss  by  sin,  so  there  is  a  three-fold  res¬ 
toration  in  the  Redemption.  The  divine  Justice  and  Right¬ 
eousness,  affronted  and  flouted  bv  the  disobedience  of  sin,  are 
vindicated  and  satisfied  by  the  atoning  and  propitiatory  work 
of  the  Saviour.  The  mind  of  man,  darkened  and  confused  by 
sin,  is  illuminated  and  enlightened  by  the  revelatory  and  proph¬ 
etic  work  of  Our  Lord.  As  the  will  of  man  was  weakened 
and  became  prone  to  evil,  through  His  royal  achievement  as  con¬ 
queror  of  the  powers  of  evil  He  uplifts  and  empowers  the  human 
will  by  the  Grace  which  conies  from  Him,  to  fight  and  conquer 
evil  and  turn  completely  towards  God  and  the  good.  Hence 
His  work  is  divided  into  the  three  functions,  priestly,  prophetic, 
and  kingly.1  From  another  viewpoint  the  Saviour  completed 
His  work  of  salvation  of  man  through  coming  down  from 
Heaven,  humbling  Himself,  and  being  glorified — becoming 
man,  being  crucified,  and  rising  again.  There  was  a  triple  func¬ 
tion  of  Our  Lord  in  the  world,  and  it  is  described  in  the  name 
‘Christ’,  .  .  .  given  to  prophets,  priests,  and  kings  .  .”2 

This  three-fold  office  of  Our  Lord  is  suggested  in  Holy  Scrip- 


not  the  famous  Professor  of  Christian  Ethics  at  the  Seminary  at  Chalki, 

Basil  Antoniades.  Androutsos  quotes  him  as  follows,  from  the  work 

'H  XpicmaviKri  ’H section  73:  “To  sin  as  a  man  was  a  possibility 

which  might  have  taken  place  in  Christ  Jesus  without  being  precluded 

bv  His  divine  nature.  And  in  this  fact  exactlv  lies  the  moral  lofti- 
«/  •/ 

ness  and  grandeur  of  the  Saviour,  that  while  a  fall  even  in  His  case 
was  possible,  yet  He  did  not  fall  but  remained  sinless,  not  because 
He  was  not  able  to  sin,  but  because  He  was  able  not  to  sin.”  (In  An¬ 
droutsos’  Aoy/j.aTLKifi,  end  of  note,  pp.  191-193.) 

1  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  194. 

2  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  III.  pp.  224-225. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  OUR  LORD’S  PERSON 


191 


ture,1  and  “whatever  in  the  Old  Testament  is  as  it  were  a  symbol 
and  prophecy,  becomes  fact  (lit.  truth)  and  realization  in  the 
New.  The  public  life  of  Our  Lord  is  the  fulfilment  of  His  three¬ 
fold  office :  up  to  His  death  He  exercised  His  prophetic  office, 
in  His  passion  and  death  His  priestly  work  is  manifested,  and 
in  the  foundation  and  ordering  of  His  Kingdom.  .  .  He  exer¬ 
cised  His  royal  office.”2  The  Fathers  saw  in  part  the  implica¬ 
tions  of  Holy  Scripture,  but  “the  scientific  working  out  of  His 
three-fold  office  belongs  to  later  times.”  We  must  not  think, 
however,  that  there  was  an  actual  division  or  separation  in  the 
work  of  Our  Lord  Himself.  We  only  distinguish  the  three  of¬ 
fices  as  a  help  to  our  own  reasoning  and  thinking.  Yet  it  is 
true  that  “the  center  of  His  three-fold  office  was  Our  Lord's 
priestly  work  by  which  He  reconciled  man  and  God.  The  other 
two  serve  as  means  for  this  end — the  prophetic,  by  preparing 
the  spirit  of  man  to  receive  His  teaching,  and  the  kingly  work, 
by  bestowing  the  grace  of  Redemption  and  perfecting  the  be¬ 
liever  in  the  Kingdom  of  God.”'3 


(a)  Our  Lord  as  High  Priest 

“The  Saviour  as  the  Great  High  Priest  offered  Himself  as  a 
spotless  sacrifice  to  God  the  Father,  a  sacrifice  of  propitiation, 
being  Himself  both  Priest  and  Victim,  and  both  appeased 
( i^iXacraro)  and  satisfied  the  righteousness  of  God  offended  by 
the  sin  of  man  in  his  transgression  of  the  divine  law.  He  took 
on  Himself,  as  the  sinless  Representative  of  the  human  race, 
the  punishment  for  sin  ...  to  which  sinful  man  was  liable, 
and  poured  out  on  the  Cross  His  precious  and  saving  Blood,  es¬ 
tablishing  the  New  Covenant  which  He  made  with  the  Father, 
through  which  everyone  who  believes  in  Him  is  saved,  confessing 
the  propitiation  of  His  death  on  the  Cross.”4  His  priestly  work 

1  Old  Testament:  e.  g.,  Deut.  18,  15;  Is.  42,  1-4;  Ps.  110-4;  Ezek. 
40,  ff.  Ps.  2,  71;  110;  Mic.  2  ,13;  5,  2;  Zach.  6,  9  ff.  New  Testament: 
e.  g.  St.  Luke  13,  33;  St.  Matt.  13,  57;  Acts  3,  22;  7,  37 — St.  John  17, 
19;  St.  Matt.  20,  28;  Heb.  4,  14;  5,  1-5; — St.  Matt.  25,  31-4;  St.  Luke 

19,  12  ff. 

2  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  195. 

3  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  196. 

4  Kephala,  op.  cit.,  p.  188. 


192 


III.— SIN  AND  SALVATION 


includes  all  the  sufferings1  which  our  Lord  underwent  for  us, 
from  Bethlehem  to  Calvary.  Though  man  by  sin  is  under  sen¬ 
tence  of  death  by  the  righteous  and  holy  decree  of  God,  yet 
God’s  mercy  demanded  that  man  be  saved  from  destruction  and 
that  he  be  restored  to  fellowship  with  God  after  his  guilt  and 
condemnation  had  been  removed.  Since  man  was  incapable  of 
accomplishing  this  for  himself  and  achieving  his  own  salvation, 
God  found  the  means  to  accomplish  it,  in  the  Incarnation.  Our 
Lord  taking  our  nature,  compensates  for  the  guilt  and  punish¬ 
ment  of  sin  by  suffering  for  us,  and  His  death  counter-balances 
the  eternal  death  to  which  our  race  was  doomed.  His  work 
then  as  priest  is  unique  and  sole,  once  for  all  and  final,  as  the 
words  of  Ps.  110,  4  (cf.  Heb.  6,20)  signify.  He  offered  a  true 
sacrifice  as  the  true  Priest,  His  Body  and  His  Life,  not  only  as 
an  act  of  obedience  but  as  well  as  an  evidence  of  His  Love.  He 
“became  a  curse  for  us”  to  redeem  the  world  from  the  curse  of 
the  law.2  So  His  work  is  described  as  propitiatory.3  The  idea 
of  sacrifice,  symbolized  in  the  Old  Testament,  was  realized  in 
the  fact  of  His  Sacrifice  whereby  He  made  atonement  for  us 
with  God.4  “His  death  on  the  Cross  was  the  Propitiation  par 
excellence,  and  the  Great  Sacrifice  of  Redemption.  From  it 
flowed,  as  from  a  source,  the  merit  of  Christ,  conveying  forgive¬ 
ness  of  sins  through  Him  the  great  High  Priest,  the  Mediator 
between  God  and  man.”  It  was  absolutely  necessary  for  the 
salvation  of  man,  and  His  death  was  in  behalf  of,  and  for,  man.5 
“His  Sacrifice  is  the  cleansing  bath  of  humanity,  purifying  and 
washing  away  every  taint  of  sin  from  the  race,  and  sanctifying 
those  who  believe  in  Him.”  His  priesthood  is  as  different  from 

1  So  Androutsos  (op.  cit.,  p.  196),  Macarius  (op.  cit.,  II,  pp.  152- 
186),  and  Mesolora  (op.  cit.,  Ill,  p.  235)  who  loc.  cit.,  gives  other  refer¬ 
ences. 

2  Gal.  3,  13;  Heb.  5,  1 ;  8,  3;  Phil.  2,  8;  Rom.  5,  19;  Gal. 
1,  4;  2,  20;  1  Cor.  15,  3,  5,  7;  Rom.  3,  25 ;  2  Cor.  5,  21;  1  St.  Pet.  2, 
20-24;  1  St.  John  2,  2. 

3  On  the  seven  titles  of  the  Saviour  in  the  New  Testament,  cf.  Ke- 
phala,  op.  cit.,  pp.  189-190;  references,  ibid. 

4  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  197-198. 

5  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  III.  pp.  230-231;  for  the  evidence  of  the  Sym¬ 
bolic  Books,  cf.  in  vol.  I.  ibid.,  Mogila,  pp.  309-401 ;  Kritopoulos,  pp. 
305-306;  Gennadius,  p.  76;  vol  II.  Dositheus,  p.  107.  Platon’s  Catech. 
sect.  23;  Macarius,  op.  cit.,  II.  pp.  152-187. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  OUR  LORD’S  PERSON 


193 


that  of  Aaron  “as  a  body  is  from  the  shadow  which  accompanies 
it,”  for  the  Aaronic  priesthood  was  only  a  type,  a  foreshadowing, 
and  a  promise,  of  what  was  to  come.1 

Scriptural  teaching  as  to  the  Atonement  was  naturally  sub¬ 
ject  to  development  and  more  extended  exposition  with  the  pro¬ 
gress  of  Christian  thought.  The  early  Fathers,  notably  Origen, 
St.  Gregory  of  Nyssa,  St.  Ambrose,  and  St.  Gregory  the  Great, 
expounding  the  notion  of  Our  Lord's  death  from  the  side  of  love, 
not  of  justice,  interpreted  it  as  redemption  from  the  power  of 
Satan.  Yet  St.  Irenaeus2  and  St.  Athanasius  both  brought  out 
the  other  aspect  of  the  death  of  Christ  on  Calvary,  as  a  repre¬ 
sentative  sacrifice  removing  the  guilt  of  sin.  “He  offered  a  sac¬ 
rifice  for  all,”  St.  Athansius  says,  “in  behalf  of  all  giving  over 
the  temple  of  Himself  unto  death.”3  The  moral  necessity  of  the 
death  of  the  Cross,  St.  Anselm  developed  in  his  theory  founded 
on  the  idea  of  guilt  and  satisfaction,  as  did  Nicholas  of  Methone 
independently  of  St.  Anselm.  The  theory  of  Nicholas4  may  be 
summarized  as  follows :  “Men  as  sinful  are  subject  to  death  and 
to  its  originator,  the  devil.  Deliverance  .  .  .  can  be  achieved 
through  the  death  not  of  a  man — for  lie  as  himself  guilty,  could 
only  make  expiation  for  himself  and  for  none  other — but  of  some 
sinless  being.  God  foresaw  this  contingency  and  His  love  de¬ 
creed  that  His  Son  should,  by  becoming  man,  offer  Himself  for 
men  to  deliver  them  from  slavery  to  Satan  and  sin.  This  Re¬ 
deemer  must  needs  be  God-Man — God,  that  His  sacrifice  could 
be  efficacious,  and  man,  that  He  should  be  able  to  suffer,  and 
serve  men  as  the  prototype  in  the  struggle  for  the  conquest  over 
evil.” 

“While  Nicholas  sees  the  death  of  the  Lord  as  necessary  .  . 
in  order  to  do  away  with  the  power  of  Satan,  St.  Anselm  relates 
it  to  the  divine  Holiness.  Sin  is,  for  him,  an  injury  to  the  honor 
of  God,  in  that  the  sinner  refuses  to  offer  God  the  honor  due  Him 
by  not  submitting  his  will  to  God .  .  .  The  only  attitude  God 

^ephala,  op.  cit.,  p.  189. 

2  Adv.  haer.,  III.  18.  1. 

3  De  Incarnatione  verbi  Dei,  20,  and  Adv.  Arianos  Orat.,  1,  60.  in 
Migne,  P.G.  t.  XXVI,  139. 

4  Anecd.  1,  25,  quoted  by  Androutsos  (op.  cit.,  pp.  199-200)  from 
Hagenbacli’s  Dogmengeschichte  (5th  Ed.,  pp.  417  ff.). 


194 


III.— SIN  AND  SALVATION 


may  adopt  towards  such  conduct  on  the  part  of  His  creature  (to 
preserve  both  His  honor  and  the  harmony  and  order  of  His  uni¬ 
verse)  is  either  (to  demand)  satisfaction  for  or  punishment  of, 
sin.  That  is,  to  compensate  for  His  outraged  dignity  He  de¬ 
mands  one  of  two  things :  either  that  man  should  freely  make 
satisfaction  to  God  by  yielding  over  what  is  God's  due,  or  else 
that  God  should  punish  man  by  depriving  him  of  the  blessedness 
and  of  the  other  good  things  that  would  have  been  his  had  he 
not  sinned.  Of  the  two  ways  God,  in  His  mercy,  chose  the  way 
of  satisfaction .  .  .  But  man  could  not  in  any  way  make  satis¬ 
faction  to  God,  since  all  that  he  is  and  has  to  offer,  he  is  already 
obliged  to  offer  to  God.  So  God's  charge  against  man  is  so 
great  that  it  cannot  be  compensated  for  by  the  whole  world,  or 
by  anything  and  everything  outside  God,  but  only  by  something 
still  greater,  that  is  by  God  Himself .  .  .  Hence  since  God  can¬ 
not  Himself  make  satisfaction  (nor  can  man)  for  what  man 
owes,  only  one  who  combines  divinity  and  manhood,  or,  God  as 
man,  can  satisfy  the  divine  righteousness.  This  satisfaction  by 
the  God-Man  must  not  be  merely  submission  of  the  God-Man  to 
God,  since  everv  rational  being  owes  this  to  God  in  any  case 
but  the  death  of  the  Cross  which  the  Lord  was  not  bound  to  of¬ 
fer,  either  naturally  or  morally.  .  .  So  the  death  to  which  the 
Saviour  submitted  is  the  perfect  satisfaction  of  God.  As  dying 
is  the  greatest  loss  of  man,  and  life  the  greatest  good,  it  is  ob¬ 
vious  that  the  oblation  of  His  life  on  the  part  of  the  God-Man 
possessed  propitiatory  and  satisfying  power,  compensating  and 
even  more  than  compensating,  for  all  the  sins  of  the  world.  .  . 
Since  Christ  as  God  offered  what  was  not  His  bounden  duty,  the 
recompense  He  made  is  transferred  to  (the  credit  of)  all  His 
brethren  after  the  flesh  who  were  bound  to  make  it.”1  “It  is  ap¬ 
parent'’,  says  Androutsos  commenting  upon  this  theory,  “that 
this  latter  theory  of  the  merit  of  Christ  is  entirely  superfluous. 
Since  the  satisfaction  of  God  is  the  deliverance  of  man  from 
punishment,  and  the  punishment  consisted  in  being  deprived  of 
the  good  things  for  which  man  was  created,  satisfaction  restores 
man  to  his  first  state  and  achieves  just  what  Christ’s  merit 
achieves.  The  Anselmic  theory  differs  from  previous  concep¬ 
tions  of  Christ’s  death  in  the  Church  ...  by  making  use  of 

1  In  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  199-201. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  OUR  LORD'S  PERSON 


195 


elements  either  entirely  other  than  those  in  the  Church’s  theory 
or  rather  by  being  developed  under  the  influence  of  alien  factors 
— such  as  the  conception  of  sin  in  this  acceptance  of  the  term,  as 
a.  detraction  of  God's  honor.  .  .  .  The  notion,  however,  of 
Christ’s  death  as  reconciling  .  .  .  God's  holiness  or  His  right¬ 
eousness  with  His  love,  and  as  substitutionary  in  assuming  the 
punishment  of  men,  is  the  basis  upon  which  in  Holy  Scripture 
the  death  of  Christ  is  founded,  the  height  from  which  the 
Fathers  also  view  it.”1 

Protestant  theories  of  the  Atonement  have  attempted  to 
grapple  with  a  very  real  difficulty  involved  in  the  dogma:  how 
it  is  possible  for  the  death  of  one  to  make  satisfaction  for 
others  as  their  representative,  and  how  an  innocent  man  may 
suffer  or  be  punished  for  the  guilty.  So  Protestant  theology 
sees  in  the  Atonement  only  the  manifestation  of  the  greatness 
of  the  love  of  God,  of  the  appalling  enormity  of  sin,  and  of  the 
gulf  between  man  and  God  created  by  sin.  Such  a  conception 
of  the  Cross  deprives  the  death  of  Christ  of  its  fundamental 
character,  making  of  it  something  secondary  and  unnecessary.2 

The  Sacrifice  of  the  Cross  is  of  the  greatest  value  and 
worth,  in  that  not  only  did  human  nature  suffer,  the  principium 
quo ,  but  that  also  He  who  offered  that  Sacrifice  and  was  Him¬ 
self  sacrificed,  the  principium  quod ,  was  God  Himself.  The 
magnitude  of  the  oblation  is  also  apparent  from  the  greatness 
of  the  self-abnegation  of  Our  Lord  in  giving  Himself  to  His 
Passion  and  Death.  Hence  “both  the  power  and  fruits  of  it 
extend.  .  .  .to  all  men  of  all  times  and  to  nature  groaning  and 
waiting  for  freedom  from  the  bondage  of  corruption.”*  “The 
power  of  the  atoning  death  of  Christ”,  says  Mesolora,  “together 
with  its  consequences,  extends  over  all  men,  .  .  .  avails  for  all 
sins,  .  .  .  and  operates  through  all  time,  from  the  beginning  of 
the  Fall  of  man  until  the  consummation  of  the  world.”4  The 
death  of  the  Cross  also  availed  to  obtain  a  glory  “which  is  not 
only  a  natural  consequence  of  the  hypostatic  union  but  at 

1  Ibid.,  p.  201. 

2Androutsos,  \oynaTLnr),  pp.  201-202;  for  more  extended  treatment, 
cf.  Zv/u/3o\i/c77,  pp.  182-190. 

3  Aoy/jLaTLKTj,  p.  202;  cf.  Rom.  8,  21;  2  St.  Pet.  3,  13. 

4  Op.  cit.,  III.  p.  236;  cf.  1  St.  John  2,  2;  1  St.  John  1,  7;  Heb.  1,  14. 


196 


III.— SIN  AND  SALVATION 


the  same  time  a  positive  reward  which  the  Saviour  obtained 
for  the  human  race,  having  accomplished  His  saving  work 
and  undergone  (the  death  of)  the  Cross/’1 

The  Sacrifice  of  the  Cross  is  entire,  complete,  and  plenary, 
and  there  is  no  ground  for  the  Roman  doctrine  of  “super¬ 
abundant  satisfaction”  even  in  such  texts  as  St.  John  2,  2, 
Heb.  10,  14,  and  Rom.  5,  15.*  According  to  the  Roman  notion, 
the  Grace  of  Christ  abounds  and  exceeds  the  sin  of  men;  if 
the  two  were  put  into  a  balance-scale,  His  Grace  would  im¬ 
measurably  outweigh  our  sin.  This  sort  of  deduction  is  en¬ 
tirely  foreign  to  the  Apostle’s  thought,  for  he  simply  says  that 
if  transgression  brought  death  upon  men,  it  is  the  more  certain 
that  the  Grace  of  Christ  brings  salvation.  So  too  in  the 
Fathers,  the  comparison  is  only  to  indicate  the  greatness  of 
the  Redemption  in  Christ  as  against  the  sin  of  man  and  its 
consequences.  “But  this  notion  of  the  superabounding  satis¬ 
faction  of  Our  Lord  is  a  matter  without  any  practical  signifi¬ 
cance,  since  whether  the  satisfaction  be  sufficient  or  more  than 
sufficient,  it  amounts  to  the  same  thing:  in  His  death.... all 
the  sins  of  man  are  atoned  for.”  Its  only  practical  connection 
is  with  the  development  of  the  theory  of  the  treasury  of  merits 
and  indulgences,  which  will  be  noticed  later.3 

“The  Sacrifice  of  the  Cross  once  for  all  consummated, 
takes  place,  so  to  speak,  both  in  heaven  and  on  earth.  So  in 
the  Sacrifice  of  the  Eucharist  (which  is  an  actual  Sacrifice 
in  which  Our  Lord,  as  we  shall  see,  offers  Himself  through 
the  priest  for  the  personal  application  of  the  fruits  of  Gol¬ 
gotha),  (and)  in  heaven,  “He  maketh  intercession  for  us”,4 
through  which  Intercession  He  makes  the  benefits  of  the  Cross 
available  to  men.  . .  .It  is  an  actual  prayer  like  that  which  He 
made  upon  earth  for  us”,  as  the  above  text  implies. 

Finally,  the  doctrine  of  the  Church  is  firmly  opposed  to 

1  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  203  and  cf.  notes;  see  also  Dyobouniotes’ 
'H  Aoy/x.  ’AvSp.  Kpiv.,  p.  38  and  Androutsos’  Aoyp..  MeX.,  A',  pp.  102-103. 

2 Macarius  (op.  cit.,  II.  p.  176)  and  Antonius  (op.  cit.,  p.  258) 
both  follow  Roman  teaching  on  this  point,  on  which  cf.  Androutsos, 
AoypaTiKTj,  p.  203-4,  note  6,  and  Mesolora’s  discussion,  op.  cit.,  III. 
pp.  237-239. 

s  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  204-205.  On  the  Roman  doctrine  of  works 
of  supererogation  and  indulgences,  cf.  pp.  367-370  following. 

4  Heb.  5,  25  and  cf.  9,  24;  1  St.  John  2,  1;  Rom.  8,  34. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  OUR  LORD'S  PERSON 


197 


any  notion  of  the  Sacrifice  of  the  Cross  based  upon  dualistic 
principles,  such  as  Manichaeism  or  Gnosticism,  as  well  as 
against  the  Pelagian  and  pantheistic  notions.  According  to 
Manichaeism,  the  Sacrifice  was  only  the  deliverance  of  the  soul 
from  the  evil  of  the  physical  body.  Pelagianism  held  it  as 
superfluous,  since  the  Saviour  came  “not  to  make  atonement 
but  to  teach  and  stimulate  men  by  His  example."  According 
to  the  pantheistic  hypothesis,  evil  is  only  a  stage  in  the  evolu¬ 
tion  of  man,  and  is  outgrown  in  the  course  of  his  development. 
“The  Church  (in  opposition  to  these  theories)  teaches,  .that 
sin  does  not  proceed.  .  .  .from  matter  but  from  the  free  will  of 
man;  that  Redemption  is  not  only  a  deliverance  from  a  hostile 
principle  but  also  friendship  with  God.  .  .  .  ;  that  sin  proceeds 
from  human  freedom,  which  has  involved  man  in  a  depth  of 
corruption  from  which  only  the  Sacrifice  of  the  Cross  could 
save  us ; .  . .  .  that  Redemption  is  a  real  and  actual  thing — we 
have  in  Christ  Jesus  not  simply  the  consciousness  of  Redemp¬ 
tion  but  atonement  from  our  sins  in  very  fact."1 

(b)  Our  Lord  as  Prophet2 

As  Prophet,  Our  Lord  taught  in  word  and  deed  the  eternal 
truth  of  which  He  was  the  embodiment  incarnate.  He  “is 
the  Way,  the  Truth,  and  the  Life."3  He  came  to  deliver  man 
from  the  evil  of  his  perverse  way,  and  to  restore  to  him  the 
possibility  of  knowing  the  truth  for  which  he  was  created,4 5 
both  in  the  sphere  of  religious  truth  and  in  that  of  moral  or 
ethical  truth.  He  only  could  lead  man  to  this  fulness  of 
knowledge;  He  only  “satisfied  the  mind  and  filled  the  void 
of  men’s  hearts  and  appeased ....  the  longing  desires  of  the 
human  soul.”''  Our  Lord  announced  the  eternal  plan  and  will 
of  God,  the  full  truths  of  the  Faith,  and  the  true  principles 
of  worship.  He  was  more  than  a  prophet,  for  His  wisdom  was 
the  boundless  wisdom  of  God.  His  teaching  was  not  only  in 

1  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  205-207. 

2  This  arrangement  of  the  material  is  that  of  Androutsos,  not  of 
Mesolora  and  Kephala,  who  put  the  priestly  office  second. 

s  Cf.  Kephala,  op.  cit.,  pp.  7-9. 

4  Ibid.,  p.  177-179. 

5  Ibid.,  pp.  181-182. 


198 


III.— SIX  AND  SALVATION 


word,  but  in  deed,  evidencing  His  mission  by  miracles,  signs, 
and  wonders.1  In  Him  prophecy  was  complete,  who  was  the 
highest  and  greatest  teacher  of  mankind.2  The  truths  He 
revealed  were  those  about  God — His  Kature,  Persons,  Proper¬ 
ties,  and  Attributes;  about  Himself  as  the  Only  Begotten, 
sent  into  the  world,  to  suffer,  die,  and  rise  again;  about  the 
Holy  Spirit;  about  man — his  fall,  need  of  regeneration,  im¬ 
mortality,  the  brotherhood  of  all  men,  and  the  like.3  As  prophet 
He  foretold  the  fall  of  Jerusalem  and  the  future  of  His 
Church.4 5 6  As  His  miracles  exceeded  in  power,  in  character, 
and  in  their  source,  those  of  the  prophets  before  Him,  so  did 
His  teaching.'  There  is  a  threefold  difference  between  Our 
Lord  and  the  prophets  of  the  Old  Testament:  they  were  in¬ 
spired  by  the  Word — He  was  the  Word  in  whom  inhered  all 
wisdom  and  might;  they  taught  about  Him,  the  Word,  and 
He  proclaimed  and  lived  what  they  taught  in  prophecy;  the 
prophets  spake  once,  or  according  to  the  term  of  their  natural 
lives,  but  He  “as  the  Eternal  Prophet  speakes  eternally  in 
His  Church.."0  Both  the  Mosaic  law,  the  ritual  and  cere¬ 
monial  ordinances  which  looked  forward  to  Him  by  promise, 
and  the  moral  law,  had  fulfilment  and  completion  in  Him, 
who  delivered  them  from  the  meticulous  and  literal  observance 
which  they  had  at  the  hands  of  the  Pharisees  and  other  Jewish 
teachers.  This  same  office  Our  Lord  exercises  in  His  Church, 
illuminating  its  teachings  by  the  light  of  His  Holy  Spirit  and 
guiding  and  directing  it  in  the  understanding  and  interpre¬ 
tation  of  His  Word.7 

(c)  Our  Lord  as  King 

As  the  Old  Testament  accorded  to  the  expected  Messiah 
the  powers  of  royalty,8  so  in  His  fulfilment  of  these  prophecies 
did  our  Lord  show  forth  His  office  as  King.  He  “bore  the 


1  Ibid.,  p.  182;  cf.  St.  John  10,  38. 

2  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  207. 

3Kephala,  op.  cit.,  pp.  183-184,  with  full  references. 

4  Kephala,  ibid.,  pp.  185-186. 

5  Androutsos,  ibid.,  pp.  207-208. 

6  Kephala,  op.  cit.,  p.  1S7. 

7  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  208-209,  and  cf.  Mesolora,  III.  p.  225. 

8  Cf.  Ps.  2,  71;  Isaiah,  9,  6-7;  Jer.  23,  5-6;  Zech.  9,  9-10. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  OUR  LORD'S  PERSON 


199 


kingly  crown,  whether  as  glorified  by  God  and  named  His 
Beloved  Son,  or  as  founding  His  Church  and  Kingdom,  or  as 
performing  miracles,  being  shown  thereby  as  Lord  of  heaven 
and  earth,  of  things  visible  and  invisible.  His  royal  glory 
was  completed  in  the  Ascension  and  Session  at  the  right  hand 
of  the  Father,  whence  through  His  Spirit  He  administers 
His  Church  and  judges  the  world,  being  at  the  same  time 
Judge  and  merciful  King,  having  all  power  in  heaven  and 
earth.”1  The  Jews  expected  a  King,  but  awaited  one  who 
was  to  be  a  worldly  ruler  and  prince.  The  Kingdom  of  our 
Lord,  however,  is  of  a  nature  consistent  with  the  divine  plan 
of  redemption,  a  spiritual  and  moral,  not  an  earthly,  kingdom.2 
“Having  purchased  back  mankind  from  the  bondage  of  death 
and  sin  at  the  price  of  His  death  on  the  cross,  He  founded  His 
spiritual  Kingdom ....  In  it  He  achieves  His  work  of 
salvation,  teaching  men  through  the  Holy  Spirit  the  word  of 
God,  and  communicates  His  Grace  through  the  sacraments.  .  .  . 
Thus  His  kingly  office  is  inextricably  bound  up  with  His 
priestly  and  prophetic  offices.”3  “As  King.  .He  is  to  judge 
the  quick  and  the  dead  and  reward  each  according  to  his 
works.”4  His  royal  office  Our  Lord  exercised  only  in  part  on 
earth,  in  working  miracles,  establishing  the  laws  of  His  King¬ 
dom,  and  the  like,  but  His  royal  power  is  chiefly  seen  in 
His  descent  into  hell,  His  Ascension,  and  His  heavenly  work.6 

Our  Lord’s  triumphant  entry  into  the  domain  of  death 
has  always  been  part  of  the  Christian  Faith.  The  evidence 
of  Holy  Scripture  is  more  explicitly  expounded  by  the  Fathers, 
the  summary  of  which  is,  that  the  Lord  after  His  death  on 
the  Cross  descended  with  His  soul  into  Hell.6  According  to 
Mesolora,  the  purpose  of  Our  Lord’s  descent  was  “to  preach 

1  Mesolora  op.  cit.,  III.  p.  226. 

2Cf.  St.  Luke  1,  33;  1  Tim.  6,  15;  St.  Matt.  28,  18;  cf.  also  Kep- 
bala,  op.  cit.,  p.  191. 

3  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  210. 

4  Kephala,  op.  cit.,  p.  191. 

5  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  211,  cf.  St.  Matt.  10,  914;  1;  St.  Luke 
10,  16. 

6  Cf .  Acts,  2,  27;  Eph.  4,  9,  and  1  St.  Peter  3,  18;  4,  6;  patristic 
evidence,  p.  212  of  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  note  1 ;  symbolic  evidence,  Meso¬ 
lora,  1.  op.  cit.,  Mogila,  p.  402;  Kritopoulos,  p.  306;  St.  John  Dam., 
wEk5o<tls,  III.  70,  76,  et  al. 


200 


III— SIX  AND  SALVATION 


salvation  and  forgiveness  to  the  captives,  and  to  extend  to 
those  who  had  gone  before,  His  Redemptive  work”1  and  its 
benefits.  The  vast  range  of  speculation  and  supposition  about 
the  significance  of  the  descent  into  Hell  has  developed  many 
questions:  Was  it  only  an  extension  of  His  Prophetic  work? 
Was  it  simply  as  extending  His  redemption  to  those  not  on 
earth?  Did  He  descend  directly  after  His  death  or  after  His 
Resurrection  ?  What  is  “heir' — the  place  of  condemnation,  or 
the  limbus  patr-um,  as  the  Western  Church  holds?  In  default 
of  explicit  revelation  on  the  subject,  Androutsos"  says  that  we 
should  keep  free  from  speculation  where  it  has  no  warrant,  and 
confine  ourselves  to  the  definite  teaching  of  the  Church.  This 
may  be  summarized  in  the  three  statements:  (a)  “The  descent 
into  hell  took  place  before  the  Resurrection,  as  the  Fathers 
held  and  as  the  mention  of  the  fact  in  the  Apostles’  Creed,  be¬ 
tween  the  burial  and  the  Resurrection,  indicates;  (b)  it  is 
both  a  confirmation  of  the  death  of  Our  Lord  and  of  the 
existence  in  Him  of  a  human  soul,  as  well  as  the  actual  tri¬ 
umphant  manifestation  of  Our  Lord  entering  and  despoiling 
the  power  of  death.  ...  ;(c)  it  exercised  a  salutary  effect  on 
the  state  of  the  dead.  But  what  this  was  and  to  whom  it 
was  extended  cannot  be  determined.  .  .  .  The  opinion  of  many 
Fathers  seems  to  commend  itself  as  more  probable  that  the 
deliverance  of  the  righteous  men  of  the  Old  Testament  was 
the  saving  operation  of  Our  Lord  in  descending  into  hell.”* 

“Our  Lord's  Resurrection  is  the  seal  and  validation  of 
that  truth  of  our  Faith  which  constitutes  the  center  of  the 
evangelical  message,  and  is  at  the  same  time  the  guarantee 
and  earnest  of  the  Resurrection  of  all.  The  Ascension  and 
Session  at  the  right  hand .  .  show  forth  the  glory,  the  might, 
and  the  authoritv  which  Our  Lord  had,  even  in  His  human 
nature,  over  all  that  is  in  heaven,  on  earth,  and  under  the 
earth.  The  final  act  and  manifestation  of  the  kingly  might 
of  our  Lord  is  the  last  judgment  of  the  world  in  time,  in 
which  He  will  judge  the  quick  and  the  dead,  and  make  a 

1  Mesolora  op.  cit.,  III.  p.  240. 

-  Op.  cit.,  p.  213. 

s  Op.  cit.,  p.  214,  and  cf.  the  whole  discussion  in  Mesolora,  op.  cit., 
III.  pp.  239-242. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  OUR  LORD’S  PERSON 


201 


new  heaven  and  earth  in  which  He  will  rule  with  the  elect 
of  His  Kingdom  forever.”1 

B.  Redemption,  Atonement,  and  Salvation 

The  work  of  Our  Lord  in  making  atonement  for  man,  in 
achieving  his  redemption,  and  propitiating  the  Divine  Justice 
has,  as  has  been  shown  above,  a  universal,  complete,  and  final 
character.  The  Greek  theologians  distinguish  two  meanings 
of  Redemption:  objectively,  it  is  the  deliverance  of  fallen 
man  from  sin,  and  subjectively,  the  personal  appropriation 
of  this  great  achievement  by  the  individual,  through  the  Holy 
Spirit.2  “Redemption”,  says  Mesolora,  “in  its  widest  mean¬ 
ing  includes  the  whole  Revelation  of  God,  His  Providence 
and  His  particular  activity  directed  towards  the  salvation  of 
man.  In  general,  all  the  works  of  God  to  the  end  of  removing 
sin,  from  the  Fall  of  man  on,  are  called  ‘redemption’,  which  is, 
negatively,  the  deliverance  from  sin,  and  positively,  the  sanc¬ 
tification  of  man.  Redemption  includes  three  things — (a)  the 
doctrine  of  Our  Lord  as  Redeemer  of  the  world;  (b)  the  doc¬ 
trine  of  His  redemptive  work  applied  to  men  by  Grace  and 
adoption;  and  (c)  the  doctrine  of  the  continuity,  preserva¬ 
tion,  and  functioning  of  the  Church  founded  by  Him.”3  In 
another  connection  he  says :  “The  Atonement,  through  the 
death  of  our  Lord  on  the  Cross,  did  not  render  sin  non-exist¬ 
ent,  nor  does  it  take  away  the  consequences  and  burden  of  it, 
for  this  is  in  entire  opposition  to  the  ethical  order  of  the 
universe  and  to  the  Holiness  of  God.  Atonement  and  Redemp¬ 
tion  removed  only  the  middle  wall  of  partition  separating 
man  from  God,  and  procured  eternal  life.  The  merit  of 
Christ  lies  for  us  in  the  forgiveness  of  sins  and  union  with 
God.  This  was  attained  objectively  through  the  Sacrifice  of 
the  Cross;  it  is  accomplished  subjectively  in  each  of  us  by 

1  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  214-215.  He  has  a  note  at  the  end 
of  the  chapter  (pp.  215-217)  on  the  question  of  the  two  states  of 
Our  Lord — humiliation  and  exaltation.  This  two-fold  division  is 
often  used  as  the  scheme  for  presenting  Christologv  in  Orthodox  dog¬ 
matic.  For  eschatological  doctrine,  cf.  pp.  416-422  following. 

*  Cf.  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  167;  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  Ill,  p.  204, 
note  1. 

*  Op.  cit.,  III.  p.  229,  note  I. 


202 


III.— SIN  AND  SALVATION 


* 

his  own  appropriation  of  the  Grace  flowing  from  the  Cross,  and 
the  life  of  faith.  . .  .  As  Christ  died  to  sin  to  make  satisfaction  to 
the  divine  righteousness,  so  each  man  must  die  to  sin,  having 
the  life  and  suffering  of  the  Saviour  as  his  example.  Only 
one  who  strives  and  conquers  in  this  struggle, — through  the 
life-giving  Grace  of  God  revealed  completely  in  the  death  on  the 
Cross  of  the  Only  Begotten  Son  of  God,  and  through  the  ex¬ 
ercise  of  his  own  free  will  cooperating  with  it, — is  redeemed, 
justified,  sanctified,  and  saved....”1  In  Androutsos’  words: 
“The  death  of  the  Cross  established  fellowship  between  God 
and , man  in  the  sense  that  there -was  no  obstacle  on  God’s 
side  for  the  rehabilitation  of  man,  and  the  way  of  salvation 
and  eternal  life  was  opened  up  to  man.  But  in  order  for 
man  *to  lay  hold  of  and  make  these  good  things  his  own  it  is 
necessary  that  God  should  extend  to  him  a  helping  hand;  man 
having  fallen  into  the  depth  of  destruction  through  sin  can¬ 
not  raise  himself  up.  . .  .He  stands  in  need  of  divine  assistance 
throughout ....  The  whole  doctrine  of  Grace,  the  Church,  and 
the  Sacraments .  .  is  concerned  with  the  appropriation  of  the 
redemptive  work”2  of  our  Lord. 

1  Op.  cit.,  pp.  231-232,  note  I. 

2  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  218. 


LECTURE  IV. 

IV.— DOCTRINE  OF  GRACE  AND 
OF  THE  CHURCH 


LECTURE  IV. 

THE  DOCTRINE  OF  GRACE  AND  OF  THE  CHURCH 


Contents 

Pages 

Introduction :  The  sources  of  modern  Orthodox 
teaching 

(a)  The  development  of  modern  theology  206-208 

(b)  The  authority  and  acts  of  Post-Reforma¬ 
tion  synods  208-218 


Pages 

206-218 


1.  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  GRACE 


1.  The  Nature  of  Grace 

Definition  218-221 

God's  Foreknowledge,  Predestination, 

Grace,  and  Free-Will  221-225 

2.  The  Operation  of  Grace 

Justification,  as  (1)  remission  of  sins  226-230 

(2)  sanctification  230-231 

3.  Faith  and  Good  Works 

St.  Paul's  and  St.  James’  doctrine  232-234 

Protestant  and  Roman  theories  234-236 


218-225 


226-230 


231-236 


II.  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  CHURCH  237-267 


1. 

Die 

Conception  and  Mission  of  the  Church 

237-239 

o 

The 

Church  divinely  founded  and  estab¬ 

lished 

239-241 

3. 

The 

Nature  of  the  Church 

241-246 

The  \otes  of  the  Church 

243-246 

4. 

The 

Constitution  and  Organization  of  the 

Church 

246-249 

5. 

Die 

Orthodox  Church 

249-263 

(a)  is  the  only  true  Church,  and 

249-253 

(b)  hence  is  infallible; 

254-259 

(c)  there  can  be  no  “branches”  of  the 

Church 

259-263 

Additional  Note:  The  Rebaptism  of  Latins 


263-268 


DOCTRINE  OF  GRACE  AND  OF  THE  CHURCH 


Introduction :  The  Sources  of  Modern  Orthodox  Teaching 

The  subject  matter  of  the  present  lecture  is  distinguished 
from  that  of  the  preceding  lectures  in  several  respects.  In 
the  first  place  the  development  of  the  theology  of  Grace,  so 
far  as  concerns  the  Eastern  Church,  is  in  the  largest  degree 
a  modern  achievement.  For  practically  all  the  explicit  teach¬ 
ing  we  are  dependent  upon  the  work  of  synods  and  councils  sub¬ 
sequent  to  the  Ecumenical  Councils  for  the  basis  of  the  ma¬ 
terial  of  this  and  the  following  lectures.  This  brings  up  the 
question,  Of  what  weight  are  the  dogmatic  formulations  of 
Orthodoxy  since  the  time  of  the  Ecumenical  Councils?  As 
we  saw  in  Lecture  I,1  the  full  tradition  of  the  Church  includes 
more  than  the  decrees  of  the  Ecumenical  Councils,  since  im¬ 
portant  doctrines  of  the  Church — the  Sacraments,  Justification, 
and  the  like — were  not  enunciated  until  after  the  Schism.* 
Rhosse  holds  that  the  decrees  and  definitions  of  the  Councils 
and  Synods  of  the  16th  century  and  on,  have  binding  force 
upon  every  true  member  of  the  Orthodox  Church;3  Mesolora 
says  that  they  have  not  the  obligatory  character  of  the  Creed 
and  of  the  Seven  Ecumenical  Councils,  but  are  only  of  illus¬ 
trative  and  secondary  value;4  Androutsos  calls  them  “secon¬ 
dary  authorities. 5,5  The  decisions  of  local  synods  and  coun¬ 
cils,  particularly  those  since  the  Schism,  are  valid  insofar  as 
they  “add  nothing  new,  but  simply  expound  by  way  of  defense 
or  by  way  of  refuting  errors,  those  dogmatic.  .  .  .truths  for- 

xPp.  27-30. 

2  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  59-60  and  note. 

3  Ibid. 

4  Op.  cit.,  I.  pp.  12-13. 

5  Aoy/jLariKTi,  p.  20. 


DOCTRINE  OF  GRACE  AND  OF  THE  CHURCH 


207 


mulated  or  simply  touched  upon  in  the  Ecumenical  Councils.”1 
In  other  words,  such  councils  subsequent  to  the  Schism  as 
confirm,  expound,  and  more  explicitly  state  the  content  of 
the  Faith — consonant  with  the  decrees  of  the  Ecumeni¬ 
cal  Councils,  the  Fathers,  and  the  Creed — have  binding 
force  upon  all  Orthodox.  In  this  sense  only  are  they  “secon¬ 
dary",  and  not  on  a  par  with  the  Ecumenical  Councils.  “Lo¬ 
cal  synods  have  always  had  the  character  of  consultative"  (that 
is,  rather  than  legislative)  “bodies.  Their  rulings  have  the 
weight  of  directive  principles  because  of  the  Bishops  who  were 
present,  but  they  are  not  laws  in  the  sense  in  which  the  rulings 
of  the  Ecumenical  Councils  are  so  described."2  The  rulings 
of  such  councils  were  subject  to  revision,  ratification,  and  re¬ 
affirmation  on  the  part  of  subsequent  gatherings.  The  seal  of 
acceptance  by  the  mind  of  the  Church  in  later  synods  served 
to  consolidate  and  make  immutable,  decrees  passed  in  local 
gatherings.  For  instance,  the  rulings  of  the  Synod  of  1667 
were  subsequently  ratified  in  1682,  and  this  latter  synod  said: 
“AYe  pronounce  that  all  other  acts  done  by  the  Holy  Synod 
stand  unchanged  and  immutable  (d/xeraKiV^Ta  kol  dixeTaTpeirra) 
as  having  been  done  rightly  and  lawfully."3  It  is  apparent 
then,  that  the  subsequent  ratification  of  the  acts  of  a  local 
synod  by  other  assemblies  or  councils  accords  to  such  acts  a 
real,  definite,  and  binding  authority,  and  that  the  reason 
prompting  such  ratification  and  validation,  in  the  case  of  dog¬ 
matic  pronouncements,  is  their  consistency  in  doctrine  and  its 
formulation  with  what  had  been  defined4  before  by  the  chief 
authorities  of  the  Orthodox  Church — the  Bible,  and  Sacred 
Tradition,  that  is,  the  Ecumenical  Councils  and  the  teach¬ 
ing  of  the  Fathers.  There  is  then  a  genuine  and  actual  de¬ 
velopment  of  doctrine  in  the  Orthodox  Church,  and  an  ade¬ 
quate  organ  for  its  formulation,  Palmieri  to  the  contrary 

1  Mesolora,  Upclktlkti  QeoXoyia,  p.  29,  note  1 ;  cf.  his  definitions  of 
Orthodoxy,  and  his  discussion  of  Dogmatic,  pp.  17-18,  28-31  ibid. 

2  Aoki/ilov  ’Eiac\Ti<naaTiKov  Ackcllov,  by  the  Archimandrite  Apostolos 
Christodoulos,  Constantinople,  1896,  p.  50;  cf.  pp.  255-259  following. 

3  UarpLapxi-Kd  ''Eyypacpa,  Dilikanis,  vol.  III.  Constantinople,  1905, 
pp.  199-200. 

4  Cf.  Sakellaropoulos,  ’EKKX-qcnaaTLKov  biKcuov  rijs  avaroXurijs  opdodo^ov 
'EKtcX-rjaias,  Athens,  1898,  p.  37. 


208  IV.— DOCTRINE  OF  GRACE  AND  OF  THE  CHURCH 


notwithstanding.1  The  Orthodox  Church  claims  that  she  “has 
never  added  to  nor  changed  what  had  been  decreed  by  the 
Ecumenical  Councils ....  Her  dogmas  are  those  of  the  early 
Church ....  Her  teaching  is  primitive  Christianity.  ...  She 
holds  unaltered  and  immutable  the  primitive  and  genuine 
Christianity  of  the  first  eight  centuries,  which  was  first  preached 
by  the  Apostles  in  the  Greek  countries  and  in  the  Greek 
language.”2  The  Vincentian  canon,  according  to  Rhosse,  is 
“in  harmony  with  the  local  and  sectional  {pepiKai)  councils 
of  the  Eastern  Church  and  with  them  only” — that  is,  in  con¬ 
trast  to  Roman  development — “for  they  have  neither  added 
to,  nor  taken  away  from  the  dogmas  of  the  ancient  Catholic 
Church  of  the  time  before  the  Schism,  but  remain  faithful 
to  them,  thus  by  their  unanimity  of  teaching  and  true  ortho¬ 
doxy  forming  the  continuation,  truly  and  canonically,  of  the 
ancient  Catholic  Church.”3  What  is  taught  then  by  the  synods 
of  the  16th  century  and  on,  being  only  the  amplification  and 
formulation  in  explicit  language  of  the  teaching  of  the  Ca¬ 
tholic  Church,  has  for  all  practical  purposes  the  authority 
of  dogma  for  the  Orthodox  Church. 

The  explicit  formulation  of  the  doctrines  of  Grace,  Justi¬ 
fication,  the  Church,4  and  the  Sacraments,  is  due  chiefly  to 
the  local  synods  and  councils  subsequent  to  the  Reformation. 
We  have  come  to  discern  in  the  history  of  dogma  a  shifting 
of  interest  and  emphasis  in  the  presentation  of  the  content 
of  the  Christian  Truth  in  the  various  ages  of  the  Church. 
As  the  earliest  years  of  the  Church’s  life  were  devoted  to 
the  statement  of  its  doctrine  of  God  against  the  attacks  of 
heresies,  and  the  first  four  Ecumenical  Councils  were  given 
over  to  the  problems  of  Christology  under  the  stimulus  of 
heretical  teaching,  so  the  implications  of  the  third  clause  of 

1  Cf.  Theologia  Dogm.  Orth.,  vol.  I.  Ch.  3,  particularly  pp.  63  ff. 

2  ’AvrnraTUKd,  Diomede  Kyriakos,  Athens,  1893,  pp.  28,  46;  cf.  the 
’JZyKvicXios  rrjs  puds,  ay  las,  KadoXucrjs  kcli  dTroaroXiKijs  ’E/c/cX^cxtas  ’EttkttoXt? 
irpbs  tov s  airavra\ov  6p6o8o^ovs,  Constantinople,  1863;  Epistola  Dog- 
matica  Synoda  Constantinopolitanae,  1723-3,  in  Mansi,  etc. 

3  AoyyaTiKri,  pp.  103-104. 

4  “The  doctrine  of  the  Church,  from  the  (time  of  the)  Reformation, 
became  particularly  the  ‘sign  spoken  against,’  about  which  all  other 
dogmatic  differences  center.”  Androutsos,  2u/t l^oXikt),  p.  56. 


DOCTRINE  OF  GRACE  AND  OF  THE  CHURCH 


209 


the  Creed  were  left  to  the  work  of  the  Church  in  the  times 
subsequent  to  the  Ecumenical  Councils  for  explicit  statement 
and  formulation.  As  the  great  problems  which  agitated  the 
Church  of  the  first  eight  centuries  were  settled  once  for  all 
by  the  Ecumenical  Councils,  the  questions  brought  up  answered, 
and  the  discussion  closed,  so,  also,  in  regard  to  the  matters 
which  engaged  the  attention  of  the  Church  of  the  sixteenth 
and  following  centuries.  The  discussion  has  been  closed  “in 
a  sense”  only,  for  as  the  formulation  of  the  Christological 
doctrine  of  the  Church  served  to  determine  the  course  of 
subsequent  theological  thought,  so  the  decrees  of  the  synods 
and  councils  subsequent  to  the  Schism,  and  particularly  those 
of  the  last  three  centuries,  have  defined  in  advance  the  direc¬ 
tion  in  which  Orthodox  thought  was  to  move.  They  have 
determined  its  course  but  not  sterilized  its  development. 
In  other  wrords,  no  Orthodox  theologian  has  called  into  ques¬ 
tion  any  of  the  doctrines  embodied  in  authoritative  decrees  of 
the  synods  from  the  17th  century  on,  in  the  matters  of  which 
this  lecture  is  to  treat :  for  an  Orthodox  dogmatician  these 
questions  have  been  decided,  and  for  him  these  decrees  have 
the  force  of  dogma.1 

1  But  cf.  Diomede  Kyriakos,  writing  in  the  Jahrbiicher  fur  protes- 
tantische  Theologie,  vol.  XVI.  1890,  p.  153:  Die  theologische  Wis- 
senschaft  bewegt  sich  freier  bei  uns  als  in  der  papstlichen  Kirche.  Der 
Katechismus  von  Mogilas,  nnd  die  Bestimmungen  einigen  kleinen  Sy- 
noc/en  des  XVII.  Jahrhunderts  haben  bei  uns  keine  absolute  Geltung. 
Kyriakos  was  writing  clearly  for  Protestant  consumption,  and  his 
words  here  must  be  taken  in  connection  with  those  quoted  from  him 
above.  He  would  not.  for  example,  question  the  dogmas  about  the 
Seven  Sacraments  or  about  the  Church,  yet  their  formulation  was  the 
work  of  the  “small  synods  of  the  17th  century.”  The  Orthodox  theolo¬ 
gian  does  not  ground  his  conviction  of  the  truth  of  these  doctrines 
on  the  basis  of  the  local  synods  of  the  17th  century,  save  in  so  far 
as  they  expressed  the  mind  of  the  Church  as  previously  declared  in 
the  Ecumenical  Councils  and  found  in  the  Holy  Scriptures.  Palmieri, 
after  mentioning  the  Confessions  of  Metrophanes  Kritopoulos,  Dosi- 
theus,  the  Catechisms  of  Mogila  and  Philaret,  etc.,  states:  “nullum 
igitur  ex  praecitatis  monumentis  fidei  orthodoxae  charactere  symbol- 
i co  oecomenico  instruitur 31  [op.  cit.,  vol.  I.  p.  650;  cf.  his  whole  sec¬ 
tion,  de  auctoritate  librorum  symbolicorum  Ecclesiarum  orthodoxarum, 
pp.  649-660,  ibid.  His  argument  is  that  which  is  developed  in  his  II 
Progresso  Dommatico,  that  the  Orthodox  theory  breaks  down  in  prac¬ 
tice,  and  hence  that  Orthodoxy  needs  the  Pope  as  a  center  of  unity 


210  IV.— DOCTRINE  OF  GRACE  AND  OF  THE  CHURCH 


The  effect  of  the  Reformation  on  the  Orthodox  Church 
is  seen  in  the  work  of  the  17th  century  synods.  It  is  not 
my  purpose  here  to  discuss  the  history  of  the  times  in  which 
the  various  “Symbolic  Books”  and  Confessions  had  their  ori¬ 
gin,  nor  to  enter  upon  the  various  questions  as  to  authorship, 
sources,  causes,  and  occasions  which  provoked  them.  Our 

and  as  the  organ  for  the  infallible  definition  of  dogma.  This  fact 
must  be  kept  in  mind  in  reading  his  work.)  In  short,  no  Orthodox 
questions  the  validity  and  truth  of  the  accepted  declarations  of  the 
Councils,  though  the  degree  in  which  he  accords  formal  authority 
to  a  specific  council  differs  with  the  writer.  As  Ambraze  says:  “The 
Confessions  are  considered  by  all  as  sources  of  Orthodox  teaching., 
though  they  do  not  have  that  obligatory  character  which  belongs  to 
the  Creed  and  the  decrees  of  the  Ecumenical  Councils.  These  Con¬ 
fessions  have  validity  insofar  as  their  content  is  agreeable  to  the  dog¬ 
matic  definitions  of  the  Ecumenical  Councils,  or  rather,  all  the  afore¬ 
said  Confessions  derive  their  dogmatic  teaching  from  the  Creed  and  are 
based  upon  it.  But  they  develop  and  interpret  more  fully  certain 
truths  as  circumstances  and  necessity  give  rise  for  the  Church  to 
counter  and  wage  war  on  wrong  teachings  of  heretical  Christian 
Churches”  ('H  ’Op0o5o£os  ’E/c/cX^crta  irepiex^v  ras  pera^v  tu v  xPiaTiaviK 
’EkkXtictluv  8 Lacpopas,  .  .  .Athens,  1903,  p.  73).  In  other  words,  Ecu¬ 
menical  Councils,  says  Androutsos,  are  valid  in  and  of  themselves,  jure 
divino  et  ipso  jure,  and  “their  decrees  infallible  of  themselves  and 
not  because  of  the  consent  to  them  and  acceptance  of  them  by  the 
Church”,  “whose  acceptance  nevertheless  constitutes  the  eternal  cri¬ 
terion  of  ecumenicity”  (A07 paTiK-rj,  p.  290).  “Decrees  of  local  synods 
have  no  immediate  authenticity,  but  are  infallible  on  the  basis  of  their 
being  received  by  the  Church”  (Aoyp.  MeX.,  A’,  pp.  129-130  and*  cf. 
p.  11,  AoypaTLKi]) .  In  the  words  of  the  Archimandrite  Chrysostom  Pa- 
padopoulos,  these  Confessions  “have  not  absolute  and  infallible  weight, 
but  (do  possess)  relative  theological  and  historical  worth  .  .  .  since 
they  are  neither  decrees  of  Ecumenical  Councils,  nor  ‘Symbols  of  the 
Faith’  ”  (A ocrideos,  Trarpidpxvs  'JepoaoXvpucv  in  Ne'a  2 Ltav,  vol.  V.  1907, 
p.  127,  cf.  At  2vvo8oi  /cat  at  dpoXoyicu  rou  tf  aiihvos,  ibid.,  vol.  VII.  1908, 
p.  724).  Against  the  Roman  arguments  in  this  connection,  which  Palmi- 
eri  presents  so  effectively,  cf.  'ZvvTopos  dTrdvTr/cxLs  irpos  to  Xoidcvpov  <j>vXXd8i.ov 
to v  Svtikov  dpxieTTicr kottov  ’lovXiavoii  Mapt'a  ’IXA epii),  Athens,  1884.  In 
answer  to  Palmieri’s  three  conclusions  (op.  cit.,  pp.  654-655)  it  may 
be  answered  that  Orthodoxy  neither  claims  nor  understands  Infalli¬ 
bility  in  the  sense  in  which  the  Roman  Church  uses  it.  The  Orthodox 
answer  (cf.  Papadoupoulos  above)  is  very  much  like  the  Anglican  con¬ 
tention  in  regard  to  Roman  claims.  The  lines  upon  which  the  so- 
called  “Branch  Theory”  is  developed  are  entirely  consistent  with  the 
method  in  which  Orthodoxy  has  acted,  even  though  there  is  no  ex¬ 
plicit  acceptance  of  the  theory  by  the  Orthodox  Church. 


DOCTRINE  OF  GRACE  AND  OF  THE  CHURCH 


211 


interest  in  them  is  solely  because  they  are  sources  for  the 
dogmatic  teaching  of  the  Orthodox  Church.  With  the  ex¬ 
ception  of  the  Confession  of  Gennadius  Scholariusf  written 
sometime  between  1453  and  1468,  all  the  remaining  Symbolic 
Books  were  the  result  entirely  of  the  Reformation,  directly  or 
indirectly.  These  texts  include:  (a)  the  Answers  of  the  Patri¬ 
arch  Jeremiah  II  to  the  Tubingen  theologians,  of  the  years 
1576,  1579,  and  1581,  which  while  they  were  written  against 
the  Lutherans,  yet  have  little  polemic  coloring,  and  do  not 
show  a  controversial  spirit.2  They  deal  practically  with  the 

1  Introduction  and  text  in  Mesolora  op.  cit.,  I.  pp.  66-67 ;  on  him 
cf.  Palmieri  op.  cit.}  pp.  434-441 ;  Greek-Turkish  text,  pp.  442-452,  ibid., 
bibliography  on  Gennadius  pp.  435-436  (note  2)  ibid.;  Papaioannes  in 
’E/cK-Xpo-tacrr.  ’A \g6eia,  Constantinople,  vol.  XVIII.  1898,  pp.  430-434; 
vol.  XIX.  1899,  pp.  24-28.  Androutsos  disparages  its  value  as  a  dog¬ 
matic  text,  “since  it  only  deals  with  Christian  doctrine  in  general 
and  does  not  concern  itself  with  the  differences  in  teaching  in  the 
various  Christian  churches”  (Scg/SoXiKTj,  p.  32). 

2  During  the  reign  of  Joasaph  II.  Patriarch  of  Constantinople 
(1555-1565),  relations  between  the  Orthodox  and  the  Lutherans  were 
initiated,  which  developed  in  1573  in'  a  mission  of  the  Lutherans  to 
Constantinople.  David  Ungnad,  Stephen  Gerlach,  Martin  Crusius, 
and  Jacob  Andreas  were  the  prime  movers  in  this  negotiation,  which  as 
Crucius  testified  was  undertaken:  “ut  ipsos  ad  nos  perducere  conati 
sumus.”  He  naively  writes:  “si  aeternae  animarum  saluti  consultum 
isti  cupiant,  necesse  est  eos  ad  nos  accedere,  nostramque  amplecti  doc- 
trinam  aut  in  aeternurn  perire’>  ( Prooemium  to  Acta  et  scripta  theolo- 
qorum  wirtembergensium  et  Patriarchae  Constantinopolitani.  .  .  . 
YViirtemberg,  1584;  reprinted  in  1758  at  Leipzig  by  Gedeon  Cyprius 
(Latin  and  Greek)).  The  deputation  brought  a  copy  of  the  Confession 
of  Augsburg  translated  into  Greek,  together  with  letters  from  Cru¬ 
sius  and  Andreas.  In  the  year  1576  Jeremiah  II  (Tranos,  Patriarch 
1572-1579,  1580-1584,  1588-1595),  whom  Meletios  calls  “a  man  endowed 
with  every  virtue”  ( ’EKKXgaLacrTiKTi  Aaropia,  vol.  Ill,  pp.  401-404)  wrote 
his  first  Answer,  discussing  the  Confession  of  Augsburg,  (text  in 
Mesolora,  I.  pp.  124-194,  preceded  by  historical  notes  and  introduction, 
pp.  78-123  ibid.).  To  this  Crusius,  Andreas,  and  Osiander  wrote  a  re¬ 
sponse  in  1578,  which  elicited  Jeremiah’s  Second  Answer  the  year  fol¬ 
lowing  (text,  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  I,  pp.  195-247).  The  Lutherans  wrote 
again  justifying  their  position,  and  Jeremiah’s  Third  Answer  (1581), 
after  discussing  Free  Will,  the  Sacraments,  and  the  Invocation  of 
Saints,  ends  the  discussion  asking  them  to  “go  their  own  way  and 
not  to  write  again  on  dogmatic  matters,  and  if  they  do  write,  to  do  so 
only  on  the  score  of  friendship”  (Mesolora,  I,  p.  264,  whole  text, 
pp.  248-264  ibid).  Palmieri  says  of  the  Answers  that  they  expound 


212  IV.— DOCTRINE  OF  GRACE  AND  OF  THE  CHURCH 


whole  range  of  the  Orthodox  Faith,  with  special  emphasis  on 
matters  of  difference  between  Orthodoxy  and  Lutheranism, 
(b)  The  Confession  of  Metrophanes  Kritopoulos,  Patriarch 
of  Alexandria,  written  at  Helmstadt  in  1625  at  the  request  of 
Lutheran  friends.  It  is  so  sympathetic  with  Protestant 
thought  and  so  conversant  with  Protestant  terminology  as  to 
lend  color  to  the  accusation  of  being  heretical  and  not  truly 
Orthodox.1  (c)  The  Orthodox  Confession  of  Peter  Mogila,  Met- 

Orthodox  doctrine  by  appealing  to  tradition,  are  without  either  the 
style  or  color  of  polemic,  and  are  rightly  included  among  the  Sym¬ 
bolic  Books  (op  cit.,  p.  458,  and  cf.  pp.  461-463  for  the  amusing  out¬ 
come  of  Sokolov’s  book  on  the  Answers). 

1  Born  in  1599,  Kritopoulos  became  a  monk  of  Mt.  Athos  and  was 
singled  out  for  distinction  by  Cyril  Lucar,  who  sent  him  to  Eng¬ 
land,  in  1616,  where  he  studied  at  Oxford.  He  went  to  the  Conti¬ 
nent  in  1623,  traveled  extensively,  and  in  1625  wrote  his  Confession 
(‘0^0X0710  7-77?  avaTo\LKrjs  ’E/c/cA^cnas) .  The  autographed  copy  of  the 
work  is  preserved  in  the  library  at  Wolfenbiittel,  of  which  the  genuine¬ 
ness  has  been  impugned  by  some  Greek  writers  e.  g.,  Sathas  in  his 
’SeoeWrjvtKT]  <pi\o\oyia,  p.  298,  and  as  strongly  demonstrated  by  others 
( e .  g.,  Andronicus  Demetracopoulos,  AokI/juov  irepi  tov  /3ioe  /cat  avyypap.- 
/jLciTLov  ^ hr}Tpo(pavovs  tov  KpltotovXov,  Leipzig,  1870,  pp.  40-41;  and  in 
the  ’E /e/c\77 crtcurr.  'AXrjdeLa,  vol.  III.  1882,  pp.  634-636).  It  was  published 
in  Greek  and  Latin  at  Helmstadt  in  1661,  and  the  text  (pp.  279-361), 
with  an  introduction  (pp.  265-278)  is  given  in  Mesolora,  Zv/jl^oXikt],  vol. 
I.  It  treats  of  the  whole  compass  of  the  Orthodox  Faith,  and  is  dis¬ 
tinguished  by  certain  peculiarities:  (a)  his  definition  of  the  Church 
(Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  I.  p.  316)  with  which  cf.  the  Augsburg  Confession, 
part  I.  article  VII;  (b)  the  number  of  the  Sacraments  (Mesolora,  op. 
cit.,  I.  p.  312-313);  (c)  his  enumerations  of  the  books  of  Holy  Scrip¬ 
ture  (ibid.,  pp.  318-319);  (d)  while  he  calls  the  effect  of  the  conse¬ 
cration  in  the  Mass  a  “change”  (p.era^oXr],)  he  says:  “The  manner  of 
this  charge  is  unknown  to  us  and  inexplicable  .  .  It  may  only  be  ap¬ 
prehended  through  faith”  (ibid.,  pp.  327-328).  It  is  to  be  noticed 
that  he  does  not  use  the  term  transubstantiation.  Though  it  be  only 
a  private  and  personal  profession  of  faith,  it  rightly  holds  its  place 
among  the  Symbolic  Books  of  Orthodoxy,  according  to  Mesolora,  (ibid., 
pp.  277-278)  who  regards  it  as  entirely  Orthodox.  Mazarakis  de¬ 
clares  it  clear  and  free  from  every  taint  of  Protestantism  (MriTpocpdvTjs 
KpiToirc.vXos,  liar.  'AXef....,  Cairo,  1884,  p.  45).  Androutsos  says  that 
those  who  fasten  on  such  details  as  these,  miss  the  whole  point 
of  the  Confession,  and  wrongly  impute  Protestant  opinions  to  Krito¬ 
poulos  CLvpl^oXlkt),  p.  37).  Palmieri  (op.  cit.,  pp.  573-576)  says: 
Constat  sententias  lutheranas  hand  semel  in  Confessionem  Hetrophanis 
irrepsisse,  eisque  adstipulari  disertis  verbis  Metrophanem  declarasse. 
Ergo  neque  characterem  privatae  Confessionis  ei  vindicandum  ducimus. 


DOCTRINE  OF  GRACE  AND  OF  THE  CHURCH 


213 


ropolitan  of  Kiev  (b.  1596,  cl.  1646),  which  appeared  in 
Greek  for  the  first  time  in  its  present  form  probably  about 
1667.1  There  are  two  works  of  Mogila — the  Confession  and 
an  Orthodox  Catechism — and  they  are  often  confused,  since 
both  are  written  in  the  catechetical  style.  There  is  a  differ¬ 
ence  in  teaching  between  them,  and  the  mystery  of  the  rela¬ 
tionship  between  the  two  has  not  yet  been  solved.  A  synod 
in  1640  at  Kiev,  having  examined  a  catechism  submitted  to 
it  by  Mogila,  amplified  it  and  then  endorsed  it.  Mogila  then 
submitted  it  to  the  Patriarch  (Kectarius)  of  Constantinople, 
who  turned  it  over  to  the  council  of  Jassy  (1642)  where  it 
was  subject  to  revision,  and  then  finally  (1643?)  endorsed  by 
a  synod  at  Constantinople.  The  Catechism  was  published 

1  Following  Legrand,  Bibliographic  hellenique  (XVII.  siecle)  vol. 
IV.  Paris,  1896,  and  vol.  II.  ibid.,  p.  204;  cf.  Mesolora's  introduction, 
op.  cit.,  I.  pp.  362-369.  Mogila  had  two  practical  difficulties  with 
which  to  deal:  (a)  the  Roman  Church,  with  its  strong  hold  on  Poland, 
the  policy  of  the  Uniat  movement,  and  the  presence  of  Jesuits;  and 
(b)  Protestantism,  which  had  no  inconsiderable  influence  at  this  junc¬ 
ture  on  Orthodoxy,  disrupted  by  the  defection  of  Cyril  Lucar,  and  un¬ 
able  to  cope  with  Western  scholarship  and  learning.  The  first  sen¬ 
tence  of  the  Confession  comes  into  sharp  conflict  with  Protestantism 
on  the  subject  of  faith  and  works,  (cf.  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  I.  p.  376), 
while  the  treatment  of  the  Filioque  (ibid.,  pp.  412-413)  leaves  no  room 
for  the  suspicion  of  a  pro-Roman  tendency.  Its  final  endorsement  by 
Nectarius  of  Constantinople,  Joannicius  of  Alexandria,  Macarius  of 
Antioch,  Paisius  of  Jerusalem,  nine  metropolitans,  and  others,  in  1662, 
set  the  seal  of  Orthodox  official  approval  on  the  Confession.  (Cf.  Par- 
thenius’  Encyclical  and  the  list  of  signatories,  op.  cit.,  pp.  370-375.) 
Its  value  has  been  variously  estimated  by  Orthodox  writers.  Damalas 
( Ilepi  apxuv,  Leipzig,  1863,  p.  9.)  considers  it  to  be  “an  Orthodox 
Catechism  which  neither  from  its  writer  nor  from  the  synod  which 
endorsed  it  .  .  .  has  any  claim  to  ecumenical  character  or  weight.” 
“It  is  a  full  and  perfect  symbolic  text,  woven  together  and  worked  with 
the  greatest  skill  and  subtlety,  and  at  the  same  time  a  perfect  talis¬ 
man  for  dogma  and  morals,  both  in  faith  and  practice,  for  the  Orthodox 
Christian''  (The  Protosynkellos  Chrysostom,  in  Kepi  ’E/c/cXTjo-i'aj,  vol. 
I.  p.  6).  Androutsos  says  of  it:  “While  the  distinction  of  substance 
and  his  divisions  and  subdivisions  are  not  all  useful,  and  certain  chap¬ 
ters,  especially  those  on  the  Sacraments  and  the  seven  deadly  sins, 
are  obviously  strongly  under  the  influence  of  scholastic  theology,  yet 
the  work  of  Mogila  on  the  whole  breathes  the  spirit  of  the  Orthodox 
Eastern  Church  in  all  its  pristine  character,  .  .  .  and  remains  perm¬ 
anently  a  most  precious  monument  of  Orthodoxy  and  a  wholesome 
aid  in  the  study  of  Symbolic”  ( Zi^/SoXt*?),  p.  35).  Balanos,  on  the 


214  IV.— DOCTRINE  OF  GRACE  AND  OF  THE  CHURCH 


first  in  1621,  and  the  Confession,  possibly  soon  after  its  en¬ 
dorsement  in  1643-5,  the  great  edition  being  the  aforementioned 
one  of  1667.  The  Confession  is  divided  into  three  sections, 
on  Faith,  Hope,  and  Love,  and  in  a  popular  and  brief  style 
treats  of  the  fundamentals  of  Orthodoxy,  (d)  The  Acts1  of 
the  Synods  of  Constantinople  (1638),  Jassy  (1641-1642), 
Jerusalem  (1672), 2  and  Constantinople  (1672).  Of  these 

other  hand,  depreciates  its  value  since  “it  is  a  Catechism,  and  must 
be  regarded  as  such.  No  catechism  can  ever  be  more  than  a  produc¬ 
tion  of  its  own  time,  and  do  more  than  follow  the  spiritual  condi¬ 
tion  contemporaneous  with  it”  (Eivai  y  6p6odo£os  'EWynKy  ’E/c/cAtjo-io. 
povov  Koivwvia  Aarpetas;  Athens,  1904,  p.  9).  For  complete  text  of  the 
Confession,  ef.  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  I.  pp.  376-487;  and  on  Mogila,  the 
critical  problems  connected  with  the  text,  chronology,  bibliography, 
and  Russian  opinion,  cf.  Palmieri,  op.  cit.,  I,  pp.  537-563.  English  edi¬ 
tions  of  the  text  are  in  The  Doctrine  of  the  Russian  Church,  translated 
from  the  Slavano-Russian  Original,  W.  Blackmore,  Aberdeen,  1845; 
The  Orthodox  Confession  of  the  Catholic  and  Apostolic  Eastern  Church, 
from  the  Version  of  Peter  Mogila,  translated  into  English,  with  pre¬ 
face  by  J.  J.  Overbeck,  and  introductory  notice  by  J.  N.  Robertson, 
London,  1898;  cf.  also  The  Teaching  of  the  Russian  Church,  by 
A.  C.  Headlam,  London,  1897,  and  History,  Authority ,  and  Theology,  by 
the  same,  Milwaukee,  1910,  especially  chapters,  V,  VI,  and  VII. 

1  These  Acts  are  all  in  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  vol.  II.  On  pp.  7-24  he 
gives  a  history  of  Cyril  Lucar  leading  up  to  an  introduction  to  the 
Synod  of  Constantinople  (pp.  24-28),  acts  of  the  same  (pp.  28-32); 
introduction  to  the  Synod  of  Jassy  (pp.  32-37),  the  two  Epistles,  (pp. 
37-42)  ;  introduction  to  the  Council  of  Jerusalem  (pp.  43-54),  and  text 
of  the  Acts  (pp.  55-87). 

2  The  alleged  Confession  of  Cyril  Lucar  (b.  1572,  d.  1638),  published 
in  Geneva  in  1629,  was  the  occasion  of  all  of  these  synods,  the  basis 
of  their  decrees,  and  in  large  measure  the  cause  which  called  them  to¬ 
gether.  It  is  published  in  English  by  J.  N.  Robertson,  The  Acts  and 
Decrees  of  the  Synod  of  Jerusalem  .  .  .  with  an  Appendix  contain¬ 
ing  the  Confession  published  with  the  name  of  Cyril  Lucar,  condenvned 
by  the  Synod.  London,  1899.  Like  Metrophanes  Kritopoulos,  of  whom 
we  spoke  above,  Cyril  Lucar  is  of  interest  to  Anglican  Churchmen,  for 
he  gave  the  celebrated  uncial  Manuscript,  Codex  Alexandrinus,  to  Sir 
Thomas  Roe,  King  Charles  I’s  Ambassador  to  Turkey,  from  whom  it 
came  into  the  possession  of  the  British  Museum  where  it  is  at  present. 
He  is  a  most  interesting  personage,  was  very  much  in  contact  with  all 
of  the  movements  of  his  time,  and  his  effect  on  his  Church  during  and 
after  his  life-time  was  far-reaching.  In  1601  he  was  raised  to  the 
throne  of  the  Patriarchate  of  Alexandria.  As  an  illustration  of  the 
extraordinary  character  of  the  times,  and  of  the  relation  between 
the  Sublime  Porte  and  the  Plianar,  it  may  be  said  in  passing  that  after 


DOCTRINE  OF  GRACE  AND  OF  THE  CHURCH 


215 


Synods,  by  far  the  most  significant  is  that  of  Jerusalem.  All 
of  them  dealt  with  practical  problems  arising  out  of  the  Con¬ 
fession  of  Cyril  Lucar,  which  was  strongly  Calvinistic  in  tone. 
The  difficulties  of  the  Orthodox  Church  were  many — pressure 

his  first  election  to  the  Patriarchate  of  Constantinople  (1612)  he  held 
the  position  of  Patriarch  six  times,  with  intervals  between  his  reigns 
(1620-1623;  1623-1630;  1630-1633;  1633-1634;  1634-1635;  1637-1638). 
The  publication  of  the  Confession  which  purported  to  be  by  him,  in 
1629,  was  followed  by  a  Greek  edition  in  1633.  It  aroused  a  great 
storm  among  the  Orthodox,  and  was  greeted  with  acclamation  bv  the 
Continental  Protestants.  Tlieophanus  II.  of  Jerusalem,  repudiated 
in  Cyril’s  name  his  authorship  of  the  Confession.  After  Cyril  Lucar’s 
execution  in  1638,  a  Cvril  Contarene  succeeded  to  the  throne  for  the 
third  time,  who  immediately  called  a  Synod  which  met  in  Constan- 
tinople  that  same  year,  and  condemned  both  Cyril  Lucar  and  his  doc¬ 
trines  (text,  in  Mesolora,  II,  pp.  28-32).  All  the  Calvinistic  doc¬ 
trines  which  had  been  enunciated  under  Lucar’s  name  in  the  Con¬ 
fession  were  strongly  repudiated  in  this  \f/ ijcpos  (‘‘Vote”).  Jerusalem 
and  Alexandria,  together  with  twenty-one  bishops  and  twenty-three 
prelates  and  clergy,  signed  the  decree.  Of  the  results  Mesolora  says: 
‘“The  Acts  of  this  synod  rightly  formulate  the  teaching  of  the  Orthodox 
Church  .  .  .  Cyril  Contarene  showed  then  and  now  .  .  .  that  the 
Eastern  Orthodox  Church  does  not  tolerate  any  Protestant  innovations” 
{ibid.,  p.  25).  The  Acts  of  the  Synod  of  Jassy  (the  capital  of  the  then 
principality  of  Moldavia,  now  part  of  Roumania)  consist  only  of  two 
Synodical  Epistles:  (a)  to  the  Synod  in  Jassy  from  Parthenius  I. 
Patriarch  of  Constantinople  (successor  of  Cyril  Contarene — 1639-1644)  ; 
(b)  to  the  Duke  of  Moldavia  from  the  Synod  itself.  Forty-five  prelates 
attended,  among  whom  was  Peter  Mogila.  The  significance  of  this 
Synod  lies  chiefly  in  the  fact  that  “at  it  were  assembled  both  Greeks 
and  Russians,  who  showed  the  Jesuits  and  the  Protestants  that  the 
Orthodox  Church  was  alive,  that  she  preserved  her  dogmas  unshaken, 
.  .  .  and  rejected  all.  Western  innovations”  (Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  II, 
p.  36).  The  first  Epistle  emanated,  as  was  said  above,  from  Constan¬ 
tinople,  and  dealt  in  turn  with  each  of  the  propositions  of  the  Confes¬ 
sion  attributed  to  Lucar,  save  that  on  Cliristologv.  It  is  significant, 
however,  that  these  articles  were  condemned  without  including  the 
person  of  Cyril  Lucar,  showing  that  Parthenius  was  unwilling  to 
fasten  their  authorship  on  him.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  “Synod”  of 
Jassy  was  merely  an  extension  of  that  of  Constantinople,  and  practically 
met  only  to  confirm  the  condemnation  of  the  propositions  of  the  al¬ 
leged  Lucarian  Confession.  The  Synod  of  Jerusalem  (1672)  is  by  all 
comparison  the  most  important.  As  its  Acts  declare,  it  was  assembled 
to  bear  witness  to  the  Orthodox  Faith  and  to  repudiate  Lutheran  and 
Calvinistic  doctrines  of  whatever  sort.  The  occasion  of  the  convocation 
of  this  Svnod  was  the  dedication  of  the  renovated  sanctuarv  of  the 
Nativity  at  Bethlehem,  which  served  Dositheus  the  Patriarch  of  Jeru- 


216  IV.— DOCTRINE  OF  GRACE  AND  OF  THE  CHURCH 


from  Continental  Protestantism,  from  Roman  proselytism  under 
French  protection,  and  the  normal  difficulties  of  the  Church 
under  Turkish  domination.  The  Confession  of  Faith  of  Do- 
sitheus,  appended  to  the  Acts  of  the  Synod  of  Jerusalem,  con- 

salem  as  a  proper  season,  time,  and  place,  to  obtain  an  explicit  rati¬ 
fication  of  the  Orthodox  Faith  at  the  hands  of  a  large  concourse  of 
prelates  and  clergy.  The  Acts  survive  in  two  documents — “the  Shield 
of  the  Orthodox  Faith”  and  the  “Confession  of  Faith,”  (text,  Mesolora, 
II.  pp.  55-86,  and  pp.  103-129).  Both  are  probably  due  to  Dositheus. 
The  purpose  of  the  former  was  two-fold:  (a)  to  inveigh  against  Prot¬ 
estantism,  and  (b)  to  clear  the  name  of  Lucar  from  the  imputation  of 
having  written  the  Confession  published  ostensibly  as  his  work.  Meso¬ 
lora  sets  a  very  high  value  indeed  on  these  Acts,  saying  that  they  show 
how  the  Orthodox  Church  has  faithfully  adhered  to  her  Saviour’s 
teaching,  has  kept  the  middle  way  between  two  extremes  of  error,  and 
displays  “the  spirit  of  the  ancient  Church  in  opposition  ...  to  the 
opinions  of  both  the  Romans  and  the  Protestants  ...”  (op.  cit., 
II,  pp.  48-49).  The  Confession  of  Faith  is  a  document  of  very  great 
value.  It  is  alluded  to  in  the  sixth  chapter  of  the  “Shield”,  and  is  an 
integral  part  of  the  Acts  of  the  Synod.  It  is  arranged  in  the  de¬ 
crees,  which  Mesolora  (op.  cit.,  pp.  91-99)  has  compared  with  corre¬ 
sponding  passages  in  the  Confession  attributed  to  Lucar.  It  is  a 
closely  knit,  carefully  worked  out  summary  of  theological  doctrine,  in 
its  phraseology  very  strongly  impregnated  with  scholastic  terminology, 
and  in  the  exactness  of  its  language  and  dialectical  distinctions  re¬ 
freshingly  clear  and  lucid.  It  employs  the  term  transubstantiation 
(Mesolora,  II.  p.  117)  ;  explicitly  states  the  necessity  of  both  faith  and 
works  (ibid.,  p.  112);  teaches  a  state  of  purgation  after  death,  without 
calling  it  purgatory  (ibid.,  pp.  119-120)  ;  and  the  questions  at  the 
end  deal  with  certain  practical  matters  in  a  manner  utterly  repugnant 
to  Protestantism.  In  his  Enchiridion  (1690)  he  retracted  somewhat 
from  his  teaching  as  to  the  state  of  the  dead,  but  reaffirmed  very 
strongly  his  eueharistic  doctrine.  With  slight  changes  the  Confession 
of  Faith  of  Dositheus  was  embodied  in  the  Answer  of  the  Patriarchs 
of  Constantinople,  Antioch,  and  Jerusalem,  to  the  Non- Jurors  in 
1723.  The  same  Confession  was  translated  into  Russian  in  1728,  and 
a  century  later  was  published  in  a  form  showing  considerable  revision 
— e.  g.,  Dositheus  teaches  the  indelible  character  of  Baptism  as  well 
as  Holy  Order  (Mesolora,  II.  p.  116)  ;  Philaret  of  Moscow  expunged 
this,  as  he  did  the  section  on  the  Deutero-Canonical  books  of  the  Old 
Testament,  the  denial  of  the  permission  for  all  to  read  the  Bible,  etc. 
Palmieri  says:  Confessio  Dosithei  praecipuum  tenet  locum  inter  sym- 
bolica  graecae  Ecclesiae  documenta  (op.  cit.,  I,  p.  503).  Mesolora 
sets  the  highest  value  on  it  (op.  cit.,  II.  pp.  89,  91),  though  by  his 
silence  Androutsos  seems  to  regard  it  as  do  other  Orthodox  writers, 
disparagingly  (e.  g.,  Macarius,  Sylvester,  and  many  of  the  Russians, 
on  whom  cf.  Palmieri,  ibid.,  pp.  504-505).  So  Chrysostom  Papadopou- 


DOCTRINE  OF  GRACE  AND  OF  THE  CHURCH 


217 


tains  matter  of  fundamental  value  for  the  student  of  modern 
Orthodox  theology.  The  last  Synod  (Constantinople,  1672 )* 
did  little  of  import.  Its  acts  are  mostly  of  a  practical  char¬ 
acter,  and  concern  discipline  and  practice  rather  than  dogma 
and  theology. 

los  would  minimize  its  Latin  cast  of  thought  (N ea  'Ziuv,  1907,  vol. 
V.  pp.  104-108)  saying  that  “the  influence  of  Latin  theology  was  en¬ 
tirely  external  and  ought  not  be  overemphasized.  This  superficial 
similarity  of  expression  in  its  teaching  ought  not  be  regarded  as 
identity  in  thought”  (with  Latin  theology)  (in  AcaiOeos,  HaTpiapxys 
‘lepoaoXvpuov,  Jerusalem,  1907,  p.  32). 

The  question  as  to  the  authenticity  of  Lucar’s  Confession,  which 
document  provoked  all  of  the  synods  discussed  above,  is  too  vast  to  be 
entered  upon  here.  (A  very  full  bibliography  is  given  in  Palmieri, 
op.  cit.,  pp.  464-468,  notes,  and  pp.  506-507,  notes.)  Mesolora  states 
that  “Cyril  did  not  write  the  Confession  attributed  to  him,  but  some 
other  person,  possibly  a  Latin,  in  order  to  slander  him  with  the  im¬ 
putation  of  Calvinism”  (op.  cit.,  II,  p.  18).  Sathas  (in  KeoeWpviKp 
<pi\o\oyia,  p.  244)  denies  his  authorship  of  it  and  attributes  it  to 
Protestants.  Chrysostom  Papadopoulos  repudiates  the  imputation  that 
Lucar  wrote  the  Confessio?i  (’ATroXoyia  KvpiWov  rod  Aov/capecos,  in  Ne'a 
2tW,  vol.  II.  1905,  pp.  17-35;  ibid.,  vol.  V.  1907,  pp.  525-533;  ibid., 
KvpiXXos  Ar.vKapis,  Tergesti,  1907,  etc.),  as  does  Ezechiel  Velandiotes, 
(’O  ’Eduopapri's  KvpiWos  Ac.vKapis,  Athens,  1906).  On  the  other  hand, 
Renieris  (KvpiWos  Aovicapis,  6  olKovp.eviKo s,  IT aTpiapxvs,  Athens,  1889,  pp. 
54-55),  Demetrius  Balanos  (‘II  ‘Op.oXoyia  KvpiWov  rov  A  ovK&peios, 
Athens,  1906,  p.  5),  and  Androutsos  ( Si’g/SoAt/o)  p.,  33)  are  convinced 
that  he  did,  whether  from  purely  religious  motives  and  by  conviction 
(Balanos),  or  under  the  pressure  of  circumstances  (Androutsos).  The 
Confession  is  certainly  not  a  document  of  the  Orthodox  Church.  Pal- 
mieri’s  discussion  is  in  op.  cit.,  pp.  464-537,  (vol.  I.). 

1  It  was  convened  by  Dionysius  IV,  five  times  Patriarch  of  Constan¬ 
tinople  (  1671-1673;  1676-1679;  1683-1684;  16S6-1687;  1693-1694), 

as  an  answer  to  difficulties  propounded  to  the  Orthodox  Church,  many 
of  which  reflect  Protestant  stimulation.  The  Acts  deal  with  the  Sacra¬ 
ments,  the  Eucharist  (as  a  “transmutation”  of  the  elements)  infant 
baptism,  the  arch-episcopate,  the  marriage  of  clergy,  the  Church,  ikons, 
fasting,  and  the  canon  of  Holy  Scripture.  Introduction  in  Mesolora, 
vol.  II.  pp.  130-139,  text,  pp.  139-145.  He  also  adds  the  account  of 
another  small  synod  in  1691  at  Constantinople  (pp.  147-150)  the  chief 
work  of  which  was  the  confirmation  of  the  acts  of  the  Synod  of  Jeru¬ 
salem,  and  a  reiteration  of  the  doctrine  of  t  ransubstantiation,  which 
Mesolora  says  “constitutes  the  one  important  act  of  the  Synod”  (p. 
149  ibid.).  He  does  not  give  the  texts  of  the  Acts.  The  strong  justi¬ 
fication  and  vindication  of  the  term  by  this  Synod  is  not  without  great 
theological  interest.  Text  in  Mansi-Petit,  vol.  XXXVII,  and  the  pas¬ 
sage  in  question,  in  column  465. 


218  IV—  DOCTRINE  OF  GRACE  AND  OF  THE  CHURCH 

Despite  -  the  fact  that  Orthodoxy  and  Protestantism  have 
in  common  as  essential  characteristics  a  strongly  anti-Roman 
and  anti-Papal  bias,  despite  the  fact  also  that  they  both  ap¬ 
peal  to  primitive  Christianity,  the  upshot  of  all  the  negotia¬ 
tions  between  Continental  Protestantism  and  the  Orthodox 
Church  was  the  discovery  that  there  really  was  nothing  funda¬ 
mental  in  theology  or  spirit  upon  the  basis  of  which  Orthodox 
and  Protestantism  could  unite.  It  is  significant  that  with 
the  exception  of  the  abortive  attempt  of  the  Non- Jurors,  no 
Anglican  advances  have  yet  met  Orthodox  repudiation.  All 
of  the  later  synods  direct  their  fulminations  against  Calvinis- 
tic  and  Lutheran  doctrines.  It  is  also  significant  that  in  the 
main  the  development  of  Greek  theology  has  paralleled  that 
of  the  Western  Church.  The  doctrine  of  Grace,  the  Church, 
and  the  Sacraments  is  indigenous,  legitimate,  and  inevitable 
in  both  East  and  West.  In  both  East  and  West  the  formula¬ 
tion  of  doctrine  has  taken  place  subsequent  to  the  Schism  be¬ 
tween  the  Eastern  and  Western  Churches. 

I.  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  GRACE 
1.  The  Nature  of  Grace 

During  the  sixteenth  and  seventeeth  centuries  the  minds 
of, men  in  the  West  were  occupied  with  questions  concerning 
the  doctrine  of  grace,  faith,  free-will,  predestination,  and  the 
efficacy  of  the  sacraments.  To  this  movement  of  thought  in 
the  West,  with  its  parallel  effect  in  Orthodox  circles,  we  are 
indebted  for  the  explicit  definition  of  Orthodox  teaching  on 
these  matters.  The  doctrine  of  Grace  has  a  very  wide  range 
of  contact  in  any  Christian  dogmatic  system.  In  Orthodox 
doctrine  this  is  particularly  true,  (a)  It  is  bound  up  with 
the  doctrine  of  God,  since  God  who  is  preeminently  good, 
and  acts  freely  in  all  He  does,  freely  created  man  of  His  own 
goodness  and  benevolence.  So  it  is  of  His  nature  as  Chris¬ 
tians  know  it,  that  He  give  to  man,  beyond  man’s  deserts  and 
without  the  consideration  of  expediency  or  of  a  covenant  obli¬ 
gation,  what  is  so  essential  to  man’s  needs.  In  this  sense 
Rhosse  speaks  of  the  Grace  of  the  Holy  Spirit  of  God  cooper¬ 
ating  with  man’s  natural  endowment,  the  cooperation  of  man 
with  it  constituting  his  pristine  state  of  righteousness  and 


s 

THE  DOCTRINE  OF  GRACE  219 

* 

innocence.1  (b)  The  doctrine  of  Grace  is  closely  knit  up 
with  the  teaching  about  man,  who  being  created  by  God  with 
relative  free-will,  endowed  by  Him  with  all  he  needed  to 
lead  a  life  of  happiness  in  obedience  to  God,  was  yet  to  be 
sustained  by  God's  constant  protection  and  empowering  over¬ 
sight.  Still  more  did  man  after  his  Fall  stand  in  need  of 
that  without  which  he  could  never  hope  for  recovery,  the 
gift  of  which  is  so  entirely  consistent  with  God’s  Nature  and 
Essence,  (c)  The  doctrine  of  Grace  is  intimately  connected  with 
the  problem  of  man’s  free-will  and  God's  Providence,  His 
Foreknowledge,  and  Foreordination.  (d)  Preeminently  is 
the  doctrine  of  Grace  involved  in  the  dogma  of  Redemption, 
for  by  Grace  only  can  man  appropriate  the  fruits  of  the  re¬ 
demptive  and  atoning  work  of  the  Saviour  and  make  them 
effective  in  his  own  individual  life.  As  Christian  dogma  forms 
a  unified  whole,  so  the  whole  nexus  of  doctrine,  especially 
in  its  practical  religious  and  moral  bearings,  is  permeated 
with  the  teaching  about  Grace.  It  is  obvious  also  that  this 
doctrine  constitutes  the  starting  point  and  basis  for  all  of  the 
rest  of  Orthodox  dogmatic.  Androutsos’  definition  of  Grace 
involves  its  relation  to  the  doctrine  of  the  Church  and  of  the 
Sacraments. 

“Grace  is”,  he  says,2  “the  divine  power  by  which  we  appro¬ 
priate  the  redemptive  work  of  Our  Lord.  Since  it  works 
the  justification  and  salvation  of  man  it  depends  upon  cer¬ 
tain  subjective  conditions  in  him.  It  is  stored  up  in  the 
Church,  and  administered  through  the  Sacraments.  ...  In  gen¬ 
eral,  it  is  the  manifestation  of  the  love  and  benevolence  of 
God  towards  man ;  in  particular,  it  means  the  saving  power 
of  God  by  which  He  brings  home  to  each  individual  the  Re¬ 
demption  consummated  for  all  by  Our  Lord,  regenerating  and 
cultivating  the  life  in  Christ  and  preparing  (man)  for  eternal 
life.”  “By  the  death  of  our  Lord  on  the  Cross,  who  was  the 
Mediator  between  God  and  Man,  mankind  was  reconciled 
with  its  God  and  Father,  thereby  was  reestablished  the  re- 

1  Rhosse,  Ao7/LtartKi7,  p.  434. 

2  Androutsos,  boynarucr),  pp.  218-219.  He  takes  occasion  to  note 
the  various  distinctions  and  definitions,  such  as  “prevenient  and  con¬ 
comitant”,  “external  and  internal”,  etc.  of  scholastic  terminology,  but 
says  that  they  are  “without  actual  content  or  significance”  (ibid.). 


220  IV.— DOCTRINE  OF  GRACE  AND  OF  THE  CHURCH 

lation  of  fellowship  with  G-od,  sundered  because  of  original 
sin,  and  God's  saving  Grace  made  known  to  man.  This  Grace 
we  need  to  lay  hold  of  through  faith  in  Christ  generated  by 
love,  by  which  we  become  God's  children ....  The  redeeming 
work  of  the  Saviour  is  called  divine  Grace  because  by  it  salva¬ 
tion  is  bestowed  from  God  on  us  .  .  .  The  continuous  opera¬ 
tion  and  energy  of  the  Holy  Spirit  is  also  (called)  divine 
Grace  ...  In  this  sense,  then,  it  may  be  defined  as  that  super¬ 
natural  power  of  the  Holy  Spirit  by  which  the  appropriation 
of  the  redeeming  work  of  the  Saviour  is  achieved/51  In  the 
divine  economy  the  ministry  of  Grace  is  the  work  of  the 
Holy  Spirit,  while  our  Lord  is  the  cause  of  our  receiving  it. 
This  is  testified  in  Holy  Scripture,  and  is  the  reason  for  call¬ 
ing  the  Holy  Ghost,  “the  Spirit  of  Christ/52  The  term  is  ap¬ 
plied  not  to  natural  helps  towards  righteousness,  nor  to  the 
example  of  Our  Lord’s  life,  nor  to  God's  law  or  will,  but  to 
that  “power  which  regenerates  and  nourishes  the  spiritual 
life,  given  freely  by  God  and  not  by  reason  of  our  merit/53 

We  may  distinguish  three  characteristic  notes  of  Grace, 
all  of  which  are  essential  to  the  true  conception  of  it.  It  is 
(a)  absolutely  necessary,  (b)  it  is  free,  and  (c)  it  is  universal. 
It  is  absolutely  necessary  “since  man  cannot  be  justified  and 
saved  by  his  own  works,  nor  could  he  even  believe  unless 
Christ  first  draw  him,  and  unless  .  .  .  his  will  be  aroused  by 
some  higher  energy.554  Man  could  not  attain  communion  with 
God  by  his  own  efforts,  nor  secure  the  necessary  nourishment 
for  his  own  spiritual  life.1 2 3 4 5 6  He  could  not  secure  deliverance 
from  sin,  actual  or  original,  by  anything  he  can  do  of  him¬ 
self.  Grace  is,  in  short,  as  necessary  as  was  Eedemption:  if 
the  work  of  Christ  was  an  unnecessary  work  on  God’s  part, 
then  so  is  Grace  unnecessary,  as  the  Pelagians  held/ 

1  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  III.  pp.  243-244. 

2  Rom.  8,  9;  Gal.  4,  6;  Acts  1,  8;  St.  John  6,  44;  Acts  2,  33;  10, 
44;  Eph.  3,  5;  Rotn.  5,  5. 

3  Androutsos,  ibid. 

4 Mesolora,  ibid.,  p.  247,  and  cf.  St.  John  3,  5. 

5  St.  John  6,  44. 

6  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  221,  and  cf.  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  p.  246.  The 
Pelagians  were  condemned  by  the  Council  of  Carthage,  cf.  Canons 
113  (124). 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  GRACE 


221 


Grace  is,  secondly,  free ,  as  the  very  word  implies.  This 
means  that  it  is  based  upon  no  human  covenant,  whereby  it  is 
given  by  God  as  the  fulfilment  of  a  promise  or  an  obligation. 
It  is  not  a  return  for  human  merit  or  deserving,  but  a  free 
gift  of  God’s  love.1  Xo  righteous  action  of  man  can  be  pre¬ 
sumed  upon  as  the  cause  of  God’s  Grace  being  given  to  him. 
Even  in  the  case  of  Cornelius  (Acts  10,  35)  it  was  not  “natu¬ 
ral  powers  which  made  the  bridge  by  which  the  natural  man 
enters  into  the  domain  of  grace”,  for  the  chasm  between  grace 
and  nature  is  impassable  by  man.  “The  word  grace  does 
not  mean  Something  given  in  return’  (d-TroSiSo/xerov)  but 
a  ‘gift  freely  given’,  bestowed  purely  out  of  the  divine  Love.”2 
“It  is  of  God  to  give  Grace — of  man,  to  receive  it.”3 

Thirdlv,  grace  is  universal,  but  not  irresistible.  “'The  Grace 
of  Redemption  is  offered  to  all  men,  calling  them  to  salva¬ 
tion  and  assisting  them  to  every  good  work.  If  some  accept 
the  call,  many  on  the  other  hand  approach  .  .  .  but  fall  away 
from  it,  which  phenomenon  is  to  be  attributed  to  the  free  will 
of  man  who  may  accept  or  reject  the  call  and  fall  from  Grace. 
Since  all  that  happens  in  time  and  in  the  world  is  constituted 
by  the  eternal  will  and  design  of  God,  and  the  Redemption 
in  a  very  special  sense  is,  as  we  have  seen,  the  carrying  out 
of  God’s  eternal  Will,  it  is  clear  that  the  election  of  some  to 
life  in  Christ  and  the  rejection  of  others  are  things  deter¬ 
mined  and  decreed  before  the  world  by  God.  Before  the 
foundation  of  the  world  He  chose  them,  foreordaining  some 
to  eternal  life,  and  others  to  eternal  condemnation.”4  This 
third  aspect  of  the  doctrine  of  Grace  involves  the  problem  of 
free-will  and  predestination,  which  has  already  been  consid¬ 
ered  in  part  in  Lecture  II.5 

God’s  foreknowledge  belongs  to  His  character  as  omnis- 

1  Rom.  9,  11,  18;  11,  6;  2  Tim.  1,  9;  Tit.  3,  5. 

2  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  222-223. 

3  Mesolora,  op.  cit..  Ill,  p.  248,  and  cf.  p.  247 ;  cf.  St.  Augustine, 
De  peccato  originali,  24;  non  enim  gratia  gratia  erit  ullo  nwdo,  nisi 
gratuita  fuerit  omni  modo.  Cf.  Jeremiah  II,  in  Mesolora,  op.  ctC,  I,  pp. 
170-173;  215-218;  260-263;  Mogila  ibid.,  p.  391;  Dositheus,  II.  pp. 
103-104;  Kritopoulos,  I.  p.  310  and  Macarius,  op.  cit.,  II.  pp.  338- 
341. 

4  Androutsos,  loc.  cit. 

6Pp.  93-100. 


222  IV.— DOCTRINE  OF  GRACE  AND  OF  THE  CHURCH 

cient;  He  knows  all  the  future  as  well  as  the  present  and  the 
past.  According  to  Bhosse,  God  knows  the  acts  of  His  free 
creatures  only  in  general,  not  as  to  their  actual  content.  If 
He  knows  not  only  all  that  man  can  do,  but  in  detail  what 
He  will  do,  then  (a)  He  becomes  partaker  in  this  sense  in 
what  man  does,  whether  for  good  or  evil,  and  (b)  man’s  free 
will  is  lost.  Hence  God  must  know  man’s  acts  relatively 
not  absolutely,  and  in  general  not  in  particular.1  Androutsos 
says  that  God  does  know  what  is  going  to  happen  in  every 
possible  instance,  but  that  His  knowledge  exercises  no  influence 
on  such  acts.  “The  events  are  known  by  God  because 
they  exist,  and  do  not  exist  because  He  knows  them.”  His 
foreknowledge  does  not  determine  events  but  merely  foresees 
them.2  This  foreknowledge  on  God’s  part  does  not  make  Him 
a  cause  of,  or  sharer  in,  the  acts  which  are  contrary  to  His 
will  for  good :  His  Providence  overrules  all  such  acts  and 
brings  good  out  of  evil.  His  final  end  and  ultimate  purpose 
in  Creation  He  will  not  suffer  to  miscarry.  God’s  foreknowl¬ 
edge,  according  to  Mesolora,  is  that  divine  power  by  which  God 
foresees  all  things  that  are  to  happen,  whether  the  works  and 
thoughts  of  man  or  whatever  is  dependent  upon  man  as  a 
rational  creature  endowed  with  free  will.  “But  it  does  not 
follow  that  because  God  foresees  all  things,  that  He  is  the 
cause  of  them  all ;  consequently,  He  does  not  foresee  everything 
in  the  absolute  sense  of  foreordination ,  but  according  to  His 
foreknowing  will  and  power  He  foreordains  those  things  which 
are  not  in  man's  province  .  .  .  such  as  Creation,  the  salvation 
of  mankind,”  and  the  like.3  St.  John  Damascene  writes:  “It 
is  well  to  know  how  it  is  that  God  foresees  everything,  yet 
does  not  foreordain  everything.  He  foresees  even  the  things 
which  have  to  do  with  us,  but  does  not  foreordain  them, 
since  He  neither  wishes  evil  to  happen  nor  is  constrained  by 
virtue  so  that  the  work  of  His  foreseeing  will  should  be 
foreordination.  He  foreordains  what  does  not  concern  us  ac¬ 
cording  to  His  foreknowledge,  according  to  which  also  God 
judges  all  things  in  advance  according  to  His  goodness  and 


1  Op.  cit.,  pp.  316-324. 

2  Op.  cit.,  pp.  66-67;  118-119. 

3  Op.  cit.,  Ill,  p.  192. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  GRACE 


223 


righteousness.”1  “This  foreknowledge”,  says  Mesolora,  “does 
not  abrogate  either  man's  reason  or  his  free-will,  because  it 
depends  upon  us  whether  we  remain  in  virtue  or  renounce  it.  . 

.  Xor  does  it  contravene  either  the  goodness  or  righteousness 
of  God,  who  wills  that  all  be  saved  and  all  come  to  the  knowl¬ 
edge  of  the  truth.  .  .  .The  foreordination  which  St.  Paul  speaks 
of  (in  Pom.  8,  29-30)  is  founded  upon  the  foreknowledge  of 
God,  which  takes  for  granted  the  existence  of  the  rational  use 
by  man  of  his  natural  light,  or  the  innate  law  of  God  in  him.  . 

.  .together  with  his  free  will.  God  knows  in  advance  those  who 
are  to  he  worthy  of  His  Grace,  which  prevents,  helps,  and  calls 
all  men,  of  whom  some  by  the  right  use  of  their  reason,  will,  and 
knowledge  of  the  good,  lay  hold  of  it  and  are  thereby  justified, 
and  others,  making  no  use  of  these  faculties, ....  stand  apart 
from  God,  and  are  thus  self-ordained  to  condemnation;  while 
God  foresaw  what  they  would  do.  .  .  .He  did  not  foreordain 
them  to  it,  inasmuch  as  He  simply  knew  in  advance  what  would 
happen.  ...  So  these  as  foreknown,  God  foreordains .  .  .  .and  as 
foreordained,  He  calls  them  through  the  Holy  Spirit,  whom  re¬ 
ceiving  as  working  with  them  to  receive  His  Grace,  He  justifies. 
....  So  the  cause  of  the  merit  of  the  elect  and  of  their  right¬ 
eousness  is  not  the  foreknowledge  of  God .  Our  Church 

teaches  that  God  foresees  all  things  but  does  not  foreordain  all 
things :  He  foreordains  the  things  which  are  not  in  our  province, 
according  to  His  foreknowledge ....  cBy  grace  we  are  saved’, 
....  for  Grace  goes  before,  and  the  will  of  man  follows  after, 
and  accepts  it.”2  “We  believe  that  God  knows  in  advance 
through  His  omniscience  those  who  are  To  be  conformed  to  the 
image  of  His  Son.'3  in  life  and  deed,  by  the  cooperation  of  con- 

1  "E/cSocris,  II.  47,  and  cf.  46. 

2  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  III.  pp.  193-195.  This  is  a  summary  of  the 
teaching  of  the  Symbolic  Books,  of  which  cf.  Kritopoulos  on  Rom. 
8,  29-30,  in  Mesolora,  I,  p.  308;  Mogila,  ibid.,  pp.  390-391,  393;  Synods 
of  Jassy  and  Jerusalem,  vol.  II.  pp.  29,  38,  64-65;  Dositheus,  ibid., 
p.  105;  Gennadius’  De  divina  procidentia  et  praedestinatione  tracta- 
tus;  Eugenius  Bulgaris,  Theologikon,  c.  28  (Greek  ed.,  pp.  175-210)  ; 
Jeremiah’s  II’s  first  and  second  Answers,  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  I.  pp.  170, 
215,  etc. 

3  Rom.  8,  29. 


224  IV.— DOCTRINE  OF  GRACE  AND  OF  THE  CHURCH 


comitant  and  prevenient  Grace.1  These  also  He  foreordained, 
according  to  His  righteousness  and  goodness,  to  enjoy  eternal 
life  and  divine  glory/’2  According  to  Androutsos,  “this  fore¬ 
ordination  of  some  men  to  destruction  and  of  others  to  salva¬ 
tion  is  not  arbitrary  and  absolute,  but  relative.  ...  It  is  based 
upon  the  foreknowledge  of  God,  but  without  prejudice  to  the 
free-will  of  man.  Hence  the  foreordination  of  man  is  depen¬ 
dent  upon  human  conditions,  and  no  one.  ...  .can  be  sure  whether 
he  will  remain  in  Grace,  or ...  .  absolutely  sure  that  he  is  pre¬ 
destined  to  life  or  that  he  will  be  saved.  Both  these  truths,  the 
universality  of  Grace  and  of  the  call  (to  salvation),  and  the 
foreordination  of  man,  relative  because  of  his  free-will,  are 
clearly  taught  by  the  Church3  and  the  Bible4 5  .  .  .  The  many 
references  in  Holy  Scripture  to  conversion,.  .  .  .and  the  other 
promises  and  threats,3  have  no  meaning  if  Grace  operates  neces¬ 
sarily.  . .  .  Man  becomes  subject  to  Grace  voluntarily,  and  it 
never  coerces  him.  This  freedom  constitutes  his  ethical  worth 
and  his  merit.”6  Mesolora  brings  out  strongly  the  two-fold 
character  of  the  doctrine  of  Grace.  “The  energy  of  the  Holy 
Spirit  (in  Grace) .  .  .  .does  not  take  away  man’s  free-will,  which 
remains  always  unharmed,  nor  does  (Grace)  compel  it,  for  then 

1  This  differentiation  of  the  kinds  of  grace  into  ‘‘illuminating” 
or  “prevenient”  {(Pojtkxtlkt],  irpo  kcltcipkt  ucp , )  and  “concomitant”,  “per¬ 
sonal”,  “cooperating”,  and  “enabling”  (cwepyovaa,  ISikti  [e^i/07], 
ei'dvvap.ovaa, )  is  due  to  Dositheus  Confession,  article  3  (cf.  for  text 
Mesolora,  op.  tit.,  II,  p.  104),  on  which  Mesolora  says:  “Although 
we  distinguish  the  divine  Grace  in  the  redeeming  work  of  the  Saviour 
from  that  which  cooperates  with  man’s  free  will  in  appropriating  the 
former,  yet  the  unity  of  Grace  as  one  whole  is  not  taken  away  by  this 
distinction”  (op.  tit.,  Ill,  p.  224,  note  2). 

2 Mesolora,  op.  tit.,  III.,  p.  199. 

3  Thus  clearly  in  Dositheus’  Confession,  in  Mesolora,  op.  tit.,  II.  pp. 
64-65,  104-105. 

4  Cf.  1  Tim.  2,  4,  6;  2  Cor.  5,  15;  1  St.  John  2,  2;  St.  Mt.  20, 
16  (in  textus  receptus,  16b  has  “many  be  called,  but  few  chosen — ” 
MSS.  Aleph.  B.  L.  etc.,  have  this;  cf.  St.  Matt.  22,  14.)  Rev.  3,  20; 
Acts.  7,  51. 

5  Cf.  Prov.  1,  24-25;  Isaiah.  5,  4;  65,  2;  St.  Matt.  11,  21;  Ezek. 

18,  23;  St.  Matt.  3,  8;  Acts  2,  38;  2  Cor.  6,  17;  1  Thess.  5,  19; 

2  'St.  Pet.  3,  9;  Rev.  3,  19,  20,  etc. 

6  Androutsos,  AoypLariKr),  pp.  224-225;  cf.  St.  John  Chrysostom, 
Theodoret,  etc.  note  8,  pp.  225-226  ibid. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  GRACE 


225 


his  regeneration ....  would  have  no  moral  value .  .  .  .  Redemp¬ 
tion  was  wrought  because  of  the  wrong  use  of  man’s  free-will. 
Without  this  free-will  divine  Grace  could  neither  uplift,  illu¬ 
minate,  nor  save  man.  .  .  .The  Orthodox  Church”  (in  contrast  to 
the  over-emphasis  of  the  West  on  the  importance  of  Grace  as 
against  Pelagianism,  and  on  works  as  against  Protestantism)1 
“has  kept  a  middle  road,  teaching  that  man’s  salvation  is 
achieved  first  through  Grace.  .  .  .and  secondly  through  the  free 
acceptance  of  it  by  man.  .  .  .  The  Saviour  proclaimed  this  truth, 
saying  ‘whosoever  will  to  come  after  me’.2  The  free  will  of  man 
is  the  determining  factor  and  the  basis  for  the  operation  of 
divine  Grace.”3  “Man  needs  to  appropriate,  or  to  make  his 
own,  the  merit  of  Christ,  first  through  divine  Grace,  that  is, 
through  the  operation  and  help  of  the  Holy  Spirit  of  God,  and 
secondly,  through  his  own  effort  and  choice  by  the  power  of  his 
free  will.”4  These  two  factors  theoretically  involve  contradic¬ 
tory  and  irreconcilable  notions.  “If  in  theory  we  are  unable 
to  understand  how  the  circle  of  human  freedom  operates  in 
God  without  violating  His  Absolute  character,  yet  in  practice 
we  may  not  dispose  of  the  human  factor,  which  cutting  the 
Gordian  knot  of  the  theoretical  difficulties,  offers  a  solution 
which  satisfies  human  instinct.  The  omnipotence  of  God  re¬ 
spects  human  freedom,  which  is  the  basis  of  the  existence  of  the 
moral  world.  Otherwise,  sacrificing  human  freedom  and  re¬ 
garding  Grace  as  absolute,  we  fall  into  the  errors  of  absolute 
predestination.”5 


1  Cf.  op.  cit.,  Ill,  pp.  245-246. 

2Cf.  St.  Matt.  16,  24;  St.  Mark  8.  34;  St.  Luke  9,  23;  Rev.  22,  7. 

3Mesolora.  op.  cit.,  III.  pp.  245-247. 

4  Ibid.,  p.  252,  which  is  his  summary  of  the  teaching  of  the  Sym¬ 
bolic  Books  given  ad  loc. 

5  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  227.  The  doctrine  of  absolute  predestina¬ 
tion  is  founded  on  such  texts  as  Rom.  8,  29-30;  Eph.  1,  4-11;  Phil. 

2,  13;  1  Cor.  4,  7,  and  the  whole  9th  Chapter  of  Romans.  Androutsos 

says:  ‘‘The  Apostle  does  not  here  deal  with  the  subjective  factor  of 
God’s  energy,  that  is,  man’s  free  will,  but  neither  does  he  rule  it  out 

.  .  .  In  many  other  places  he  speaks  of  this  human  factor  (e.  g., 

2  Cor.  6,  1;  1  Thes.  1,  6;  1  Cor.  1,  21;  Rom.  1,  16;  Phil.  2,  12; 

Rom.  8,  32;  11,  32;  1  Tim.  2,  4;  Tit.  2,  11,  etc.)  as  a  condition 

of  salvation ...  and  as  often  as  he  talks  about  foreordination  to  salva¬ 
tion  he  everywhere  presupposes  an  analogous  disposition  on  the 


226  IV.— DOCTRINE  OF  GRACE  AND  OF  THE  CHURCH 


2.  THE  OPERATION  OF  GRACE 

The  operation  of  Grace  in  the  concrete  is  regarded  properly 
as  a  process — a  progress  and  development  of  the  individual 
in  the  Christian  life,  beginning  with  conversion  and  regenera¬ 
tion  and  ending  in  the  glory  to  which  man  is  called.  Six  states 
of  this  progress  have  been  enumerated  by  different  Orthodox 
theologians:  the  call,  conversion,  regeneration,  justification 
sanctification,  and  mystical  union.  Thus  Antonius1  and  Meso- 
lora.2  Androutsos  does  not  see  the  necessity  of  this  division  and 
on  the  basis  of  Rom.  8,  29-30  distinguishes:  (a)  “the  call, 
or  conversion  or  preparation  for  justification,  (b)  justification 
or  sanctification,  and  (c)  glory, — in  which  justification  holds 
the  middle  place  following  the  call  and  preceding  glory.”* 
These  three  stages  only  he  regards  as  necessary.4  (a)  The 
call  is  comprised  of  two  elements — the  external,  the  preaching 
of  the  word,  and  the  internal,  the  receptive  attitude  of  man  by 
which  he  through  Grace  accepts  the  invitation  of  God.  This 
action  of  Grace  on  the  inner  man  creates  the  fidem  informem, 
by  which  he  is  disposed  to  accept  God’s  revelation,  and  directly 
affects  his  whole  spiritual  nature,  bringing  into  him  the  graces 
of  faith,  hope,  and  love.5  “This  preparation  is  the  sine  qua  non 

part  of  man,  which  .  .  .  constitutes  the  reason  explaining  God’s  con¬ 
demnation  or  His  approval  .  .  .  Protestantism  naturally  and  neces¬ 
sarily  holds  to  the  notion  of  absolute  predestination;  naturally,  since 
it  regards  the  natural  man  as  spiritually  and  morally  dead  ( i .  e., 
totally  depraved)  and  hence  God’s  Grace  must  be  the  sole  factor  in  salva¬ 
tion,  and  as  such  cannot  be  lost  or  escaped;  and  necessarily,  since  it 
is  inevitable  that  the  doctrine  of  absolute  predestination  and  of  ir¬ 
resistible  Grace  result  from  these  premises”  (op.  cit.,  pp.  226-228)  ;  cf. 
his  2vp.(3o\u<r)  for  a  more  extended  treatment  of  the  subject,  pp.  198- 
204  ff . ;  Confession  of  Dositheus,  in  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  II,  pp.  104-105, 
and  Mesolora,  III.  pp.  252-254. 

1  Op.  cit.,  pp.  275  ff. 

2  Op.  cit.,  III.  pp.  254-269. 

3  Op.  cit.,  pp.  229-230. 

4 “Most  of  these  (above  six)  distinctions  are,  on  examination,... 
seen  to  be  only  different  expressions  or  aspects  of  the  same  thing” 
(p.  229  ibid.).  This  view  is  subject  to  Dyobouniotes’  censure  in  his 
'H  Aoyp..  ’Avbp.  KpLp .,  p.  41,  and  his  ’0<pei\op.evr]  a-rravT.,  pp.  99-101,  who 
maintains  that  they  are  valid  and  real  distinctions,  marking  different 
steps  and  grades  in  the  way  of  salvation. 

5  Cf.  Dositheus  in  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  II,  p.  104. 


THE  OPERATION  OF  GRACE 


227 

and  condition  of  justification.  .  .  .not  the  efficient  cause  of  it.” 
Man  cannot  merit  the  gift  of  justifying  Grace  in  the  sense  that 
God  is  bound  to  give  it  to  him  in  return  for  his  meritorious 
acts. 

(b)  “ Justification  as  an  actual  change  in  man  is  both  the 
doing  away  with  sin  and  guilt,  and  the  implanting  of  a  new 
life ; .  .  .  .  negatively,  the  remission  of  sins,  and  positively,  sanc¬ 
tification.  So  justification  and  salvation  are  often  used  inter¬ 
changeably,  and  it  may  be  said  either  that  man  is  justified  or 
that  he  is  saved ,  by  faith  and  works.  If  men  died  immediately 
after  justification  they  are  saved,  just  as  much  as,  if  they  live 
thence  forward  without  falling  from  Grace,  they  are  potentially 
inheritors  of  eternal  life  which  is  dependent  on  justification. 
The  two  elements,  forgiveness  of  sins  and  sanctification,  are 
not  separate  from  each  other  in  time  as  if  sanctification  followed 
upon  cleansing  from  sin,  but  they  are  two  aspects  of  one  and 
the  same  thing.  .  .  .  This  remission  of  sins  is  no  mere  imputa¬ 
tion  of  freedom  from  sin.  .  .  .but  an  actual  effacement  of  it.  .  .  . 
The  judge  in  pronouncing  an  accused  man  innocent  does  not 
make  him  so,  but  only  publicly  proclaims  him  what  he  already 
is.  But  God  in  judging  a  sinner  does  not  regard  him  as  right¬ 
eous  while  he  is  a  sinner,  but  makes  him  actually  righteous.  .  .  . 
The  state  of  sin  is  removed  entirely  by  God's  power  in  the  act 
of  justification.  AVe  say  ‘entirely’  because  while  the  impulse 
to  sin  yet  remains  in  the  justified,  it  is  not  accounted  to  him 
as  sin,  since  his  will  does  not  follow  the  tendency  of  this  impulse 
to  sin.  .  .  .  The  principle  and  basis  of  sin,  the  perversion  of  the 
will,  is  entirely  removed  and  the  regenerate  will  is  borne  God- 
ward.  .  .  .  The  assertion  that  the  energies  of  sin,  however  they 
may  be  defined,  cannot  he  removed,  cannot  be  explained  in  any 
other  way  than  on  the  hypothesis  either  (a)  that  God  cannot 
do  this — in  which  case  sin  would  be  regarded  as  being  of  too 
great  power  for  even  the  Almighty  to  break.... or  (b)  that 
God  does  not  wish  to  do  away  with  sin — which  violates  the  idea 
of  God  as  merciful,  and  is  in  opposition  to  the  whole  economy 
of  Redemption.”1  Androutsos  rejects  every  theory  of  there  be- 
ing  two  justifications — one  in  which  a  sinner  is  pronounced 
righteous  and  one  in  which  he  has  actually  attained  righteous- 


1  ^oy/j-ariKTi,  pp.  231-233. 


228  IV.— DOCTRINE  OF  GRACE  AND  OF  THE  CHURCH 


ness.1  Consequently  God  does  not  call  a  man  righteous  in  whom 
there  is  only  “righteousness  in  germ”,  “potential  righteousness”, 
but  makes  him  actually  what  he  pronounces  him  to  be.  In  op¬ 
posing  this  theory  Androutsos  asks :  “From  whence  does  this 
state  of  ‘potential  righteousness’  proceed?  From  man,  or  from 
God?  If  you  answer,  ‘from  man’,  then  this  is  Pelagianism.  . .  . 
if  you  say  ‘from  God’,  then  you  hold  to  the  Roman  doctrine 
of  infused  Grace....  and  regard  the  justification  coming 
through  Baptism  as  being  only  such  ‘in  germ’ !” 

Justification  is  then  “the  principle  (and  beginning)  of 
a  new  life  developed  gradually  through  the  free  will  of  the 
justified,”2  and  in  this  sense,  with  emphasis  on  the  progressive 
and  developing  character  of  the  process,  Mesolora  understands 
it.  After  quoting  Rom.  3,  24,  he  defines  justification  as  “the 
proclaiming  of  a  man  as  righteous  (just)  by  God,  and  regard¬ 
ing  him  as  such  before  Him,  for  the  sake  of  the  objective  Jus¬ 
tification  wrought  by  Jesus  by  His  death  on  the  Cross.3  This 
justification  is  only  potentially  that  final  and  complete  justifica¬ 
tion  which  is  developed  gradually  on  the  part  of  the  subject,  and, 
by  the  cooperation  of  man  through  faith  working  by  love,  has  as 
its  consequence  sanctification  and  salvation4.  .  .  .It  is  not  only  the 
external  imputation  of  righteousness  to  man  by  the  death  of 
the  Lord,  but  the  appropriation  in  the  case  of  each  individual 
....  of  the  redeeming  work  of  Christ,  by  which  we  achieve  sanc¬ 
tification — the  predestined  end,  and  the  terminus  ad  quem  of 
the  true  Christian5.  .  .  .Justification  is  the  work  both  of  divine 
power — by  which  we  are  not  only  pronounced  just  though  we 
are  sinners,  but  are  also  raised  up  to  receive  the  Grace  which 
first  justified  us  in  the  death  of  the  Lord, — and  as  well  the  work 
of  man — in  accepting  and  receiving,  in  constant  faith.  .  .  .by 
his  own  act  of  will  the  continuous  operation  of  divine  Grace, 
and  showing  it  through  a  living  faith  by  which  he  is  constituted 
and  is,  actually  righteous6  ....  The  divine  Grace  not  only  pro- 

1  Dyobouniotes  expounds  this  view,  p.  43  of  his  Aoyp.  ’Avdp.  Kpiv., 
and  pp.  103-104  of  his  '0 0et\.  dwavT^cns. 

2  Androutsos,  Aoyp..  MeX.  A’,  p.  110. 

3  Op.  tit.,  III.  p.  260. 

4  Ibid. 

5  Ibid.,  p.  263. 

e  Ibid.,  p.  265. 


THE  OPERATION  OP  GRACE 


229 


nounces,  but  makes  us  righteous,  in  Justification.’'1  This 
teaching  that  justification  is  more  than  simply  the  pronounce¬ 
ment  of  God  on  man’s  new  relation  towards  Him,  is  supported 
by  Holy  Scripture.  It  is  clear  that  many  passages2  taken  by 
themselves  may  be  interpreted  in  a  forensic  sense,  but  others3 
“indicate  much  more  than  the  mere  not  imputing  of  sins. 
The  Apostle’s  freedom  in  linking  together  ‘righteousness’  and 
‘holiness’,  ‘justification'  and  ‘sanctification’4.  .  .  .shows  that  the 
connection  of  justification  and  sanctification  is  much  more 
intimate  than  the  Protestants  imagine ....  Sanctification,  or 
moral  conversion,  is  consummated  after  justification, ...  .but 
this  new  life  in  Christ  may  not  be  separated  from  justification, 
but  is  originally  bound  up  with  it.  .  .  .The  ‘renewal  of  the 
inner  man’  is  presented  in  Holy  Scripture  as  the  immediate 
gift  of  Baptism,  or  of  Redemption  in  Christ,  or  of  the  Holy 
Spirit,0  as  well  as  the  end  towards  which  man  should  endeavor 
to  gob  .  .  .In  Church  teaching'.  .  .  .the  conception  of  Justifica¬ 
tion  and  that  of  a  just  God  demand  that  justification  be  taken 
in  the  sense  of  an  actual  renewal  of  the  inner  man.  In  Holy 
Scripture  justification  and  righteousness  are  opposed  to  un¬ 
righteousness  and.  .  .  .sin.  Hence  the  state  of  righteousness.  .  .  . 
must  be  considered  as  opposite  to  that  of  sin8.  .  .  .As  sin  which 
came  from  Adam  is  a  very  real  thing,  so  the  righteousness  from 
Christ  must  be  equally  as  real.  Thus  a  man  to  be  considered  as 
righteous  by  God  must  either  be  so  or  be  made  so — otherwise 


1  Ibid.,  p.  267. 


-E.  g.,  Gal.  3,  11;  Rom.  3,  20;  4,  7 
1,  14;  Heb.  9,  22;  Col.  2,  13;  Heb.  10, 
3  E.  g.y  Rom.  8,  11;  6,  4;  1  Cor.  6, 
Eph.  2,  6;  Rom.  8,  20;  2  Cor.  4,  16; 
6  etc. 


;  5,  9,  10;  Eph.  1,  7;  Ool. 
17 ;  2  Cor.  5,  19. 

11;  Gal.  3,  21;  Col.  1,  13; 
Tit.  3,  5;  Rom.  8;  16;  6, 


3  E.  g.,  1  Cor.  6,  11;  2  Thes.  2,  13. 

5  Tit.  3,  5;  Eph.  2,  10;  2  Cor.  3,  18. 

6  1  St.  John  3,  3. 

7  On  the  effects  of  Baptism,  cf.  Tertullian :  remissio  delictorum,  abso- 
lutio  mortis,  regeneratio  hominis,  consecutio  Spiritus  sancti  (Adv. 
Marc.  1,  28.)  ;  St.  Basil,  de  Spiritu,  Sancto,  15,  15,  35;  St.  Greg.  Naz. 

.  Oratio  40,  3;  St.  Augustine,  In  Joan.  tr.  26,  1;  Opus  imperf .,  11,  168; 
Dositheus,  in  Mesolora,  II,  p.  116. 

8  Cf.  Rom.  5,  19. 


230  IV.— DOCTRINE  OF  GRACE  AND  OF  THE  CHURCH 

God  judges  falsely  in  pronouncing  an  unrighteous  man  right¬ 
eous1  .  .  .  .  ” 

The  doctrine  of  sanctification,  like  that  of  justification,  is 
indebted  largely  to  Protestant  contentions  and  the  need  of 
defining  Orthodox  teaching  against  them,  for  the  particular 
character  of  its  formulation.  According  to  Mesolora,  “by  sanc¬ 
tification  we  understand  that  perfect  religious  and  moral  state 
of  the  Christian,  achieved  first  by  the  operation  of  the  Holy 
Spirit,  preserving,  increasing,  and  perfecting  his  life  in  Christ, 
and  secondly  by  the  cooperation  of  man,  manifesting  the  per¬ 
fect  religious  and  moral  life  of  a  Christian  in  good  works. 
Sanctification  is  then  a  further  development  and  progress  of 
justification,  by  which  man  is  advanced  and  perfected  in  vir¬ 
tue.  ...  By  it  we  are  perfectly  united  with  Jesus,  as  the  branch 
in  the  Vine,  bring  forth  fruit,  and  are  made  members  of  the 
one  Body,  Jesus  Christ2 3  .  .”  According  to  Androutsos  it  is 

“the  good  disposition,  the  holy  purpose,  formed  in  us  by  the 
indwelling  Grace  of  God,  and  strengthening  faith  and  love  in 
man,  shown  forth  in  joy  for  the  good  and  in  the  irresistible 
desire  to  carry  it  out ....  by  good  works .  .  .  .  Inasmuch  as  sanc¬ 
tification  constitutes ....  the  essence  of  justification,  it  is  ob¬ 
vious  that  justification,  according  to  both  Orthodox  and  Roman 
teaching,  is  different  in  individual  believers,  and  capable  of 
greater  development  and  progress. 1,3  If  justification  is  not  a 
forensic  act  and  consequently  not  the  same  in  every  case,  then 
sanctification  has  its  degrees  and  grades  as  has  glory,4  and  is 
not  the  same  in  every  one  of  the  faithful.  It  also  follows  that 
since  the  gift  of  justification  is  neither  irresistible  nor  ina- 
missible,  Grace  may  be  lost  through  sin,  and  even  those  once 
justified  may  fall  grievously.  That  “there  is  a  sin  unto  death”,5 
and  that  we  ask  forgiveness  of  our  sins6  in  the  Lord’s  Prayer, 
implies  that  justification  does  not  necessarily  involve  sancti- 

1  Androutsos,  AoynariKri,  pp.  233-237;  on  diKaiovv  in  the  New  Testa¬ 
ment  cf.  note  2,  p.  236. 

2  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  Ill,  p.  266. 

3  AoynariKr),  pp.  237-238. 

4Cf.  1  Cor.  15,  41. 

6  St.  John  5,  16,  17;  and  cf.  St.  Jas.  3,  2;  St.  Augustine  de  dono 
perseverentiae,  2,  4. 

6  On  the  distinction  of  sins  cf.  Androutsos’  ’Zvp.^oXiKyj,  pp.  240  ff. 


FAITH  AND  GOOD  WORKS 


231 


fication  and  salvation.  We  may  fall  from  Grace  any  time :  “he 
that  thinketh  he  standeth  must  take  heed  lest  he  fall.”1 2  Con¬ 
sequently  “no  one  may  be  sure  of  his  own  salvation  nor  may 
he  predict  with  certainty  that  he  will  be  able  to  keep  himself 
from  grievous  sins  in  the  future  and  remain  in  (the  state  of) 
justification.’72 


3.  FAITH  AND  GOOD  WORKS 

The  one  and  only  way  by  which  we  may  appropriate  the 
merit  of  our  Saviour  and  come  to  apprehend  it  by  sanctification, 
is  faith ,  which  means  obedience  to  the  voice  of  God.  “Faith 
is  not  a  mere  acceptance  of  the  truths  of  the  Faith,  but  a  cleav¬ 
ing  to  the  Saviour  and  an  adherence  to  His  work  bound  up 
with  acceptance  of  Gospel  Truth.  It  is  not  only  a  work  of  the 
intellect,  but  is  above  all  moral,  .  .  .  since  giving  up  this  world 
and  cleaving  to  the  Saviour  means  to  love  Him,  which  love 
takes  for  granted  the  action  of  the  will.”  Justifying  Faith 
is  essentially  a  moral  matter  and  is  inevitably  bound  up  with 
love.  “Since  love  for  God  and  love  for  one’s  neighbor  consti¬ 
tute  the  essence  of  good  works,  it  is  apparent  that  good  works 
also,  the  inevitable  expression  and  manifestation  of  love,  are 
involved  in  justification  and  salvation  in  Christ.”3  “Love  is 
the  essence  and  soul  of  good  works,  as  they  are  the  natural 
embodiment  of  love.”4  “Good  works  are  the  touchstone”,  says 
Dyobouniotes,  “of  developed  love :  where  such  exist,  unless 
they  proceed  from  other  motives,  there  is  love  in  its  perfect 
form ;  where  they  are  absent,  unless  this  absence  be  due  to 
causes  beyond  the  control  of  the  person’s  will,  there  love  is 
absent — at  least,  that  love  which  is  able  to  justify.”5  It  is 
obvious  that  where  there  is  no  occasion  to  prompt  good  works 
or  material  means  available  for  carrying  them  out,  love  is 
not  without  its  virtuous  character,  and  has  the  same  ethical 

1  1  Cor.  10,  12,  and  cf.  Rom.  11,  20;  1  Cor.  9,  27;  Rev.  3,  11;  St. 
Jas.  1,  14-15;  1  Cor.  6,  9-10;  2  St.  Pet.  2,  20-21. 

2  Androutsos,  loyfxaTiKri,  p.  241  and  cf.  pp.  238-240. 

3  Androutsos,  Aoy/jLa.TiKr),  pp.  241-242. 

*Ilid.,  Aoy fi.  MeX.,  A’,  p.  106. 

6  ’O 0etX.  d-rravr.,  pp.  102-103. 


232  IV.— DOCTRINE  OF  GRACE  AND  OF  THE  CHURCH 


value  as  if  it  could  have  been  manifested  in  good  works.1 
“Whether  one  say  that  faith  or  love  or  good  works  or  the  carry¬ 
ing  out  of  God's  commandments  justify  and  save,  it  is  all  one, 
because  of  the  intimate  connection  between  faith  and  love.  .  .  . 
The  full  statement.  .  .  .which  includes  both  the  theoretical  and 
practical  element ....  is  the  proposition  that  man  is  justified 
through  faith  that  worketh  by  love."2 

The  great  problem  of  the  relationship  between  faith  and 
good  works  is  presented  by  the  seemingly  contradictory  teach¬ 
ings  of  St.  Paul's  and  St.  James’  epistles.  Dyobouniotes  on 
this  basis  distinguishes  two  justifications,  of  St.  Paul  and  St. 
James;  one,  a  potential  justification,  or  “justification  in  germ", 
in  which  God  pronounces  a  man  just  for  the  sake  of  that  which 
he  may  become,  and  the  other,  the  actual  attainment  of  right¬ 
eousness  by  faith  and  good  works,  related  as  the  beginning 
and  the  development  of  the  life  in  Christ.  “The  Eastern 
Church  cannot  regard  justification  as  does  the  Protestant 
Church,  simply  as  a  forensic  act  of  pronouncing  a  man  right¬ 
eous,  but  as  an  internal  change.  Yet  this.  .  .  .does  not  preclude 
the  distinction  of  beginning  and  end  in  justification,  nor  pre¬ 
vent  one  from  calling  this  beginning,  the  first,  and  the  end, 
the  second,  justification.  .  .  .  The  first  is  the  proclaiming  of  a 
man  as  just  by  God,  .  .  .  inasmuch  ...  as  the  internal  change, 
even  if  it  has  not  yet  become  a  state,  yet  exists  in  germ,  and  the 
second  as  the  actual  realization  of  this  state... /To  justify' 
is  taken  in  Holy  Scripture  in  two  senses.  ...  So  justification 
as  a  forensic  act  may  be  regarded  as  proceeding  from  faith, 
and  salvation  as  of  faith  and  works."3  Other  Orthodox  writers 
have  effected  a  reconciliation  of  St.  Paul's  and  St.  James’ 
thought  by  this  doctrine  of  two  justifications — one  in  this 
present  life  through  faith,  and  the  other  at  the  second  coming, 
through  faith  with  good  works.  So  teach  Damalas,4  Antonius 

1  Androutsos,  Aoy/xaTiKri,  p.  242. 

2Ibid.;  cf.  Gal.  5,  6,  and  Dositheus  in  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  II,  p.  112; 
Dyobouniotes  takes  exception  to  this  passage  in  'H  Aoyp..  ’Av8p.  npiv., 
p.  42  and  ’O 0eiX.  air avr.,  p.  101.  St.  Paul  used  evepyoi'pevr),  not  evep- 
yovaps  (Androutsos).  Cf.  Androutsos,  Aoyp..  MeX.  A',  p.  106-108. 

3  Dyobouniotes,  'H  Aoyp.  ’Avdp.  Kpiv.,  pp.  43  ff;  *0 cpei\.  airavr.,  pp. 
103-109. 

4  Ilept  apx&v,  p.  132. 


FAITH  AND  GOOD  WORKS 


233 


(in  commenting  on  Gal.  2,  16)/  Macarius/  and  Balanos,  whose 
monograph1 2 3  is  designed  to  substantiate  this  teaching.  An- 
droutsos  distinguishes  in  the  biblical  passages  ad  loc.,  two  as¬ 
pects  of  justification:  the  active,  as  the  energy  of  God  by  which 
is  effected  the  transition  from  unrighteousness  to  justification, 
and  the  passive,  the  state  of  righteousness,  the  right  relation 
of  man  to  God.4 5....  He  says  further:  “.No  one  can  rightly 
speak  of  two  justifications  according  to  Holy  Scripture,  for 
justification  is  one,  distinguished  from  salvation  as  the  reason 
is  from  its  result  and  consequence.  ....  According  to  this  rela¬ 
tionship  one  may  sav  one  of  two  things:  either  that  justifica¬ 
tion  and  salvation  depend  upon  faith ....  or  that  they  depend 
upon  faith  and  works’....  So  when  the  above  mentioned  dog- 
maticians  distinguish  two  justifications,.  .  .  .they  do  not  actually 
distinguish  them  in  fact  from  each  other,.  .  .  .since  faith 
working  through  love  may  not  be  separated  from  faith  and 
good  works.  .  .  .  According  to  Orthodox  teaching,  faith,  in 
order  to  justify,  must  be  animated  by  love  involving  the  whole 
man,  evolving  from  a  merely  noetic  into  an  ethical  work.  .  .  . 
.  .Hence  the  terms  by  which  they  distinguish  two  justifications, 
which  are  really  in  essence  only  one,  cannot  be  employed  as 
distinguishing  features6 .... 77 

Androutsos,  while  admitting  two  senses  of  the  word  in  St. 
Paul's  and  .St.  James'  usage,  does  not  regard  them  as  necessarily 
different  and  mutually  exclusive,  and  so  does  not  solve  the 
problem  of  justification  by  this  method.  “Both7  are  talking 
about  different  aspects  of  the  one  process.  St.  James,  consis¬ 
tently  with  his  practical  aim,  ranges  works  over  against  faith, 
as  something  standing  by  itself  and  establishing  a  proper  equi¬ 
librium,  but  elsewhere8  frequently  postulates  the  organic  union 
of  both,  discussing  faith  as  the  foundation  of  works  and  works 

1  loy^arLKri  QeoXoyia  .  .  .translated  by  Theodore  Ballianos,  Athens, 
1858,  p.  240. 

2  Op.  cit.,  II.  p.  361-363. 

3  ’ll  7repl  SiKaiuxrecvs  SidaaKaXia  rrjs  ’0 pd.  'EXX^i'i/cijs  ’Ek/cXtjo-.,  pp.  39  ff. 

4  A oyp.a.TiKr) ,  p.  255. 

5  Androutsos,  \oy  par  iK-q ,  p.  256. 

8  Ibid.,  pp.  256-258  and  cf.  his  Aoyp.  MeX.,  A’,  pp.  106-113. 

7  Cf.  St.  Jas.  2,  24;  Gal.  5,  6. 

*E.  g.,  1,  3,  4;  2,  17,  18,  20,  24-26. 


234  IV.— DOCTRINE  OF  GRACE  AND  OF  THE  CHURCH 


as  the  complement  of  faith ....  St.  Paul  lays  down  the  terms 
of  justification  according  to  their  internal  organic  connection. 
.  .  .  .When  he  contrasts  faith  and  works  he  does  not  mean  faith 
as  separated  from  love,  nor  does  what  he  says  stand  in  opposi¬ 
tion  to  St.  James.  .  .  In  1  Cor.  13,  2,  he  speaks  of  faith  apart 
from  love  as  vain.  .  .  .  From  Heb.  11,  6,  we  see.  .  .  .that  faith 
is  not  a  mere  acceptance  by  the  intellect  of  the  truths  of  the 
Gospel,  but  a  good  intention  and  disposition  of  the  soul  turned 
toward  the  Saviour,  out  of  which  good  works  naturally  flow. 
It  is  apparent  that  the  faith  of  St.  James  which  the  demons 
have  is  not  the  justifying  faith  of  St.  Paul.  ..  .  Furthermore 
‘the  works  of  the  Law’  in  St.  Paul  do  not  mean  ‘good  works’  ”* 
.  .but  the  Apostle  is  inveighing  against  the  attitude  of  claim¬ 
ing  justification  as  something  due  from  God  in  return  for 
performing  works,  while  “he  who  is  justified  through 
the  merits  of  the  Saviour  receives  his  justification  freely  as 
a  gift  of  God’s  Grace.”"  This  is  the  way  in  which  the  Fathers 
have  understood  justification  by  faith,1 2 3 4  of  whom  some  follow* 
St.  James  with  a  practical  purpose  in  view,  not  intending  to 
expound  the  inner  unity  of  works  from  faith  through  love 
“Like  St.  James,  they  also  regard  good  works  as  the  fruit  and 
manifestation  of  faith,  and  as  the  standard  and  witness  of  the 
existence  of  faith  and  of  its  vital  power.”5 

The  Protestant  objection  to  the  doctrine  of  faith  and  works 
as  taught  by  the  Orthodox  Church,  is  that  “works”  bring  about 
a  certain  sense  of  merit  and  pride  in  the  believer,  and  hence 
the  view  that  they  are  essential  may  not  be  accepted.  As  Mes- 
olora  says :  “The  Christian  may  not  boast  about  his  good  works 
nor  believe  that  he  can  be  justified  through  them  alone,  for 


1  Cf.  Mesolora,  op.  tit.,  Ill,  p.  247 ;  the  Apostle  “means  works  of  the 
Mosaic  Law  .  .  .  which  was  only  a  schoolmaster  leading  the  way  to 
Christ.” 

2  Cf.  Rom.  4,  4;  3,  24;  Eph.  2,  8;  Androutsos’  AoyyaTiKT},  p.  244- 
245. 

3  E.  g.,  St.  Justin  Martyr,  Dialogus  aim  Tryph.,  47;  Shepherd  of 
Eermas,  1,  3,  8;  Clem.  Alex.  Strom.,  VI.  9;  St.  Irenaeus  Adv.  Eaer. 
IV,  27,  2;  Tertullian,  adv.  Marc.,  V,  3,  etc. 

4  St.  Irenaeus,  Adv.  Eaer.  IV.  13;  St.  Cyril  Jerus.,  Cat.,  VI.  2; 
St.  Basil  De  Fide;  St.  John  Dam.,  vE/c5ocris,  IV.  10. 

5  Androutsos,  ibid.,  pp.  246-247,  cf.  note  1. 


FAITH  AND  GOOD  WORKS 


235 


. our  justification  depends  in  the  first  place  upon  divine 

Grace  and  the  merits  of  the  Saviour  from  whom  we  have  our 
faith  as  a  free  gift.  .  .  .  Our  Church  teaches  that  faith  only 
cannot  justify  or  sanctify  a  man,  nor  can  good  works  of  them¬ 
selves  perfectly  fulfill  the  divine  will,  since  they  are  not  suffi¬ 
cient  for  salvation  without  faith,  .  .  .  but  are  well  pleasing  to 
God  and  necessary  to  salvation  .  .  as  demonstrating  the  life  and 
power  of  God's  Grace  in  us,  and  our  appropriation  of  the  re¬ 
deeming  work  of  Christ/’1  Protestantism  is  wrong  in  refusing 
any  merit  to  good  works.  “The  merit  of  Christian  works 
is  not  absolute  but  relative,  for  the  former  can  only  be  had 
between  equals,  when  each  gives  in  turn  what  is  the  other’s 
due.”2  We  have  no  absolute  merit  before  God,  as  St.  Luke 
17,  10  shows,  yet  Holy  Scripture  teaches  us3  that  “Christian 
works  become  meritorious,  or  that  by  them  we  may  become 
worthy  of  the  Kingdom  of  Heaven.  But  it  is  to  be  noticed 
that  good  or  meritorious  works  are  only  those  achieved  by  the 
power  of  Christ,  with  which  our  will  cooperates  and  concurs, 
and  that  those  done  by  the  natural  man,  still  in  sin,  or  those 
external  works  which  are  devoid  of  any  good  intention  animat¬ 
ing  them,  such  as  love  of  God  and  one’s  neighbor,  are  deprived 
of  any  meritorious  character.  . .  .  Furthermore.  . .  .the  merit 
of  our  works  may  not  exceed  the  measure  of  our  dutv”4.  .  .  . 
Consequently  the  Roman  doctrine  of  “works  of  supererogation” 
and  “the  treasury  of  merits”  is  a  “teaching  which  is  both 
unjustified  and  unreasonable.”5  The  distinction  between  coun¬ 
sel  and  precept  may  be  objectively  valid,  but  subjectively  it  is 
without  force.  Our  Lord’s  words  to  the  young  man  in  St.  Matt. 
19,  21,  do  not  mean  that  “one  can  do  more  than  is  required 

1  Op.  cit.,  III.  pp.  275,  279;  for  the  evidence  of  the  Symbolic  Books  cf. 
in  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  Jeremiah  II’s  Answer  I.  pp.  185-186;  sec¬ 
ond  Answer,  ibid.,  pp.  220-221,  224;  Kritopoulos,  ibid.,  p.  316;  against 
the  Roman  doctrine  of  supererogation,  ibid.,  p.  348;  Mogila,  ibid., 
pp.  376-378;  pp.  460,  461-463;  Dositheus,  ibid.,  II.  pp.  107-108;  Jere¬ 
miah,  II.  in  ibid.,  1,  p.  174. 

2  Androutsos,  Aoynarucr),  p.  247. 

3  St.  Luke  12,  33;  Rom.  2,  6;  Tim.  4,  8;  1  Cor.  3,  8,  14;  Heb. 
10,  35;  Col.  3,  24,  etc. 

4  Androutsos,  ibid.,  p.  249. 

6  For  a  full  discussion  of  the  Roman  doctrine  and  of  the  Orthodox 
position  against  it,  cf.  Androutsos’  2u/i/3o\i/o7,  pp.  235  ff. 


236  IV.— DOCTRINE  OF  GRACE  AND  OF  THE  CHURCH 


for  the  attainment  of  eternal  life,  but  were  said  to  show  how 
imperfect  and  incomplete  was  his  fulfilment  of  the  Law.”1 
The  Roman  doctrine  of  the  superabundant  merits  of  the  Saints, 
which  may  be  applied  to  those  yet  in  debt,  has  no  foundation 
in  Holy  Scripture,  for  “the  Saints  may  be  helped  by  the  prayers 
of  the  faithful.”2  In  general,  Roman  and  Orthodox  teach¬ 
ing  agree3  as  to  the  conditions  and  terms  of  justification, 
against  the  Protestant  theory  of  justification  by  faith  only. 
“While  Orthodox  teaching  regards  justifying  faith  as  naturally 
manifesting  itself  in  good  works,  the  Protestants  regard  it 
as  a  passive  and  receptive  organ  only  and  think  that  God  jus¬ 
tifies  a  man  as  he  believes  (that  is,  Accepts’),  not  as  he 
loves,  thus  forcibly  sundering  faith  and  works;  they  are  worlds 
apart  from  the  teaching  of  Orthodoxy.”4 


1  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  249-250. 

2  Ibid. 

3  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  251.  With  this  statement  many  Orthodox 
theologians  disagree,  e.  g.,  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  II.  p.  263;  Damalas, 
Ilepi  apxuv,  p.  151;  Balanos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  41,  58,  and  Dvobouniotes, 
'H  Aoyp.  ’A vdp.  Kpiv.,  p.  39,  'O0et\.  dirdvTrjaLS,  pp.  96-99.  The  latter 
says:  “There  is  no  possibility  of  doubt  that  the  basis  of  the  doctrine 
of  justification  is  the  teaching  about  the  original  state  of  man,  and 
the  doctrine  of  the  Fall.  Since  Roman  and  Orthodox  doctrine  differ 
widely  on  this  point,  it  follows  that  their  doctrine  of  justification 
must  be  different  .  .  .  Not  only  do  they  differ  as  to  infused  Grace 
but  also  as  to  the  merit  of  good  works,  ...  as  Philaret  of  Moscow  ob¬ 
serves,  even  if  the  distinction  be  a  delicate  one”  (pp.  97-98,  ’O0ei\. 
diravT. ) .  Androutsos  denies  that  this  deduction  follows  from  the  prem¬ 
ises  (Aoyp.  MeXeVat.  A',  p.  105).  “Justification,  both  according  to  our 
own  and  the  Roman  teaching,  is  not  only  the  removal  of  sin  but  an  ac¬ 
tual  change  and  renewal  of  the  inner  man,  as  teach  Damalas  (op.  cit., 
p.  147)  and  Mesolora  (op.  cit.,  Ill,  pp.  263-266).  .  .  .  The  Roman 
phrase,  virtus  infusa,  ...  is  a  technical  term  ...  to  mean  the 
steadfast  turning  of  the  man  towards  God  .  .  .  which  is  a  common 
doctrine  of  all  who  hold  justification  to  be  a  moral  matter.”  “If  there 
be  any  difference  between  us  and  the  Latins  as  to  the  terms  of  justifi¬ 
cation,  these  are  in  respect  to  practice  not  theory,”  and  to  the  deduc¬ 
tions  made  by  Rome  from  legitimate  doctrine.  (Androutsos,  AoyparLKrj, 
pp.  251-252,  note,  and  his  'LvpfioAiKrj,  pp.  215  ff. ) 

4  Androutsos,  Aoyp.aTi.Krj,  p.  251-252. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  CHURCH 


237 


2.  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  CHURCH 
1.  Conception  and  Mission  of  the  Church 

The  word  “church”  in  its  early  general  meaning  signified 
an  assembly  of  men  for  any  purpose,  then  became  limited  to 
gatherings  for  a  religious  purpose,  and  afterwards  was  applied 
to  the  place  in  which  such  meetings  were  held.1  In  the  Christian 
sense  it  was  loosely  applied  to  the  local  Christian  congregation, 
or  to  the  whole  totality  of  such  local  assemblies,  or  to  the  con¬ 
stituent  officers  of  the  organization.  Specifically  under  the 
Fathers  and  the  theologians  the  word  came  to  denote  all 
those  who  constitute  the  people  of  God,2  whether  living  on 
earth  or  triumphant  in  heaven.  Hence  the  distinction  be¬ 
tween  the  “Church  Militant”  and  the  “Church  Triumphant.”3 
In  the  Orthodox  sense,  according  to  Androutsos,4 5  it  means 
“only  the  totality  of  all  the  Orthodox  of  all  times.”  In  the  New 
Testament  and  the  Fathers,  various  partial  aspects  of  the 
Church’s  mission  and  character  are  indicated,  without  the 
specific  definition  of  the  word  in  exact  and  concrete  forms.8 
This  gave  rise  in  early  days  to  incomplete  conceptions  and 
definitions  against  which  the  Orthodox  have  always  reacted. 
The  Protestant  conception  of  the  Church  as  essentially  “in¬ 
visible”  is  legitimately  in  line  of  succession  from  Montanism, 
Donatism,  and  Novatianism.  The  Roman  conception  of  the 
Church,  as  Mesolora  puts  it,  is  that,  “the  Pope  is  the  Church”,6 * 
and  is  a  reaction  in  entirely  the  opposite  direction. 

1  Androutsos,  Aoy^aTi/07,  p.  259 ;  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  p.  6,  note 

1;  cf.  Acts  19,  32,  39;  7,  38;  Heb.  2,  12. 

2  Androutsos,  ibid.,  cf.  St.  Augustine  Enchiridon,  56,  and  on  Ps.  92, 
and  cf.  Eph.  1,  22. 

3  Androutsos,  ibid.,  p.  260,  and  Mesolora,  ibid.,  p.  7. 

4  Ibid.,  and  cf.  below,  on  tlie  ‘’notes”  of  the  Church  pp.  243-246 
following. 

5Cf.  1  Tim.  3,  15;  1  Cor.  3,  16;  Eph.  1,  23;  5,  23;  Rev.  19,  7; 
Gal.  4,  26;  St.  John  15,  1;  10,  1-7,  etc.;  St.  Ignatius  exalted  the 
Church’s  episcopal  organization ;  St.  Cyprian  and  Tertullian,  its 
priestly  function;  St.  John  Chrysostom  presents  it  as  “a  fellowship 
of  the  Faithful”,  as  does  St.  Epiphanius,  etc.;  cf.  Androutsos,  op.  cit., 

p.  260. 

6  Op.  cit.,  p.  11;  cf.  Androutsos,  note  2,  pp.  261-262  on  the  Protestant 

conception. 


238  IV— DOCTRINE  OF  GRACE  AND  OF  THE  CHURCH 

The  Church  is  both  visible  and  invisible,  divine  and  hu¬ 
man,  and  may  be  defined  as  "that  holy  foundation  made  by 
the  Incarnate  Word  of  God  for  the  salvation  and  sanctification 
of  men,  bearing  His  own  authority  and  authentication,  con¬ 
stituted  of  men  having  one  faith  and  sharing  the  same  sacra¬ 
ments,  who  are  divided  into  lay  and  clergy.  ..  .and  the  latter, 
who  rule  the  Church,  trace  their  beginning  through  unbroken 
succession  to  the  Apostles  and  through  them  to  our  Lord.”1 
To  which  definition  Mesolora  would  add :  "This  divine  and  .  .  . 
spiritual  foundation,  having  its  inception  in  the  will  and  plan 
of  God  before  the  foundation  of  the  world,  was  effected  on 
earth  through  Jesus  Christ  and  the  descent  of  the  Holy  Spirit 
at  Pentecost  .  .  .  and  has  as  its  Head,  Jesus  Christ,  and  as  its 
Guide,  the  Holy  Spirit.”'2  This  definition  involves  the  Church’s 
object  and  mission — the  salvation  of  men,3  which  may  be  con¬ 
ceived  of  as  the  extension  and  continuation  of  the  work  of 
our  Lord’s  three-fold  office,  as  Prophet,  Priest,  and  King.4  It 
also  states  the  two-fold  character  of  the  Church:  "As  a  founda¬ 
tion  with  definite  aim  on  earth  it  is  visible,  and  employs  a 
visible  organism  .  .  .  The  Church  is  an  organic  body,  a  peculiar 
community  with  visible  and  sensible  signs ....  But  at  the  same 
time  it  is  a  spiritual,  invisible,  and  eternal  Foundation.  .  .  . 
The  Church  is  invisible,  since  to  God  only  is  known  who  are  its 
true  members  .  .  .  united  with  Him  invisibly,  since  external 
union  with  it  frequently  happens  to  be  false,  as  is  external 
worship  in  many  cases.”5 *  It  is  also  to  be  noted  that  the 
Orthodox  definition  involves  unity  of  Faith,  for  "Our  Lord 
founded  the  Church  on  faith  in  Him.... A  distinguishing 
mark  of  the  genuineness  of  the  Church  has  been,  and  is,  unity 
of  faith,  external  and  internal,  and  the  guardianship  of  the 
Holy  Spirit  in  the  bond  of  peace.”8  The  above  definition 
leads  to  the  exposition  of  its  three  constituent  elements:  (a) 
the  divine  establishment  and  foundation  of  the  Church,  with 

1  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  262,  and  cf.  Dyobouniotes’  criticism,  in 
'H  A07 fi.  ’Avd p.  kplv.,  p.  45. 

2  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  p.  6,  (and  Kephala,  op.  cit.,  p.  192). 

3  Ibid.,  p.  7. 

4  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  264,  282. 

6  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  p.  10. 

8  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  p.  9. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  CHURCH 


239 


the  corollaries  involved;  (b)  the  essential  character  and  na¬ 
ture  of  the  Church;  (c)  the  organization  and  constitution 
of  the  Church.1 2 

2.  The  Church  Divinely  Founded  and  Established 

The  Messiah  was  to  found  a  universal  and  permanent 
kingdom  on  earth,  as  the  Old  Testament  shows,  and  our 
Lord  fulfilled  this  prophecy  in  His  Church,  against  which 
the  gates  of  hell  could  not  prevail,  and  for  which  He  shed 
His  Blood.3 4 * 6 *  On  Pentecost,  the  birthday  of  the  Church,  He 
gave  it  actual  form  and  shape,  and  straightway  His  Apostles 
went  forth  to  propagate  faith  in  Him  and  to  carry  out  their 
commission  of  extending  the  Church  He  founded.  While  the 
Church  grew  up  under  the  wings  of  the  Synagogue,  it  speedily 
emancipated  itself  and  became  an  independent  entity.  Our 
Lord  founded  His  Church  as  “the  center  and  organ  of  His 
redeeming  Work, ....and  the  Church  is  nothing  less  than  the 
continuation  and  extension  of  His  prophetic,  priestly,  and 
kingly  power.... The  means  and  the  authority  for  the  carry¬ 
ing  out  of  her  mission,  the  Church  received  from  her  Founder, 
.  .  .  .who  endowed  the  Apostles  and  their  successors  with  His 
own  authority  and  authenticity.  .  So  the  Church  and  her 
Founder  are  inextricably  hound  together:  .  .  .  the  Church  is 
Christ  with  us.  .  .  .She  always  teaches  His  truth  with  certainty 
and  transmits  His  Grace.  In  her  (the  believer)  acquires 
an  unshaken  conviction  as  to  the  trustworthiness  of  what  he 
believes.  .  .  .  ”*  Since  the  Church  is  guided  by  the  Holy  Spirit, 
it  follows  that  she  cannot  fall  away  from  the  truth,8  and  is  in¬ 
fallible.8  “This  infallibility  is  not  ascribed  to  the  members 

1  Following  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  282. 

2  Isaiah  2,  2;  54,  1;  Dan.  2,  44,  etc.;  in  this  connection  cf.  the 
general  treatment  by  Kephala,  XpicrroXoyia,  pp.  192  ff. 

3  St.  Matt.  16,  18;  Acts.  20,  28. 

4  Cor.  4,  1;  3,  8;  Acts  4,  19,  20;  St.  Luke  10,  16;  St.  Matt.  18,  18; 
Acts.  4,  12;  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  262-265. 

8  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  pp.  17  ff ;  Dositheus  in  Mesolora  II.  pp. 
111-112;  Acts  of  Synod  of  Jassy,  ibid.,  pp.  38-39. 

6  Cf.  St.  Athanasius  on  Ps.  88,  38;  St.  John  Chrysostom,  Oratio  dr 

Eutrop.,  in  Migne  P.  G.,  52,  402;  St.  Ambrose  Hexaetn,  IV.  2,  7.  Meso- 

lora's  “notes”  of  infallibility  are:  (1)  agreement  and  unanimity  of  teach- 


240  IV.— DOCTRINE  OF  GRACE  AND  OF  THE  CHURCH 


of  the  Church  as  such,  either  in  part  or  as  a  whole,  but  to  the 
Saviour,  who  as  Founder  necessarily  dwells  in  His  Church, 
and  to  the  Holy  Spirit, ...  .both  of  whom  are  the  efficient 
cause  of  infallibility.’'1  As  the  Church  possesses  her  title  to 
infallibility  from  her  Founder's  commission,  which  gave  her 
His  authority  in  the  work  of  salvation,  both  Holy  Scripture2 
and  the  Fathers3  testify  to  the  truth  of  the  doctrine  that  the 
Church  is  the  one  way  of  salvation. 

Extra  Ecclesiam  nulla  salus  * 

The  truth  embodied  in  the  phrase  “outside  the  Church 
there  is  no  salvation"  must  not  lead  to  spiritual  and  moral 
inertia,  as  if  membership  in  the  Church  assured  salvation.  This 
is  an  erroneous  conception  with  which  the  Church  has  to  cope, 
and  she  constantly  teaches  that  not  every  member  of  the 
Church  is  saved  but  only  every  true  member.  Androutsos 
would  interpret  the  principle  above  in  its  affirmative  and  posi¬ 
tive  content,  to  mean  that  “the  normal  and  regularly  constituted 
conveyor  of  the  terms  of  salvation  is  the  Church,  in  which 
the  Saviour  deposited  the  means  of  salvation,  and  that  heresy, 
schism,  or  any  other  religious  body  have  no  claim  to  be  "labora¬ 
tories  (ipyacrTijpLa)  of  salvation' ’,”  since  they  only  hold  out 
illusions  of  salvation  to  their  adherents.  This  position,  he 
maintains,  is  the  objective  aspect  of  the  principle.  Subjec¬ 
tively  the  problem  resolves  itself  into  the  question,  “can  any¬ 
one  be  saved  outside  the  Church?”  Xo  Orthodox  can  main¬ 
tain  that  all  outside  the  Church  are  damned.  As  a  personal 
problem,  the  answer  of  the  question  must  be  left  in  the  hands 
of  Him  “who  desireth  not  the  death  of  a  sinner”  but  wills 
“that  all  men  be  saved"  (1  Tim.  2,  4).  In  the  individual  in¬ 
stance  it  is  both  logically  and  theologically  possible  for  a  man 

ing;  (2)  acceptance  and  consent  to  this  teaching  without  addition  or 
subtraction;  (3)  faithful  adherence  to  the  ‘faith  once  delivered’;  — 
op.  cit.,  IV,  p.  19,  and  cf.  Kritopoulos,  I,  pp.  318-319. 

1  Mesolora,  ibid.,  p.  21. 

2Cf.  St.  Luke  10,  16;  St.  Matt.  18,  18,  17;  Tit.  3,  10;  1  St.  John 
2,  18  ff. 

3  St.  Irenaeus  adv.  Haer.,  Ill,  24,  1;  St.  Cyprian,  de  cath.  eccl.  imi¬ 
tate,  4. 

4  Origen.  In  Jesu  Nave  hom.,  3,  5;  St.  Cyprian,  Epist.  73,  21. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  CHURCH 


241 


to  be  saved  outside  the  Church:  (a)  sincerity  coupled  with 
invincible  ignorance  may  inhibit  a  man  from  accepting  the 
formulations  of  the  Faith  presented  to  him;  (b)  he  may 
have  no  opportunity  to  come  to  the  knowledge  of  the  truth ; 
(c)  the  formularies  of  his  own  profession  of  belief  “may  serve 
as  a  basis  for  supernatural  life  and  fellowship  with  the  Light”, 
inasmuch  as  they  contain  portions  and  aspects  of  revealed 
truth;  (d)  we  may  not  contend  that  God,  who  is  free,  re¬ 
stricts  Himself  to  the  use  of  the  one  means  of  Grace  He  has 
appointed.  “Other  extraordinary  acts  of  Grace  are  not  pre¬ 
cluded"  by  maintaining  the  conviction  that  “every  true  member 
of  the  Church  certainlv  shares  in  salvation."1 


3.  The  Nature  of  the  Church 

The  Church  has,  as  we  have  seen,  two  aspects — she  is  both 
invisible  and  visible.  As  invisible,  she  is  the  bearer  of  divine 
gifts  and  powers,  and  is  engaged  in  transforming  mankind 
into  the  Kingdom  of  God.  As  visible,  she  is  constituted  of 
men  professing  a  common  faith,  observing  common  customs, 
and  using  visible  means  of  Grace.  The  latter  is  the  external 
aspect  of  her  mission :  the  former,  the  unseen  aim  and  pur¬ 
pose  of  her  Founder.  The  Church  is  visible,  because  her 
Founder  was  incarnate  and  lived  among  men,  because  she  min¬ 
isters  Grace  under  tangible  signs  and  symbols,  because  she  out¬ 
wardly  professes  one  Faith,  because  she  has  a  visible  organi¬ 
zation  and  government  by  succession  from  the  Apostles,  and  be¬ 
cause  her  membership  is  constituted  of  visible  men.  Her  two 
aspects  are  inextricably  united;  as  the  two  Natures  are  in  our 
Lord's  Person,  so  “the  Church  is  a  holy  bond  uniting  two  ele¬ 
ments,  divine  and  human,  of  which  the  former  is  the  life-giv¬ 
ing  and  abiding  principle,  and  the  visible  the  external  mani¬ 
festation  of  the  divine  and  the  necessary  organ  for  the  opera¬ 
tion  of  salvation."  The  higher  principle  is  not  subject  to 
human  scrutiny,  but  is  discerned  by  the  eye  of  faith  only. 
“That  inward  union  with  our  Lord  is  the  object  towards  which 

1  Androutsos,  Ao7/u.ari/o7,  p.  267 ;  cf.  'H  A07/Z.  'A vbp.  Kptv.  by  Dyoboun- 
iotes,.  p.  46  and  *O0ei\.  dvdvrricTis,  ibid.,  p.  112;  Androutsos^  ±oy/x. 
MeX.,  A’,  p.  128.  and  A i  fiaaeis  rijs  eve oaeics  tu>v  'EkkX^ctiwj/,  pp.  50-53; 
note  2,  pp.  267-269  of  his  loynanKr). 


242  IV.— DOCTRINE  OF  GRACE  AND  OF  THE  CHURCH 


the  Church  aims,  is  true,  yet  this  mystical  union  can  take 
place  only  on  the  basis  of  the  Church,  and  is  only  promoted 
through  her".  .  .  .The  early  writers  emphasized  the  ecclesiasti¬ 
cal  character  of  Christianity  again  and  again.  The  visible 
Church  is  the  sole  guardian  and  teacher  of  the  Faith,  and 
the  one  means  by  which  the  divine  Grace  is  transmitted — “the 
Pillar  and  Ground  of  the  truth”,  the  Ark  of  Salvation.  As 
the  soul  is  to  the  body,  so  is  the  spirit  of  Christ  to  His 
Church.1 

Consequently  every  notion  of  the  Church  which  would  ex¬ 
alt  or  over-emphasize  her  invisible  character  to  the  exclusion 
of  her  visible  aspect,  is  to  be  condemned  and  rejected.  The 
notion  of  an  invisible  and  ideal  church,  of  which  the  various 
bodies  of  Christians  formed  into  distinct  organizations  and  call¬ 
ing  themselves  “Churches”,  are  partial  and  incomplete  embodi¬ 
ments,  is  utterly  foreign  to  Orthodox  teaching  and  to  histori¬ 
cal  and  biblical  authority.  The  Church  is  an  actual,  tangible, 
visible  entity,  not  an  unrealized  and  unrealizable  ideal.2  Even 
as  a  means  of  realizing  the  ideal  Church  of  Protestant  thought, 
the  visible  Church  would  be  an  absolute  necessity.3  This  con¬ 
ception  deprives  Revelation  of  its  final  and  absolute  charac¬ 
ter;  if  each  portion  of  organized  Christianity  is  each  to  hold 
one  aspect  only  of  the  truth,  who  is  to  act  as  arbiter  and 
definer  of  the  content  of  the  whole  of  Revelation?4  The  Prot¬ 
estant  conception  of  the  ideal  Church  whose  members  are 
known  only  to  God,  violates  the  teaching  that  the  members 
of  the  Church  are  not  perfected  saints,  but  sinners.  This  rests 
upon  the  Protestant  conception  of  justification,  which  is  en¬ 
tirely  opposite  to  that  of  Orthodoxy  and  Holy  Scripture."  The 
function  of  the  Church,  as  is  evident  even  from  the  Protestant 


1  Androutsos,  ^oyfiariK-r],  pp.  268-273;  cf.  St.  John  16,  13;  1  Tim. 
3,  15;  Eph.  1,  25;  5,  25;  Rev.  19,  7;  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  p.  14 
Note  1.  “The  Church  is  the  perpetual  extension  of  Christ,  and  her  aim 
the  sanctification  of  men  and  their  exaltation  into  religious  and  moral 
life”.  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  293. 

2  Cf.  Androutsos,  Ai  fiaaeis  .  .  .  rijs  ej/axrews,  p.  7-10. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  12. 

4  Ibid.,  pp.  14-18,  and  on  the  whole  question,  Aoy/iariKT),  pp.  261-262, 
note  2. 


E.  fj .,  St.  Matt.  13,  24;  3,  12;  13,  47;  22.  11. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  CHURCH 


243 


definition  of  it,1  is  to  save  sinners.  “If  the  Church  is  an  as¬ 
sembly  of  saints,  then  the  second  part  of  the  Augsburg  defini¬ 
tion  (in  qua  evangelium  rede  docetur  et  rede  administrantur 
sacramenta)  is  superfluous, ....  since  preaching  and  the  sacra¬ 
ments  would  be  unnecessary  if  all  were  holy,  righteous,  and  de¬ 
vout.”2 3  The  mission  of  “the  Church  is  to  promote  the  repen¬ 
tance  and  reformation  of  sinners,  and  from  her  are  excluded 
only  the  heretics,  schismatics,  and  excommunicate; ”s  “The 
Fathers  condemned  unanimously  every  exaggerated  view.... 
of  those  who  held  the  Church  to  he  a  fellowship  of  perfected 
saints.”4 5 

The  Church  according  to  the  Creed  is  “One,  Holy,  Catholic, 
and  Apostolic,”  which  four  terms  are  called  the  “notes”  of  the 
Church.  By  ascribing  unity  to  the  Church  we  mean  that  she 
is  one  in  origin,  one  in  Faith  and  discipline,  and  one  in  essence. 
All  her  members  constitute  one  body,  are  animated  by  the  one 
Holy  Spirit,  and  profess  alike  one  single  Faith/  the  bond 
uniting  them  to  each  other  and  to  their  Lord.  Our  Lord 
founded  only  one  Church,6 7  and  His  foundation  lias  a  unique 
and  sole  character.  The  necessity  of  oneness  in  faith  was 
strongly  emphasized  by  St.  Paul/  and  is  shown  in  the 
Church's  unity  of  teaching,  of  which  unity  in  worship  is  a 
manifestation.  The  necessity  of  unity  in  discipline  and  order 
of  government  is  apparent  from  the  Xew  Testament ;  “thus 
the  Church  conscious  of  herself  as  the  guardian  of  unity  has 
never  recognized  heresy  or  schism  as  constituting  parallel  or¬ 
ganizations  dealing  with  salvation,  but  has  cut  them  off  from 
the  healthy  body,  in  order  to  induce  repentance  and  return 
to  it  ...  .  ”8  Such  excommunications  have  always  been  deemed 
delivery  over  to  the  power  of  Satan.  This  teaching  about  unity 

1  Cf.  note  2,  p.  12,  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  13. 

3  Androutsos,  Aoy/jLaTiKT],  p.  270:  of  Dositheus,  in  Mesolora,  op.  cit., 

11.  p.  111. 

4  Ibid.,  p.  279. 

5  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  p.  14. 

6  St.  John  10,  16;  21,  15;  Heb.  3,  6;  10,  21;  Eph.  5,  27;  Rom. 

12,  5.  Cf.  At  gdaeis  .  .  .  rijs  epioc reus,  pp.  1-0. 

7  Cf.  Eph.  4,  3-15;  1  Cor.  1,  10;  Gal.  1,  6-8;  Tit.  3,  10. 

8  Cf.  1  Cor.  10-13;  Gal.  5,  20.  Androutsos,  AoypaTucri,  p.  274. 


244  IV.— DOCTRINE  OF  GRACE  AND  OF  THE  CHURCH 


is  that  of  the  Fathers.1  Unity  of  doctrine  is  not  impaired  even 
if  all  members  of  the  Church  do  not  have  the  same  mind  about 
the  articles  of  the  Faith,  as  long  as  they  maintain  the  principle 
of  the  Church's  authority."  Schisms  from  the  body  are  points 
of  departure  for  heterodoxy  in  teaching,  and  so  schismatics 
are  often  considered  heretics  as  well.3 

Our  modern  conception  of  unity  would  make  it  consist 
“in  agreement  as  to  the  fundamentals  of  the  Faith,"  maintain- 
ing  that  “while  external  unity  is  desirable,  it  is  not  indispens¬ 
able  for  the  preservation  of  church  unity."  But  separated 
bodies  are  such  because  they  have  been  cut  off  from  unity 
with  the  Church,  which  hopes  thereby  to  bring  them  to  a  sense 
of  their  guilt.  They  stand  then  in  a  permanently  anomalous 
relationship  to  the  Church.  Furthermore  there  is  no  possible 
authority  in  antiquity  for  the  distinction  into  central  or  funda¬ 
mental  doctrine,  and  secondary  or  non-essential  teaching.  “It 
is  both  historically  and  logically  indefensible".  ...  “Christian 
teaching  in  theory  constitutes  a  unified  and  organic  whole, 
one  doctrine  presupposing  another,  and  the  denial  of  certain 
doctrines ....  leads  as  a  consequence  into  the  denial  of  the 
basis  and  hypotheses  of  all."  In  practice  there  can  be  no  dis¬ 
tinction  between  any  of  the  doctrines  having  the  Church's 
authority :  heterodoxy  leads  inevitably  to  heresy.  Furthermore, 
what  would  be  the  criterion  by  which  to  judge  between  what 
is  essential  and  what  is  not?  This  distinction  would  involve  the 
denial  of  the  infallibility  of  the  Church.4 

The  Church  is  “Holy"  because  her  Founder  is  Holy  and 
her  function  is  to  make  her  members  holy.  The  early  Church 
used  the  words  “saints"  of  the  members  of  the  Body,  for  they 
are  sanctified  by  Baptism  and  fellowship  with  God,  and  sepa- 

2  E.  g.,  St.  Irenaeus,  adv.  Haer.  I,  10,  2;  St.  Ignatius  ad.  Phil.,  3; 
St.  Justin,  cum  Tryph.,  63;  St.  Basil,  Epist.,  92;  St.  John  Chrysostom 
on  Eph.  11;  St.  Clem.  Rom.,  I,  37;  St.  Cyprian,  de  unitate,  etc. 

2  Androutsos  op.  cit.,  p.  275. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  276;  Can.  6  of  2nd  Council. 

4  Androutsos,  Aoyp.aTLKy,  pp.  276-278;  Ai  /Sdtms  .  .  .  rys  hwaews, 
pp.  15-18,  45,  49.  Dyobouniotes  subjects  this  position  of  Androutsos  to 
criticism  in  his  'H  Aoyp..  'Avdp.  Kpiv.,  p.  47,  and  ’O 0etX.  airavryats,  pp.  114 
ff. ;  for  Androutsos’  answer,  cf.  his  Aoy/i.  MeX.  A',  p.  129.  Dyobouniotes 
does  not  seem  to  have  substantiated  his  contention  that  Androutsos 
admits  in  practice  the  very  distinction  he  denies  and  inveighs  against. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  CHURCH 


245 


rated  from  the  profane  world  without.  As  is  our  Lord,  so 
His  means  of  Grace,  His  teaching,  and  the  aim  He  proposes 
for  His  Church  are  holy,  and  she  is  sanctified  by  Him.  As 
an  actual  fact  the  Church  begets  saints — the  heroes  of  the 
Faith  who  demonstrate  her  capacity  for  the  sanctification  of 
humanity.  The  fact  that  there  are  sinners,  hypocrites,  and 
false  members  in  the  Church  does  not  militate  against  her 
character  as  holy,  for  her  task  is  always  to  inspire  and  stimulate 
all  that  leads  to  holiness  among  her  children,1  though  she  re¬ 
tain  unworthy  members,  hoping  for  their  amendment. 

The  word  “Catholic”  means  etymologically  “what  concerns 
the  whole,"  that  is,  it  means  “universal";  but  figuratively,  as 
applied  to  the  Church,  it  indicates  the  fact  of  her  claiming  ad¬ 
herents  everywhere  in  the  known  world.  As  “universal"  in 
this  sense,  it  was  employed  by  St.  Cyril  of  Jerusalem  and  St. 
Athanasius.2  It  must  not  be  thought  that  the  word  rightly 
means  actual  universality  in  a  numerical  sense,  for  that  would 
forbid  the  early  Church  having  any  claim  to  the  title.3  The 
Apostles  went  forth  armed  with  the  commission  to  proclaim 
everywhere  the  one  Gospel  for  all.4  As  the  word  of  salvation 
was  for  all,  and  the  means  of  Grace,  conveying  the  Redemp¬ 
tion  wrought  by  our  Lord  for  all,  were  universal  in  their  scope, 
so  the  Church  which  was  the  agent  of  these  ministrations  was 
said  to  be  “Catholic".  The  word  has  another  meaning  in  rela¬ 
tion  to  doctrine,  since  the  universality  of  the  preaching  of  a 
doctrine  established  its  “Catholic"  character,3  and  the  word  was 
thus  used  in  relation  to  the  organic  life  of  the  Church  as  dis¬ 
tinguished  from  the  sects  and  divisions  of  heresies.  The  Vin¬ 
centian  canon  has  always  been  the  standard  of  “Catholicity". 
So  the  word  in  the  Creed  means  “the  one  simple  and  unique 
whole  in  teaching  and  discipline  uniting  the  many  separate 

‘Acts.  0.  32;  Rom.  1,  7,  12,  13;  Eph.  1,  1;  Eph.  4,  11-12; 
5,  25-27;  cf.  St.  Ignatius  Proemium ,  ad.  Smyrn;  St.  Iren.  adv.  Haer., 
3,  24;  St.  Cyprian,  de  imitate  Ecclesiae,  6;  St.  Augustine,  Sermo 
214.  Androutsos,  loyixarinri,  pp.  278*279;  Dositheus  in  Mesolora  II, 
p.  Ill;  ibid.,  IV.  pp.  14-15. 

2  Cf.  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  280,  note  1,  for  references. 

3  At  fiacreis  .  .  .  tt}s  evioaeus,  pp.  27-28  and  ff. 

4  St.  Mark  16,  20. 

5  In  this  sense,  C(ithoHc=Orthodox. 


246  IV.— DOCTRINE  OF  GRACE  AND  OF  THE  CHURCH 


local  churches.”  This  is  the  sense  in  which  it  is  used  by  St. 
Cyril  of  Jerusalem,  St.  Ignatius,  and  others.1 

The  Church  is  called  “Apostolic”  as  having  been  “built 
upon  the  foundation  of  the  apostles.  ..  .Jesus  Christ  Himself 
being  the  chief  corner-stone.”2  It  is  shown  as  apostolic  in  the 
profession  of  the  Faith  of  the  Apostles  and  in  “the  discipline 
of  the  early  Church — that  is,  in  the  succession  of  bishops, 
the  successors  of  the  Apostles.”  The  doctrine  of  the  Church 
is  the  basis  of  her  fellowship  with  the  Apostles,  as  “apostolic 
succession  is  the  external  witness  and  evidence  that  the  Church 
is  true  in  agreement  with  the  primitive  Church  in  teaching 
and  discipline.  .  .  .The  Fathers,  in  reprehending  doctrine  not  in 
accord  with  apostolic  teaching  (for  example,  St.  rrenaeus 
( adv .  Haer.  Ill,  3)  and  St.  Jerome  ( Epist .  84)  )  confounded 
the  heretics  by  showing  their  departures  from  this  doctrine, 
and  regarded  apostolic  succession  as  both  the  means  for  the 
transmission  of  Apostolic  teaching  as  well  as  the  distinguish¬ 
ing  mark  of  the  true  Church,  separating  it  from  the  false.”3 

4.  The  Constitution  and  Organization  of  the  Church 

“The  Saviour  founded  His  Church  .  .  .  for  the  salvation 
of  men,  and  in  so  doing  gave  it  everything  useful  and  necessary 
for  its  visible  maintenance.  .  .  ”4  “As  a  visible  fellowship  it  has 
need  of  its  own  proper  administrative  system  in  order  to  exer¬ 
cise  our  Lord’s  three-fold  office — to  preach  the  word  of  God,  to 
administer  His  priestly  office  through  the  sacraments,  and  to 
govern  the  Faithful.”  Our  Lord  first  chose  the  twelve  and  the 
seventy  to  whom  He  gave  His  own  authority  and  power,  and 
endowed  them  with  the  power  of  the  Holy  Spirit.  “The 
Apostles  not  only  exercised  this  office  committed  to  them  but 
communicated  the  priestly  authority  to  others,  separating  out 
by  the  Holy  Spirit  deacons  and  presbyters,  and  constituting 

'Cat.  XVIII.  11;  Ad  Smyr,  8,  2;  16,  2;  Eusebius  H.  E.  5, 

16;  Tertullian,  de  Pracscript.,  26,  20;  Clem.  Alex.,  Strom.  VII.  17; 
Androutsos,  Aoy/xaTLK-q,  pp.  270-281.  cf.  Ivritopoulos  in  Mesolora, 
r.  pp.  316-317,  and  Mogila,  ibid.,  pp.  416-419. 

2  Eph.  2,  20. 

3  Ao'y/xariKti ,  pp.  281-282. 

4  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  TV.  p.  4o. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  CHURCH 


247 


their  own  successors.  Thus  the  Church  is  divided  into  two 
orders,  clerical  and  lay,  the  whole  flock  in  the  wide  meaning  of 
the  word  being  called  ‘priests’.”1  This,  however,  does  not  imply 
the  absence  in  the  Christian  Church  of  a  special  order  distinct 
from  the  laity,  any  more  than  it  did  among  the  Jews.  The 
clerical  office  is  “a  special  order  founded  by  our  Lord,  the  in¬ 
dividuals  being  consecrated  thereto  by  a  proper  service  of  the 
Church  called  ordination.”2  The  Fathers  witness  to  the  fact 
and  origin  of  the  Church's  hierarchy.3 

This  hierarchy  includes  the  three  grades — deacons,  priests, 
and  bishops — bound  together,  yet  distinguished  one  from  the 
other.  “The  bishop  ...  is  the  center  of  spiritual  authority 
and  the  head  of  the  local  Church;  the  indispensable  condition 
of  the  existence  of  the  Church,  as  distinct  from  priests  and 
deacons.  The  latter  serve  the  pastors  in  their  third  rank,  and 
the  presbyters,  receiving  their  spiritual  authority  over  their 
flocks  from  the  Bishop,4  rule  the  Church  and  perform  every 
function  of  the  Bishop  (save  ordination  and  the  consecration 
of  the  myrrh),  and  are  called  ‘priests’  because  they  offer  a  real 
sacrifice,  the  Eucharist.”5  “These  three  grades  of  the  hierarchy, 
distinguished  from  each  other,  existed  in  the  Church  from  the 
beginning,  and  were  defined  by  our  Lord  and  His  Apostles,  as 
all  Church  tradition  witnesses.”6  While  the  names  “bishop” 
and  “presbyter"  were  originally  of  the  same  force  and  were 
used  interchangeably,7 8  yet  the  functions  soon  came  to  be  dis¬ 
tinguished  clearly,  as  is  evident  from  the  Fathers  and  Tradi¬ 
tion.’'  The  bishops  differed  from  the  Apostles  in  name  only.9 


1  1  St.  Peter  2,  9 ;  Androutsos,  \oyp.ariKT],  pp.  282-283. 

2  Mesolora,  ibid.,  p.  57. 

3  St.  Augustine,  de  Civitate  Dei,  XX.  10  St.  Clem.  Rom.  1  Cor. 
43-44;  St.  Ignatius  ad  Trail.,  3;  Aidaxy,  15;  St.  Cyprian,  Epist  00. 

'■  To  this  phrase  Dyobouniotes  takes  exception,  pp.  117-118  ’O <pei\. 
airavr. ;  Androutsos’  justification  of  it,  &oyp.  MeX.,  A',  p.  134. 

5  A07 par  1  kt],  pp.  284-285  ;  Mesolora,  UpaKTiKij  QeoXoyia,  pp.  45-47,  54-58. 

e  Mesolora,  Hvp^oXikti,  TV,  pp.  59-00. 

7  E.  g.,  Phil.  1;  Acts.  20,  28. 

8  Theodoret  on  1  Tim,  3,  1;  St.  John  Chrysostom  In  Phil  homiliae, 
1;  1,  St.  Ignatius,  ad  Trail.,  3;  ad  Phil.,  1,  1;  2,  1;  ad  Eph.,  3;  Euse¬ 
bius  on  Ps.  9,  14;  the  “angels”  of  the  Apocalypse  were  Bishops  (An¬ 
droutsos)  . 

9  Androutsos.  A07 ga-rt/cTj,  p.  280. 


248  IV.— DOCTRINE  OF  GRACE  AND  OF  THE  CHURCH 


The  bishops  jure  divino  are  all  equal,  but  jure  ecclesiastico 
certain  bishops  of  important  cities  or  dioceses  were  distinguished 
from  the  others  as  “Metropolitans"  and  “Patriarchs".  Since 
the  Schism  there  have  been  four  patriarchates — Constantinople. 
Alexandria,  Antioch,  and  Jerusalem.1  The  administrative  unit 
in  every  autocephalous  Church  is  the  synod.  Despite  St. 
Jerome's  theory  of  the  origin  of  the  episcopate  as  having  evolved 
upward  from  the  presbyterate,  the  Church  maintains  the  di¬ 
vine  origin  of  that  order,  which  St.  Jerome  elsewhere  himself 
recognizes.  For  had  the  highest  order  developed  upward  from 
the  second  order,  according  to  the  Roman  theory,  there  would 
have  been  a  breach  in  Church  discipline  of  which  some  record 
would  certainly  remain.  “The  Episcopate  is  the  highest  grade 
of  the  ministry  (Upoxrvvq)  created  by  our  Lord  through  the 
Apostles,  and  the  Bishop  is  the  chief  shepherd  over  the  local 
Church  to  whose  spiritual  authority  both  cleric  and  lay  pay 
obedience."2 

“As  the  Bishop  is  the  highest  bearer  of  ecclesiastical  juris¬ 
diction,  it  is  clear  that  the  highest  authority  of  the  Church  in  a 
place  is  the  synod  of  bishops,  and  of  all  the  Orthodox  Churches, 
the  whole  of  the  bishops."  Hence  the  bishops  constitute  the 
organ  by  which  is  expressed  the  infallibility  wherewith  the 
Church  is  endowed.  This  is  the  unanimous  teaching  of  Church 
tradition3  founded  on  the  texts  of  Scripture  which  teach  the 
Church's  infallibility.  The  Councils  themselves  bear  witness  to 
it,4  as  do  the  Fathers.  Thus  St.  Athanasius,5  St.  Basil,0  St.  Greg¬ 
ory  Xazianzen,7  and  St.  Cyril.8  “Mere  numbers  do  not  constitute 
the  note  of  an  Ecumenical  Council.  .  .  As  an  external  crite- 

1  Ibid.,  and  Mesolora,  op.  cit ..  IV.  p.  60,  pp.  76-81.  Since  the  Rus¬ 
sian  Revolution  the  Patriarchate  of  Moscow  has  been  added  to  the 
number  to  take  the  place  of  Rome,  lost  to  the  Church  by  heresy  and 
schism. 

2  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  287. 

3  Dositheus,  in  Mesolora,  II.  p.  111. 

4  In  Mansi,  VI.  672;  Xicea,  1. 

Ad  Afros,  2. 

6  Epistolae,  114,  162. 

7  Or  at.,  21.  4. 

s Epist.  39.  The  cases  of  St.  Gregory  (in  Epistola  130)  and  St. 
Augustine  ( de  Baptismo  contra  Donat.,  II,  3)  have  no  connection 
with  disproving  the  statements  above,  cf.  Androutsos.  AoypaTiKri,  p.  289. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  CHURCH 


240 


rion  of  ecumenicity  we  have  the  acceptance  of  the  decrees  of  a 
council  by  the  whole  Church.  Yet  since  the  Holy  Spirit  is  the 
principle  of  Ecumenical  Councils  and  the  pontiffs  deliberating 
freely  act  in  their  own  right,  their  decrees  are  of  themselves  in¬ 
fallible,  and  not  so  from  the  consent  of  the  Church,  .  .  . 
which  is  only  an  evidence  and  external  criterion  of  ecumenicity. 
.  .  .  The  bishops  assemble  in  council  not  as  representing 
their  dioceses  nor  as  mandatories,  but  act  in  their  own  right ; 

the  presence  of  the  Holy  Spirit  does  not  mean  the  in¬ 
spiration  and  revelation  of  new  doctrines,  but  only  His  guiding 
and  overseeing  presence  to  illuminate  them  and  to  guard  them 
from  error .  .  .  The  bishops  were  not  actuated  mechanically 
by  the  Holy  Spirit,  but  worked  entirely  in  a  normal  human 
fashion,1  disputing,  investigating,  and  deliberating.  .  .  The 
scope  of  infallible  pronouncements  is  the  range  of  the  Church’s 
mission :  whatever  has  to  do  with  salvation, — that  is,  faith  and 
morals, — constitutes  the  subject  matter  on  which  is  exercised  the 
infallible  action  of  the  Councils  and  synods.”2 

5.  The  Orthodox  Church 

On  the  basis  of  what  has  been  presented  above  of  the  pres¬ 
ent-day  doctrine  of  Greek  Orthodox  theologians,  it  may  be  asked 
what  is  its  application,  in  view  of  the  practical  and  actual  situ¬ 
ation  of  Christianity  to-day?  Has  Orthodoxy  a  theory  of 
the  Church  which  will  apply  not  only  to  the  Catholic  Church 
in  ideal,  but  to  the  present  condition  of  Christendom?  What 
position  does  the  Orthodox  Church  claim  for  herself?  How 
does  she  stand  in  regard  to  the  question  of  Ecumenical  Coun¬ 
cils  ?  to  that  of  the  Infallibility  of  the  Church  ?  to  the  rival 
theories  of  the  Roman  Church?  to  the  “Branch  Theory”  of 

1  Cf.  Acts  15,  17. 

2  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  290-292.  For  a  refutation  of  the  counter¬ 
arguments  of  Protestants  and  of  the  Papal  claim  to  infallibility,  in 
connection  with  the  conciliar  action  of  the  Church,  cf.  his  'Lvp.fioXadi, 
pp.  79-87,  ft.  and  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  pp.  44-56,  “on  the  Primacy 
of  the  Pope.’’  He  rejects  the  Papal  claims  on  the  following  grounds: 
(1)  a  visible  head  of  the  Church  is  not  needed,  (2)  is  unscriptural, 
(3)  St.  Peter  did  not  claim  it,  (4)  Tradition  and  (5)  reason  and  logic 
are  against  it  ( p.  54.  ibid.).  Cf.  also  Timothy  Anastasius’  ’£^£0-7-0X77, 
pp.  16-30,  etc. 


250  IV.— DOCTRINE  OF  GRACE  AND  OF  THE  CHURCH 


Anglicanism? — I  have  reserved  some  of  the  detailed  discussions 
concerning  the  Church  until  this  point,  in  order  the  better  to 
present  a  unified  whole  of  Orthodox  teaching  and  opinion  with 
a  view  to  answering  concretely  and  definitely  some  of  the  above 
questions. 

All  Orthodox  formularies  and  pronouncements  claim  clearly 
and  distinctly  that  the  Orthodox  Church  has  kept  the  Faith 
immaculate  and  intact,  without  addition  or  subtraction,  with¬ 
out  alteration  or  omission,  as  taught  by  Holy  Scripture  and 
Sacred  Tradition.1  Inasmuch  as  the  holding  to  the  Faith  “as 
once  delivered  to  the  Saints”  constitutes  one  of  the  fundamental 
and  essential  notes  of  the  Church,  deviation  from  true  teaching 
involves  loss  of  continuity  with  the  life  of  the  Church.  It  was 
apparent  in  the  exposition  above  that  this  emphasis  on  oneness 
of  faith  is  very  strongly  brought  out  in  Orthodox  teaching.  So 
much  is  unity  of  the  Faitli  necessary  that  deviation  from  or 
repudiation  of  any  of  the  elements  of  the  Church’s  faith  brings 
about  separation  from  the  Church,  and  in  consequence,  loss  of 
fellowship  with  the  Holy  Spirit.  “It  is  a  doctrine  of  the  Or¬ 
thodox  Church,  (as  of  every  other  Church  which  claims  to  be 
the  true  Church)  .  .  .  that  the  Church  constitutes  one  body  of 
the  Faithful  inseparably  united  with  the  Saviour,  presenting  the 
Word  .  .  made  flesh  as  ever  .  .  in  a  present  relation  with 
men.  As  the  Lord  is  the  one  Saviour  of  mankind  .  .  .  thus 
His  Bride,  the  Church,  is  the  one  bearer  of  Grace,  the  one  stew¬ 
ard  of  the  mysteries,  and  the  one  ark  of  salvation.  So  every 
theoretical  deviation  from  the  teaching  of  the  Church  is  heresy, 
and  every  act  of  insubordination  against  her  constitutional 
principles  is  schism.  Both  constitute  a  state  of  opposition  to 
the  divine  authority  of  the  Church  and,  according  to  the  unan¬ 
imous  decision  of  the  Fathers,  (heretics  and  schismatics)  are 
cut  off  from  the  Church  and  consequently  from  the  fellowship 
of  the  Holy  Spirit.”2  Thus  wrong  doctrine  and  heretical  teach- 

1  E.  g.,  Epist.  Dogm.  Synod  Const,  ad  orthodoxos  Antiochenos, 
1722,  in  Mansi,  XXXVII,  cols.  128,  205;  tfE/c5o<m  IUcrews  of  Const.  1723, 
ibid.,  col.  897;  Anthimus  VI  Encyclical,  p.  36;  Jeremiah  II  in  Mesolora 
L.  pp.  124  ff ;  Kritopoulos,  ibid.,  pp.  316-321;  Mogila,  ibid.,  pp.  416- 
423;  Dositheus,  ibid.,  II.  pp.  111-112;  cf.  ’AvTiTaviKd,  D.  Kyria- 
kos,  Athens,  1893,  pp.  28,  46;  etc. 

2  Androutsos,  At  fiacreis  .  .  .  tt)s  evaxrew?,  pp.  32-33. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  CHURCH 


251 


in g  ipso  facto  both  cut  off  from  the  unity  of  the  Church.  On 
this  basis  we  may  understand  Rhosse's  conclusions.  “The 
Christian  Faith”,  he  says  in  a  footnote  to  his  definition  of  dog¬ 
ma,  “we  may  not  simply  define  as  the  teachings  about  the  opera¬ 
tions  of  God  ...  as  formulated  in  the  .  .  synods  of  the 

Catholic  Church,  ...  or  of  the  ‘Christian  Church’,  . 
since  the  Church  of  Rome  under  the  Pope  calls  itself  the  Catho¬ 
lic  Church,  though  since  the  schism  of  the  9th  century  it  is 
certainly  not  truly  so, — and  since  other  Christian  bodies  split 
off  from  it  call  themselves  ‘Catholic’  or  ‘Christian’  churches 
in  some  general  or  indefinite  or  elastic  sense  of  these  words : 
because  the  only  true  and  genuine  Catholic  Church  is  the 
Orthodox  Eastern  Church,  and  to  distinguish  herself  from 
the  noil-genuine  ‘Catholic'  Church  she  is  called  the  ‘true 
Catholic  and  Orthodox  Church  of  Christ’."1 

In  his  section  “on  the  true  conception  of  the  Orthodox 
Catholic  Church  as  having  authentic  validity”  lie  says:  “The 
Orthodox  and  genuine  Catholic  Church  is  that  fellowship  of 
men  founded  and.  established  by  Christ  and  His  Apostles, 
bound  to  Him  and  to  each  other  by  the  right  Faith,  hope 
and  love,  by  right  dogmas,  and  by  the  true  worship,  and 
governed  by  bishops  who  are  true  and  genuine  successors  of 
the  Apostles.”  This  general  definition  he  goes  on  to  explain, 
saying  that  up  until  the  9th  century  the  Church  consisted  of 
two  parts,  Eastern  and  Western,  holding  the  Orthodox  faith, 
preserving  the  genuine  tradition,  the  same  dogmas  and  basis 
of  worship,  and  the  same  organization  and  constitutional  ad¬ 
ministration.  “Since  the  9th  century,  when  the  Western 
Church  of  Rome  under  the  Pope  was  split  off  from  the  true 
Catholic  and  Orthodox  Church  of  the  first  eight  centuries, 
through  (her)  arrogant  claims,  innovations  in  dogma,  wor¬ 
ship,  and  discipline.  .  .  .and  at  divers  other  times  different 
sections,  .split  off  in  turn  from  the  Church  of  Rome.  .  .  .,  the 
Orthodox  and  genuine  Catholic  Church  includes  only  the  sep¬ 
arate  local  Churches  of  the  East,  agreeing  in  the  Faith 
(o/aoSo'Iovs)  and  Orthodox,  and  these  constitute  the  Orthodox 
Apostolic  Church,  the  continuation  truly  and  canonically 
of  the  ancient  Catholic  Church  of  before  the  Schism.”  This 

1  Op.  cit..  pp.  23-24.  note. 


IV.— DOCTRINE  OF  GRACE  AND  OF  TIIE  CHURCH 


252 


Church,  he  goes  on  to  sav,  constitutes  an  organic  whole,  and 
is  the  only  one  which  has  preserved,  intact  and  unalloyed, 
the  genuine  oral  and  written  teaching  of  our  Lord  and  the 
Apostles,  the  true  dogmas  of  the  Faith,  right  worship,  and 
the  genuine  discipline  of  the  Church.1 2  Later  on  he  expounds 
the  Vincentian  canon,  saying  that  the  conditions  it  lays  down 
can  “only  be  held  to  apply  to  the  local  and  sectional  Churches 
of  the  East  and  West  up  to  the  9th  century ....  Thereafter 
the  Churches  of  the  West  were  sundered  from  the  ancient 
Catholic  Church  by  reason  of  innovation  in  doctrine,  dis¬ 
cipline,  and  worship.  .  .  .and  the  words  of  St.  Vincent  apply 
only  to  the  ....  Churches  of  the  East,  which  have  neither  added 
nor  taken  away,  but  have  remained  faithful  in  their  teach¬ 
ing  to  the  ancient  Church  of  before  the  Schism.  Hence  the 
Orthodox.  .  .  .are  the  true  and  canonical  succession  of  the  an¬ 
cient  Catholic  Church."' 

Since  heresy  forfeits  membership  in  and  communion  with 
the  Catholic  Church  and  involves  the  loss  of  the  Holy  Spirit, 
Orthodox  writers  claim  that  the  Orthodox  Church  is  the  only 
true  Church.  They  are  certainly  convinced  that  the  Roman 
Church  is  not  a  part  of  the  Catholic  Church,  as  their  vast 
polemic  and  controversial  literature  shows.  Invective,  abuse, 
bitterness,  recrimination,  and  violence  of  language  character¬ 
ize  most  of  the  products  of  this  controversy,  but  even  irenic 
and  peaceful  works  do  not  retract  from  the  position  presented 
above.3  In  the  year  1902  appeared  a  synodical  letter  from 
Constantinople,  a  treatise  “on  the  Relations  of  the  Autoce¬ 
phalous  Orthodox  Churches,  and  on  other  General  Questions/’ 
emanating  from  the  Patriarch,  together  with  the  answers  thereto 
of  the  autocephalous  Churches  (Jerusalem,  Greece,  Russian, 
Serbia,  Roumania,  Montenegro),  and  the  Patriarch’s  final 


1  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  56-57,  and  cf.  his  At  6epe\iu5eis  5oyp.aTiK.ai  apxai 
rijs  6pdo5o£ov  avaTo\LKris  E/c/cX^aias,  pp.  10,  28-30,  etc. 

2  Op.  cit.,  pp.  100-104. 

3  E.  g.,  Ambraze,  TI  ’Op0o5o|os  ’E/c/cX^ata.  .  .Athens,  1902  cf.  pp.  1 
57,  et  al.;  Timothy  Anastasius’  ’'EvuttoXt]  -rrepl  epucreu s  t.  eKK\rj<nu>p, 
to  Prince  Max  of  Saxony,  Athens,  1910.  In  Palmieri  (op.  cit.  vols. 
1.  II.)  may  be  found  the  history  of  the  controversy,  particularly,  vol. 
1.  pp.  661-698,  763-805. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  CHURCH 


253 


response.1 * 3  The  cause  of  the  issuing  of  this  encyclical  was  un¬ 
doubtedly  the  whole  question  of  reunion.  With  the  authority 
of  all  the  Orthodox  Churches  which  endorse  it,  it  contains  of¬ 
ficial  and  definite  teaching  on  matters  which  might  otherwise 
be  moot  points. 


"The  central  idea  of  these  documents",  says  Androutsos 
in  his  tractate  on  "the  Bases  of  the  Unity  of  the  Churches  ac¬ 
cording  to  the  Recent  Pronouncements  of  the  Orthodox 
Churches  (At  tt/s  erojcreto',  twv  eKKXijaLwv  /3d<jeis  Kara  ra  apTL(fiav'r/ 
ra>v  6pdoSo$cov  ’EiKKXycruLv  Ypdp.pLa.Ta.  Constantinople,  1905,  pp.  1-87) 
"is  that  the  Eastern  Church  is  the  true  Church  of  Christ — the 
One  Holy  Catholic  and  Apostolic  Church  of  the  Creed."'  "Since 
the  Schism  the  Orthodox  Church  is  the  only  true  and  natural 
continuation  of  the  undivided  Church,  bearing  the  promise 
and  the  validity  of  her  invisible  Head."J  Macarius  says:  "It 
is  an  obvious  truth  that  this  Church  (the  Orthodox  Church) 
is  now  the  only  Church  which  remains  faithful  to  the  ancient 
Ecumenical  Councils,  and  in  consequence  she  alone  represents 
the  true  Catholic  Church  of  Christ,  which  is  infallible."4 5  This 
is  the  mind  of  the  Encyclical  of  the  year  1848,°  the  synod  of 
1872  (Constantinople)  expelling  the  Bulgarians  from  "the 
one  Catholic  and  Apostolic  Church,”6 7  and  of  the  Encyclical 
of  1896,  which  says:  "The  Orthodox  Churches  of  the  East  and 
Xorth  (Russia)  alone  constitute  to-day  the  only  One  Holy 
Catholic  and  Apostolic  Church  of  Christ,  the  pillar  and  ground 
of  the  truth.”'  In  the  official  Encyclical  of  1902  referred  to 
above,  are  the  words :  "Our  Church  only,  the  Orthodox  Eastern 


1  'H  7 rept  tujv  cryecrewt'  tujv  avTOKecpdXwv  opOobo^wv  ’EKhcXpaLuiv  kci i  wepi 
aXXwv  yevLKun1  7]Tr)p.a.Tiov  TrarptapytK-p  kcu  avvodLKp  eyhcvhcXios  tov  1902, 
at  ets  avrpv  airavT-pcrcLS,  k.  t.  A. 

"  Op.  cit.,  p.  2. 

3  Androutsos,  At  /Sacrets,  p.  20.  He  quotes  Platon  of  Moscow  in  his 
Catechism  as  saying:  '‘The  Orthodox  Church  is  not  only  the  true  Church 
but  the  only  Church”  (ibid.,  p.  21). 

4  Eiaayojyp  els  r rp>  6p6o b.  QeoXoyLa'v,  p.  955. 

5  P.  39  (Greek  text);  on  it  cf.  Palmieri.  op.  oil.,  I,  p.  635. 

0  Cf.  Papadopoulos,  'H  avyxpovos  iepapxia  Trjs  opdobo^ov  dparoXiKrjs 
'EKKXriaias,  Athens,  1895,  p.  664. 

7  ’Ey/fc/cXtor  7 rarptapxt,C7?  K-  (twoSikt]  eTnaroXr),  Constantinople,  1895, 
p.  1,  on  which  cf.  Palmieri  op.  cit.,  I.  pp.  637  ff. 


254  IV.— DOCTRINE  OF  GRACE  AND  OF  THE  CHURCH 


Church,  having  preserved  incorruptedly  the  whole  deposit  of 
Christ,  is  at  the  present  day  the  Universal  ( oikovucvikI j)  Church.*'1 

It  is  thus  clear  that  the  Orthodox  Church  claims  not  onlv 

%/ 

to  be  the  Catholic  Church,  but  to  be  the  whole  and  onlv 
Church.  The  next  question  is  then  in  order :  does  the  Ortho¬ 
dox  Church  maintain  the  doctrine  of  the  Infallibility  of  the 
Church  with  distinct  reference  to  her  present  situation?  The 
Council  of  Constantinople  (1672)  defined:  “About  the  Catho¬ 
lic  Orthodox  Church  we  say,  that  she  is  certain  and  unwaver¬ 
ing,  since  she  is  led  by  Christ,  her  Head;  that  she  is  of  her¬ 
self  true,  and  taught  by  the  Spirit  of  truth.  It  is  impossible 
for  her  to  err."'  That  there  is  only  one  Head  of  the  Church 
and  that  He  is  Christ,  is  taught  clearlv  bv  all  Orthodox  au- 
t.horities.  On  the  basis  of  Eph.  5,  23,  and  1  Cor.  3,  11, 
Mesolora  says:  “The  Church  proclaims  Christ  to  be  her  only 
Head  visible  and  invisible,  for  from  Him  she  takes  her  origin, 
as  a  building  established  of  God,  and  continues  to  be  bound  to 
Him  as  witli  her  Founder  and  Highest  Kuler,  .  .  .  the  only 
source  of  her  life.’*3  As  the  Church  under  the  leadership  and 
headship  of  our  Lord,  having  preserved  inviolate  all  the  dogmas 
of  the  Faith,  “which  the  Saviour  taught  and  His  Apostles  de¬ 
veloped,  and  the  Fathers  formulated  with  one  voice  and  without 
essential  change,  in  the  definitions  and  canons  ...  of  the  ecu¬ 
menical  and  local  councils  .  .  .  the  Eastern  Church  is  the 
one  true  and  Orthodox  Church,  which  has  her  beginning  from 
our  Lord  and  the  Apostles,  which  maintains  unity  with  the 
ancient  Church,  is  governed  according  to  the  canons,  .  .  .  and 
rejects  innovations  and  everything  leading  to  worldly  and  tyran¬ 
nical  power  .  .  .  Our  Church  only  is  infallible.  .  .”4  “She 
only  bears  the  marks  of  the  religious  fellowship  founded  by 
Jesus  .  .  .  She  only  bears  the  stamp  of  antiquity  and  unan¬ 

imity  in  doctrine,  discipline,  and  worship,  and  she  only  begets 

*Pp.  33-34. 

2  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  II.  p.  143. 

3  Cf.  1  St.  Peter,  5,  4;  1  Cor.  12,  27;  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV,  p.  40, 
and  cf.  his  whole  treatment  of  the  subject  pp.  39-44;  Eugenius  Bul- 
garis,  OeoXoyiKov,  pp.  49,  591-2;  Kritopoulos,  in  Mesolora,  op.  cit., 
I.  pp.  359-360;  Mogila,  ibid.,  pp.  417-418;  Dositheus,  ibid.,  II.  pp.  108, 
112. 

*  Mesolora.  op.  cit.,  IV.  pp.  38-39. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  CHURCH 


255 


the  true  spirit  .  .  .  and  type  of  the  Christian  Faith/’1  “Our 
Church  being  an  organic  and  visible  body  with  a  soul,  whose 
Head  is  Christ  and  whose  soul  is  the  Holy  Spirit,  ever  lives 
on,  and  without  interruption  ever  operates  under  the  guidance 
of  the  Holy  Spirit  abiding  in  her,  ‘leading  her  into  all  truth,' 
having  the  authority  not  only  to  counsel  as  to  the  right  and 
the  true,  but  also  to  call  those  who  have  strayed  away,  back  to 
submission,  possessing  infallibility  in  her  utterances  concern¬ 
ing  the  Faith,  and  hence  being  able  to  settle  any  ecclesiastical 
question.  She  is  constituted  the  Supreme  judge  of  all  eccle¬ 
siastical  questions  and  affairs/'2 

The  Orthodox  Church,  then,  does  lav  claim  to  infallibility. 
In  what  sphere  and  by  what  means  is  it  exercised  ?  As  was 
said  above,  the  sphere  of  this  infallibility  is  whatever  concerns 
faith  and  morals3 — “the  true  and  genuine  .  .  .  knowledge  of 
the  whole  Christian  teaching.”4 5  Inasmuch  as  the  content  of 
the  Faith  was  not  fully  realized  at  the  first,  nor  is  entirely 
perceived  at  any  given  stage  of  the  Church’s  life,  development 
and  formulation  of  that  Faith  is  necessary,  as  was  seen  in 
Lecture  I.  “The  incomplete  formulation  of  a  dogma  ...  is 
not  an  imperfection  in  the  Faith,  nor  may  it  be  ascribed  to  the 
Church  as  if  by  reason  of  this  she  is  fallible  .  .  .  but  it  is 
only  incompleteness  in  the  knowledge  of  the  Faith  which,  along 
with  the  growth  of  the  Body,  is  gradually  formulated  little  by 
little/'0  The  organ  for  the  formulation  of  doctrine  is  the  Epis¬ 
copate  which  when  representing  the  whole  Church,  functions 
ipso  jure  infallibly/  The  Ecumenical  Councils  represent 
such  infallible  action  on  the  part  of  the  Church,  and  are  “Coun¬ 
cils  consisting  of  the  whole  Church  or  of  all  bishops  or  their 
delegated  representatives  convened  for  the  purpose  ...  of 
deliberating  and  expressing  the  mind  (of  the  Church),  of  which 
the  spirit  and  essence  is  in  either  the  Holy  Scripture  or  the 
ancient  and  genuine  Tradition,  written  and  unwritten,  pre- 

1  Ibid.,  p.  26. 

2  Ibid.,  pp.  27-28. 

3  Cf .  Androutsos.  AoypariKri.  p.  201. 

4  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  p.  21. 

5  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  pp.  20-21. 

e  Aiidroutsos.  ibid.,  p.  200. 


256  IV.— DOCTRINE  OF  GRACE  AND  OF  THE  CHURCH 


served  in  the  Church  as  a  whole.”1 2  Consequently  whatever  the 
Episcopate  teaches  is  infallible,  "whether  as  in  part  in  local 
dioceses,  or  assembling  as  a  whole  in  Ecumenical  Councils."'1 

The  Orthodox  Church  holds  that  infallibility  belongs  not 
only  to  the  Ecumenical  Councils  and  their  decrees,  but  as  well 
“to  the  local  synods  ratified  by  them  and  particularly  to  those 
.  .  .  from  the  16th  century  on,  which  did  nothing  else  than 
formulate  and  define  what  was  either  universally  accepted  and 
acknowledged  by  the  conscience  of  the  Faithful,  or  preserved  in 
the  practice  and  customs  of  the  Faithful,  or  had  not  yet  been 
defined  in  definite  terms  and  enactments  previous  to  the  meet¬ 
ing  of  the  synod,  in  opposition  to  false  or  heterodox  doctrine 
which  up  till  then  had  not  made  its  appearance."3  “Local 
synods  have  not  the  obligatory,  final,  and  divine  authority 
which  belongs  to  the  first  Councils  .  .  .  but  are  recognized 
by  the  Church  as  rightly  developing  and  formulating  its  teach¬ 
ing.  .  .  They  did  nothing  else  than  formulate  without  change 
the  Orthodox  spirit  of  the  Church  up  till  that  time  undeveloped 
and  unproclaimed  publicly,  because  no  error  or  contradiction 
had  made  its  appearance,”4  necessitating  such  formulation. 
Hence  not  only  the  definitions  and  decrees  of  the  Ecumenical 
Councils,  but  as  well  those  of  such  synods  as  the  above-men¬ 
tioned,  form  part  of  Orthodox  teaching,  and  “together  with 
Holy  Scripture  constitute  the  genuine  and  infallible  rule  of 
Faith.  .  .  These  synods  of  the  Eastern  Church  .  .  .  are 
thus  distinguished  from  other  synods,  Roman  and  Protestant, 
.  .  .  and  in  this  possess  infallibility,  define  and  set  down  the 
Orthodox  Christian  spirit,  and  constitute  the  continuation  of 
the  true  Catholic  Tradition.”5 6  The  difference,  then,  between 
Ecumenical  Councils  and  local  synods  is  this :  the  bishops  as- 

1  Mesolora,  ibid.,  p.  29. 

2  Androutsos,  ibid.,  pp.  287-288. 

3  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  p.  31. 

4  ^Vlesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  pp.  35-36.  Chrysostom  Papadopoulos,  in 
Aocrideos,  Harp.  ‘lepoaoX.,  in  Xea  Stanovoi.  V.  1907,  pp.  127,128;  At  avpodoi 
Kai  at  bpoXoyicu  rov  t|’  atuvos,  Nea  ~ubv,  vol.  VII,  1908.  p.  747 ;  ibid., 

1909,  vol.  VIII.  p.  358,  discusses  the  formal  character  of  these  synods 
in  themselves. 

6  Ibid.,  pp.  36-37:  cf.  Eugenius  Bulgaris,  OeoXoyiKov,  pp.  61-63,  and 
pp.  48-59;  Jeremiah  II,  in  Mesolora.  I,  p.  124.  pp.  236,  247.  264. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  CHURCH 


sembled  in  council,  representing  the  whole  Church,  and  en¬ 
gaged  on  matters  within  the  province  of  infallibility,  in  their 
own  right  and  by  virtue  of  their  office  and  position,  constitute 
the  organ  for  the  infallible  formulation  of  the  Church’s  Faith. 
Their  decisions  are  irreformable  and  of  themselves  infallible, 
and  not  from  the  acceptance  of  these  enactments  by  the  Church. 
This  consent  and  acceptance  is  only  the  external  criterion  of 
ecumenicity  and  infallibility.1  The  decrees  of  a  local  synod 
are  not  thus  immediately  infallible,  but  only  so  by  the  consent  of 
the  Church,  whether  through  ratification  by  an  Ecumenical 
Council,  or  by  acceptance  on  the  part  of  the  Church  as  a  whole, 
in  its  several  parts.2  To  the  definitions  and  pronouncements 
of  local  synods  subsequently  ratified  and  accepted,  is  attached 
the  infallible  character  with  which  our  Lord  endowed  His 
Church. 

This  is  in  fiat  contradiction  to  the  contentions  of  Pal- 
mieri,  who  in  the  chapter  devoted  to  dogmatic  development, 
attempts  to  show  that  “there  has  been  ...  no  relative  devel- 
opment  ( progressus  dogmaticus  secundum  quid )  in  the  local 
synods  of  the  Orthodox  Church,  nor,  judging  from  past  ex¬ 
perience,  can  there  be  such  in  the  future.’'3  Tt  is  perfectly  true 
that  there  is  no  magisterium  in  the  Roman  sense  in  the  Ortho¬ 
dox  Church.  But  his  statement  that  there  is  “no  authorita¬ 
tive  magisterium  in  the  Orthodox  Churches  ...  in  matters 
of  faith"4  is  entirely  in  opposition  to  the  teaching  and  practice 
of  Orthodoxy,  as  the  exposition  above  shows.  The  unanimous 
mind  of  Orthodoxy  on  the  subjects  of  Grace,  the  seven  sacra¬ 
ments,  the  authority  and  nature  of  the  Church,  and  the  like, 
so  far  as  the  form  of  these  doctrines  goes,  is  entirely  the  result 
of  the  synods  subsequent  to  the  Schism  of  the  two  Churches. 
Variations  as  to  disciplinary  regulations,  variety  and  contrari¬ 
ety  of  opinions  as  to  the  matters  of  excommunication,  the  ex¬ 
pediency  of  the  use  of  oiKovo/xia  in  relation  to  Roman  Catholics 
desiring  to  become  Orthodox  and  the  question  of  their  rebap- 

1  Androutsos  Soyp.aTi.Kri,  pp.  288-291. 

2  Androutsos,  ibid,  and  p.  11;  Soy/x.  MeXeVcu,  A’,  pp.  129-130;  cf. 
Dyobouniotes,  'H  Soyp.  ’Ai >bp.  Kpiv.,  p.  49  and  ”0 0eiA.  air avr.,  p.  119; 
Androutsos,  Soyp.  MeA.  A',  pp.  142-143. 

3  Op.  cit.,  I.  p.  67. 

4  Ibid.,  p.  627,  clearly  phrased  in  three  propositions,  pp.  654-655. 


258  IV.— DOCTRINE  OF  GRACE  AND  OF  THE  CHURCH 


tism,  the  divergence  of  opinion  between  Constantinople  and 
Russia  on  the  Bulgarian  question — none  of  these  proves  Pal- 
mieri’s  case,  according  to  the  Orthodox  mind.  All  of  these  ap¬ 
parent  difficulties  can  be  reconciled  with  the  Orthodox  theory 
of  the  infallibility  of  their  Church,  since  all  have  to  do  with 
discipline  and  not  with  dogma. 

As  to  the  question,  whether  or  not  the  Orthodox  Church 
could  convene  an  Ecumenical  Council,  Androutsos  is  quite 
clear.  He  devotes  the  central  portion1 * *  of  his  tractate  on  Unity 
to  the  refutation  of  Dr.  Xeale’s  five  contentions.5  Dr.  Xeale 
argued  for  the  ‘‘Branch  Theory”  and  believed  that  it  was  en¬ 
tirely  consistent  with  Orthodox  teaching,  since:  (1)  the  Or¬ 
thodox  Church  nowhere  officially  claims  to  be  the  one  and  only 
true  Church;  (2)  she  uses  the  titles  “Eastern”  and  “Orthodox” 
in  preference  to  “Catholic”;  (3)  she  has  relatively  few  adher¬ 
ents;  (4)  she  recognizes  a.s  valid,  sacraments  not  administered 
in  her  own  Communion:  (5)  she  does  not  proselyte  among 
Roman  Catholics  and  Protestants.5  Androutsos  rightly  notes 
that  the  fact  that  the  Orthodox  Church,  since  the  Schism  of  the 
9th  century,  lias  never  attempted  to  convene  an  Ecumenical 
Council,  has  given  rise  to  the  theory  that  she  has  not  done  so 
because  she  was  not  conscious  of  herself  as  constituting  the 
whole  Church,  and  in  consequence,  could  not  call  an  Ecumen¬ 
ical  Council.  This  he  says  may  be  the  opinion  of  a  few  so- 
called  Orthodox  writers,4  but  it  certainly  is  contrary  to  the  mind 
of  Orthodoxy.5  In  the  first  place,  there  has  not  arisen  a  need 
sufficient  to  demand  an  Ecumenical  Council.  In  the  second 
place,  difficulties  of  a  practical  nature  have  always  been  a  fac¬ 
tor,  which  is  the  case  even  in  the  present  day  as  the  Encyclical 
of  1902  shows.6  That  the  convening  of  an  Ecumenical  Council 
is  neither  impossible  nor  improbable,  is  evident  from  the  fact 

1  Pp.  19-58. 

-A  History  of  the  Holy  Eastern  Church,  vol.  II,  of  Introduction , 
pp.  1199-1200. 

’Androutsos,  p.  19. 

4  Palmieri  quotes  but  two  such,  both  Russians,  pp.  653-654,  op.  cit., 
vol.  I. 

5  On  those  who  thus  deviate  from  recognized  Orthodoxy,  cf.  An¬ 
droutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  20,  and  2vy(3o\iKri,  p.  8. 

*  P.  25,  quoted  on  p.  22  of  Androutsos  (A l  fiaaeis  .  .  .  rij s  evtlureus) . 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  CHURCH 


259 


that  the  advisability  of  convening  an  Ecumenical  Council  was 
debated  at  the  time  of  the  Synod  of  1872  (on  the  Bulgarian 
question),  and  more  recently  in  Russia.  In  both  cases  the  sug¬ 
gestion  was  disputed  and  finally  rejected,  but  never  was  there 
“lieard  the  slightest  suggestion  that  the  convening  of  a  Council 
was  in  principle  impossible  because  of  the  separation  of  the 
Eastern  and  Western  Churches.”1  The  Eastern  Church  fur¬ 
thermore  does  claim  to  be  the  one  Catholic  Church  “to  which 
all  the  notes  of  the  true  Church  of  Christ  apply.  .  .  As  the 
voice  of  the  Church  expressing  itself  in  an  Ecumenical  Council 
is  infallible  ...  so  the  unanimous  mind  of  the  hierarchy  of 
the  Church  everywhere  ( consensus  ecclesiae  dispersae) ,  is  not 
less  the  indication  and  authentic  expression  of  the  mind  of  the 
whole  Church/'2 

It  follows  that  if  the  Orthodox  Church  claim  to  be  the 
Catholic  Church  and  herself  alone  to  possess  infallibility,  she 
can  recognize  no  “branches”  or  “sections”  of  the  Church.  The 
Orthodox  doctrine  is  both  explicit  and  clear,  according  to  An- 
droutsos.  There  can  be  only  one  Church  founded  by  our  Lord, 
and  in  that  Church  there  can  be  but  one  single  Faith.  This 
one  Church  is  the  Orthodox  Church;  the  one  Faith  is  the  whole 
of  Orthodox  doctrine.  There  is  no  possible  place  for  the  the¬ 
ory  that  the  unity  of  the  Church  was  broken  in  the  9th  and 
then  in  the  16th  centuries,  (a)  There  are  not  three  “divis¬ 
ions”  of  the  Church — Roman,  Protestant,  and  Orthodox— as 
the  Protestants  hold;  nor  (b)  three  “Branches”  of  the  Church — 
Roman,  Anglican,  and  Orthodox — as  the  Anglicans  believe. 
Either  Rome  or  Orthodoxy  must  be  right,  as  each  claims  to  be 
the  whole  Catholic  Church.  Since  Rome  cannot  substantiate 
her  claim.  Orthodoxy  proves  to  be  the  true  and  only  Church.* 
(a)  The  Protestant  theory  has  already  been  disposed  of,  in  the 
arguments  adduced  in  the  earlier  portion  of  this  lecture,  (b) 
What  of  the  ‘“Branch  Theory?” 

According  to  Androutsos,  the  “Branch  Theory”  rests  on  a 
double  fallacy:  (1)  that  there  is  a  unity  of  faith  possible  to 
communions  which  possess  “essential”  dogmas  in  common,  and 

1  Ibid.,  pp.  22-23,  and  cf.  }Y.KK\-ri<na<jT.  ’A\tj 6ei.a,  1889,  no.  9. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  24.  This  refutes  Palmieri,  op.  cit.,  I,  pp.  653-655. 

s  Ibid.,  pp.  2-6. 


1260  IV.— DOCTRINE  OF  GRACE  AND  OF  THE  CHURCH 


(2)  a  unity  of  organization  and  discipline  in  those  which  main¬ 
tain  a  valid  Apostolic  Succession.1  As  was  shown  above,  the  dis¬ 
tinction  between  “essential”and  “secondary”  dogmas  is,  ac- 
cording  to  Orthodox  opinion,  entirely  illegitimate.  It  is  not 
primitive,  is  historically  unjustifiable,  and  was  unknown  until 
the  Reformation  in  the  16th  century.2 3  If  it  were  true,  it  would 
yet  be  necessary  to  discover  some  authority  to  expound  the 
limits  of  fundamental  as  against  secondary,  dogmas.  It  can 
only  be  held  on  the  principle  that  the  Church  has  lost  her  in¬ 
fallibility,  which  Orthodoxy  denies,  and  that  the  Catholic 
Church  is  sundered,  which  is  impossible.  “If  our  Lord  founded 
His  Church  on  earth  .  .  .  with  which  He  abides  being 
united  with  it  forever  .  .  .  it  is  beyond  dispute  that  it  must 
be  a  unified  and  unique  organic  whole.”*  As  the  Orthodox 
Church  is  this  one  and  only  Church  and  is  thereby  infallible, 
whatever  she  teaches  and  all  she  teaches,  is  “of  faith”,  and  there 
can  be  no  picking  and  choosing,  no  arbitrary  selection  among 
her  doctrines,  no  division  into  “fundamental”  and  “secondary”. 
In  the  words  of  the  Encyclical  of  1902 :  “We  must  guard  in  its 
integrity  the  divine  jewel,  the  dogmas  of  the  Orthodox  Faith, 
which  we  have  preserved  intact  for  all  the  centuries  past.  We 
must  preserve  every  liturgical  custom  of  whatever  sort  which 
clearly  symbolizes  the  essence  of  these  dogmas.  .  .  We  must 
preserve  entire  the  whole  external  life  of  Orthodoxy.”4  “The 
Ecumenical  Councils  did  not  formulate",  says  Androutsos  in 
his  tractate,  “all  the  dogmas  of  the  Orthodox  Church,  but  many 
are  enunciated  in  the  local  synods  of  the  17th  century.”5  It 
is  impossible,  then,  to  limit  the  doctrines  of  the  Church  to 
those  of  the  first  five  centuries,  for  example.6  As  Church 
teaching  forms  an  organic  whole7  there  is  no  choice  but  to  ac- 


1  AoyfiariKri,  p.  262,  note. 

-At  pdcreis  .  .  .  rf/s  evuceojs,  pp.  15-18;  AoyfxaTiKrj,  pp.  276-277;  but 
Ambraze’s  popular  work  ('H  ’0 p968o£os  ’E lacXrjcria.  .  .  ),  which  is  primarily 
irenic  and  not  dogmatic,  employs  this  distinction;  especially  pp.  157  ff. 

3  At  /3a<xeis  .  .  .  tt) s  evivaeus,  p.  9,  and  cf.  p.  13. 

4  P.  58,  and  cf.  p.  61. 

"  Ai  ftaaeis  .  .  .  rijs  ei>ojaeios,  p.  9,  and  cf.  p.  40. 

c  Ibid.,  p.  60. 

7  AoyfiaTLKiq,  p.  277. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  CHURCH 


261 


cept  or  reject  it  all.  Negotiations  towards  reunion  between  the 
Orthodox  and  the  Old  Catholics  fell  through  because  the  latter, 
believing  that  the  Church’s  infallibility  had  disappeared  with 
the  Schism  in  the  8th  century,  would  not  admit  the  binding 
force  of  any  dogmas  formulated  since  the  Ecumenical  Councils.1 
As  Androutsos  says:  “The  teaching  of  the  Eastern  Church,  if 
examined  as  to  its  essential  character,  shows  itself  to  be  the 
same  after  as  before  the  Schism,  and  is  only  different  in  defini¬ 
tion  and  external  form.”2  So  in  answer  to  the  contention  of 
those  who  attempt  to  claim  identity  in  fundamental  teaching 
as  constituting  dogmatic  unity,  Androutsos  would  say  that  there 
is  no  differentiation  of  dogmas  into  fundamental  and  secondary ; 
all  are  on  a  par  and  all  must  be  accepted.  Agreement  on  the 
basis  of  certain  chosen  doctrines  does  not  constitute  dogmatic 
unity. 

(2)  In  answer  to  the  second  contention,  that  episcopal  ordi¬ 
nation,  and  the  preservation  of  a  valid  hierarchy  constitutes 
of  itself  the  evidence  of  membership  in  the  One  Body,  in  spite 
of  external  divisions  and  the  absence  of  inter-communion,  An¬ 
droutsos  says  that  the  Catholic  Church  can  recognize  no  body 
but  herself  as  belonging  to  the  Church.  Both  the  Protestant 
theory  of  the  “invisible  Church”  and  the  modern  “Branch  The¬ 
ory"  were  unheard  of  in  early  times.3  The  Orthodox  Church, 
which  claims  to  be  the  one  Church,  does  call  itself  Catholic — 
the  preference  for  the  term  “Orthodox”  not  in  the  least  prov¬ 
ing  Dr.  Neale’s  point.4  As  to  Dr.  Neale’s  fourth  contention, 
that  the  Orthodox  Church  acknowledges  as  valid  sacraments 

1  Cf .  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV,  p.  30;  Jeremiah  II,  in  ibid.,  I,  pp.  124, 
193,  247,  264;  Rhosse,  op.  cit.,  pp.  59  ff.  note;  pp.  489-491;  ibid., 
'OpdoSo^ias  kcll  Yla\atOKa8o\iKL(T/jLOV  avTideaeis,  pp.  16-28;  '0  IIaXcuoKa0o\t/d<r- 
pos  €v  crxecret  Trpos  tt]v  yvTjaiap  KadoXiKorriTa  kcli  6pdo8o^iav  r.  ’Avar.  ’E/c/cA., 
Athens,  1896;  Palmieri,  op.  cit.,  I.  p.  82  note,  and  II.  pp.  188-189; 
Androutsos,  At  /3d(rets  .  .  .  ri)s  epucreu s,  pp.  59-69. 

2  A i  facets  .  .  .  rijs  epweeus,  p.  65. 

s  Ibid.,  p.  49. 

4  Cf.  ibid.,  pp.  25-32.  The  terms  “Eastern”  and  “Orthodox”  came 
into  use  to  distinguish  the  Church  of  the  East  from  the  Roman  or 
Western  Church,  and  the  title  “Catholic”,  used  officially  by  the  Ortho¬ 
dox  Church,  has  the  same  connotation  of  “Roman”  in  the  East  as  in 
the  West. 


2G2  IV.— DOCTRINE  OF  GRACE  AND  OF  THE  CHURCH 


administered  outside  her  own  Church,1  Androutsos  points  out 
that  the  Eastern  Church  is  quite  consistent  in  her  theory,  but 
her  practice,  upon  which  Dr.  Neale  fastens,  is  open  to  misin¬ 
terpretation.  Since  heretics  and  schismatics  are  not  of  the 
Church  and  are  ipso  facto  sundered  from  the  Body  of  Christ 
and  the  fellowship  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  Orthodoxy  acknowledges 
no  sacraments  as  valid  save  those  of  the  one  true  Church,  that 
is,  herself.  To  do  so  would  be  to  acknowledge  the  parity  and 
equality  of  heretics  and  schismatics  with  the  Catholic  Church, 
which,  as  will  be  seen,  she  may  not  do.  But  in  cases  where  the 
Orthodox  Church  has  deemed  it  for  the  good  and  need  of  souls, 
she  may  as  “the  sovereign  over  the  sacraments.  .  .  according 
to  circumstances  change  invalid  rites  into  valid  sacraments.” 
This  she  does  by  “economy”  (kolt  oiVovo/uav)  when  she  deviates 
from  her  normal  and  strict  (kot  aKpifieiav)  manner  of  administra¬ 
tion.  It  is  impossible  to  discover  the  principle  governing  the  use 
of  “economy”  in  this  matter,  nor  is  there  a  rationale  to  determine 
the  exercise  of  “economy”  in  any  given  case.  Yet  the  Church 
exercises  this  right  as  mistress  of  the  Grace  of  God,  and  has 
allowed  as  valid  the  baptism  of  heretics,  which  normally  and 
regularly  she  pronounces  entirely  invalid.  It  is  not  a  question 
of  the  due  matter  and  form,  or  of  the  proper  intention:  a  body 
even  with  formally  valid  orders  outside  the  Church  has  lost  the 
fellowship  of  the  Holy  Spirit  by  whose  agency  only  the  Sacra¬ 
ments  become  realities.  This  is  clearly  shown  by  the  Acts  of 
the  synod  which  condemned  the  Bulgarian  Church,  in  which  it 
was  said  that  the  excommunicated  bishops  “played  with  what 
ought  not  be  played  with,  since  they  had  fallen  from  the  Grace 
of  Orders,  and  profess  to  transmit  to  others  the  Grace  of  Orders, 
from  which  they  had  fallen.  Who  is  able  to  give,  as  says  the 
synod  of  Carthage,  what  he  has  not,  or  how  may  the  Holy  Spirit, 
having  cast  them  forth  (through  them),  work  spiritual  ef¬ 
fects?”2  So  the  exercise  of  “economy”3  does  not  mean  that  the 
Orthodox  Church  recognizes,  either  in  theory  or  practice,  the 

1 Ibid .,  p.  19. 

2  Acts  of  the  Synod  of  1872,  p.  57  quoted  by  Androutsos,  p.  36. 
His  whole  discussion  epitomized  above,  is  on  pp.  32-53  op.  cit. 

3  On  this  whole  subject  cf.  Lecture  V.  on  The  Sacraments,  and  J. 
A.  Douglas,  The  Relations  of  the  Anglican  Churches  with  the  Eastern- 
Orthodox,  London,  1921,  on  this  question  of  “economy”. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  CHURCH 


existence  of  any  other  body  than  herself  as  having  valid  orders, 
and  so  having  this  much  claim  to  be  part  of  the  Church.  She 
recognizes  no  Church  but  herself.1 

In  summary  we  may  state,  (a)  that  the  Orthodox  Church 
claims  to  be  the  whole  and  only  Catholic  Church;  (b)  that  as 
such  she  claims  infallibility;  (c)  that  she  can  recognize  no 
unity  of  doctrine  save  on  the  basis  of  the  acceptance  of  the 
whole  of  her  teaching;  (d)  that  she  cannot  admit  the  existence 
of  any  “members”  or  “branches”  of  the  Church,  since  it  is 
constituted  of  herself  alone,  nor  the  validity  of  any  sacraments 
save  her  own.  Consequently  her  ideal  of  unity  is  not  that  of 
gathering  up  and  uniting  the  divided  portions  of  the  Church, 
but  a  return  of  all  heretical  or  schismatical  bodies  to  the  one 
Church.  “As  the  Orthodox  Church  constitutes  the  true  Church 
of  Christ,  any  ‘Church'’  outside  her  cannot  be  a  true  or  equal 
member  of  the  true  Church,  and  if  reunion  should  take  place 
between  Orthodoxy  and  these  Churches,  it  would  not  consti¬ 
tute  a  reestablishment  of  the  broken  and  destroyed  unity  of 
the  Church,  but  only  a  return  to  the  true  form  of  Christian¬ 
ity.’”  .  .  “Our  desire”,  says  the  Encyclical  of  1902,  “is  that 

all  heterodox  shall  come  into  the  bosom  of  the  Orthodox  Church 
of  Christ,  which  only  is  able  to  give  them  salvation.”3 

Additional  Note  on  the  Rebaptism  of  Latins 

The  theory  of  the  Orthodox  Church  as  to  the  validity  of 
sacraments  has  been  given  above:  no  sacraments  are  valid  out¬ 
side  the  Church,  in  which  only  the  Holy  Spirit  is  present  as 
the  agent  in  all  sacraments.  It  is  much  more  consistent,  ac¬ 
cording  to  Androutsos,  than  the  Roman  theory  inherited  from 
St.  Augustine.  According  to  this  theory,  Baptism  may  be  val¬ 
idly  administered  by  anyone  whatsoever  who  uses  the  proper 
matter  and  form  with  the  proper  intention.  In  the  case  of  a 
heretic  or  infidel  baptising  a  person,  he  does  not  act  qua  here- 

1  Ibid.,  pp.  25-26,  cf.  note  below  on  the  question  of  the  rebaptisin 
of  Latins. 

•Androutsos,  p.  4  (Ai  /Sacrets  .  .  .  rrjs  ivucreus) . 

3  P.  48.  The  Orthodox  theory,  as  herein  presented,  is  thus  perfectly 
lucid,  consistent,  and  utterly  inelastic.  It  is  significant  that  there 
is  no  room  in  it  for  the  “Branch  Theory”  of  the  Anglican  Church. 
(Cf.  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  84-85. 


264  IV.— DOCTRINE  OF  GRACE  AND  OF  THE  CHURCH 


tic  but,  for  the  time  being,  as  a  member  of  the  Church.  In  all 
cases  it  is  our  Lord's  command  which  is  being  obeyed,  and  His 
efficient  Word  brings  to  pass  what  He  has  enjoined,  despite  the 
unworthiness  or  the  anomalous  position  of  the  officiant.  So 
far  as  validity  is  concerned,  sacraments  may  then  be  admin¬ 
istered  validly  outside  the  Church.1  The  Orthodox  objections 
brought  against  this  view  are  weighty:  (a)  it  is  not  the  primi¬ 
tive  conception,  for  the  distinction  of  “regularity”  and  “valid¬ 
ity''  was  unknown  to  the  early  Church;2  (b)  if  those  who  act 
in  good  faith,  being  outside  the  Church  but  carefully  satisfy¬ 
ing  all  the  required  conditions  for  the  validity  of  sacraments, 
are  truly  recipients  of  Grace,  are  made  regenerate  in  Baptism, 
and  receive  the  grace  of  the  Eucharist,  then  both  theoretically 
and  practically  the  dogma  of  the  unity  of  the  one  true  Church 
is  made  of  no  effect :  theoretically,  the  acceptance  of  validity 
of  sacraments  outside  the  Church  extends  the  Church  beyond 
the  bounds  of  the  visible  Church  and  makes  it  equivalent  to 
the  “invisible  Church”  of  the  Protestants;  practically,  such 
an  admission  is  tantamount  to  the  acknowledgment  of  a 
certain  status  of  other  religious  bodies  as  possessing  in  some 
degree  membership  in  the  Catholic  Church,  and  thus  violating 
the  essential  principle  of  the  actual  and  objective  unity  of  the 
Church.3  (c)  It  involves  an  utterly  mechanical  and  magical 
conception  of  the  Sacraments,  which  the  early  Church  neither 
recognized  nor  accepted.4 

If  the  difficulties  and  inconsistencies  in  the  Koman  theory 
are  apparent,  the  difficulties  of  the  Orthodox  theory,  large  as 
they  may  bulk  in  the  eyes  of  outsiders,  are  all  resolvable  by 
the  theory  of  “economy”.  The  Orthodox  Church  recognizes 
no  sacraments  outside  herself  as  valid,  yet  may  in  practice  re¬ 
lax  the  stringency  of  her  theory  and  accept  them  as  valid  under 
certain  circumstances  in  the  case  of  outsiders  coming  into  the 

1  Androutsos,  A i  fiaaeis  .  .  .  rij s  epioaeios,  pp.  36-38. 

2  Ibid,  p.  34.  The  Eastern  Fathers  did  not  recognize  baptism  by 
heretics,  e.  g.,  St.  Basil,  St.  Athanasius,  St.  Gregory  Nazianzen,  St. 
Cyril  of  Jerusalem,  St.  Cyprian,  St.  Firmilian,  the  local  synods  in 
Africa  and  Asia  Minor,  etc. 

3  Androutsos,  ibid.,  pp.  40-45. 

4  Dyobouniotes,  Ta  Mvarripia,  pp.  30-31,  and  cf.  p.  65,  Androutsos, 
Aoy/j.aTiKT],  pp.  300-301,  et  al. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  CHURCH 


265 


Church.  This  she  does  because  the  Church  is  the  guardian, 
administrator,  and  sovereign  of  the  sacraments.  While  we  may 
not  predict  the  circumstances  and  occasions  in  which  she  may 
so  exercise  discretion  and  condescension  in  her  practice,  never¬ 
theless,  granted  the  principle,  she  is  entirely  consistent  in  the¬ 
ory.  If  she  allows  Baptism  by  any  other  than  a  priest  (who 
is  the  regular  minister  of  that  sacrament)  she  does  so  by  the 
use  of  “economy”.1  All  of  the  occasions  in  which  her  practice 
seems  inconsistent,  illogical,  and  without  a  fixed  principle  de¬ 
termining  her  course  of  action,  may  be  accounted  for  on  the 
basis  of  “economy7'.2 

In  the  Orthodox  Church  there  has  been  a  great  diversity 
of  rulings  on  the  part  of  local  synods  and  councils,  on  the 
question  of  rebaptism  of  Roman  Catholics,  and  the  recogni¬ 
tion  of  Roman,  Nestorian,  or  Armenian  orders  as  valid.  This 
diversity  has  laid  her  open  to  the  charge  of  having  no  principle 
at  all  in  such  matters.3  Palmieri  points  out  that  the  synod  of 
Moscow  in  1620  held  the  baptism  of  Latins  invalid,  but 
those  of  1656  and  1666-1667  reversed  this  judgment.  The 
attitude  of  the  Greeks  was  equally  inconsistent.  Macarius  of 
Antioch  (1648-72)  regarded  Roman  Baptism  as  valid,  but  sub¬ 
sequent  synods,  under  the  Patriarchs  Cyril  V  (1748-1751; 
1752-1757)  and  Paisius  II  (1751-1752),  reversed  this  decision, 
saying  “we  regard  them  as  unbaptized  and  as  needing  to  be  bap¬ 
tized."4  Again,  the  synod  of  Constantinople  in  1875  writing  to 
the  Holy  Synod  of  Athens,  said  that  this  ruling  had  been 
“necessary  in  view  of  the  circumstances  of  Orthodoxy”,5  and  re¬ 
versed  it.  Three  years  later  it  sanctioned  the  practice  of  ad¬ 
mitting  “Romans  and  Armenians  by  Holy  Baptism  according 
to  the  regulations  of  our  Orthodox  Church,  and  not  by  anoint- 

1  Ibid.,  note  2  pp.  30-31. 

2  Cf.  Theotokas,  Xop.o\oyia  rov  0'iKovp.evLKov  narpiapxeiov,  Constan¬ 
tinople,  1896,  pp.  367  ff;  on  the  difficulties  in  attempting  to  discern 
the  principle  guiding  the  exercise  of  “economy’’  cf.  Androutsos  op.  cit. 

3  E.  g.,  Palmieri,  Le  rebaptisation  des  latins  chez  les  Grecs,  in  Revue 
de  VOrient  chretien,  vol.  VII,  1902,  pp.  618-646;  VIII,  1903,  pp.  111- 
143;  Un  document  inedit  sur  la  rebaptisation  des  latins  chez  les  Grecs, 
in  Revue  Benedictine,  1906,  pp.  215-231. 

4  In  Gedeon,  Kavovisal  5iard£ets,  vol.  I.  p.  254 — cf.  Palmieri,  Thcol. 
Dog.  Orth.,  I.  pp.  623-625,  617-618,  and  ct.  pp.  8-9. 

5  In  Thotokas,  op.  cit..  p.  369. 


266  IV.— DOCTRINE  OF  GRACE  AND  OF  THE  CHURCH 


ing  with  Holy  Chrism  alone.”1  In  1879  it  “allowed  .  .  .  three 
Protestants  and  Roman  Catholics  to  be  received  into  the  Or¬ 
thodox  Church  by  anointing  with  Holy  Chrism”2  alone.  Pal- 
mieri  makes  much  of  these  variations  in  practice,  as  he  does  of 
the  repudiation  by  the  Russian  Church  of  the  excommunica¬ 
tion  of  the  Bulgarians  pronounced  by  Constantinople  in  1872/ 
On  the  Roman  theory  all  such  deviations  would  be  utterly  an¬ 
omalous.  On  the  Orthodox  theory  they  are  certainly  not.  If 
the  Orthodox  premises  are  true  and  the  Church  can  administer 
the  sacraments  as  she  deems  wise — in  this  case  relaxing  her 
strictness,  in  that  observing  it — there  is  nothing  at  all  wrong 
in  principle  in  all  these  varieties  in  practice.  Whether  or  not 
occasions  of  the  exercise  of  “economy”  can  become  a  precedent 
for  other  cases  in  which  the  circumstances  may  be  adjudged 
similar,  is  an  entirely  different  question.4 

“The  Greek  Church”,  says  Androutsos,  “from  the  time  of 
the  Schism  generally  accepted  the  Baptism  of  Roman  Cath¬ 
olics,  consonant  with  the  synod  of  1484  which  met  at  Constanti¬ 
nople.  From  1756  in  accordance  with  a  decision  given  in 
synod  under  Cyril  V,  it  baptized  Latins  and  Protestants  over 
again,  though  instances  are  not  lacking  of  their  reception  with¬ 
out  rebaptism,  for  example,  the  case  of  Princess  Sophia  the 
consort  of  the  Heir  Apparent.5  On  the  contrary,  the  Russian 
Church  and  with  it  the  other  autocephalous  Churches,  formerly 
rebaptized  them,  which  practice  the  synod  of  Moscow  under 
Philaret  confirmed,  but  since  that  held  in  Moscow  in  1667  they 

'Ibid.,  p.  370. 

^  Ibid. 

3  Cf.  his  Theol.  Dog.  Orth.,  I,  pp.  9-10  et  al. 

4  Ambraze  ('H  ’Opd68o£os  ’E/c/cX^crta)  gives  on  pp.  161  ft*,  a  list  of 
such  instances  of  the  exercise  of  “economy”,  using  them  as  possible 
precedents  for  indicating  the  course  of  the  Orthodox  Church  in  the 
problem  of  Reunion.  It  is  questionable  whether  such  instances  may 
be  quoted  as  precedents.  On  the  subject  cf.  J.  A.  Douglas,  op.  cit., 
Androutsos  on  The  Validity  of  English  Ordinations  from  an  Orthodox- 
Catholic  Point  of  View ,  London,  1909,  and  in  the  lectures  following 
pp.  282-286,  292-303,  377-378. 

6  On  the  service  for  her  admission,  and  a  brief  history  of  the  oc¬ 
casion,  cf.  Ambraze,  'H  ’Op0o5o£os  ’E/c/cX^crta,  pp.  168-170.  She  is  the  wife 
of  Constantine,  and  is  the  present  Queen  of  Greece.  She  was  baptized 
in  the  German  Evangelical  Church. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  CHURCH 


267 


have  been  receiving  Latins  by  document,1  or  by  anointing,"  if 
they  have  not  been  anointed  (=  confirmed),  and  Protestants 
by  anointing,  according  to  the  decision  of  1718.  This  differ¬ 
ence  can  be  explained  on  historical  grounds,  since  it  is  to  be 
attributed  to  the  scandalous  proselyting  efforts  of  the  Papists 
at  different  times  in  Turkey  and  Russia.  From  the  dogmatic 
standpoint,  however,  we  can  gain  nothing  from  this  explana¬ 
tion,  for  as  Baptism  is  a  sacrament  and  possesses  dogmatic 
significance,  recognition  of  it  or  the  reverse  may  not  be  con¬ 
sidered  as  the  work  of  the  Church  in  her  disciplinary  capacity, 
altering  its  decision  as  it  does  with  places  and  seasons.  The 
reason  adduced  by  some  Orthodox  writers — the  lack  of  the 
trine  immersion,  considered  formerly  as  essential  except  only 
in  the  cases  of  clinical  Baptism  under  urgent  necessity — can¬ 
not  explain  both  practices,  but  only  one  of  the  two.  For  either 
trine  immersion  is  necessary,  and  for  lack  of  it  Romans  and 
Protestants  are  unbaptized,  or  else  it  is  relatively  necessary, 
and  Roman  and  Protestants,  as  baptized  by  clinical  Baptism, 
need  not  be  baptized  again,  for  be  who  rebaptizes  them  incurs 
the  severe  interdict  for  sin  of  this  nature.  The  difficulty  lies 
deeper,  in  the  acceptance  of  the  theory  that  there  may  be  Grace 
outside  the  Church.  It  is  certainly  the  case  that  in  the  Eastern 
Church  the  validity  of  sacraments  after  the  Schism  was  not 
properly  regarded  from  the  standpoint  of  the  Church  as  the  one 
steward  of  Grace  and  salvation.  The  sacraments  of  the  Latins  and 
Protestants  were  rejected  rather  because  of  the  violation  of  the 
ritual  parts — the  trine  immersion.  But  if  one  take  the  Armenians 
into  consideration,  who  although  baptized  by  immersion  yet  oft¬ 
entimes  on  coming  into  Orthodoxy  were  rehaptized  by  us,3  he 
will  recognize  that  the  ancient  theory  that  outside  the  Church 
Grace  does  not  operate  and  consequently  sacraments  are  ah  initio 
invalid,  even  though  it  were  not  studied  out  in  theory,  underlies 
the  practice  of  the  Church  at  all  times  and  is  everywhere  pre¬ 
supposed.”4 

1l.  e.,  a  recantation  of  heretical  beliefs,  and  a  profession  of  Orthodoxy. 

2  5 ta  fivpov — oil  of  the  catechumens.  It  is  not  the  Chrism  (of  Con¬ 
firmation)  . 

3  Cf.  Theotokas  NopoXoyia,  p.  366. 

*  Androutsos,  AoypaTiKr),  pp.  332-333,  note,  and  cf.  Dyobouniotes, 
Ta  Mcar^pia,  pp.  64-65,  note  1. 


LECTURE  V. 

V.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 


LECTURE  V. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 


l. 


2. 


3. 


Contents 


Pages 

Pages 

I.  THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  GENERAL 

272-305 

The  notion  and  purpose  of  sacraments 

272-277 

Definition 

273-274 

Essential  notes:  (a)  divine  institution 

274 

(b)  visible  signs 

275-276 

( c )  Grace  bestowed 

276-277 

The  number  and  classification  of  the 

sacraments 

278-286 

The  seven  sacraments 

278-279 

Classification:  (a)  “chief”  or  “greater” 

and  “lesser” 

280-281 

(b)  “obligatory”  and 

“voluntary” 

282-283 

(c)  iterable  and  non- 

iterable 

283 

The  theory  of  indelible 

character 

284-285 

A  Greek  theory 

285-286 

The  administration  of  the  sacraments 

286-305 

(a)  proper  external  rite 

287-288 

(b)  proper  officiant 

289-290 

necessity  of  intention 

290-291 

The  doctrine  of  Economy 

292-301 

as  applied  to  Anglican  Orders 

302-303 

(c)  subjective  factors 

304-305 

ex  opere  operato 

305 

sacramentals 

305 

II.  THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  PARTICULAR 

306-354 

1. 

Baptism 

306-316 

2. 

Chrism  ( Confirmation ) 

316-324 

3. 

The  Holv  Eucharist 
•/ 

324-353 

(a)  Definition  and  Institution 

324-328 

(b)  The  Doctrine  of  the  Change  or 

Transubstantation 

328-336 

(c)  The  Eucharist  as  sacrament 

336-346 

(d)  The  Eucharist  as  sacrifice 

347-353 

I.  THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  GENERAL 


1.  The  Notion  and  Purpose  of  Sacraments 

The  Orthodox  Church  uses  the  term  “mystery”  for  what 
in  the  Western  Church  is  called  “sacrament”.  The  word  “mys¬ 
tery”  (p varrjpiov )  is  derived  from  the  verb  pveiv,  to  initiate, 
originally  signifying  “to  close  the  means  of  communication” — 
the  eyes,  ears,  and  lips.  So  it  was  used  by  the  “mystery  re¬ 
ligions”,  and  in  the  Orphic  and  Eleusinian  “Mysteries”.1  “The 
initiates  (pepvqpivoi)  had  not  the  right  to  look  upon  the  rites 
and  speak  of  the  teachings  in  public,  but  had  to  preserve 
them  secretly  (/zuo-tikw?)  and  reverence  them  in  silence.  Hence 
the  word  pvetv  came  to  mean  to  teach  sacred  and  mysterious 
things.”2 3  By  extension  of  this  meaning  the  word  “mystery” 
came  to  denote  anything  hidden  or  incomprehensible, — in  Eng¬ 
lish,  a  “mystery”or  “secret”.8  Thus  it  was  applied  to  what 
we  call  “mysteries”  of  the  Faith, — the  Cross,  the  works  of 
Redemption,  the  doctrine  of  the  Holy  Trinity,  and  the  like. 
Finally  it  came  to  have  a  special  application,  by  reason  of  its 
double  connotation  of  “religious”,  and  “secret”  or  “mysterious”, 
to  certain  definite  means  of  Grace  in  the  Church,  to  which  in 
its  technical  meaning  it  is  exclusively  referred.4  The  word 
“sacrament”  from  sacrare,  to  “dedicate”  or  “make  holy”,  came 
to  be  used  to  mean  “oath”.  Tertullian  applied  it  to  the  Chris¬ 
tian’s  oath  of  Baptism,  by  which  he  becomes  a  soldier  of  the 
Church  militant.  Its  subsequent  development  was  somewhat 
analogous  to  that  of  the  term  “mystery”,  and  it  finally  came 
to  be  applied  exclusively  to  the  seven  definite  means  of  Grace 

1  Dyobouniotes,  Ta  MutrrTjpia,  p.  8  note. 

2  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  p.  138,  note  2. 

3  E  (].,  Tim.  3,  16;  Eph.  1,  9;  3,  9;  5,  32;  Col.  1,  27;  St.  Matt. 
13,  11,  etc.  Dyobouniotes  ibid. 

4  Androutsos,  AoypaTiKri,  p.  294  and  note. 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  GENERAL 


273 


of  the  Catholic  Church.1  Mesolora  claims  that  the  word  “mys¬ 
tery”  is  the  more  exact,  and  is  to  be  preferred  to  “sacrament” 
in  that  “it  expresses  more  deeply  and  amply  the  mysterious 
character  of  the  power  and  concurrence  of  divine  Grace  in 
the  believer.”2  In  these  lectures  the  English  word  “sacrament” 
will  be  used  for  the  Greek  pvajppiov. 

“Regenerating,  justifying,  and  sanctifying  Grace  is  brought 
to  the  faithful  in  the  Christian  Church  by  means  of  the  sac¬ 
raments”,3  which  are  external  and  tangible  means  and  acts. 
“As  such,  the  sacraments  are  founded  on  the  close  connection 
of  spirit  and  matter,  of  the  supernatural  and  the  material, 
which  pervades  the  whole  of  Christianity.  That  which  is 
perceptible  is  neither  unclean  nor  naturally  evil ....  but  is  ele¬ 
vated  by  Christianity  in  its  wholesome  form,  into  a  symbol 
and  bearer  of  spiritual  and  supernatural  power : . . .  .  that  sav¬ 
ing  power  which  flows  from  the  death  of  Christ.”4  There  can 
be  no  dualism  or  manicheism  in  genuine  Christianity.  The 
two-fold  character  of  the  means  of  Grace  is  demanded  by  and 
involved  in  the  two-fold  character  of  the  Church, — visible  and 
invisible, — for  the  Church  as  visible  must  use  visible  means  to 
convey  her  invisible  Grace  in  accordance  with  the  aim  of 
her  Founder.5  This  is  the  teaching  of  the  Fathers.6  The  sac¬ 
raments  are  “the  various  manifestations  of  our  Lord’s  saving 
power,  and  the  means  by  which  Christ  is  present  and  works 
in  His  Church.  .  .  .As  the  Church  is  the  perpetual  extension 
of  Christ, ....  so  the  sacraments  are  the  power  by  which  the 
Church  sanctifies  men,  and  the  seven  pillars  which  uphold 
the  religious  and  moral  life  of  the  Faithful.”7  The  sacraments 

1  Dyobouniotes,  ibid.,  and  p.  9,  note. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  149.  For  the  Latin  word,  cf.  Tertullian,  adv.  Marc.  2, 
27;  de  praescrip.  haer,  40;  St.  Cyprian,  Epistola,  73,  22;  St.  Augustine 
on  St.  John  80,  on  Ps.  73;  St.  Hugo  of  St.  Victor’s  de  Sacramentis 
Christianae  Fidei. 

3  Dyobouniotes,  op.  tit.,  p.  3. 

4  Androutsos,  op.  tit.,  pp.  292-293. 

5  Mesolora,  op.  tit.,  IV,  pp.  139-140,  and  cf.  (in  Mesolora,  I,)  Jere¬ 
miah  IPs  First  Answer,  p.  141;  Second  Answer ,  p.  229;  Kritopoulos, 
ibid.,  p.  312. 

6  Cf .  St.  John  1,  17;  St.  John  Chrysostom,  in  1  Epist.  ad  Cor.  hom. 
7;  St.  Augustine,  Sermo  272;  Dositheus  in  Mesolora,  II,  p.  114,  et  al. 

7  Androutsos,  op.  tit.,  p.  293. 


274 


V.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 


may  then  be  defined  as  “the  divine  rites  instituted  by  Christ 
and  His  Apostles,  which  through  visible  signs  convey  hiddenly 
the  Grace  of  God.”1  The  word  p.v<rrqpLov  in  its  technical  mean¬ 
ing  is  distinguished  from  the  wider  meaning  in  regard  both 
to  the  thing  concerned,  the  sanctification  of  man,  and  the  man¬ 
ner  of  accomplishing  this  end, — not  by  symbolizing,  but  by 
actually  communicating,  sanctifying  Grace.  The  sacraments  are 
then  “the  divinely  instituted  rites  manifesting  and  communicat¬ 
ing  invisible  Grace.”’2  The  aim  and  object  of  the  sacraments  is 
thus  apparent  from  the  definition.  They  are  “the  abundant 
springs  of  divine  Grace  by  which  the  Saviour  satisfies  all  the 
spiritual  needs  of  the  members  of  the  Church”.  Their  pur¬ 
pose,  Mesolora  says,  is  four-fold:  “(a)  the  communication 
and  guarantee  of  divine  Grace;  (b)  the  distinctive  notes  of 
the  true  Church;  (c)  the  bond  of  love  and  incentive  for  the 
exercise  of  virtues,.  .  and  (d)  the  memorial  of  the  great  and 
wondrous  deeds  wrought  by  our  God  and  Saviour  for  us  men.”3 

(a)  The  distinctive  and  constituent  notes  of  the  sacraments 
involved  in  the  definitions  above  are  three:  (a)  divine  in¬ 
stitution,  (b)  outward  sign,  and  (c)  inward  Grace  given.  All 
Orthodox  teaching  unites  in  asserting  that  our  Lord  instituted 
and  established  all  seven  sacraments.  All  that  the  Apostles 
did  was  done  in  His  name,4  and  while  we  have  the  explicit 
record  of  our  Lord’s  institution  of  the  sacraments  of  Baptism 
and  the  Eucharist,  but  no  scriptural  record  of  His  having 
established  the  other  five,  still  “inasmuch  as  Holy  Scripture 
does  not  show  the  contrary,  .  .  .  what  is  true  of  Baptism  and 
the  Eucharist  is  taken  by  analogy  as  true  of  the  other  sacra¬ 
ments  as  well.”5  On  the  basis  of  the  definite  witness  of  our 
Lord’s  having  established  the  two  sacraments  of  Baptism  and 
the  Eucharist,  Dyobouniotes  says :  “We  may  presume  with 
great  certainty  that  the  others,  like  Baptism  and  the  Euchar- 

1  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  pp.  8-9. 

2  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  294-295.  Mesolora’s  definition  (op.  cit., 
IV,  p.  143)  is  substantially  the  same,  but  less  concise. 

3  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  pp.  140-141;  cf.  Mogila  in  Mesolora,  I., 
pp.  423-424. 

4Cf.  1  Cor.  4,  1;  St.  Matt.  28,  19;  St.  John  20,  21-23;  Heb.  2,  10; 
10,  7;  Gal.  4,  4;  2  Cor.  5,  19,  etc. 

8  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  295. 


275 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  GENERAL 

ist,  were  instituted  by  our  Lord/’1  “It  is  necessary”,  says 
Mesolora,  “that  they  have  their  beginning,  institution,  and 
warrant,  either  from  our  Lord  and  God,  as  Founder  of  the 
Christian  religion,  as  “Captain  of  our  Salvation”  and  Source 
of  Grace,  or  from  the  Apostles  who  founded  the  Church  on 
Christ  the  Cornerstone,  from  Whom  directly  or  indirectly  they 
received  the  command  regarding  the  hallowing  of  certain  fixed 
rites,  the  sacraments.”2  The  first  explicit  mention  of  this 
doctrine  is  found  in  Ps.  Ambrose,  in  the  words:  quis  est  auctor 
sacrament  or  um  nisi  Dominus  Jesus ?  De  coelo  sacramenta 
venerunt.3  While  it  is  not  legitimate  to  ascribe  the  estab¬ 
lishment  of  the  other  five  sacraments  to  the  Church,  it  is 
consistent  with  Orthodox  thought  to  hold  that  they  were  insti¬ 
tuted  not  directly  by  our  Lord,  but  indirectly  through  the 
Apostles,  which  “opinion  does  not  detract  from  their  divine 
institution,  in  that  it  holds  that  they  were  founded  by  our 
Lord’s  command  through  His  Apostles,”4  nor  “does  it  diminish 
in  the  least  their  divine  validity.  .  .  .Whether  mediately  or  im¬ 
mediately,  the  institution  of  these  mysteries  is  ascribed  to 
our  Lord,  and  the  fact  is  essentially  the  same  either  way.” 
It  is  also  allowable  to  consider  that  our  Lord  did  not  prescribe 
or  order  these  five  sacraments  in  detail,  but  left  the  determina¬ 
tion  of  their  outward  signs  to  the  Apostles.5 6  Both  of  these 
theories,  however,  are  only  theological  opinions  and  not  dogma. 

(b)  Inasmuch  as  the  Church  is  both  visible  and  invisible, 
and  man,  to  whom  our  Lord  ministers  through  her,  is  composed 
of  body  and  soul,  every  sacrament  must  have  an  outward 
and  visible  sign.  The  Church  thereby  refutes  every  dualistic 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  10. 

-Op.  cit.,  IV.  p.  163;  cf.  Jeremiah  II.  in  Mesolora  I.  pp.  229,  140- 
141,  263;  Dositheus,  ibid.,  II.  pp.  113-114;  Kritopoulos,  I.  pp.  339,  320. 

3  De  Saor.  4,  4,  13. 

4  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  11;  for  the  general  principle  cf.  the 

words  of  Kritopoulos:  “The  Apostles  would  not  have  dared  to  do  some¬ 
thing  not  enjoined  upon  them  (by  our  Lord)”  (in  Mesolora,  I,  p.  337). 

6  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  296-297.  Dyobouniotes  seems  to  prefer 
the  theory  that  the  outward  signs  were  also  ordained  by  our  Lord 
for  the  other  five  sacraments,  since:  (a)  they  are  so  early,  (b)  so 
universal,  and  (c)  without  diversity  of  custom  or  (d)  ascription  of 
any  human  origin  (op.  cit.,  p.  13). 


276 


V.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 


theory,  as  was  mentioned  above,  and  this  principle  is  clearly 
taught  form  the  earliest  times.1  By  “outward  signs”  the 
Church  means  the  external  acts  and  words,  the  physical  and 
tangible  part  as  a  whole,  in  contrast  to  the  Grace  given, — the 
invisible  and  spiritual  part  of  the  sacraments.  The  “rites 
and  words  which  are  absolutely  essential  to  the  consummation 
of  the  sacrament  and  the  conveying  of  its  Grace”  constitutes 
the  “outward  sign.”2  Orthodox  theologians  with  a  few  excep* 
tions3  eschew  the  refinements  of  scholastic  dialectical  distinc¬ 
tions,  both  as  involving  the  whole  scholastic  theological  out¬ 
look,  and  as  unnecessary.4 

(c)  The  outward  signs  in  the  sacraments  convey  and  trans¬ 
mit  Grace  not  of  themselves  but  by  the  presence  of  the  Holy 
Spirit,5 6  and  this  Grace  is  not  the  same  in  every  sacrament, 
but  is  in  each  case  different  and  ordered  for  its  own  particu¬ 
lar  end.  So  in  Baptism  and  Chrism  one  is  justified,  in  the 
Eucharist  he  is  fed  and  quickened,  and  the  like.9  The  Grace 
is  not  merely  symbolized  or  promised,  but  actually  conveyed 
to  the  believer ;  and  the  true  conception  of  sacrament  neces¬ 
sarily  involves  this.7  The  Protestant  conception  of  the  sacra¬ 
ments  as  merely  “signs”  or  “symbols”  is  utterly  contrary  to 
the  teaching  of  Holy  Scripture  and  the  Church.8  What 
the  relation  is  between  the  outward  sign  and  the  Grace  given 
by  it  has  been  a  subject  of  theological  speculation  for  centuries. 
The  outward  sign  serves  to  “externalize  the  invisible  and  hid¬ 
den  Grace  of  God”  which  it  conveys,9  but  does  the  Grace  ac¬ 
company  the  sign  or  is  it  enshrined  within  it?  Origen  and 
his  disciples  seemed  to  hold  the  former  theory,  and  St.  Cyril 

4  Cf.  St.  John  Chrysostom,  on  St.  Matt.  84,  2. 

2  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  pp.  13-14. 

3  E.  g.,  Jeremiah  II,  1st  Answer,  in  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  I,  p.  140,  uses 
the  distinction  of  matter  and  form. 

4  Cf .  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  297-298;  Dyobouniotes,  pp.  11-15, 
and  Mesolora,  IV.  p.  164  (with  references). 

5  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  15. 

6  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  298. 

7  Ibid.,  p.  299;  Dyobouniotes  op.  cit.,  pp.  16-17. 

8  Ibid.,  and  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  pp.  144-5,  147,  165;  and  cf. 
Androutsos,  'Lv^oXlkt],  pp.  251  ff. 

9  Mesolora,  loc  cit.,  p.  164. 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  GENERAL 


277 


of  Alexandria  the  latter.1  Gabriel  of  Philadelphia2  and  the 
Confession  of  Mogila3  both  regard  the  Grace  as  being  within 
the  sign  ( eyK€Ka\vpLpLevr)v  j  airoKaroi  eis  eiSos).  Dyobouniotes  says 
that  as  the  Fathers  professed  ignorance  of  the  manner  where¬ 
by  Grace  is  conveyed  in  the  sacraments,  neither  Gabriel  nor 
Mogila  may  be  taken  as  rightly  representing  the  mind  of  the 
Church.4  Androutsos  says  that  the  question  is  in  any  case  with¬ 
out  importance  for  dogmatic.5 

Inasmuch  as  our  Lord  instituted  the  sacraments,  “the  Grace 
conveyed  by  them  is  absolutely  necessary  to  salvation.*16 7  This 
is  true  not  only  because  of  the  divine  institution  but  also  be¬ 
cause  the  Grace  conveyed  by  the  sacraments,  “guaranteeing 
and  sealing  our  salvation,117  is  indispensible  for  us.8  Hence 
the  lack  of  them  means  the  lack  of  salvation.  This  does  not 
mean  that  everyone  must  make  use  of  all  the  sacraments, 
but  that  each  must  use  those  necessary  for  him.  We  may 
not  say,  in  the  absence  of  any  revelation  on  the  subject, 
that  one  may  not  be  saved  without  them,  provided  the  failure 
to  receive  them  has  not  been  due  to  contempt  of  them  or 
unpardonable  negligence  on  our  part.9 10  If  failure  to  use  them 
is  due  to  these  causes  then  one  is  deprived  of  salvation.  “But 
God  is  certainly  able  to  save.  ...  otherwise  than  through  the 
sacraments.  ..  .Nevertheless  he  who  despises  or  is  indifferent 
to  the  divinely  instituted  means  of  Grace  is  surely  not  to  be 
excused.1110 


1  St.  Cyril  in  Migne,  P.  G.  t.  LXXIII,  245. 

2  De  Sacramentis  4,  quoted  by  Androutsos,  p.  298,  note  2. 

3  In  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  I,  p.  423. 

4  Op.  cit.,  p.  18. 

6  Op.  cit.,  p.  299. 

6  Dyobouniotes,  p.  23. 

7  Mesolora,  IV.  p.  141. 

8  Androutsos,  p.  299. 

9  Cf.  St.  Augustine:  non  defectus  sed  contemptus  sacramenti  damnat. 

10  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  299-300,  and  Dyobouniotes  [op.  cit.,  pp.  23- 

24)  comes  to  almost  the  same  conclusion. 


278 


V.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 


2.  The  Number  and  Classification  of  the  Sacraments 

The  seven  sacraments  of  the  Orthodox  Church  are:  Bap¬ 
tism,  Chrism,1  Eucharist,  Penance,  Orders  “priest¬ 

hood”),  Marriage,  and  Unction.  “Each  of  these  seven  sacra¬ 
ments  is  founded  upon  express  words  of  Holy  Scripture  and  the 
Hew  Testament,  of  which  the  conception  was  interpreted  and 
defined  from  early  times  by  sacred  Tradition  and  the  voice  of 
the  Church  as  a  whole.”2  Accordingly,  Baptism  is  referred  to 
St.  Matt.  28,  19-20;  Chrism  to  Acts  8,  14-17;  19,  2-7,  (Heb. 
6,2)  ;  the  Eucharist  to  St.  Matt.  26,  26-28;  St.  Mark  14,  22-25; 
St.  Luke  22,  19-20;  1  Cor.  11,  23-25;  Penance  to  St.  John 
20,  21-23  (St.  Matt.  16,  19;  18,  17,  18;  Acts  19,  18)  ;  Orders  to 
1  Tim.  4,  14;  2  Tim.  1,  6;  Acts.  6,  6;  8,  17;  (13,  3)  ;  Marriage 
to  Eph.  5,  22-32;  1  Cor.  7,  14,  39;  (St.  Matt.  19,  6),  and  UnC' 
tion  to  St.  Jas.  5,  13-15.3  There  have  been  different  explana¬ 
tions  of  the  number — the  satisfaction  of  the  sevenfold  needs 
of  man’s  spiritual  and  moral  life  by  corresponding  provisions 
of  Grace,  the  seven  gifts  of  Grace  as  in  a  way  parallel  to  the 
seven  gifts  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  and  the  like.  All  such,  says  An- 
droutsos,  “are  not  logical  proofs  that  there  ought  to  be  seven 
sacraments  .  .  .  but  conjectures  ex  post  facto  to  show  that 
the  divinely  instituted  sacraments  are  fitted  to  the  nature  and 
needs  of  man.”4  While  the  seven  sacraments  were  known  from 
the  earliest  times,  yet  the  definition  that  there  were  seven  came 
much  later.5  The  fact  of  Grace  being  communicated  by  these 
seven  means  was  early  recognized,  but  “not  only  in  Tradition  is 
the  distinct  and  specific  numbering  of  them  as  seven  lacking,  but 
the  sacraments  are  mentioned  along  with  other  holy  acts  and 
deeds — the  monastic  life,  services  for  the  dead,  the  sign  of  the 
cross,  and  the  like.  To  explain  this  phenomenon  one  must  con¬ 
sider  that  Revelation  does  not  present  dogmas  systematically, 
and  that  the  Church  defines  them  officially  only  when  they  are 

1  Dositheus  calls  it  /Se/3cuWts  (Confirmation),  in  Mesolora,  op.  cit., 
II.  p.  113. 

2  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV,  p.  160  and  cf.  Kepliala,  XpurToXoyia,  pp. 
197-198. 

3  Mesolora  ibid.,  and  p.  161;  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  19. 

4  Op.  cit.,  pp.  312-313. 

6  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  20  and  note  1. 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  GENERAL 


279 


brought  into  question/’1  So  we  do  not  find  the  full  enumera¬ 
tion  in  the  Fathers — some  of  them  mentioning  two  only,2 
others  three,3  and  others  four.4  “But  if  the  general  notion  of 
the  sacraments  and  their  enumeration  only  came  about  later, 
vet  the  faith  in  the  seven  sacraments  as  divinely  instituted 
means  of  Grace  has  always  existed  in  the  Church.”''  The  first 
mention  in  the  East  of  all  seven  sacraments  is  by  the  monk 
Job  in  1270/  who,  however,  counts  the  monastic  state  as  one 
of  the  seven,  omitting  Fenance,  and  also  by  Michael  Paleologus 
at  the  synod  of  Lyons  in  1274/  The  first  appearance  of  the 
explicit  enumeration  of  the  seven  in  the  West  is  by  Peter  Lom¬ 
bard8  and  Alexander  III.9 

Both  West  and  East  are  officially  committed  to  the  doc¬ 
trine  of  the  seven  sacraments.  The  evidence  of  the  Symbolic 
Books  is  most  explicit.  Dositheus  says  in  his  Confession  (ar¬ 
ticle  15)  :  ‘AYe  believe  that  there  are  gospel  sacraments  in  the 
Church  and  these  are  seven  ,  .  .  no  more  and  no  less.”10  So 
too,  Jeremiah  II,”  Kritopoulos,12  the  Synod  of  Constantinople,13 
and  Mogila.14  Despite  the  absence  of  explicit  testimony  from 
early  times,  the  evidence  for  the  seven  sacraments  is  very  strong 
indeed,  and  may  be  summarized  as  follows:  (a)  both  East  and 
West,  Rome  and  Orthodoxy,  agree  in  the  number  and  names 
of  the  seven  sacraments,  which  teaching  is  official  and  de  fide 
in  both  Communions;  (b)  the  FTestorians  and  Monoplivsites 
(5th  cent.)  both  teach  seven  sacraments,  and  it  is  impossible 

I  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  315. 

-  E.  g.,  St.  Justin  Martyr,  Apologia,  I;  St.  Augustine  on  Ps.  108; 
St.  John  Damascene  (vE/c5o<7is,  IV.  9  and  13),  St.  John  Chrysostom,  etc. 

3  St.  Cyril  of  Jerusalem,  Cat.,  1-3;  1-4;  St.  John  Damascene,  op.  cit., 
IV,  4,  13;  St.  Ambrose,  de  Sacramentis,  3  and  4. 

4  St.  Augustine,  de  bapt.  5,  20. 

5  Androutsos,  ibid.,  p.  316. 

6  Ibid.,  pp.  314-316  and  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  20. 

7  On  which  cf.  Palmieri,  op.  cit.,  p.  89. 

8  Sent.,  4,  13;  not  by  Hugo  of  St.  Victor,  to  whom  the  authorship 
of  de  caeremoniis  was  wrongly  attributed. 

9  Androutsos  and  Dyobouniotes,  loc.  cit. 

10  In  Mesolora,  II,  p.  113  and  p.  114. 

II  Mesolora,  I,  pp.  141,  229,  263,  et  al. 

12  Ibid.,  pp.  320-339. 

13  II.  p.  30. 

14 1,  pp.  423  ff. 


280 


Y.— THE  DOCTRINE  DF  THE  SACRAMENTS 


that  they  should  have  received  this  doctrine  from  without, 
since  the  hostility  between  them  and  the  Orthodox  would  have 
made  it  impossible;  (c)  while  there  was,  it  is  true,  no  explicit 
enumeration  of  all  seven  in  the  early  Church,  yet  the  teaching 
as  to  each  of  them  finds  support  in  the  Fathers  and  in  Tra¬ 
dition.1 

Various  classifications  of  the  seven  sacraments  are  found 
in  Orthodox  writers.  The  fact  that  the  institution  of  Bap¬ 
tism  and  the  Eucharist  by  our  Lord  is  explicitly  given  in  the 
New  Testament  accords  them  a  preeminent  position.  “Of  the 
sacraments,”  says  Androutsos,  “Baptism  and  the  Eucharist 
hold  a  special  place  as  the  chief.”2  As  regards  the  Anglican 
doctrine  of  the  “two  Sacraments  generally  necessary  to  sal¬ 
vation”  and  the  restriction  of  the  use  of  the  term  to  those  “or¬ 
dained  of  Christ  in  the  Gospel  .  .  .  with  a  visible  sign  or 
ceremony  ordained  of  God”,3  both  Mesolora4  and  Androutsos,5 
on  the  basis  of  the  Bishop  of  Salisbury’s  exposition  of  the 
Anglican  belief,6  seem  to  find  it  acceptable.  Ambraze,  with 
earnest  zeal  for  reunion,  presents  effectively  this  diversity  of 
usage  in  Orthodoxy  with  special  reference  to  the  Anglican 
formularies.7  In  his  book  on  “the  Orthodox  Church  in  rela¬ 
tion  to  all  other  Christian  bodies”  he  says:8  “The  Orthodox  Con¬ 
fession  (that  is,  that  of  Mogila),  regards  the  ‘sacrament  of  the 
Eucharist  as  above  all  the  others,  and  more  than  the  others 
necessary  for  our  salvation.’9  The  Patriarch  Jeremiah  II  re¬ 
gards  ‘Baptism  and  the  Eucharist  as  the  chiefest  of  the  sacra¬ 
ments’”10  .  .  .  Metrophanes  Kritopoulos  says  of  these  two 


1  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit .,  pp.  20-21  and  notes;  Androutsos,  op.  ait., 
pp.  316-317;  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  p.  155. 

2  Op.  cit.,  p.  313. 

3  Cf.  Art.  XXXV.  of  B.  C.  P. 

4  Op.  cit.,  IV.  pp.  146-148  and  notes. 

5  Op.  cit.,  p.  317. 

6  Qe/xara  t ijs  SidciaKaXlas  rijs  ’E/ckXtjo’/cis  rijs  ’AyyXtas  Trpbs  irXrjpocpopiap 
tup  ’Opdo56£up  eKboOevra,  by  John,  Lord  Bishop  of  Salisbury. 

7  Cf.  his  Aoki/iiop  -irepl  epuaeus  tup  ’Ayy Xikup  ’ ’ETriaKomapup  pera  Trjs 
’0 pdo5ot;ov  ’ApaToXiKijs  ’E/ocX.,  Athens,  1891,  pp.  73-79. 

8  'H  ’Op665o£os  ’E/c/cX?7<xta  .  .  .  Athens,  1902,  ibid.,  p.  85,  ff. 

8  Mesolora,  I,  p.  427. 

10  Mesolora,  I,  p.  228. 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  GENERAL 


281 


that  they  are  “called  sacraments  .  .  .  (as)  consisting  of  vis¬ 
ible  matter  and  the  Holy  Spirit.  .  .”  With  Penance  they 
constitute  “the  three  sacraments  necessary  for  salvation.  .  . 
Besides  which  necessary  sacraments  are  other  mystical  rites 
also  called  sacraments  by  the  Church/’1  Ambraze  also  quotes 
the  Protopresbyter  Constantine  as  saying  in  his  Catechism  that 
“there  are  two  chief  and  preeminent  sacraments  of  the  Hew 
Testament,  Baptism  and  the  Eucharist/’  and  Platon  of  Mos¬ 
cow  to  the  same  purpose.2  Nevertheless,  as  we  have  seen,  there 
are  seven  sacraments  according  to  Orthodox  teaching,  which 
are  sufficient  to  satisfy  all  the  religious  needs  of  man,  the 
Grace  given  through  which  being  absolutely  necessary  for  sal¬ 
vation,3  all  seven  must  be  accepted  “as  being  necessary  for  the 
salvation  of  the  faithful.”4  “According  to  the  spirit  of  Or¬ 
thodoxy”,  says  Mesolora,  “all  the  seven  sacraments  are  divinely 
instituted,  and  of  equal  rank.”5 

Besides  regarding  the  sacraments  as  only  “signs”  and 
“symbols”,6  Protestantism  rejects  the  five  sacraments  of  which 
the  institution  is  not  explicitly  recorded”  in  Holy  Scripture, 
accepting  only  two,  Baptism  and  the  Eucharist.  This  refusal 
to  accept  five  of  the  sacraments  of  the  Church  proceeds  from 
the  Protestant  rejection  of  Tradition  “as  of  equal  weight  with 
Holy  Scripture,  as  a  source”7  of  divine  teaching ;  it  is  consistent 
with  the  Protestant  notion  of  the  Church  as  being  essentially 
invisible  and  with  an  erroneous  conception  of  justification.3 
Still,  as  Dyobouniotes  observes,  “certainly  Holy  Scripture  never 
declares  explicitly  that  there  are  seven  sacraments;  yet  this 
may  be  well  explained  from  the  character  of  Holy  Scripture, 
which  does  not  profess  to  be  a  dogmatic  treatise.  Accordingly 
the  contention  of  Protestants  that  (the  doctrine  of)  the  seven 

'Ibid.,  pp.  313-314. 

-  Op.  cit.,  p.  S6. 

3  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  23,  and  Mesolora,  IV.  p.  156. 

4  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  p.  152,  quoting  the  Acts  of  the  synod  of 
Constantinople  (  1672);  text  referred  to,  in  vol.  II.  p.  140. 

5  Op.  cit.,  IV,  p.  153.  h 

6  Cf.  Androutsos,  'Lvp^oXlkt],  pp.  258  ff ;  and  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV, 
pp.  144-149. 

7  Androutsos,  Aoy par iktj ,  p.  317. 

8  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  p.  159. 


282 


V.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 


sacraments  cannot  be  accepted,  since  Holy  Scripture  never  ex¬ 
plicitly  defines  that  there  are  seven,  is  neither  correct  nor  log¬ 
ical — the  more  so  as  in  this  case  the  acceptance  of  even  two 
sacraments  by  Protestants  would  be  equally  groundless,  for 
there  is  no  explicit  reference  in  Holy  Scripture  to  the  fact 
that  there  are  two  sacraments/’1 

There  are  other  divisions  of  the  sacraments  besides  those 
mentioned.  Mesolora  distinguishes  them  according  to  the  pur¬ 
pose  of  each  severally  and  their  personal  application  to  indiv¬ 
idual  needs,  into  those  of  (a)  “general  obligation” 
( v7roxpeioTLKd ) ,  of  which  two,  Baptism  and  the  Eucharist,  are 
“chief  and  preeminent”,  and  the  other  three  are  Chrism,  Pen¬ 
ance,  and  Unction,  which  five  are  of  “general”  application  to 
all  the  Faithful;  and  those  (b)  of  a  voluntary  and  individual 
character,  Holy  Order  and  Marriage  (npoaLperLKa)  .2  In  his 
treatment  of  the  subject  he  discusses  Baptism,  Chrism,  Pen¬ 
ance,  and  the  Eucharist  in  the  first  category  and  the  other  three 
in  the  second.3  This  is  the  more  usual  classification  of  the 
sacraments,  yet  neither  Androutsos  nor  Dyobouniotes  employs 
it.  The  latter  says:  “The  customary  distinction  of  the  sacra¬ 
ments  into  those  ‘of  general  obligation’  and  ‘those  which  have 
a  voluntary  character’,  into  ‘necessary’  and  those  which  are  not 
so,  is  not  correct,  since  all  the  sacraments  are  of  obligation  ac¬ 
cording  to  the  circumstances  of  this  or  that  need  of  the  believer. 
That  this  distinction  is  erroneous  is  clear  from  the  fact  that  in 
the  Church  Baptism  has  from  early  times  been  joined  with 
Chrism,  and  the  Eucharist  with  Penance,  and  also  from  the  fact 
that  there  is  no  agreement  among  theologians  as  to  which  of  the 
sacraments  are  of  obligation  and  which  are  not.”4 

Another  classification  of  the  sacraments  is  “into  those 
which  may  be  had  again  and  those  which  may  not.  To  the 
second  category  belong  Baptism,  Chrism,  and  Orders;  the 


1  Op.  cit.,  pp.  19-20. 

2  Op.  cit.,  IV.  p.  152. 

3  Cf .  pp.  180-320  for  the  first  category;  pp.  321-367  for  the  second. 
He  departs  from  his  first  classification,  as  will  be  noticed  above,  in 
putting  Unction  under  the  second  division,  in  the  body  of  his  work. 

4  Op.  cit.,  pp.  23-24,  note  3. 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  GENERAL 


283 


others  may  be  repeated.1'1  By  “being  repeated”  or  “iterated” 
is  meant  that  they  may  be  given  again  to  the  same  person. 
Those  which  may  not  be  given  again  to  one  who  has  once  re¬ 
ceived  them  duly  and  regularly,  are  the  above  three ;  the  sacra¬ 
ment  of  Marriage  mav  be  had  three  times  in  all.2  This  dis- 
tinction  gave  rise  to  the  Scholastic  theory  of  the  indelible  char¬ 
acter  of  these  three  sacraments.  This  theory,  based  on  Optatus 
of  Milevis,  and  St.  Augustine,3  was  expressly  taught  at  the 
councils  of  Florence4  and  Trent,0  at  which  latter  council  it  was 
solemnly  defined.6  According  to  the  Roman  theory,  each  of 
these  three  sacraments,  besides  conveying  its  own  Grace,  gives 
a  “character'1  which  is  ineffaceable.  To  illustrate  what  is 
meant  by  character  Scotus  uses  the  figure  of  the  badges  dis¬ 
tinctive  of  three  grades  of  civil  society — the  royal  household, 
the  army,  and  the  official  members  of  the  latter.  It  has  been  a 
“question  whether  the  faculty  in  which  the  character  inheres 
as  its  subject  be  the  will  (Scotists)  or  the  practical  reason 
(Thomists)”  ;7  yet  the  doctrine  of  the  “imprinting  of  a  char¬ 
acter  on  the  soul,  which  is  a  certain  spiritual  and  ineffaceable 
mark  ( signum ),  whence  these  sacraments  cannot  be  iterated”8 
is  part  of  Latin  theological  teaching,  de  fide  since  Trent. 
“This  seal  or  sign  is  indelible,  so  that  even  if  the  divine  Grace 
given  through  the  sacrament  be  lost,  the  seal  remains.  Thus 
is  explained  the  fact  witnessed  to  by  the  history  of  the  early 
Church,  that  the  return  into  the  Church  of  those  who  had 
lost  the  Grace  of  the  sacraments  was  made  not  through  the 
repetition  of  the  sacraments  but  simply  through  a  service 
restoring  the  lost  Grace."9  The  Confession  of  Dositheus  ex¬ 
pressly  teaches  this  doctrine :  “Baptism  conveys  an  indelible 

1  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  313-314. 

2  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  p.  154.  cf.  the  teaching  on  Marriage  below. 

3  Contra  Partner.  Don.,  V,  3-7,  et  passim ;  Epistola  98,  5;  Contra 
Epist.  Partner.,  2,  13,  29. 

4  Sess.  ult.;  Decret.  Eugenii  IV,  5. 

8  Sess.  VII.  can  IX,  and  XXIII,  cap.  IV,  and  can.  IV. 

6  Sess.  ult.  can.  VII. 

7  M.  J.  Ryan,  s.  v.,  in  Catholic  Encycl.,  III.  pp.  586-588. 

8  Concil.  Trid.  Sess.  ult.  can.  VII:  impritni  characterem  in  anima.  .  . 
unde  ea  (sacramenta)  iterari  non  possunt.  St.  Thomas  Aquinas, 
Summa,  III.  9.  lxiii. 

9  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  pp.  24-26. 


284 


V.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 


character  just  as  does  Holy  Order”,1  which  fact  has  subjected 
this  formulary  to  hostile  animadversion  on  the  part  of  some 
Orthodox  writers.2 

Inasmuch  as  the  theory  of  indelible  character  is  an  attempt 
to  explain  the  fact  that  certain  sacraments  are  not  to  be  iter¬ 
ated,  it  is  only  to  be  judged  from  the  standpoint  of  a  theory 
and  cannot  be  considered  a  dogma,  since  “it  lacks  the  very 
character  of  dogma,  as  it  is  not  based  upon  either  Holy  Scrip¬ 
ture  or  Sacred  Tradition.”3  The  texts  used  in  support  of  it, 
for  example,  Eph.  1,  13 ;  2  Cor.  1,  21-22,  and  the  quotations 
from  the  Fathers,4  prove  nothing,  for  they  cannot  at  all  be  ap¬ 
plied  to  justify  the  theory,  according  to  both  Androutsos  and 
Dyobouniotes.  Furthermore  it  is  impossible,  they  maintain,  to 
discern  either,  what  is  the  nature  of  the  character  which  is  im¬ 
pressed,  or  the  part  of  the  soul  into  which  it  is  stamped,  or  the 
reason  why  certain  sacraments  should  be  set  apart  from  others 
as  imparting  this  character.  For  all  these  reasons  and  because 
of  the  weighty  difficulties  involved  in  the  theory  the  modern 
writers  all  agree  in  abandoning  it.  “If  we  examine  this  Latin 
theory”,  says  Christodoulos,  “we  find  it  first  to  be  without 
foundation,  and  secondly  to  be  pernicious  in  its  consequences. 
The  idea  of  an  indelible  character  which  is  supposed  to  be  im¬ 
printed  in  ordination,  cannot  be  supported  by  any  clear  evi¬ 
dence  of  any  sort  from  our  Canons.  There  is  nothing  said 
about  it  in  the  Canons,  and  the  expression  itself  does  not  once 
occur  in  them.”5  Androutsos6  and  Dyobouniotes7  both  reject  it 
for  the  reasons  given  above. 

A  better  explanation,  Dyobouniotes  asserts,  can  be  found 
for  the  facts  than  that  offered  by  the  theory  of  indelible  char- 

1  In  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  II.  p.  116. 

2  Cf.  Palmieri,  Dositeo,  Patriarca  di  Gerusalemme,  Florence,  1909 ; 
Chrysostom  Papadopoulos  devotes  considerable  effort  to  minimize  and 
depreciate  the  Latin  cast  of  Dositheus’  Confession;  cf.  A oaideos,  n arpiap- 
XV*  'lepocro\vfxwv,  Jerusalem,  1907,  p.  32  et  al.;  and  in  Nea  2twv,  1907, 
vol  V.  pp.  104-108. 

3  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  314,  note  1. 

4  Cf.  ibid.,  p.  315,  and  Dyobouniotes,  p.  26,  note  1. 

6  Aoki/mov  eKK\rj(na(TTiKov  ducaiov,  Constantinople,  1896,  p.  205, 

6  Op.  cit.,  pp.  314-315. 

7  Op.  cit.,  pp.  26-27. 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  GENERAL 


285 


acter.1  That  is,  in  brief,  that  all  sacraments  are  in  a  sense  in¬ 
delible.  “There  is  no  doubt”,  says  he,  “that  the  effects  of  the 
sacraments  are  in  themselves  perfect  and  complete,  and  need  no 
completion  nor  fulfilling.”  If  a  good  confession  is  made,  the 
penitent  receives  absolution  and  stands  in  no  need  of  further 
grace  of  forgiveness.  So  with  all  the  other  sacraments.  “In 
this  sense  then  all  the  sacraments,  so  far  as  concerns  their  ef¬ 
fect,  are  not  repeated  nor  ought  be  repeated,  for  such  iteration 
would  be  an  act  of  disbelief  and  tempting  God.  .  .  When 
in  practice  certain  sacraments  are  iterated  it  is  because  of  the 
general  difference  in  their  energies  and  operations”.  .  .  A 
penitent  who  is  shriven,  after  confession  may  fall  into  other 
sins,  and  in  consequence  stand  again  in  need  of  absolution.  He 
receives  it  again,  not  as  a  fulfilment,  as  it  were,  of  an  imper¬ 
fect  or  incomplete  gift  of  Grace,  but  because  of  new  conditions 
in  his  soul.  Hence  “the  iteration  of  certain  sacraments  pro¬ 
ceeds  from  and  depends  upon  their  operation  and  energy.  .  . 
This  theory  does  not  accept  differences  of  energies  in  the  sacra¬ 
ments  in  the  sense  that  some  imprint  character  and  others  do 
not”,  but  on  the  basis  of  differences  in  the  need  of  the  recipient 
and  in  the  nature  of  the  Grace  given.2  Two  difficulties  in  re¬ 
gard  to  this  theory  result  from  the  fact  that  it  would  seem  to 
conflict  with  Orthodox  practice  in  regard  to  the  remarriage 
of  two  people  who  have  been  divorced  from  each  other,3  and  in 
regard  to  the  practice  of  anointing  again  a  sick  person,  even  if 
no  change  has  occurred  in  his  condition  of  illness.  As  to  the 
first,  Dyobouniotes  says  that  current  theological  opinion  in¬ 
clines  to  support  his  theory  and  condemn  the  practice ;  especially 
is  this  the  case  in  Eussia.  As  to  the  second,  he  claims  that 

1  As  the  word  is  a  convenient  term,  it  may  find  its  way  occasionally 
into  Orthodox  writings,  but  yet,  says  Androutsos,  “by  using  it... 
we  do  not  mean  to  explain  the  fact  of  the  noniteration  of  sacraments 
according  to  the  Roman  theory,  but  taking  the  word  objectively  we 
mean  to  say  this  only,  that  certain  sacraments  performed  in  the  Ortho¬ 
dox  Church  are  not  done  again,  even  though  those  who  receive  them 
fall  away  or  lapse  into  heresy  or  schism,  and  return  again  to  Ortho¬ 
doxy”  ( ^oyfiariKTi,  pp.  339-340,  note  3.  Full  discussion  in  his 
'Ev/i(3o\iKri,  pp.  282  ff. ). 

2  Op.  cit.,  pp.  27-28. 

3  Cf.  Christodoulos,  op.  cit..  p.  407. 


286 


V.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 


there  has  been  no  official  pronouncement  of  Orthodoxy  on  the 
matter,  and  feels  that  the  Roman  ruling  is  in  main  correct,  in 
spite  of  the  differences  in  principle  between  the  Roman  and  Or¬ 
thodox  doctrine  of  Unction.1  So,  too,  Androutsos  holds  that 
the  practice  of  not  iterating  the  three  sacraments  “may  be  ac¬ 
counted  for  in  another  way.  As  one  is  only  born  once  (a7ra£) 
naturally,  so  spiritually  he  is  born  once  only  through  Baptism 
and  Chrism  joined  with  it.  As  Ordination  is  the  entrance  in¬ 
to  the  priestly  service,  it  has  no  reason  even  to  be  iterated.1’2 
Modern  Greek  opinion,  then,  strongly  repudiates  the  notion  of 
indelible  character  in  the  sacraments  of  Baptism,  Chrism,  and 
Holy  Order,  and  accounts  for  the  fact  that  these  sacraments 
may  not  be  iterated  on  the  basis  of  the  character  and  kind  of 
their  operation  and  energy.  In  all  the  sacraments  the  Grace 
bestowed  is  impressed  in  the  soul  so  that  that  Grace  may  not 
be  repeated.3 


3.  The  Administration  of  the  Sacraments 

“That  the  administration  of  a  sacrament  should  effect  on 
the  catechumens  or  the  Faithful  its  saving  energy,  three  con¬ 
ditions  must  be  satisfied:  (a)  the  administration  must  be  done 
through  the  use  of  the  outward  sign  and  the  words  and  acts 
prescribed  by  the  Church,  (b)  by  the  proper  minister, — a 
bishop  or  a  priest,  (c)  and  the  individual  must  be  prepared 
and  receptive  for  the  Grace  to  come.”4  These  three  terms  or 
conditions  must  be  complied  with  in  every  case,  for  the  sacra¬ 
ment  to  be  “valid”  in- itself  (to  borrow  western  terminology), 
and  “efficacious”  for  the  individual.  It  is  to  be  observed  that 
Orthodox  theology  does  not  sunder  the  treatment  of  these 
two  subjects,  validity  and  efficacy.  It  is  also  worth  noticing 
that  even  modem  Orthodox  theology  manages  to  discuss  the 

1  Op.  cit.,  pp.  29-30,  and  notes  1  and  2. 

2  Op.  cit.,  p.  315,  in  note.  The  question  of  indelibility  of  character 
is  related  to  that  of  reordination  and  rebaptism  of  those  who  are  out¬ 
side  the  fold  of  Orthodoxy,  cf.  additional  note  to  Lecture  IV.  and  in¬ 
fra  pp.  292  ff. 

3  Cf.  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  159. 

4  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  300,  301,  310-311. 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  GENERAL 


287 


question  of  the  administration  of  the  sacraments  without  em¬ 
ploying  the  categories  of  "regular”  and  "valid  or  invalid”.1  Keep¬ 
ing  in  mind  these  two  facts  we  may  go  on  to  consider  the 
terms  or  conditions  for  the  administration  or  consummation 
of  the  sacraments. 

(a)  The  first  condition  involves  the  fulfilment  of  the  neces¬ 
sary  rites  and  ceremonies,  the  use  of  the  proper  matter,  words, 
and  acts,  laid  down  bv  the  Church.  Some  of  these  are  a 
development  and  extension  of  the  original  simple  service  and 
are  not  of  rigid  necessity  since  the  omission  of  them  would 
not  invalidate  the  sacrament.  So  the  "outward  sign”  of  Bap¬ 
tism  includes  what  is  necessary  for  the  consummation  of  the 
sacrament,  the  fulfilment  of  one  of  the  conditions  making  the 
sacrament  a  possible  means  of  Grace.  The  "outward  signs” 
of  this  sacrament  are  the  trine  immersion  and  emersion,  to¬ 
gether  with  the  words  of  the  priest:  "The  servant  of  God  is 
baptized  in  the  name  of  the  Father  and  of  the  Son  and  of  the 
Holy  Ghost”,  "without  which  the  sacrament  cannot  he  eon- 

1  With  the  possible  exception  of  Mesolora,  whose  work  (Su/qSoXfKij) 
aims  to  expound  but  not  to  correlate  the  various  elements  of  Orthodox 
teaching.  Thus  he  mentions,  but  does  not  discuss,  indelible  character 
(op.  cit.,  IV.  p.  154).  In  his  treatment  of  Baptism  he  does  use  the 
words  “irregular”  and  “valid”  in  connection  with  Anglican  Baptism. 
He  says:  “The  Baptism  of  the  Anglicans  may  be  considered  valid ,  as 
having  been  done  with  water  and  in  the  name  of  the  Holy  Trinity, 
and  as  conveying  divine  Grace,  ...but  still  it  is  not  regarded  as  licit 
and  regular ,  since  it  is  not  performed  according  to  the  order  prevailing 
in  the  Church  from  early  times”  (p.  203).  The  introduction  of  this 
category,  which  is  essentially  alien  to  Orthodox  thought,  leads  Mesolora 
into  quite  obvious  difficulties  and  inconsistencies;  for  he  says,  even 
granted  the  fulfilment  of  all  prescribed  conditions,  only  on  the  basis 
of  urgent  necessity  may  such  sacraments,  performed  by  non-Orthodox, 
be  adjudged  valid,  in  the  absence  of  which  absolute  necessity  they  may 
not  be  so  reckoned,  and  “in  consequence  must  be  iterated,  or  rather,  be 
performed  regularly  (kolvovlkus)  ”.  The  reason  he  adduces  for  the 
Orthodox  Church  not  ordinarily  recognizing  the  Baptism  of  those 
not  of  its  fold  who  desire  to  come  into  Orthodoxy,  is  that  she  “does 
not  regard  their  Baptism  as  valid  and  regular”  (p.  204).  This 

anticipates  a  little  what  will  be  discussed  farther  on  in  this  lecture 
(cf.  pp.  292  ff.)  but  in  conclusion  it  may  be  suggested  that  Mesolora 
uses  “necessity”  to  cover  the  cases  of  the  exercise  of  “economy”,  which 
may  serve  to  reconcile  his  inchoate  theory  with  the  facts  and  with 
other  Orthodox  teaching. 


288 


V.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 


summated.”1  According  to  Dyobouniotes’  definition  of  “out¬ 
ward  signs”,  as :  “those  services  and  words  instituted  by  Christ 
and  the  Apostles,  which  are  absolutely  necessary  for  the  ac¬ 
complishment  of  the  sacrament  and  for  the  communication 
through  it  of  divine  Grace”,  the  Church  service,  that  is, 
the  prescribed  rites  and  ceremonies,  as  Androutsos  also  ob¬ 
serves,2  includes  elements  which  are  not  essential.  “Yet  it 
does  not  follow  that  the  rites  of  the  sacraments  which  are 
prescribed  by  the  Church  are  voluntary,  as  if  the  priest  had 
the  right  to  omit  or  change  anything  in  them  at  his  own 
discretion.  It  is  only  the  Church,  as  history  shows,  which 
can  change,  curtail,  or  add  rites  which  do  not  constitute  the 
‘outward  signs’,  in  the  performance  of  the  sacraments.”3  Kri- 
topoulos  says :  “The  Church,  moved  by  the  Holy  Spirit,  pre¬ 
scribes  the  manner  (of  the  administration  of  the  sacraments), 
collecting  all  the  elements  from  Holy  Scripture.”4  The  rites, 
ceremonies,  and  prescribed  additions  not  essential  to  the  con¬ 
summation  of  the  sacrament,  are  “the  logical  presentation  and 
expression  of  the  faith  of  the  Church  through  which  she  gives 
and  professes  to  give  the  special  Grace  of  the  sacraments.”  So 
the  form  of  the  rites  of  non-Orthodox  bodies  has  a  bearing  on 
the  question  as  to  whether  “economy”  may  be  exercised  in  a 
given  case :  there  can  be  no  such  exercise  of  economy  when  the 
rite  of  a  sacrament  and  the  teaching  and  practice  of  the  relig¬ 
ious  communion  using  it  are  utterly  divergent.5 

The  external  part  in  the  administration  of  the  sacrament, 
including  the  “outward  signs”,  may  not  be  thought  of 
as  magic,  as  if  in  and  of  itself  the  due  performance  of 
these  external  rites  and  words  with  the  proper  visible  ele¬ 
ments,  worked  mechanically  to  produce  Grace.6  As  Saint  Basil 

1  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  14,  note  1. 

2  Op.  cit.,  p.  300. 

3  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  pp.  13-14  and  note  1;  cf.  Mesolora,  op.  cit., 
IV.  pp.  167-168,  who  arranges  the  essentials  for  the  proper  and  ef¬ 
fectual  administration  of  the  sacraments  in  a  different  order,  as  he 
discusses  these  along  with  the  three  essential  characteristics  of  a 
sacrament,  pp.  163  ff. 

4  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  I.  pp.  319-320. 

6  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  300. 

6  Ibid.,  and  p.  311. 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  GENERAL 


289 


observes:  “Whatever  Grace  there  be  in  the  water  (of  Baptism) 
is  not  there  of  the  nature  of  the  water,  but  of  the  presence  of 
the  Holy  Spirit.”1  The  Grace  is  that  flowing  from  the  work  of 
our  Lord  in  Redemption.2  The  view  that  Jews  and  heathen  can 
“baptize  validly,  really  amounts  to  the  acceptance  of  the  exter¬ 
nal  act  as  something  working  mechanically  by  means  of  sound, 
syllables,  and  actions,  and  (thereby)  conveying  Grace.”3 

(b)  The  proper  minister  or  officiant  in  the  administration 
of  the  sacraments  is  a  bishop  or  a  priest,4  canonically  ordained,5 
with  proper  jurisdiction  and  authority  given  him  from  the 
Church.6  Orthodox  writers  emphasize  again  in  this  connection 
that  neither  of  these  two  conditions — the  fulfilment  of  the 
proper  form  of  words  and  acts,  by  the  proper  person —  may  be 
understood  in  any  magical  or  mechanical  sense.  “By  the  ac¬ 
ceptance  of  the  validity  of  sacraments  .  .  .  performed  by  the 
laity,”  says  Dyobouniotes,  “a  kind  of  magical  power  is  attrib¬ 
uted  to  the  outward  signs  of  the  sacraments,  through  which 
the  sacrament  is  magically  consummated  along  with  the  pro¬ 
nouncing  of  the  words  in  connection  with  the  outward  signs. 
But  this  magical  power  and  mechanical  communication  of  di¬ 
vine  Grace  the  ancient  Church  never  acknowledged  nor  ac¬ 
cepted.”7  “He,  who  accomplishes  the  sacraments,”  says  And- 
routsos,  “is  not  the  priest,  but  the  Founder  of  the  sacraments, 
Jesus  Christ,  who  abides  continually  in  His  mystical  Body,  the 
Church,  exactly  administering  His  saving  power.  The  priest  is 
the  indispensable  organ  by  which  the  unseen  divine  power  ac¬ 
complishes  the  sacrament.”8  The  priest  consummates  the  sac¬ 
rament  by  the  use  of  the  proper  outward  signs  in  the  form  of 
rite  prescribed  by  the  Church,  by  “virtue  of  the  power  of  the 
Holy  Spirit.”9 

1  De  Spiritu  Sancto,  15,  and  cf.  St.  Jerome  on  Isaiah  4,  4. 

2  Cf.  St.  Ireneaus:  Si  non  vere  passus  esset  (Ohristus),  nulla  gratia 
ei  cum  nulla  fuerit  passio  (Adv.  Haer.  Ill,  18,  6). 

3  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  300. 

4  Ibid.,  and  Jeremiah  II.  in  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  I.  p.  162. 

5  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  30  and  note  I;  Mogila  in  Mesolora,  I. 
pp.  424,  429-430. 

6  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  pp.  165-166. 

7  Op.  cit.,  pp.  30-31. 

8  Op.  cit.,  p.  301. 

9  Mogila  in  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  I.  p.  424. 


290 


V.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 


The  accomplishment  of  the  sacraments  does  not  depend  on 
the  faith  or  moral  perfection  of  the  officiating  priest,  since  he 
is  simply  the  organ  and  means  by  which  Christ  gives  His  Grace. 
Hence  the  popular  contention  that  the  priest  “cannot  give  what 
he  has  not”,  is  without  foundation,  since  “it  is  based  on  the 
erroneous  idea  that  he  who  administers  the  sacrament  is  the 
one  who  imparts  Grace  as  from  himself.  If  the  consummation 
of  the  sacrament  did  depend  on  the  faith  and  moral  perfection 
of  the  priest,  then  salvation  would  be  something  uncertain  as 
well  in  the  individual  as  in  the  Church,  and  the  existence  of  the 
latter  as  a  visible  communion  would  be  brought  into  question 
.  .  .  Accordingly  the  faith  and  moral  perfection  of  the  priest 
are  not  essential.”1  “Grace  may  operate  and  be  given  through 
unworthy  ministers  .  .  .  for  the  sacraments  are  not  given  by 
reason  of  our  worthiness  but  of  that  of  the  Saviour.”2  So  the 
priest  acts  as  the  organ  of  Christ  and  as  the  representative  of 
His  Church.  Just  as  the  mind  of  the  Church  is  reflected  and 
manifested  in  her  rites  and  ceremonies,  on  the  principle  lex 
orandi,  lex  credendi,  so  the  acts  of  the  priest  are  those  not  of 
himself  personally  but  of  the  Church  of  which  he  stands  as  rep¬ 
resentative. 

What  is  required  of  the  officiant  is  that  he  “have  the  inten¬ 
tion  to  do  what  the  Church  does.”3  He  consummates  the  sacra¬ 
ment  by  the  use  of  the  proper  rite  and  the  necessary  outward 
signs  “with  a  will  (y vw/^)  determined  to  consecrate.”4  This 
intention  or  disposition  of  the  priest  “is  shown  externally,  and 
involves  the  will  to  administer  the  sacrament  not  in  play  nor 
for  teaching  purposes,  but  soberly  in  accordance  with  the  pre¬ 
scribed  forms  of  the  Church.  A  sacrament  as  an  act  presup¬ 
poses  the  general  elements  of  every  human  act — consciousness 
and  free  will.  .  .  It  is  sufficient  that  the  priest  act  freely  and 

1  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  pp.  31-32  and  note  2;  Androutsos,  op.  cit., 
p.  301.  Cf.  St.  Cyril  Jerus.,  Cat.  17,  35;  St.  Athanasius,  de  Trinitate, 
40;  St.  John  Chrysostom,  Homily  14,  3,  on  Acts,  and  50,  3  on  St.  Mt. 

2  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  pp.  170,  169;  Jeremiah  II  in  ibid.,  pp.  144  ff; 
Dositlieus,  ibid.,  II.  pp.  114,  118,  119.  Exposition  and  refutation  of 
Protestant  view  in  Mesolora,  IV,  pp.  171-174. 

3  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  pp.  32-33. 

4  Mogila,  in  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  I.  p.  424.  He  uses  yvcj/jcr]  arro^aaiapiv-q 
for  the  theological  terms  irpodeais  or  deXpais. 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  GENERAL 


291 


with  full  consciousness  of  what  he  is  doing,  and  that  he  con¬ 
form  externally  to  the  order  the  Church  enjoins.”  This  is  all 
that  is  required  to  determine  intention,  and  Orthodoxy  rejects 
the  subtle  and  unnecessary  distinctions  of  scholastic  theolo¬ 
gians  in  their  whole  treatment  of  the  subject.1 

A  natural  consequence  of  the  theory  that  the  validity  of  sac¬ 
raments  depends  on  the  religious  and  moral  state  of  the  officiat¬ 
ing  priest,  Androutsos  notes,  is  the  denial  of  the  dogma  of  the 
unity  of  the  Church,  and  of  that  of  the  Church  as  a  visible  or¬ 
ganism.  Another  consequence  is  “the  opinion  that  sacraments 
administered  by  heretics  are  valid  if  they  are  rightly  per¬ 
formed.”2  Since  the  officiant  acts  not  only  in  his  own  name  or 
by  his  own  power  but  independently  of  his  merits  or  vices,  purely 
as  the  representative  of  the  Church  which  is  functioning  by 
him,  “the  Orthodox  Church,  holding  the  view  that  the  Grace 
of  the  Holy  Spirit  does  not  function  outside  the  Church,  has 
always  rejected  sacraments  performed  outside  herself — not  only 
those  which  were  not  rightly  celebrated  but  even  those  in  which 
the  outward  part  had  been  carefully  preserved  intact.”3  The 
sacrament  depends  not  on  the  minister,  as  a  Protestant  view 
would  have  it,  but  quite  the  contrary,  on  the  Church.  Since  the 
Orthodox  theory  demands  a  priest  or  bishop  as  the  officiant  in  all 
sacraments,  “the  validity  of  the  Baptism  of  heretics  depends, 
from  long  usage  in  the  Church,  not  only  on  the  canonical  fulfil¬ 
ment  of  Baptism  but  on  the  recognition  of  the  validity  of  priest¬ 
hood  among  the  heretics  and  chiefly  on  the  idea  of  the  Church  as 
the  guardian  of  divine  Grace.  Hence  it  comes  about  that  the 
question  of  the  validity  ...  of  heretical  Baptism  can  be  pro¬ 
perly  settled  (only)  if  the  question  of  the  validity  ...  of  the 
priesthood  (  —  Orders)  of  heretics  be  first  examined  and  an¬ 
swered.”'4 


1  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  309-310;  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  pp.  168- 
169;  Macarius,  op.  cit.,  II.  p.  611. 

2  Op.  cit.,  pp.  301,  302. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  303,  and  Aoy part. /cal  MeXerai,  A’,  pp.  135-136;  Dyobouniotes, 
'H  Aoyp..  ’A u8p.  Kpiv.,  p.  51,  and  ’O 0ei\.  anapT.,  pp.  126-128. 

*  Dyobouniotes,  Ta  Mccrr^pta,  p.  65. 


292 


V.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 


The  Doctrine  of  Economy1 

It  seems  well  at  this  point,  at  the  risk  of  repeating  what  has 
already  been  considered  in  part  and  of  anticipating  what  prop¬ 
erly  belongs  in  another  connection,  to  discuss  as  succinctly  as 
possible  the  Orthodox  theory  of  “economy”  with  reference  to 
the  validity  of  sacraments  outside  the  Orthodox  Church.  Im¬ 
pinging  upon  this  question  and  intimately  related  to  it  is  the 
matter  of  the  non-iteration  of  the  three  sacraments  of  Baptism, 
Chrism,  and  Orders.  As  we  have  seen,  the  practice  of  the  non¬ 
iteration  of  these  sacraments  once  validly  performed,  prevails 
and  has  prevailed  in  both  East  and  West.  The  theory  of  the 
West,  that  these  sacraments,  besides  their  own  proper  Grace, 
convey  an  indelible  character ,  modern  Orthodox  opinion  on  the 
whole  strongly  rejects.  The  theory  which  Orthodox  writers 
feel  accounts  for  all  the  facts  without  involving  the  objections 
and  inconveniences  of  the  Latin  doctrine  of  indelible  character, 
explains  the  non-iteration  of  these  sacraments  on  the  basis  of 
the  nature  of  the  Grace  conferred  by  them  and  the  peculiar  char¬ 
acter  of  its  operation.  Properly  speaking,  the  question  of 
character  does  not  come  into  the  province  of  economy,  since 
the  employment  of  economy  is  only  in  relation  to  sacraments 
performed  outside  the  Orthodox  Church.  Dyobouniotes,  how¬ 
ever,  would  extend  it  in  another  direction  to  cover  cases  of  sac~ 
raments  performed  by  Orthodox,  yet  not  entirely  according  to 
the  full  measure  of  the  rites  prescribed  by  the  current  use  of 
the  Church.2  It  covers,  too,  by  common  consent,  the  Baptism 

1  Ilie  most  illuminating  discussion  of  this  subject  known  to  the 
writer  is  to  be  found  in  the  Rev.  J.  A.  Douglas*  The  Relations  of  the 
Anglican  Churches  with  the  Eastern-Orthodox  (London,  1921),  pp. 
55-69,  et  al. 

2  There  is  a  difference  of  opinion  between  Dyobouniotes  and  An- 
droutsos  on  the  necessity  of  all  the  elements  of  the  “service”  or  rite 
of  administration  of  a  sacrament  according  to  the  use  of  the  Church, 
beyond  those  of  the  “outward  signs”.  The  latter  holds  that  the 
Church  has  extended  and  amplified  the  simpler  essential  “external 
signs”  (=all  the  parts  of  the  sacrament  save  the  “Grace  conferred”) 
beyond  the  minimum  necessary  for  validity  (op.  cit.,  p.  300).  The 
former  holds  that  “the  Church  in  prescribing  the  rites  of  the  sacra¬ 
ments  .  .  makes  all  of  obligation  for  the  performance  of  the  sacraments, 
agreeable  to  her  own  definition,  since  the  Church  only  has  power 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  GENERAL 


293 


“of  necessity”,  performed  by  an  Orthodox  layman  or  laywoman 
when  it  is  impossible  to  obtain  a  priest.1 

The  Orthodox  estimate  of  sacraments  performed  outside  the 
Church  is,  as  we  have  seen,  that  they  are  all  invalid.  “This 
view  is  based  on  the  idea  that  Grace  is  confined  exclusively  to 
the  Church,  outside  of  which  there  is  no  Grace,  and  so  the  sacra¬ 
ments  cannot  be  administered.”2  This  is  the  teaching  of  the 
Fathers.  St.  Irenaeus  says:  ubi  Ecclesia,  ibi  et  Spirit  us 
Sanctus ,  and  St.  Augustine  agrees  with  this  view  in  his  dis¬ 
tinction  between  the  Holy  Spirit’s  assisting  Grace  indwelling 
and  not-yet-ind welling-3  “St.  Athanasius,4  St.  Cyril  of  Jeru¬ 
salem,0  St.  Basil,6  St.  Gregory  Hazianzen7  and  others8  denied 
in  principle  heretical  Baptism,  agreeing  with  the  view  of  St. 
Cyprian,  Firmilian,  and  the  synods  held  in  Africa  and  Asia 
Minor.  The  holy  canons  do  not  know  the  later  exact  distinc¬ 
tion  between  invalid  and  irregular  ordination,  .  .  .  pro¬ 
nouncing  both  the  Baptism  and  Orders  of  heretics  invalid  and 
regarding  ‘those  baptized  or  ordained  by  heretics  as  neither  of 
the  company  of  the  faithful  nor  in  the  ranks  of  the  clergy’,9 
like  St.  Basil.”10  The  latter  says  that  those  who  split  off  from 
the  Church  “had  not  the  Grace  of  the  Holy  Spirit  with  them 
.  .  .For  the  first  who  withdrew  from  the  Fathers  had  Orders, 

to  make  this  or  that  change'’ .  .  .  The  omission  of  any  such  prescribed 
additions  to  the  essential  “external  signs”  renders  the  sacrament 
incapable  of  being  pronounced  valid  save  by  the  exercise  of  economy. 
He  maintains  that  it  is  within  the  Church’s  province  to  determine 
the  rite  thus  necessary  for  validity  ('H  Aoyp.  ’A vSp.  xpiv.,  p.  51,  and 
’OcpeiX.  dira^TijaLS,  pp.  124-126;  Androutsos,  Aoy p..  Me\.,  A',  p.  140). 

1  Dyobouniotes,  ibid.,  and  Ta  'Slvar-ppia ,  p.  30;  Androutsos,  ibid.,  and 
AoyyaTiKri,  pp.  324,  323-324,  etc. 

2 Dyobouniotes,  Ta  M varripia,  p.  161. 

3  Spiritus  sanctus  aliter  adjuvat  nondum  inhabitans,  aliter  inhabi- 
tans;  nam  nondum  inhabitans,  ut  sint  fideles,  inhabitans  adjuvat  jam 
fideles;  in  Epist.  194,  4,  18. 

4  Viewed  Arian  Baptism  as  invalid  even  if  performed  properly. 

5  UpOKCLTTIXVO'lS,  7. 

6  In  Epist.  199,  he  rejects  Marcionite  Baptism,  even  if  performed  in 
the  name  of  the  Holy  Trinity. 

7  Cf.  Orat.  40,  26,  in  Migne,  P.  G.,  t.  XXXVI,  396. 

SE.  g.}  St.  Gregory  of  Nyssa,  in  Migne,  P.  G.,  t.  XLV,  881. 

9  Apostolic  canons,  67. 

10  Androutsos,  AoypariKri,  pp.  304-306. 


294 


V.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 


and  through  the  laying  on  of  hands  had  the  spiritual  charisma. 
But  when  they  tore  themselves  away  they  became  laymen  and 
had  not  the  authority  either  to  baptize  or  ordain,  since  they  were 
unable  to  impart  to  others  that  Grace  of  the  Holy  Spirit  from 
which  they  themselves  had  fallen  away.”1 

In  the  early  Church  a  practical  question  arose  in  the  case 
of  many  of  these  heresies.  While  their  sacraments  were  not 
recognized  as  valid,2  what  should  be  the  course  of  the  Church’s 
action  in  regard  to  individuals  who  wished  to  come  from  heresy 
and  schism  into  union  with  the  Church?  The  case  of  those 
baptized  or  ordained  in  the  Catholic  Church,  who  afterwards 
lapsed  into  heresy  or  schism  and  then  recanted,  desiring  re¬ 
admission  into  the  Church,  was  clear  enough:  after  doing  pen¬ 
ance  they  were  reconciled  without  rebaptism  or  reordination, 
since  those  sacraments  once  validly  administered  (Baptism, 
Chrism,  and  Orders),  might  not  be  iterated.3  In  the  case  of 
those  coming  from  heresy  and  schism  with  Baptism  or  ordina¬ 
tion  from  heretics  or  schismatics,  the  action  of  the  Early 
Church  differed  in  different  cases;  sometimes  their  Baptism 
and  Orders  were  validated  by  the  Church,  and  at  other  times 
such  persons  were  again  baptized  and  ordained.4  “Such  per¬ 
sons  desiring  to  come  into  the  Church,”  says  St.  Basil,  “hav¬ 
ing  been  baptized  as  it  were  by  laymen,  they  (that  is,  the  Fath¬ 
ers  in  Synod),  ordered  to  be  cleansed  again  by  the  true  Bap¬ 
tism,  that  is,  that  of  the  Church;”  but,  he  adds,  for  the  sake 
“oiKovofjLias  twv  7toAAwv”,  the  Baptism  of  the  Cathari  might  be 
accepted.5 6  The  Orthodox  use  of  “economy”,  then,  dates  back 

1  Epist.  188,  and  cf.  204,  3. 

2  “The  Early  Church,”  says  Dyobouniotes,  “regarded  as  invalid 
the  Orders  of  the  Montanists,  Paulitians,  Arians,  Nestorians,  Mace¬ 
donians,  Sabbatians,  Novatians,  Tetradites,  Apollinarians  and  all  other 
heretics  like  them”  (op.  cit.,  p.  161,  note  3  with  references). 

3  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  160. 

4  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  306-307.  “The  ordination  of  such  schis¬ 
matics  and  heretics  must  not  be  regarded  as  reordination,  which  is 
forbidden  by  the  Church,  but  as  the  first  ordination,  since  that  ordina¬ 
tion  had  in  schism  or  heresy  was  not  actually  such”  (Dyobouniotes. 
op.  cit.,  p.  161,  note  2).  Neither  the  Early  Church  nor  the  Orthodox 
Church  has  ever  known  the  use  of  hypothetical  or  conditional  Baptism 

(Androutsos,  ibid.,  p.  301,  note  1). 

6  Epist.  188. 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  GENERAL 


295 


to  St.  Basil  and  the  practice  of  the  Early  Church.  The  early 
synods,  it  may  be  noted,  declared  the  Baptism  of  many  of  the 
heresies  void  and  invalid,  “even  though  it  is  certain  historically 
that  they  observed  scrupulously  the  outward  form  and  acts, 
as  did  the  Montanists,  Manicheans,  and  Paulitians,  according 
to  St.  Athanasius.”1  Yet  there  was  even  in  early  times  a  great 
variety  of  practice,  since  the  Church  recognized  some  sacra¬ 
ments  as  valid  when  those  who  had  had  them  in  heresy  or 
schism  came  into  the  Church,2  and  refused  to  recognize  others. 

“The  recognition  by  economy  of  the  sacraments  of  heretics 
may  he  explained  in  two  ways: — either  (a)  that  the  sacra¬ 
ments  of  schismatics  and  heretics  coming  into  the  Church  were 
as  it  were  revivified  and  quickened  by  reason  of  entrance  into 
the  Church,3  or  (b)  that  the  Church,  as  a  steward  of  Grace  and 
dispenser  of  the  sacraments,  has  the  power  to  change  the  val¬ 
idity  of  sacraments,  making  those  that  are  invalid  valid,  and 
vice  versa.  The  former  view  prevails  in  the  Western  Church, 
which  distinguishes  character  and  Grace  in  (certain  of)  the 
sacraments,  and  holds  that  character  may  be  impressed  by  the 
canonical  accomplishment  of  the  sacraments  even  among  schis¬ 
matics  and  heretics.  This  view  cannot  be  accepted,  since  it 
is  contrary  to  the  practice  of  the  Church  which  regards  many 
of  the  sacraments  of  heretics  as  invalid  and  according  to  cir¬ 
cumstances  (pronounces)  them  valid  and  invalid.  The  prac¬ 
tice  of  the  Church  can  only  be  explained  by  the  second  view, 
which  is  the  more  acceptable,  in  that  it  is  based  on  the  idea 
that  outside  the  Church  the  Grace  of  God  does  not  exist,  and 
precludes  the  distinction  in  the  sacraments  of  character  and 
Grace,  which  distinction  cannot  be  founded  either  on  Holy 
Scripture  or  Tradition.”4  The  Latin  view  is  rejected  by  all 
Orthodox  theologians  on  the  grounds  suggested  above:  (a)  it 
violates  the  principle  of  the  one  true  and  visible  Church;  (b) 

1  Adv.  Arian.  orat.,  2,  43,  in  Migne,  P.  G.  t.  XXVI,  237.  Androutsos, 
op.  cit.,  pp.  306-307. 

2  E.  g.,  the  Cathari,  Donatists,  Encratites,  and  Massalians  were  rec¬ 
ognized;  cf.  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  163  note  1. 

3  “This  view”  says  Androutsos,  “is  untenable,  since  it  presupposes 
that  there  are  heretics  who  have  valid  sacraments,  which  the  Orthodox 
Church  does  not  accept”  {op.  cit.,  p.  308). 

4  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  pp.  162-163.  note  1. 


296 


V.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 


it  makes  of  the  sacraments  magical  and  mechanical  rites  auto¬ 
matically  effecting  supernatural  results,  without  proper  regard 
to  the  truths  involved  in  the  doctrine  of  the  sacraments,  (that 
our  Lord  is  Himself  the  celebrant,  and  the  Holy  Spirit  the 
agent  accomplishing  the  sacraments)  ;  (c)  that  it  involves 
the  distinction  of  character  and  Grace,  and  the  doctrine  of  in¬ 
delible  character,  which  is  totally  unsupported  by  Holy  Scrip¬ 
ture  and  Tradition,  imports  needless  distinctions  among  the 
sacraments,  and  in  any  case  is  incapable  of  being  exactly  de¬ 
fined;  (d)  it  involves  the  recognition  in  theory  and  practice  of 
heretics  and  schismatics  as  quasi-members  of  the  Church,  and 
of  their  communions  as  in  some  sense  sections  or  portions  of 
the  Body  of  Christ.1 

The  whole  theory  and  practice  of  the  use  of  economy  rests 
on  the  Orthodox  doctrine  of  the  Church  expounded  in  Lecture 
IV,  and  on  the  deduction  that  the  Church  is  the  guardian  and 
administrator  of  Grace,  the  dispenser  and  steward  of  the  sacra¬ 
ments,  and  the  center  of  the  operations  and  energies  of  the 
Holy  Spirit.2  In  her  modern  life  she  appeals  back  to  the  prac¬ 
tice  of  the  Early  Church  and  to  the  principle  of  St.  Basil.  “If 
the  Church  is  the  dispenser  of  Grace  .  .  .  she  may  recognize 
.  .  .  the  sacraments  of  heretics  coming  into  her  for  the  sake 
of  the  resulting  good  in  order  to  avoid  worse  evil,  by  economy, 
condescendingly  or  by  accommodation,  or  by  whatever  other 
terms  may  be  described  her  deviation  in  many  instances  .  .  . 
from  the  exact  and  strict  way  of  her  principles.”3  “By  econ¬ 
omy”  (/car  oiKovo/xtav)  is  contrasted  with  “by  strictness” 
(/car1  GLKpl^eLav) .  Some  meanings  of  the  word  economy  cor¬ 
respond  closely  to  what  we  mean  by  “indulgence”,  and  “dispen¬ 
sation  :”  the  dispensation  from  the  Friday  fast,  permission 
to  marry  a  cousin,  a  dispensation  to  lay  aside  the  priestly  garb 
— these  are  all  exercises  of  “economy.”  Again,  it  means  the 
carrying  out  of  the  spirit  rather  than  the  exact  and  rigid  let¬ 
ter  of  a  law,  which  would  be  described  as  being  /car’  aKpl^uav. 

1  Cf.  ibid.,  and  p.  166,  note  3;  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  302-304,  note; 
pp.  390  ff;  his  At  /3acrets  rijs  evwaeus,  pp.  36-43;  To  Kvpos  twv  ’Ayy Xt- 
KavLKibv  xeLP0T0 viuv,  pp.  15,  et  al the  additional  note  to  the  previous 
lecture,  pp.  263-267,  above. 

2  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  306,  and  At  /3dcrets  rrjs  'Evuaews,  p.  38. 

8  Androutsos,  AoypaTiKri,  p.  307. 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  GENERAL 


297 


It  may  never  be  a  contravention  of  the  spirit  of  any  prescrip¬ 
tion,  canonical  or  legal,1 2  but  is  as  it  were  a  mean  between 
acrepeia  and  aKplfieia.  The  writer  had  the  word  explained  to 
him  once  by  a  prominent  Orthodox  ecclesiastic  under  the  fig¬ 
ure  of  a  ship  in  a  storm  being  lightened  of  valuable  cargo  for 
the  purpose  of  saving  human  life.  Exercises  of  economy  are 
always  in  view  of  some  emergency  or  contingency  not  contem¬ 
plated  in  the  general  terms  of  prescriptive  law,  custom,  usage, 
or  dogmatic  teaching.  They  may  serve  as  precedent  only  when 
conditions,  circumstances,  and  needs  are  demonstrably  the  same-' 

The  motive  animating  the  Church  in  the  exercise  of  econ¬ 
omy  is  the  good  of  souls.  "The  Church,  as  a  self-directing 
fellowship,  gauges  the  exercise  of  strictness  or  economy  and 
in  general  her  whole  attitude  concerning  the  sacraments,  ac¬ 
cording  to  what  commends  itself  to  her,  having  in  view  the 
salvation  of  all  and  taking  into  consideration  both  her  own 
children  and  her  members  who  have  fallen  away  from  her .  .  . 
Though  it  has  not  yet  been  officially  formulated,  nor  the  ques¬ 
tion  thoroughly  investigated  from  the  theological  standpoint 
to  determine  the  scope  of  the  exercise  of  economy,  yet  this  no¬ 
tion  of  it  is  founded  on  the  practice  of  the  Church,  in  which 
the  same  sacrament  in  different  circumstances  has  been  pro 
nounced  at  one  time  valid  and  at  another  invalid.”3  This  lack 
of  consistency  has  brought  it  about  "that  there  is  a  discrepancy 
between  theory  and  practice,  and  that  the  Church  seems  to  be 
teaching  one  thing  and  doing  another.”4  There  has  been  no  of¬ 
ficial  investigation  of  the  principle  guiding  the  exercise  of 
economy,  says  Androutsos,  nor  any  authoritative  explanation 
of  her  seemingly  inconsistent  course  of  action.5  "While  in  the 

1  On  the  canonical  aspects  of  the  question,  cf.  A.  Christodoulos, 
AokI^lov  €KK\7jaiaaTLKov  biKaiov,  pp.  407  ff. 

2  There  is  also  the  technical  use  of  the  word,  common  to  theology,  in 
the  phrases  “the  economy  of  Redemption’’,  e.  g.,  in  Gennadius,  7 
(Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  I,  p.  5);  Jeremiah  II.,  1st  Answer  (Hid.,  p.  155) 
etc;  the  meaning  “administration”  (of  the  sacraments,  e.  g.)  in  Meso¬ 
lora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  p.  302 ;  the  meaning  “economy”  in  the  sense  of  order, 
dispensation,  scheme, —  cf.  Jeremiah,  in  Mesolora,  I.  p.  184. 

3  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  308. 

4  Ibid.,  p.  306. 

5  Ibid.,  pp.  308-309. 


298 


V.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 


concrete  it  is  possible  for  terms  and  conditions  to  be  laid  down 
(in  a  given  case),  on  the  basis  of  which  the  Church  accepts  her¬ 
etics  by  economy  without  rebaptism,  yet  in  general  the  principle 
dictating  the  use  of  strictness  and  economy  is  inscrutable,  nor 
can  any  theory  be  formulated  to  explain  her  course  of  action 
and  supply  the  reason  which  actuates  the  Church  in  one  case 
to  accept,  and  in  another  to  reject,  the  sacraments  of  heretics.”1 

Dyobouniotes,  in  his  treatment  of  the  sacrament  of  Orders, 
goes  into  the  question  with  some  fulness.  He  holds  that  there 
are  certain  principles  on  which  in  the  concrete  the  Church 
may  act  in  the  matter  of  recognizing  heretical  or  schismatic 
ordination.  “The  Church  as  the  administrator  and  steward  of 
divine  Grace  can  recognize  by  economy  the  orders  and  sacra¬ 
ments  of  schismatics  and  heretics.2  In  the  exercise  of  this 
economy  the  Church  takes  into  consideration  not  only  in  a 
general  way  the  faith  of  those  heretics  and  schismatics  coming 
to  her,  and  particularly  their  view  of  the  sacraments  both  of 
Orders  and  Baptism,  and  the  fact  as  to  the  canonicity  of  the 
ministration  of  these  sacraments,  but  also  the  unbroken  suc¬ 
cession  of  the  episcopal  authority  from  the  times  of  the  Apos¬ 
tles.  Accordingly  this  is  the  explanation  of  the  general  ac¬ 
tion  of  the  Church  in  declaring  invalid  the  orders  and  sacraments 
of  those  heretics  and  schismatics  in  whom  either  the  episcopal 
succession  from  apostolic  times  was  broken  or  the  Faith  per¬ 
verted,  especially  in  the  case  of  the  doctrine  of  the  sacraments, 
or  the  regularity  of  the  administration  of  the  sacraments  de¬ 
stroyed,  and  at  the  same  time  the  Church’s  recognition  as  valid 
of  the  orders  of  schismatics  and  heretics  whose  line  of  epis¬ 
copal  succession  from  the  Apostles  was  not  impaired,  nor  their 
Faith,  especially  in  regard  to  the  sacraments,  perverted,  nor  the 
regularity  of  the  administration  of  the  sacraments  questioned. 
Yet  it  must  be  understood  that  the  Church,  as  the  dispenser  of 

1  At  (3aaeis  rijs  e^ticrews,  p.  39;  To  Kvpos  r.  ’Ayy\uc  xeLPOTOV‘,  pp-  11*13; 
the  charge  of  expediency,  as  the  sole  principle  in  the  course  of  Ortho¬ 
dox  procedure,  is  intimated  by  Palmieri  in  commenting  on  the  synod 
of  Constantinople  (of  1875),  cf.  op.  cit.,  I.  p.  624.  Text  of  Acts  in 
Theotokas,  No/xoXoyia  t.  oiKov/iev.  irarp.,  Constantinople,  1897,  pp.  367 
ff;  on  which  cf.  note  2  on  pp.  307-308  of  Androutsos’  A oyp.ari.Kri. 

2  On  the  differences  in  practice  in  the  early  Church,  cf.  Androutsos, 
Aoyp.aTLKri,  pp.  393-395,  note. 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  GENERAL 


299 


divine  Grace,  can  recognize  the  orders  and  the  sacraments  in 
general  of  schismatics  and  heretics  even  if  they  have  not  been 
performed  canonically  and  even  if  the  Apostolic  Succession  be 
broken ;  and  for  reasons  which  seem  to  her  good  and  necessary 
the  Church  may  reject  the  Orders  and  the  sacraments  in  general 
of  heretics  and  schismatics  who  do  preserve  the  canonical 
order  in  the  administration  of  the  sacraments  and  possess  un¬ 
impaired  the  Apostolic  Succession.  This  is  the  explanation  of 
the  inconstancy  of  the  Church’s  action  ...  at  one  time  pro¬ 
nouncing  invalid  the  sacraments  ...  of  heretics  and  schis¬ 
matics,  though  they  he  canonically  performed,  .  .  .  and  at 
another  pronouncing  valid  the  sacraments  of  heretics  and  schis¬ 
matics,  .  .  .  although  they  have  not  been  canonically  per¬ 

formed.”1 

In  early  days  as  well  as  in  later  times  there  has  been  a 
wide  divergence  of  practice  in  the  Orthodox  Church.2  There 
has  also  been  a  wide  divergence  of  opinion  among  Orthodox 
writers.  It  would  be  impossible  to  go  into  the  question  histor¬ 
ically,  or  treat  of  it  in  these  lectures  in  any  detail.  One  ex¬ 
ample  may  suffice  as  an  illustration.  In  1872  a  synod  at  Con¬ 
stantinople  solemnly  excommunicated  the  Bulgarians  because 
of  “phyletism”,  and  “rationalism”.  There  was  not  the  slightest 
question  as  to  Orthodoxy  of  belief,  nor  validity  of  orders,  nor 
unbroken  Apostolic  Succession.  The  sentence  of  the  synod 
pronounced  them  “alien  to  the  One,  Holy  Catholic,  and  Apos¬ 
tolic  Church,  and  for  this  reason,  schismatics.”3  It  anathema¬ 
tized  all  their  clerics,  all  who  held  fellowship  with  them,  and 
said:  all  who  “regard  their  orders  and  priestly  acts  as  valid, 
both  clerics  and  laymen,  we  pronounce  schismatics  and  stran¬ 
gers,  outside  the  fofd  of  the  Orthodox  Church  of  Christ.”4  Their 
sacraments  could  not  be  regarded  as  valid,  since  their  prel¬ 
ates  had  fallen  from  the  Grace  of  Orders,  and  could  not  there¬ 
fore  communicate  to  others  what  they  had  lost.5  This  synod, 

1  Dyobouniot-es,  Ta  Mu< jr-ppia,  pp.  162-165. 

2  On  which  cf.  Ambraze's  arguments  in  'H  ’Opdo5o£os  ’E/c/c\?7cn'a,  pp. 
161-177. 

3In  Papadopoulos,  'H  <rvyxPovos  ^PaPX^a  TV s  ’Opdo86£ov  avaroXcKrif 
’E/c/cX^c-ias,  Athens,  1895,  p.  664. 

4  Ibid. 

5  P.  57  of  the  Acts,  quoted  by  Androutsos,  pp.  35-36,  of  his  A l 


300 


V.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 


under  Anthimus  VI  (1871-1873,  his  third  time  of  being  Patri¬ 
arch),  was  attended  by  representatives  from  Alexandria  and 
Antioch,  and  by  many  metropolitans,  bishops,  and  prelates  of 
the  Greek  Church.  Jerusalem  did  not  subscribe  to  the  ana¬ 
thema  against  the  Bulgarians  nor  did  he  attend  the  synod. 
He  lost  his  throne  for  this  reason.1  The  Russian  Church  did 
not  at  all  concur  in  this  condemnation  of  the  Bulgarians.  A 
few  years  later  (1878-1879),  the  question  came  up  regarding 
the  treatment  of  excommunicated  Bulgarians  desiring  to  re¬ 
turn  to  the  Orthodox  Church,  and  the  general  question  as  to 
the  validity  of  orders  received  from  heretics  and  schismatics. 
“The  committee  appointed  by  the  Ecumenical  Patriarch  for  the 
investigation  and  solution  of  the  question  regarding  the  val¬ 
idity  ...  of  orders  received  from  excommunicated  or  schis¬ 
matic  bishops,  reported  (July  21,  1879)  that  ‘such  .  .  .  can 

be  received  into  communion,  each  in  his  own  clerical  rank  and 
dignity,  according  ...  to  the  8th  Canon  of  the  1st  Ecumen¬ 
ical  Council/  The  Synod  accepted  this  judgment,  except  the 
Church  of  Greece,  which  voiced  scruples  about  it,  inclining 
rather  to  reordination,  but  yet  finally  accepted  the  view  of  the 
synod  of  Constantinople.”2 

Just  what  is  the  status  and  sacramental  capacity,  so  to 
speak,  of  validly  ordained  clergy  who  have  fallen  into  heresy  or 
schism,  it  is  difficult  to  discern.  In  one  place  Dyobouniotes 
wrote :  “A  priest  falling  into  heresy  from  Orthodoxy  still  retains 
his  priesthood,  for  it  has  indelible  character,  but  loses  its  Grace 
so  that  he  cannot  communicate  such  (Grace)  through  the  sac¬ 
raments.”3  By  implication  Dyobouniotes  would  maintain  that 
on  returning  to  the  Church  he  would  recover  this  lost  Grace.4 

/S dcreis  rijs  huaeios.  On  the  synod,  cf.  M.  Gedeon,  "Eyy pacpa  TrarpiapxiKa  k. 
avvodiKa  irepl  r.  f3ovXyapu<ov  £rjTr)paTos  (1852-1873),  Constantinople,  1908; 
bibliography  of  the  Russian  view  of  the  synod  and  its  action,  in  Pal- 
mieri,  op.  cit.,  I,  p.  619,  note  1,  and  cf.  his  Un  documenta  prezioso  sul 
decadim-ento  dell’  ortodossia,  Rome,  1900. 

1  According  to  Palmieri,  op.  cit.,  I.  p.  619,  note  2,  on  the  basis  of 
'H  ’EKKXrjcia  'Iepo<roXvp.uJi>  Kara  tovs  reaadpas  reXeraiovs  aiojvas,  Athens, 
1900,  pp.  104-105. 

2  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  pp.  164-165  note  2,  and  Androutsog, 
Aoyp.a.TiKri}  p.  395  note. 

3  'H  Aoyp,.  ’A vdp.  Kpiv.,  p.  51. 

4 ’O (peiX.  a.TrdvTT]<ns,  p.  129. 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  GENERAL 


301 


Androutsos  criticizes  this  statement  as  combining  two  mutually 
exclusive  theories,  the  Orthodox  and  the  Latin,  and  rejects  it 
completely;1  such  a  person,  .  .  he  says,  on  his  return  to  Or¬ 

thodoxy,  can  be  recognized  as  a  priest  only  by  the  Church  exercis¬ 
ing  economy.  Basil,  the  Metropolitan  of  Smyrna,  in  his  work  on 
the  validity  of  heretical  orders,  says :  “By  deposition  the  Grace 
( XapicrfjLa )  of  the  priesthood  is  neither  removed  nor  destroyed — 
for  the  efficient  cause  (of  the  priesthood)  is  the  Holy  Spirit, 
— hut  its  energy  and  operation  are  circumscribed  and  impeded.772 
He  claims  that  there  is  no  definite  precedent  in  the  action  of 
early  synods  and  the  Councils  to  deal  with  these  cases,  “since 
they  never  say  explicitly  whether  to  determine  and  allow,  or 
to  forbid,  the  acceptance  as  valid  of  the  orders  of  those  ordained 
solely  by  excommunicated  bishops.7'3  Rhosse,  in  his  study 
of  Old  Catholicism  to  which  he  devoted  much  time  and  atten¬ 
tion,  finally  came  to  the  conclusion  that  Old  Catholic  orders 
were  invalid.4  “A  bishop  who  falls  away  from  the  true  Ecumen¬ 
ical  Church  of  the  first  eight  centuries,  and  perverts  his  Faith 
by  the  acceptance  of  novel  doctrines,  can  not  give  to  others 
either  the  true  episcopal  office  or  the  true  priesthood-77'’  Rhosse 
envisages  the  whole  problem  in  terms  of  doctrinal  teaching: 
heresy  forfeits  Grace;  Orthodoxy  has  as  its  chief  claim  to 
Catholicity  the  preservation  unimpaired  of  the  true  doctrines 
of  Christianity.  Mesolora  in  his  section  “on  the  Grace  of  Or¬ 
ders  and  the  validity  of  heretical  ordination776  says  that  when 
the  Grace  of  Orders  is  once  given,  canonically  and  rightly,  it 
may  not  be  done  again,7  and  that  the  Church  may,  by  the  exer¬ 
cise  of  economy,  receive  those  heretically  ordained,  by  the  lay- 

1  Aoy/j..  MeAeVcu,  A’,  pp.  118-119.  It  is  to  be  noticed  that  Dyoboun- 
iotes  in  his  later  works  abandons  the  theory  of  indelible  character, 
as  we  saw  above. 

2  Ilepi  tou  Kvpovs  rijs  xeiporoiuas  KKripiKwv  vi to  eirurKOTruv  KadrjpTjfxepuiv 
teal  ax'-o’P-o-TLKuiv  yeipoToj'^fleV-rwi',  Smyrna,  1887,  p.  18. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  7. 

4  Cf .  his  Aoyp.a.TiKr),  pp.  60-61,  note  286-287;  489-491;  and  his 

’'E/c0ecrts  7 rpos  tt/ v  iepov  ^vvobov,  of  1874,  pp.  22-23.  On  the  literature  of 
the  subject  and  the  history  of  the  relations  of  Old  Catholics  and  Ortho¬ 
dox,  cf.  Palmieri,  op.  cit.,  II.  p.  189. 

5  'Opdo8o£las  Kal  Ua\aiOKa9o\LKiap.ov  avrideaLS,  Athens,  1876,  p.  51. 

6  Op.  cit.,  IV.  pp.  331-336. 

7  He  here  seems  to  hold  the  theory  of  indelible  character. 


302 


V.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 


ing  on  of  hands  (not  ordination),  and  prayer,  upon  a  repudia¬ 
tion  by  them  of  their  heresy  and  an  expression  of  penitence.1 
“We  are  of  the  opinion,”  he  says,  “that  the  Church  may  receive 
those  clerics  ordained  by  excommunicated  or  schismatic  bish¬ 
ops,  without  reordination,  .  .  .  but  those  ordained  hv  hereti¬ 
cal  bishops  by  reordination,  since  .  .  .  they  have  perverted 
the  true  Faith  by  heresies  and  novel  doctrines  .  .  .  and  in 
so  doing  have  fallen  from  the  true  .  .  .  Church  and  from  the 
bond  of  priestly  succession  bound  up  with  it.  Such  cannot  im¬ 
part  genuine  episcopal  orders  nor  the  true  priesthood.  .  . 
Hence  Romans  and  Protestants  ought  to  be  reordained.”2 

The  question  of  Anglican  orders  may  be  briefly  touched 
upon  here,  as  this  is  the  obvious  place  for  reference  to  it.  An- 
droustsos’  monograph  on  the  subject3  has  been  translated  into 
English,4  and  is  a  most  valuable  contribution  to  the  subject. 
Taking  as  proven  the  historical  fact  of  Parker’s  consecration, 
he  says :  “The  Orthodox  Church  may  by  economy  recognize 
the  priesthood  of  Anglicans  coming  into  Orthodoxy  ...  on 
the  condition  that  the  Anglican  Church  declare  herself  in  an 
Orthodox  manner  on  certain  doctrines.”5  Rhosse6  and  Meso- 
lora7  both  say  that  the  Orthodox  Church  cannot  recognize  the 
validity  of  Anglican  Orders.  “The  Anglican  Church,  although 
she  preserves  the  three  grades  of  the  Ministry,  .  .  .  neverthe¬ 
less  rejects  the  sacrament  of  Orders  as  conveying  a  special 

1  Ibid. 

2  Ibid.,  pp.  335-336. 

3  To  Kvpos  tuv  ’ Ay y\ ik av ik civ  xeLP0T0VL^v >  Constantinople,  1903. 

4  The  Validity  of  English  Ordinations  from  an  Orthodox-Catholic 
point  of  view ,  translated  by  F.  W.  Grove  Campbell,  LL.D.,  London,  1909. 

5  Pp.  82-83,  ibid.,  these  are:  the  doctrine  of  the  seven  sacraments, 
confession,  the  Eucharist  as  a  real  sacrifice  and  the  doctrine  of  the 
Real  Presence,  the  authority  of  the  Ecumenical  Councils;  cf.  his 
Aoy p.anKr],  p.  392,  note;  cf.  also  Androutsos’  note  Ai  dyyXiKaviKal 
XeipoToviai,  in  'I epos  HvvdeapLos,  Athens,  Feb.  16-March  1,  1922,  pp. 
102-103.  This  brief  recapitulation  of  the  subject  is  characterized  by  no 
little  acerbity,  and  considerable  ignorance  of  the  facts  about  the  Eng¬ 
lish  Church.  It  is  a  standing  example  of  the  futility  of  obtaining 
facts  second  hand;  Mr.  Androutsos’  information  is  derived  from  Ger¬ 
man  sources.  But  compare  the  pronouncement  of  His  Holiness,  Mele- 
tios  IV,  given  in  full  in  The  Christian  East,  October,  1922. 

6  A07 yariKT},  p.  286,  note  1. 

7  Op.  cit.,  IV.  pp.  331-336. 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  GENERAL 


Grace.  .  .  .  Hence  it  follows  that  it  has  not  the  dogmatic 
character  which  our  Church  ascribes  to  it,  and  so  their  service 
of  the  Laying  on  of  Hands  cannot  he  recognized  as  valid.  As 
to  the  historical  question,  it  has  not  yet  been  shown  clearly  that 
the  consecration  of  their  first  bishop,  Parker,  was  done  canon¬ 
ically  and  that  their  Orders  have  an  unbroken  and  genuine 
Apostolic  Succession.*'1  Ambraze  is  distinctly  in  favor  of  their 
validity.2  Dyobouniotes  says  that  the  "solution  of  the  question 
of  the  validity  of  Anglican  Orders  depends  on  the  proof  (a)  of 
the  canonical  character  of  the  consecration  of  the  first  bishop 
of  the  Anglican  Church  since  the  Reformation,  Abp.  Parker, 
and  (b)  on  the  correctness  of  the  teaching  of  the  Anglican 
Church  about  Orders  and  the  sacraments  in  general,  and  its 
agreement  with  the  teaching  of  the  Eastern  Church.  Of  these 
two  problems  the  first  may  be  solved  by  historical  research,  .  .  . 

.  hut  tiie  second  can  only  be  settled  satisfactorily  and  cer¬ 
tainly  when  the  Episcopal  Church  shall  define  officially  and 
authoritatively  her  teaching  about  Holy  Orders  and  the  sacra¬ 
ments  in  general,  the  inconsistency  and  indefiniteness  of  which 
(now)  does  not  allow  (the  forming  of)  certain  conclusions 
based  on  sure  and  unquestioned  teaching.’’3  The  most  recent 
discussion  of  the  subject  is  in  a  brochure  of  Prof.  Ivomnenos  of 
the  Chalki  Theological  Seminary.  He  says :  "The  reserved  at¬ 
titude  of  our  Church  towards  Anglican  Orders  is  altogether  un¬ 
reasonable.  .  .  We  are  of  unhesitating  opinion  that  the  same 
rule  (as  applies  to  Roman  Catholics),  ought  to  be  applied  to 
the  Anglican  Clergy,  inasmuch  as  they  also  are  demonstrated 
by  the  relative  notab  ilia  to  have  received  not  the  semblance  of 
ordination  but  one  which  is  real  and  is  based  upon  .  .  .  his¬ 
toric  Succession  from  the  Apostles,  upon  its  canonical  trans¬ 
mission,  and  upon  an  essentially  and  fundamentally  right  con¬ 
ception  of  it.”4 

1 Ibid .,  p.  336,  and  note  2. 

:  Op.  cit.,  pp.  66-90,  and  his  AoKipuov  repi  epuaeus  tup  ’AyyXiKapup 
''ETnGKOTriavuv  p-era  tt/s  ’OpdoSo&v  ’ AparoXiK^s  ’EKKXr/alas,  Athens,  1891. 
For  bibliography  on  the  subject  cf.  Palmieri,  op.  cit.,  II.  p.  188,  notes. 

3  Ta  Mixrnjpta,  p.  164  note  1. 

4  From  his  HvpfSoXal  els  ra s  irpocnradeias  7 rpos  evuuLv,  Constantinople, 
1921,  p.  9;  translation  of  the  Rev.  J.  A.  Douglas  in  The  Church  Times 
of  July  15,  1921;  cf.  also  pp.  18,  ff.  of  the  Rev.  J.  A.  Douglas,  The 


304 


V.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 


(c)  The  third  condition  or  term  of  the  administration  of 
the  sacraments  is  concerned  with  their  relation  to  the  individual 
recipient.  It  is  entirely  a  subjective  condition,  and  without  it 
the  sacrament  may  fail  of  its  effect.  While  ‘The  sacraments  are 
accomplished  by  divine  command,  or  directly  upon  the  fulfil¬ 
ment  of  the  prescribed  ecclesiastical  act  by  the  officiant,  .  .  . 
yet  in  order  that  they  be  effective  to  work  saving  power  on 
those  who  receive  them,  these  must  be  prepared  for  the  recep¬ 
tion  of  divine  Grace.  This  distinction  between  the  actual  con¬ 
tent  of  the  sacraments  performed  by  divine  command  and  their 
saving  energy,  appears  in  1  Cor.  11,  29.”  Other  passages  in 
Holy  Scripture1  testify  to  the  sacraments  as  objective  means  of 
justifying  and  sanctifying  Grace,  and  the  Fathers2  clearly  hold 
to  the  objective  character  of  this  Grace  irrespective  either  of 
the  oiliciant  or  the  recipient.8  “As  the  sun  lightens  all,  as  the 
echo  strikes  the  ears  of  all,  healthy  and  deaf,  so  the  sacraments 
offer  to  all,  the  believing  and  the  virtuous  as  well  as  those  who 
are  not  so,  the  Grace  of  God.  But  as  the  light  and  the  sound 
operate  where  there  are  healthy  sense  organs  (to  receive  them), 
thus  the  Grace  proffered  by  the  sacraments  operates  and  brings 
about  its  proper  effects  only  where  there  is  such  receptivity.”4 
“If  the  power  of  the  sacraments  comes  forth  from  God  for  Jesus 
Christ’s  sake,  yet  for  its  proper  reception  and  personal  value 
it  is  necessary  that  there  be  a  preparation  of  those  who  receive 
the  sacrament.”  This  consists  in  faith,  the  conviction  of  sin, 
in  the  desire  and  craving  for  the  help  of  God,  with  special  ref¬ 
erence  to  the  Grace  of  each  sacrament.  “If  we  wish  to  express 
this  subjective  preparation  in  a  single  phrase,  including  the 
case  of  infants,  it  is  clear  that  ‘passive  receptivity’5  would  be 

Relations  of  the  Anglican  Churches  with  the  Eastern-Orthodox,  es¬ 
pecially  in  regard  to  Anglican  Orders,  Faith  Press,  London,  1921,  and 
F.  Gavin,  The  Greek  Church  and  the  Anglican  Question,  in  the  A. 
C.  AI.  May,  1921,  pp.  206-224. 

1E.  <7.,  Rom.  3,  20;  Tit.  3,  5;  Acts  8,  17;  19,  8. 

2  St.  Augustine,  contra  Cresconium  Don.,  4,  16,  et  passim. 

3  Androutsos,  Ao^y-arucr),  p.  310. 

4  Dyobouniotes,  Ta  Mucrr^pta,  p.  34,  and  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  pp. 
177-178. 

5  Dyobouniotes  takes  exception  to  this  phrase  of  Androutsos  in  his 
'H  Aoyg.  ’A v8p.,  xpiv.,  p.  52,  and  ’0 0et\.  a-rravr.,  pp.  120-130;  cf.  An- 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  GENERAL 


305 


the  expression  in  a  succinct  form  of  the  fundamental  charac¬ 
teristic  of  the  personal  factors  in  the  appropriation  of  the  sav¬ 
ing  Grace  of  the  sacraments.”  This  Androutsos  finds  to  be  the 
essential  attitude  of  all  recipients  of  the  sacraments,  both  of 
infants  at  their  Baptism  as  well  as  of  those  of  riper  years  who 
“become  conscious  of  the  chasm  of  sin  separating  them  from 
God,  and  ardently  long  for  His  help.”1 

Just  as  the  sacraments  do  not  depend  for  their  accomplish¬ 
ment  and  fulfilment  on  the  person  or  state  of  the  officiating 
priest,  so  they  are  likewise  independent  of  the  state  of  the  re¬ 
cipient.  The  change  in  the  Eucharist,  for  example,  of  the 
bread  and  wine  into  the  Body  and  Blood  of  Christ,  takes  place 
irrespective  of  the  faith  or  ethical  state  of  celebrant  or  people. 
Hence  is  derived  the  doctrine  that  the  sacraments  are  achieved 
and  consummated  ex  opere  operato,  independently  of  the  per¬ 
sonal  qualities  of  officiant  or  recipient,  provided  that  they  be 
canonically  and  rightly  celebrated  by  the  proper  person  with 
the  necessary  intention.2 

Besides  the  sacraments,  the  Church  employs  certain  sacra¬ 
mental  services,  or  sacramentals.  They  may  be  defined  as  “those 
services  instituted  by  the  Church  by  means  of  which  the  in¬ 
fluence  of  evil  spirits  is  averted,  the  course  of  man’s  life  is 
hallowed,  and  the  material  objects  connected  with  it  made  holy.”3 
The  sacramentals  do  not  work  ex  opere  operato  nor  may  they 
claim  divine  institution  and  authority.  They  include  exorcisms, 
benedictions,  dedications,  the  sign  of  the  Cross,  special  blessings, 
and  the  like.  “These  services,  depending  on  the  receptivity  and 
faith  of  those  who  take  part,  do  not  operate  of  necessity  as  do  the 
sacraments,  nor  yet  are  they  merely  empty  symbols  of  divine 
truths  or  simply  definite  methods  of  prayer  to  God.”4 


droutsos’  reply  to  the  criticism,  justifying  his  use  of  these  words,  pp. 
130-131  of  his  iloynariKal  M  eXe'rai,  A’. 

1  Androutsos,  Aoy^arLKri,  p.  311. 

:  Ibid.,  and  p.  312;  Dvobouniotes,  Ta  M varripia,  pp.  33-36.  Mesolora 
seems  to  have  misconceived  the  theological  implications  of  this  doc¬ 
trine  and  to  reject  it;  cf.  op.  cit.,  IV,  pp.  175-179. 

*  Dyobouniotes,  Ta  MuarTjpta,  p.  35,  note  1. 

4  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  317,  note. 


306 


V.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 


II.  THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  PARTICULAR 

I.  Baptism 

“Baptism  is  the  sacrament  in  which  he  who  is  thrice  im¬ 
mersed  in  water  in  the  Name  of  the  Father  and  of  the  Son  and 
of  the  Holy  Ghost,  is  cleansed  from  all  sin  and  regenerated 
spiritually/'1 2 * *  It  is  the  door  into  the  Church/  the  spiritual  and 
mystical  grafting  of  the  wild  olive  into  the  good  olive/  the  en¬ 
trance  into  the  participation  of  the  other  sacraments/  The 
institution  of  the  sacrament5 6  came  after  our  Lord's  Resurrec¬ 
tion  and  before  His  Ascension  into  Heaven/  since  the  discourse 
with  Nicodemus7 8  was  a  prophecy  of  the  establishment  of  Bap¬ 
tism.  Of  the  testimony  of  the  Fathers  to  the  institution,  pur¬ 
pose,  and  scope  of  the  sacrament  it  is  not  necessary  to  give 
examples/ 

The  institution  of  Baptism  was  foreshadowed  and  prefigured 
both  in  prophecy  and  in  typical  institutions,  of  which  Dyoboun¬ 
iotes9  names  “as  chief'1 :  circumcision,  the  levitical  ablutions  and 
purifications  of  the  Old  Testament,  the  saving  of  Noah  by  the 
waters  of  the  Flood,  the  passing  of  the  children  of  Israel  through 

1  Dyobouniotes,  Ta  M vcrrripia,  p.  38.  He  finds  the  definition  given 
by  Androutsos  (Aoy/xariKTj,  p.  318:  “the  divinely  instituted  service  by 
which  one  immersed  in  water  is  regenerated  spiritually”)  incomplete 
and  consequently  “erroneous,  since  it  ought  to  include  the  essential 
elements”  ('H  Aoyp..  ’Avdp.  Kpiv.,  p.  53,  cf.  ’0 0etX.  anavri^aLS,  pp.  130- 
132).  Androutsos  responds  to  this  criticism  (pp.  114,  117  of  his 
Aoyp..  MeX.,  A’.)  by  showing  that  the  general  definition  given  involves 
the  essentials  further  expounded  in  the  text.  For  Mesolora’s  diffuse 
definition  cf.  op.  cit.,  IV.  pp.  180-181. 

2  Androutsos,  AoypariKri,  p.  318. 

*  Kephala,  XpL<rro\oyia,  p.  197. 

‘Androutsos,  ibid.;  for  the  other  terms  to  denote  Baptism,  in  early 
usage  both  of  East  and  West,  cf.  Mesolora,  IV.  p.  182;  Dyobouniotes, 
op.  cit.,  p.  38. 

5  Dyobouniotes  and  Androutsos  ibid.,  and  p.  319  (Androutsos  op.  cit.). 

6  For  refutation  of  contrary  theory  cf.  note  1.  p.  39,  Dyobouniotes. 

7  Dyobouniotes,  ibid.,  and  Mesolora,  IV.  pp.  184-185. 

8  Cf .  Androutsos,  p.  319;  Dyobouniotes,  p.  39;  Mesolora  IV,  p.  183; 
Mogila,  in  Mesolora,  I.  p.  424;  Dositheus,  ibid.,  II.  p.  104;  Dyobouniotes, 
p.  43. 

9  Op.  cit.,  pp.  39-42. 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  PARTICULAR 


307 


the  Red  Sea,  the  custom  of  baptizing  proselytes  to  Judaism, 
the  Baptism  of  John  the  Baptist,  and  that  done  hy  the  Apos¬ 
tles  previous  to  the  day  of  Pentecost.  Our  Lord's  Baptism  by 
St.  John  was  “not  only  in  order  to  fulfil  all  righteousness, 
but  in  order  that  He  might  become  the  Door  and  the  Way  into 
Life,  and  might  hallow  the  nature  of  water  .  .  .  so  as  to 
give  to  those  baptized  in  His  Baptism  the  Grace  of  the  Holy 
Spirit”1 

The  administration  of  the  sacrament  must,  under  all  nor¬ 
mal  conditions,  be  at  the  hands  of  a  bishop  or  a  priest.  As 
we  know  from  Holy  Scripture,  the  Apostles  and  disciples  com¬ 
municated  their  authority  to  baptize  to  others,  and  the  Church 
has  restricted  this  function  to  the  priesthood  exclusively.2  It 
was  very  rarely  allowed  to  a  Deacon  (according  to  the  example 
of  Philip  in  Acts  8,  12),  and  then  only  when  no  priest  or 
bishop  was  available;  only  in  cases  of  dire  necessity  may  bap¬ 
tism  be  performed  by  a  lay  person.  “'Such  baptism  must  be 
validated  .  .  .  afterwards  by  the  Church.”3  Mogila  says 
in  his  Orthodox  Confession Baptism  may  not  be  administered 
by  any  other  save  a  regular  (lawful,  canonical),  priest,  but  in 
time  of  urgent  necessity  a  lay  person,  either  man  or  woman, 
may  perform  this  sacrament,”  which  person,  Dositheus  adds, 
must  be  Orthodox.4  This  exceptional  case,  which  is  lawful  ac¬ 
cording  to  ancient  precedent,  is  only  so  in  the  event  of  absolute 
and  urgent  necessity.5 

The  “'external  signs”  in  Baptism  are  threefold:  (a)  water, 
(b)  trine  immersion  and  emersion,  and  (c)  the  use  of  the 

1  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  p.  183. 

2  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  333  and  notes. 

3  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  45;  cf.  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  pp.  218-219: 
“The  canons  prescribe  that  the  priest  must  complete  the... rite  in  the 
case  of  a  child  so  baptized,”  and  cf.  note  1,  ibid. 

4  In  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  I,  p.  425,  and  II,  p.  115. 

5  Mesolora,  IV.  p.  201.  On  the  testimony  of  the  Fathers,  cf.  Dyo¬ 
bouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  45,  and  Androutsos,  p.  334.  Both  observe  that 
the  objection  of  St.  Epiphanius,  Irenaeus,  and  Tertullian  to  the  prac¬ 
tice  of  Baptism  in  certain  of  the  sects  of  their  day,  by  women,  was 
based  on  the  fact  that  such  Baptism  was  “solemnly,  regularly,  and 
publicly”  performed  by  women;  this  is  an  utterly  different  matter 
from  Baptism  in  the  case  of  urgent  necessity  by  a  lay  woman  { loc.  cit .), 


308 


V.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 


proper  formula.  In  general,  “the  outward  act  must  include 
all  that  which  from  Apostolic  times  has  been  regarded  as  neces¬ 
sary  for  the  canonical  administration  of  the  sacrament/’1  The 
irreducible  minimum  of  these  necessary  conditions  is  the  in¬ 
vocation  of  the  Holy  Trinity  and  trine  immersion  in  water.2 
The  use  of  water  is  testified  by  Holy  Scripture,  the  early 
Church,  the  Fathers,  and  the  universal  practice  of  the  Church. 
Water,  “as  the  natural  means  of  physical  cleansing,  is  the  most 
appropriate  symbol  of  spiritual  cleansing  from  sin.”3  No  other 
matter  is  allowed  or  accepted  by  the  Orthodox  Church/ 
The  word  “baptism”  itself  means  “dipping”  or  “immersion”, 
and  this  was  universally  the  primitive  practice.  This  is  tes¬ 
tified  by  the  Fathers,5  even  of  the  West,6  by  the  existence  in  the 
baptistries  of  older  churches  of  fonts  built  for  immersion,  and 
by  the  terminology  employed  in  regard  to  the  sacrament  of 
Baptism.'  This  immersion  “'means  the  submersion  of  the  whole 
body  of  the  baptizand  in  the  water.”8  There  must  be  three 

1  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  329. 

2  Ibid.,  and  cf.  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  pp.  196-197.  The  only  cases 
in  which  the  Orthodox  Church  has  shown  herself  “accommodating  in 
practice,  while  in  principle  she  denies  the  validity  of  alien  Baptism 
entirely,  is  when  such.... has  been  had  by  trine  immersion,  affusion, 
or  aspersion,  and  in  the  name  of  the  Holy  Trinity ...  This  economy  is 
not  absolute,  but  is  limited  by  certain  conditions;  in  the  present  case, 
the  invocation  of  the  Holy  Trinity  is  the  sine  qua  non”  (Androutsos, 
op.  cit.,  pp.  332-333). 

3  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  51. 

4  Ibid.,  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  329  and  note  1 ;  cf.  Kritopoulos,  in 
Mesolora,  I.  p.  320;  Mogila  ibid.,  p.  425.  Mesolora  seems  to  differ 
from  this  absolute  prohibition,  in  cases  of  extreme  necessity  allowing 
the  use  of  the  sign  of  the  Cross  only  with  the  proper  formula  (op.  cit., 
IV,  p.  194,  note  3),  or  the  use  of  other  material  substances  than  water 
(p.  210  ibid.,  and  note  2).  The  cases  of  clinical  baptism  by  aspersion 
(ibid.,  p.  200)  are  “the  exception  which  proves  the  rule”  in  Orthodox 
practice.  People  so  baptized  are  not  capable  of  taking  Orders  (Meso¬ 
lora,  ibid.,  p.  200,  note  1,  and  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  331). 

5  Cf.  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  53;  Androutsos,  pp.  330-331,  and  notes. 

6  E.  g.,  St.  Thomas  Aquinas  calls  it  communion,  laudabilior,  tutior. 

7  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  54 ;  \ovrpov,  lavacrum,  balneum.  On  the 
evidence  of  the  Symbolic  Books,  cf.  in  Mesolora, — Jeremiah  II.  I.  p. 
226;  Mogila,  ibid.,  p.  425;  Kritopoulos,  ibid.,  p.  320;  Dositheus,  II. 
p.  115,  etc. 

8  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  p.  198. 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  PARTICULAR 


309 


immersions  and  emersions,  according  to  Orthodox  teaching. 
This  was  undoubtedly  the  primitive  practice,1 2 3  but  some  latitude 
of  usage  came  in  later,  for  example,  in  Spain,  where  one  immer¬ 
sion  became  the  custom  as  a  profession  of  faith  in  the  Unity 
of  Essence  in  the  Godhead.'  Trine  immersion  meant  profes^ 
sion  of  faith  in  the  three  Persons  of  the  Godhead,  and  also 
“symbolized  the  three-day  burial  of  our  Lord  and  His  Resur¬ 
rection.”''  ,Xo  case  can  be  made  out  for  the  practice  of  “affu¬ 
sion”  or  “aspersion”.  It  is  contrary  to  primitive  custom, 
against  the  very  significance  of  the  word  “Baptism”,  foreign  to 
all  of  the  terminology  and  phraseology  employed,  and  does 
violence  to  the  divine  institution.4 5 6 7  It  is  a  perversion  and  a 
false  usage,  and  cannot  in  the  least  find  support  in  the  recogni¬ 
tion  of  clinical  Baptism  in  early  times.  Quoting  examples  of 
the  use  of  economy  proves  nothing/' 

The  use  of  the  formula,  “the  servant  of  God,  N.,  is  baptized 
in  the  Xame  of  the  Father  and  of  the  Son  and  of  the  Holy 
Ghost,”  is  necessary  for  a  valid  Baptism,  though  the  Latin 
formula  actually  amounts  to  the  same  thing.  The  difference  is 
only  one  of  phraseology.  “The  officiating  priest  in  the  Ortho¬ 
dox  Church  is  lost  to  sight,  so  to  speak,  under  the  sacraments 
which  he  performs,  and  their  operation  is  ascribed  directly  to 
GocT .  .  .  In  the  Latin  form  the  priest  appears  as  achieving 
and  administering  divine  Grace  .  .  .  ,  in  which  the  sharp  sep¬ 
aration  of  clergy  from  laity  is  apparent.”'  “The  difference 
between  the  two  forms  lies  generally  in  the  .  .  .  fact  that  the 

1  Ibid.,  p.  196,  and  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  54,  where  patristic 
references  are  given. 

2  Dyobouniotes,  ibid.  ‘'The  invalidity  of  the  Baptism  of  the  Eunom- 
ians  performed  with  only  one  immersion.  .  .was  not  on  account  of  this 
fact,  but  because  of  the  anti-Trinitarian  teaching  of  the  sect.”  Cf.  also, 
Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  note  3,  p.  330. 

3  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  330,  and  Dyobouniotes,  ibid. 

4  VTesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  pp.  200  and  ff. 

5  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  330-331,  and  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p. 
54,  note. 

6  Dyobouniotes  sharply  criticizes  this  aspect  of  the  distinction 
which  Androutsos  draws,  cf.  *H  A07 g.  ’A vdp.  KpLv.,  p.  54,  and  ’O 0et\. 
airavT.,  pp.  133  and  383,  and  Androutsos’  Soy/x.  McX.,  A',  p.  126. 

7  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  334-335. 


310 


V.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 


Latin  Church  emphasizes  the  priest’s  part’’1  in  consummating 
the  sacrament.  What  is  essential  and  a  sine  qua  non  in  the 
formula  is  the  invocation  of  the  Holy  Trinity.2  The  mention 
in  the  New  Testament  of  Baptism  “in  the  name  of  the  Lord”3 
does  not  preclude  Baptism  in  the  name  of  the  Holy  Trinity,  but 
according  to  St.  John  Damascene4  meant  that  “those  who  believed 
in  Him  were  to  be  baptized,”  or  “meant  that  Baptism  instituted 
by  our  Lord  and  performed  according  to  His  command  or  in 
His  power”,  according  to  other  Fathers.5 *  Baptism  performed  any 
other  way  than  in  the  name  of  the  Holy  Trinity  is  absolutely 
void/'  In  the  administration  of  Baptism,7  the  Orthodox  rite 
employs  the  oil  of  the  catechumens,8  and  “the  renunciations  of 
Satan  and  the  exorcisms,  which  were  from  early  times  associated 
with  Baptism,  but  which  do  not  constitute  its  ‘outward  signs’ 
.  .  .  according  to  the  general  acceptance  of  the  word.”9 

The  inward  Grace  conveyed  in  the  sacrament  of  Baptism 
is  two-fold,  effecting  (a)  the  forgiveness  of  all  sins,  original 
and  actual  or  personal,  and  (h)  regenerating  and  justifying 
the  soul,  by  adoption  making  the  Christian  an  heir  of  salva¬ 
tion.10  “The  energy  of  Baptism”,  says  Androutsos,  “is  that  of 
justification,  just  as  the  organ  by  which  we  receive  justifying 
Grace  is  Baptism.”  The  forgiveness  of  all  sins — not  only  the 
removal  of  guilt  and  punishment,  but  the  doing  away  with  the 
whole  body  of  sin — is  the  negative,  while  the  life-giving,  regen¬ 
erating  power  of  Grace  implanting  faith,  hope,  and  love  .  .  . 


1“But  not  as  himself  proffering  the  Grace,  as  some  wrongly 
hold,” — Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  55,  note  1,  and  cf.  Mesolora,  op.  cit., 
IV.  pp.  206-207. 

-’Androutsos,  ibid. 

3E.  g.,  Acts  2,  38;  8,  12,  16;  10,  48;  19,  5. 

4  vE/c5o<ns,  IV.  9,  quoted  by  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  56. 

5  Quoted  by  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  329-330,  references  ad  loc. 

e  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  56;  cf.  St.  John  Dam.,  loc.  cit.,  Mesolora, 
op.  cit.,  IV.  pp.  197-199;  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  332-333. 

7  Discussed  in  detail  by  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  pp.  211-215. 

8  Ibid.,  pp.  194-195,  and  cf.  Kritopoulos,  in  Mesolora,  I.  p.  320. 

*  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.f  p.  57. 

10  Cf.  St.  John  3,  6;  Tit.  3,  5;  Gal.  3,  26-28;  I  Cor.  12,  15;  St. 
Mark  16,  16;  1  St.  Pet.  3,  21. 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  PARTICULAR 


311 


is  the  positive  aspect  of  the  Grace  of  Baptism.1  These  two 
effects  of  Baptism  the  Fathers  and  Doctors  emphasize  and 
teach.2  “They  are  so  intimately  bound  together  that  no  one 
can  say  where  one  leaves  off  and  the  other  begins/53  for  “they 
together  constitute  one  indivisible  whole.554  It  has  been  the 
particular  genius  of  the  Greek  Fathers  to  lay  special  stress  on 
the  positive  effects  of  the  Grace  of  Baptism — as  regeneration 
(Tit.  3,  5),  and  illumination  (cf.  Heb.  6,  4;  10,  32), — while 
the  West  has  tended  more  to  emphasize  the  negative  side  of 
baptismal  Grace.3 4 5  Yet  the  Orthodox  Church  has  not  been  de¬ 
ficient  in  her  doctrine  of  the  remission  of  sins  by  Baptism,  but 
teaches  that  it  is  an  utter  extirpation  and  effacement  of  sin  in 
the  Christian:  ail  sin  is  done  away,  as  Dositheus  says.6  While 
this  is  true,  the  lust  of  the  flesh  still  remains  in  the  baptized, 
undestroyed.  This  impulse,  however,  is  not  in  itself  sinful, 
but  only  may  lead  to  sin,  if  the  will  cooperates  with  it.  The 
sinful  character  which  it  possesses  in  the  natural  man7  is  com¬ 
pletely  done  away  by  Baptism.  C oncupiscentia  remains  along 
with  other  difficulties  in  the  baptized — suffering,  pain,  and 
death — but  all  lose  their  fearful  and  absolute  character  by  rea¬ 
son  of  the  life  in  Grace.  As  pain  and  suffering  serve  the  Chris¬ 
tian  as  occasions  for  the  development  of  virtues,  so  concupis¬ 
cence — the  spark  which  may  enkindle  the  evil  passion,  the  in¬ 
stinct  or  desire  which  if  not  conquered  may  become  sin  if  the 
will  surrender — can  be  the  means  of  strength  and  spiritual 
development  if  the  Christian  cleaves  closely  to  God's  Grace.8 

1  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  320;  cf.  on  this  passage  Dyobouniotes’ 
comments  in  'H  Aoyp..  ’Av5p.  Kpiv.,  p.  54  and  ’O0eiX.  airavr.,  p.  132, 
and  Androutsos  in  loy/i.  MeX.,  A’,  p.  117;  Kritopoulos,  in  Mesolora,  op. 
cit.,  I.  pp.  321-322,  and  Mesolara,  op.  cit.,  IV.  pp.  207-8. 

2  Cf.  note  1,  p.  58  of  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  and  pp.  320-321  of 
Androutsos,  op.  cit. 

3  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  58. 

4  Androutsos,  p.  320. 

5  Ibid.,  p.  321  and  cf.  notes  for  references. 

6  Cf .  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  II,  p.  115. 

7  Cf.  Rom.  7. 

8  So  explicitly  in  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  322-324;  Mesolora  is 
more  guarded,  avoids  committing  himself  to  the  use  of  the  term,  which 
is  used  in  Protestant  formularies  which  he  discredits  {op.  cit.,  IV.  p. 
209),  but  accepts  the  idea,  e.  g :  ‘We  may  not  deny  that  there  remain 


312 


V.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 


From  the  nature  of  the  Grace  of  Baptism,  it  is  obvious  that 
it  is  universally  necessary  for  salvation.1  “He  who  receives 
not  the  seal  of  the  water  (of  Baptism)  .  .  .  cannot  enter  into 
the  Kingdom  of  Heaven."'  That  it  is  the  indispensable  means 
for  all  men  to  receive  salvation  is  apparent  from  Holy  Scripture 
and  the  Fathers.3  Without  it  man  cannot  he  saved,4  and  on 
the  basis  of  St.  Matt.  26,  25,  30,  and  5,  16,  “the  Church  has  re¬ 
garded  as  baptized  those  who  have  witnessed  to  the  Faith”  by 
martyrdom,  deeming  them  to  have  the  Baptism  of  bloodf  “An¬ 
other  extraordinary  means  to  serve  in  lieu  of  Baptism  by  water, 
which  we  Orthodox  disallow,”  says  Androutsos,  “but  the  West¬ 
ern  Church  recognizes — is  the  so-called  Baptism  of  desire 
There  is  no  authority  for  it  in  Holy  Scripture  or  Tradition." 

Since  the  Grace  of  Baptism  is  absolutely  necessary  for  all, 
the  sacrament  is  to  be  denied  to  no  one,  not  even  infants.7 
It  is  for  everyone,  irrespective  of  sex  or  age,  and  Infant  Bap¬ 
tism  became  normal  in  the  Church  just  so  soon  as  circumstances 
allowed  it.  As  original  sin  is  universal  and  the  need  for  re¬ 
lease  from  it  universal,  the  Church  wisely  and  justly  allows  in¬ 
fants  to  receive  the  Grace  which  cleanses  them  from  its  stain 

over  after  Baptism-  -  .certain  traces,  the  desire  of  the  flesh,  even  when 
original  sin  be  entirely  done  away... an  inclination  toward  evil,”  etc. 
(ibid.,  pp.  210-211);  Dyobouniotes  does  not  endorse  the  doctrine,  but 
gives  it  without  comment  as  Western  teaching  (op.  cit.,  p.  59).  The 
passage  from  the  synod  of  Jassy  referred  to  by  Mesolora  (ibid.)  forms 
a  rather  dubious  authority  for  the  doctrine  (q.  v.,  vol  II.  Mesolora, 
p.  40). 

1  E.  g.,  Dositheus  in  Mesolora  II.  p.  115;  Jeremiah  II.  ibid.,  I.  p.  140; 
Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  pp.  187-188;  St.  John  3,  5. 

2  St.  Cyril  Jer.,  Cat.  Ill,  2. 

'Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  324;  cf.  St.  Mark  10,  15,  10;  Acts  2,  28, 
22,  10;  Eph.  5,  10,  and  refs.  ibid.  (Androutsos). 

4  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  pp.  G0-G1. 

6  Ibid.,  and  cf.  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  320-327,  for  early  references 
to  the  recognition  of  it  by  the  Church.  “The  Feast  of  the  Infants 
slaughtered  by  Herod,  kept  by  the  Church  on  Dec.  29,  is  one  indica¬ 
tion  of  the  belief  of  the  Church  in  the  Baptism  of  blood,”  ibid.,  and  cf. 
Dyobouniotes,  pp.  02-63. 

8  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  327-328;  Dyobouniotes  (op.  cit.,  p.  63) 
gives  the  Latin  doctrine  without  comment  and  simply  presents  it 
objectively. 

7  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  45. 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  PARTICULAR 


313 


and  gives  them,  in  their  innocency,  the  equipment  to  fight 
victoriously  against  sin.1  Christ  received  little  children ;  the 
Old  Testament  prescribed  circumcision,  the  prototype  of  Bap¬ 
tism,  for  male  infants  on  the  eighth  day  of  their  life,  and  we 
know  that  whole  households  were  baptized  by  the  Apostles.2 
Not  only  the  legitimacy  but  the  necessity  of  Infant  Baptism 
is  attested  by  the  Fathers3  and  the  Symbolic  Books.4 *  “The 
little  ones  have  need  of  the  regeneration  of  Baptism,  since  they 
have  original  sin.  .  .  .They  are  capable  of  receiving  the  Grace 
of  Christ  since  they  are  unable  to  offer  it  any  personal  ob¬ 
stacle,  in  the  general  way  of  free-will  in  its  relation  to  Grace, 
which  when  there  is  no  opposition,  can  bring  about  its  effects 
unhindered/'"  Consequently  the  objections  to  Infant  Baptism 
cannot  have  great  weight.  These  may  be  reduced  to  two:  (a) 
infants  have  neither  consciousness  nor  faith,  and  so  cannot  be 
fit  recipients  of  Baptism;  (b)  Infant  Baptism  violates  the  free 
will  and  deliberately  disregards  the  possible  choice  of  the  chil¬ 
dren,  and  hence  is  reprehensible.  Against  these  it  may  be  urged 
that  according  to  Orthodox  doctrine  the  sacraments  act  in  every 
case  ex  opere  operaio  and  the  Protestants’  objection  proceeds 
from  the  falsely  reasoned  premises  of  their  doctrine  of  the 
sacraments.6  According  to  Mesolora,  “the  faith  of  the  offici¬ 
ant.  .parents,  .and  sponsors  makes  up  for  the  lack  of  it  in  the 
infant.”7  They  know  the  child’s  needs,  and  oversee  its  spir¬ 
itual  progress.  So  far  as  the  second  objection  goes,  it  is  equally 
groundless.  Just  as  parents  provide  the  necessary  physical 
cleansings  of  the  child,  supply  it  with  food,  guide  it  and  edu¬ 
cate  it  without  regard  to  the  will  of  the  child,  so,  having  in 
view  interests  far  higher,  they  provide  for  its  spiritual  regen- 

1  Ibid.,  p.  45. 

2Cf.  St.  Matt.  19,  14:  1  Cor.  1,  16;  Acts  10,  16,  18;  Mesolora 
op.  cit.,  IV.  p.  189. 

3  For  the  Fathers,  cf.  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  47 ;  Androutsos,  op. 
cit.,  p.  325  and  notes. 

‘  Symbolic  Books,  in  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  Jeremiah  II.  in  1.  p.  147; 
Kritopoulos^  ibid.,  p.  34;  Mogila,  ibid.,  p.  425;  Dositheus,  II.  p.  115. 

s  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  326,  substantially  repeated  by  Dyobouniotes, 
op.  cit.,  p.  50. 

6  Dyobouniotes,  ibid.,  pp.  47-49. 

7  Op.  cit.,  IV.  p.  191. 


314 


V.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 


eration,  and  oversee  its  spiritual  needs.1  As  to  the  state  of 
unbaptized  infants  the  Orthodox  Church  has  made  no  official 
pronouncement,  yet  inclines  to  the  view  that  “they  may  not 
inherit  the  Heavenly  Kingdom,  though  they  undergo  no 
punishment.”2 

“For  a  worthy  reception  of  Baptism  is  demanded,  ...  in 
the  case  of  adults,  a  two-fold  preparation, — Faith  in  the  Saviour 
and  in  Christian  Truth,  and  Repentance  and  the  conviction 
of  sin.”s  In  the  early  Church  preparation  for  Baptism  in¬ 
volved  a  course  of  instructions  and  a  period  of  testing, — the 
Catechumenate.  This  custom  has  left  its  trace  in  the  “prayers 
for  the  catechumens” ;  thereupon  follow  the  exorcisms,  renun¬ 
ciations,  and  recitation  of  the  Creed.4  This  moral  and  intel¬ 
lectual  preparation  is  compensated  for,  in  the  case  of  infants, 
by  their  state  of  personal  sinlessness,  their  receptivity,  and 
their  inability  to  offer  any  obstacles  to  the  working  of  Grace, 
since  “where  there  is  no  will,  or  where  Grace  finds  no  personal 
impediment,  it  can  operate  absolutely.’'5  “As  without  their  will 
they  share  by  nature  in  the  sin  of  the  author  of  the  race,  so 
much  more*  can  they  without  will  become  partakers  in  the 
redeeming  Grace  of  the  Saviour.”7  Androutsos  holds  that 
there  is  no  necessary  internal  bond  between  the  Grace  of  Bap¬ 
tism  and  the  faith  of  the  godparents,8  for  the  latter  are  to  ful¬ 
fil  the  lack  of  it  on  the  child's  part  “in  time".  Infants  are  not 
baptized  in  the  faith  of  their  sponsors  and  parents,  but  they 

1  Dyobouniotes,  ibid.,  p.  49-50;  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  325-326. 
On  the  institution  of  sponsors,  cf.  Dyobouniotes,  note  2.  p.  49 ;  Meso- 
lora,  ibid.,  p.  191,  pp.  211-212. 

2  Cf.  St.  Gregory  Nazianzen,  Orat.,  40,  23;  Response  of  Cyril  of 
Constantinople  in  1815  (Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  328,  note  3);  Con¬ 
stantine  Economos,  Kclttixv ffts  7?  op968o£os  SiSaaKaXia  rrjs  ir iarews,  Vienna, 
1813,  c.  15,  on  which  most  of  the  theological  opinions  are  based.  Cf. 
Androutsos,  loc.  cit.,  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  note  1.  pp.  61-62,  and  Meso- 
lora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  note  6,  pp.  187-188,  and  note  1.  pp.  219-220. 

3  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  335. 

4  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  pp.  211-212;  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  60. 

8  Androutsos,  Aoyp.  MeX.,  A’,  p.  136. 

6  On  this  phrase  cf.  Dyobouniotes’  criticism,  'H  Aoyp..  ’Av8p.  Kpiv., 
p.  55,  and  ’OcpeiX.  6lttclvt.,  p.  135. 

7  Androutsos,  AoypariKT],  p.  335. 

8  As  against  Mesolora,  quoted  above;  Macarius,  op.  cit.,  II,  p.  409, 
and  Economos’  Catechism,  p.  64  {op.  cit.). 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  PARTICULAR  315 

are  constituted  sharers  in  Baptism  looking  forward  to  the 
personal  acquisition  on  their  own  part,  of  such  faith.1  In  the 
case  of  both  infants  and  adults,  the  Grace  of  Baptism  is  like 
all  sacramental  Grace,  objective,  and  its  “energy  operates  in¬ 
dependently  of  the  faith  and  moral  condition  of  the  recipi¬ 
ent.”2  But  this  bestowed  regeneration  has  to  be  appropriated 
by  the  person  receiving  it,  in  order  that  it  may  become  his 
own  personal  possession,  and  be  capable  of  development.  “The 
apprehension  and  development  of  this  Grace  does  depend  on 
the  faith  and  moral  character  of  the  baptized.  Baptism  be¬ 
stows  regeneration,  but  as  it  were  in  germ,  and  it  has  need 
of  development  depending  on  the  soil  into  which  it  falls, 
that  is,  the  religious  and  moral  condition  of  the  person.1’3 

Inasmuch  as  Baptism  is  by  nature  something  like  physical 
birth,  which  may  only  occur  once,  so  as  spiritual  regenera¬ 
tion  it  can  only  take  place  once.4  Baptism  canonically  per¬ 
formed  may  not  be  iterated.5  This  is  the  teaching  of  the  Fa¬ 
thers,  for  example,  Tertullian :  denuo  ablui  non  licet,'’  St. 
John  Chrysostom :  “Just  as  it  is  not  now  possible  for  Christ 
to  be  crucified  again,  so  it  is  impossible  to  be  baptized  a  sec¬ 
ond  time’"7;  Theodore/  St.  John  Damascene,9  and  others. 
“'Like  the  priesthood”,  says  Dositheus,  “which  may  not  be 
received  twice,  so  one  who  is  once  rightly  baptized  may  not 
be  baptized  again,  no  matter  how  many  sins  he  may  fall 
into ....  If  he  wish  to  return  unto  the  Lord  he  receives  again 
the  adoption  which  he  lost,  by  the  sacrament  of  Penance.”10  Any¬ 
one  who  has  been  baptized  twice,  even  through  ignorance, 

1  Androutsos,  Aoy/iartKr/,  pp.  335-336. 

2  Dyobouniotes,  Ta  Nvarripui,  p.  59. 

sIbid.,  p.  60. 

4  Ibid,,  p.  63-64. 

*  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  p.  204. 

6  Re  poeniteniia,  1. 

7  Homily  9,  3,  on  the  Epistle  to  the  Hebrews. 

8  “As  Christ  suffered  once  for  all,  so  we  may  not  share  in  His  suf¬ 
ferings  but  once  only;  through  Baptism  we  are  buried  and  rise  with 
Him.  We  have  no  need  to  receive  Baptism  a  second  time”  (on  Heb. 
6,  6). 

9  ’'E/cScxrts,  IV.  9;  St.  Cyril  Jer.  IIpow.  eis  Karrjxv .  16;  Tertullian.  de 
Baptismo,  15. 

10  In  Mesolora,  II,  pp.  116-117. 


316 


V.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 


can  not  receive  Holy  Orders.1  So  questions  of  “rebaptism”  are 
not  properly  so  called,  for  they  only  describe  instances  in 
which  the  Church  has  properly  baptized  a  person  who  has 
not  received  the  sacrament  at  all.2  But  the  mere  fulfilment 
of  the  necessary  outward  signs  by  one  in  Orders  is  not  suffi¬ 
cient  to  make  a  Baptism  valid,  if  not  performed  inside  the 
Orthodox  Church.  The  question  of  the  recognition  of  Bap¬ 
tism  outside  the  Church,  is,  as  we  have  seen,  bound  up  with 
that  of  the  validity  of  the  priesthood,  and  “chiefly  with  the 
idea  of  the  Church  as  the  steward  of  divine  Grace.”3 

2.  The  Sacrament  of  Chrism 

The  sacrament  of  Chrism4  is  “that  divinely  instituted  rite 
by  which  the  bodily  members  of  the  baptized  person  are 
anointed,  and  his  incipient  spiritual  life  strengthened  and 
perfected”5 6  by  the  bestowal  of  the  gifts  of  the  Holy  Spirit.* 
It  is  actually  the  completion  and  perfection  of  the  sacrament 
of  Baptism,  the  “indispensable  and  necessary  complement”7 
of  that  sacrament,  “a  royal  seal  validating  as  well  as  con¬ 
firming  Holy  Baptism,  just  as  the  Amen  validates  and  con¬ 
firms  the  creed.”8  “Baptism,  the  birth  and  entrance  of  the 
Christian  into  the  spiritual  life  in  Christ,  is  completed  by 
the  bestowal  of  all  the  gifts  necessary  for  that  life”  and  by 
the  firm  establishment  of  the  steps  of  the  life  opened  up  by 
Baptism,  looking  forward  to  “the  long  course  of  spiritual  con- 

1  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit .,  p.  65. 

2  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  p.  204. 

3  Dyobouniotes,  ibid.,  cf.  additional  note  to  preceding  lecture  and 
the  section  on  Economy  in  this  present,  pp.  292  ff. 

4  Or  “Myrrh”  ( /ivpov ),  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV,  p.  219,  or  “Confirma¬ 
tion”  (/3e/3c»Wts),  Dositheus  in  Mesolora,  II.  p.  113;  other  names 

used  for  this  sacrament,  in  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  66;  Mesolora, 
IV.  pp.  222-223. 

6  Androutsos,  AoyptaTiKTi,  p.  336. 

6  Dyobouniotes,  Ta  Mvarr/pia,  p.  66;  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV,  p.  219; 
cf .  Mogila  ( in  Mesolora,  I.  pp.  425-426 )  :  “When  the  priest  anoints 
the  baptized  with  the  Holy  Myrrh,  the  gifts  of  the  Holy  Spirit  are 
poured  out  upon  him.  .  .By  this  unction.  .  .he  is  sealed  and  strengthened 
in  the  gifts  of  the  Holy  Ghost.” 

7  Mesolora,  IV.  p.  221. 

8  Kritopoulos,  in  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  I.  p.  321. 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  PARTICULAR 


317 


fiicts  in  the  Christian  warfare  into  which  it  leads  him.”1  As 
the  complement  of  Baptism,  the  rite  of  Chrism  is  always 
immediately  connected  with  the  administration  of  Baptism,2 
to  which  practice  Jeremiah  II.3,  Mogila,4 5  and  the  other  Sym¬ 
bolic  Books  bear  witness. 

The  evidence  in  Holy  Scripture  for  the  sacrament  is  found 
chiefly  in  Acts  8,  14-17  and  19,  2-6.°  In  two  other  passages, 
2  Cor.  1,  21,22  and  1  St.  John  2,  20,27,  occur  the  words 
“unction”,  “anointing”,  and  “sealed”,  which  some  Orthodox 
writers  quote  as  the  authority  for  the  use  of  anointing.  These 
texts  furnish  rather  flimsy  support,  as  Dybouniotes  admits,  who 
says  in  the  body  of  his  text :  “It  appears  that  the  inward  be¬ 
stowal  of  the  gifts  of  the  Holy  Spirit  is  made  by  means  of 
outward  anointing”,  but  in  the  note :  “One  cannot  be  sure 
that.  .  .  .these  texts  refer  to  an  external  anointing  with 
oil,  ...  as  the  words  in  Old  and  New  Testament  usage  often 
mean  simply  the  inward  anointing  without  the  outward.”6 
“These  passages”,  says  Androutsos,  “are  concerned  with  the 
inward  anointing  in  a  metaphorical  sense,  but  the  words  ‘con¬ 
firmation’  and  ‘unction’  seem  to  imply  an  outward  anointing 
by  which  the  Grace  of  the  Holy  Spirit  is  bestowed.”7  The 
evidence  in  Holy  Scripture  for  anointing  with  Chrism  can 

1  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  339.  His  definition  of  the  Grace  given 
in  Chrism,  which  “increases  and  strengthens  the  spiritual  life  of  the 
neophyte”  {ibid.),  Dyobouniotes  subjects  to  criticism  ('H  Aoy p.  ’A vdp. 
Kp.,  55),  saying  that  this  is  not  correct,  but  the  Grace  given  is  the 
Holy  Spirit  in  His  seven  gifts.  He  says  that  Androutsos  is  entirely 
under  the  influence  of  the  Roman  notion  of  Confirmation  (’0 0ei\. 
d-rravT.,  p.  136).  Androutsos  answers  that  he  is  defining  the  opera¬ 
tion  rather  than  the  nature  of  the  Grace  bestowed,  which  he  takes 
for  granted  as  being  the  gifts  of  the  Holy  Spirit  (±oyp.  MeX.  A’,  pp. 
141,  143). 

'Dyobouniotes,  Ta  'Mvarripi.a,  pp.  82-83. 

3  In  Mesolora,  I,  p.  426,  and  cf.  pp.  226,  228-229. 

4  Ibid.,  I  p.  321.  “According  to  the  practice  of  the  Orthodox  Church,” 
says  Androutsos  {op.  cit.,  p.  343),  “Chrism  is  inseparably  united  with 
Baptism .  .  .  This  truth  is  far  from  being  repugnant  to  Holy  Scripture, 
is  confirmed  by  it,  and  witnessed  to  clearlv  by  Tradition.”  For  his- 

*J  7  t/  V 

torical  evidence  cf.  loc.  cit.,  notes,  and  p.  344. 

5  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  337. 

6  Op.  cit.,  p.  71. 

7  Op.  cit.,  p.  336. 


.'*18  V.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 

be  based  only  on  these  two  texts.  That  Orthodox  writers 
have  felt  the  difficulty,  is  apparent  from  the  words  of  Jere¬ 
miah  II:  “The  sacrament  of  Holy  Myrrh  is  not  brought  out 
(ifufrepercu)  in  Holy  Scripture,  but  is  handed  down  by  the  dis¬ 
ciples  of  the  Word.”1  According  to  an  Orthodox  Tradition 
the  institution  of  the  sacrament  by  our  Lord  took  place  on 
Maundy  Thursday  night  after  the  Foot  Washing  and  before 
the  Institution  of  the  Last  Supper,2  hence  the  custom  of  the 
consecration  of  the  oil  on  this  day.3  This  view,  according  to 
Hyobouniotes,  is  “improbable”,  and  we  have  no  definite  in¬ 
formation  about  the  time  of  the  institution  from  Holy  Scrip¬ 
ture.4 5 

The  promises  of  the  gift  of  the  Holy  Spirit"  were  fulfilled 
at  Pentecost,  and  “the  Apostles  having  received  the  Holy  Ghost 
bestowed  Him  on  the  faithful  by  the  laying  on  of  hands.”6 
The  texts  from  Acts  referred  to  above  give  us  authentic  in¬ 
formation  of  the  fact  that  “the  Apostles  laid  their  hands 
on  the  baptized  in  order  to  convey  to  them  gifts  different  from 
those  bestowed  in  Baptism.”7  “This  laying  on  of  hands  and 
the  communication  of  the  gifts  of  the  Holy  Spirit  is  not 
something  of  a  passing  nature,  but  something  permanent,  the 
more  so  as  it  would  be  incomprehensible  for  the  bestowal  of 
the  regular  gifts  of  the  Holy  Spirit  by  the  laying  on  of  hands 
to  have  then  been  necessary  in  the  Apostles’  time  but  not 
afterwards.”8  The  Apostles  in  so  doing  must  have  been  carry¬ 
ing  out  a  command  of  our  Lord,  and  the  manner  of  the  act 
alone  would  indicate  that  “these  outward  acts  were  effectual 
means  of  Grace.”9  The  evidence,  then,  for  the  bestowal  of 
Grace  by  the  laying  on  of  hands  is  perfectly  clear,  and  the 
indirect  evidence  for  our  Lord’s  having  instituted  this  means 
is  equally  certain:  the  Apostles  were  not  observing  a  personal 

1  In  Mesolora,  I,  p.  142. 

2  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  pp.  225-226,  note  3. 

3  Ibid.,  pp.  332-333,  note  3. 

4  Op.  cit.,  p.  70,  note  1. 

5  E.  g.,  St.  John  13,  14,  15;  St.  Luke  24,  49  ;  Acts  1.  8. 

6  Acts  2 ;  Dvobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  pp.  66-67. 

7  Ibid.,  p.  68. 

8  Ibid.,  p.  69. 

9  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  337. 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  PARTICULAR 


319 


and  individual  ruling  made  by  themselves  for  “nothing  essen¬ 
tial  in  the  Christian  religion  was  commanded  by  them  save 
by  our  Lord’s  injunction.”1  The  question  then  arises,  granted 
the  evidence  for  the  bestowal  of  Grace  by  means  of  the  laying  on 
of  the  hands  of  the  Apostles,  (a)  is  this  the  same  thing  as  the 
sacrament  of  Chrism,  or  (b)  merely  the  conveyance  of  extra¬ 
ordinary  gifts  in  an  extraordinary  manner?  As  to  the  sec¬ 
ond,  it  is  clear  from  Holy  Scripture2  that  this  does  not  refer 
to  “the  special  gifts  given  only  to  certain  people  .  .  .  but  to  the 
regular  gifts  of  the  Holy  Spirit  indispensable  for  every  true 
Christian.”3  As  to  the  first,  it  is  abundantly  apparent  from 
the  evidence  of  the  Fathers,  who  “refer  the  sacrament  to  the 
afore-mentioned  passages  from  Acts,  ascribe  the  saving  energy 
of  the  Holy  Spirit  to  Chrism,  and  do  not  distinguish  it  from 
the  laying  on  of  hands”,4  that  this  laying  on  of  hands  by  the 
Apostles  is  the  sacrament  of  Chrism. 

The  evidence  from  the  Fathers  is  all  but  unanimous5 6 7  in 
speaking  of  the  sacrament  as  that  of  anointing  with  Chrism." 
So  too  the  evidence  of  the  early  Councils,  and  the  fact  that  the 
schismatic  bodies  which  split  off  from  the  Church  from  early 
times  until  the  4th  or  5th  centuries,  have  the  sacrament  of 
Chrism  as  it  is  observed  by  the  Orthodox.  “From  what  has 
been  said  above,”  continues  Dyobouniotes,  “it  becomes  clear 
that  both  Holy  Scripture  and  Tradition  recognize  Chrism  as 
a  sacrament.”'  Since  there  are  two  usages  in  question,  the 
laying  on  of  hands  and  anointing  with  Chrism,  the  question 
naturally  arises,  what  is  the  relation  of  the  two  “outward 
signs”  ?  Both  cannot  be  such,  for  in  “that  case  we  should 

1  Hvobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  70. 

2  E]  g.,  1  Cor.  12,  29;  St.  John  7,  33-40. 

3  Dyobouniotes,  ibid.,  pp.  68-69. 

4  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  337-338,  q.  v.,  for  patristic  references. 

5  “Only  Tertullian  ( De  Baptismo,  8),  Cyprian  (Epistle,  73),  and 
Augustine  (in  Migne,  P.  L.  21,  777)  mention  the  laying  on  of  hands 
as  a  constituent  element  of  the  sacrament”  (Androutsos,  op.  cit., 
p.  338) . 

6  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  73.  q.  v.,  for  patristic  evidence.  He 
quotes  Pope  Melchisedek  (f  314)  on  the  close  connection  of  Baptism 
and  Chrism,  by  implication  indicating  “Chrism”  rather  than  the  West¬ 
ern  “Confirmation”  by  a  Bishop  (p.  83,  note  3,  ibid). 

7  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  74,  references  in  notes. 


320 


V.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 


have  the  unique  and  singular  phenomenon  of  two  essential 
outward  signs  in  one  and  the  same  sacrament !  ...  Of  the  two, 
....one  must  constitute  the  essential  outward  sign.  . .  .Which 
of  the  two  it  is  not  easy  to  discover  from  Holy  Scripture, 
which  refers  to  both,1  or  from  Tradition  wdiich  is  (equally) 
indefinite  and  uncertain,  now  emphasizing  one,  and  now  the 
other,  and  sometimes  both.”2  “This  phenomenon”,  says  An- 
droutsos,  “may  be  explained  in  three  ways,8  either  (a)  the 
sacrament  was  originally  administered  by  the  laying  on  of 
hands,  but  later,  whether  by  definition  or  by  the  growth  of 
the  custom  in  the  Church,  the  anointing  came  to  be  the 
usage;  or(b)  Chrism  was  used  from  early  times  along  with 
the  laying  on  of  hands;  or(c)  the  Apostles  themselves,  hav¬ 
ing  at  the  first  performed  the  sacrament  by  the  laying  on  of 
hands,  afterwards  substituted  for  it  the  use  of  Chrism.”4  He 
finds  the  first  improbable  because  the  Church  does  not  change 
an  apostolic  ordinance,  and  there  is  no  evidence  of  the  intro¬ 
duction  of  the  change  anywhere  in  early  Church  history.  The 
second  is  equally  inacceptable,  for  the  lack  of  evidence  and 
because  of  general  improbability.  “The  third  hypothesis  is 
the  only  probable  one,  that  the  sacrament,  administered  by 
the  Apostles  by  the  laying  on  of  hands  in  the  early  Church 
with  its  small  numbers,  afterwards,  when  Christianity  began 
to  grow,  came  to  be  administered  through  Chrism  by  any 
priest.... If  certain  Churches  of  the  West  preserved  the  lay¬ 
ing  on  of  hands,5  the  custom  appeared  to  them  the  more  nec- 

1  Dvobouniotes  says  that  “the  sacrament  was  administered  in  the 
same  apostolic  time  by  the  laying  on  of  hands  of  the  Apostles  and  by 
Chrism”  (op.  cit.,  p.  71),  which  seems  rather  an  unwarranted  as¬ 
sumption,  on  the  basis  of  his  own  words  quoted  above. 

:  Op.  cit.,  pp.  71-72. 

Dvobouniotes  discusses  four  possible  ways  of  explaining  the  re¬ 
lation  of  the  two:  (a)  the  laying  on  of  hands  is  essential  and  anointing 
not  so,  (b)  anointing  essential,  and  the  laying  on  of  hands  not  essen¬ 
tial,  (c)  both  are  essential,  and  (d)  either  may  be  used  canonically 
(p.  72,  note  1). 

*'  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  338. 

6  Not  only  in  the  West,  but  elsewhere  as  well,  e.  g.,  Eulogius  the 
Patriarch  of  Alexandria  ( f  608 )  writing  to  Photius,  testifies  that  the 
“gift  of  the  Holy  Spirit  is  had  by  the  laying  on  of  hands”;  Simeon 
of  Thessalonica  refers  to  the  use  of  both  laying  on  of  hands  and 
Chrism. — cf.  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  75  note  2. 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  PARTICULAR 


321 


essary  in  that  Chrism  was  performed  bv  bishops.”1  Dyobouni- 
otes  holds  much  the  same  theory,  that  the  sacrament,  origi¬ 
nally  administered  by  the  Apostles  by  the  laying  on  of  hands, 
was  from  later  apostolic  times  administered  by  Chrism.  “Why 
this  snbstintion  was  effected  we  do  not  know.  .  The  opinion 
that  with  the  growth  of  the  Church  and  the  increase  of  her 
membership,  the  Apostles,  so  few  in  number,  were  unable  to 
cope  with  the  work  of  bestowdng  the  gifts  of  the  Holy  Spirit 
by  the  laying  on  of  hands ....  as  there  were  so  many  baptized 
scattered  about  over  many  places.  . .  .and  (consequently)  ruled 
that  the  sacrament  should  be  administered  by  presbyters  by 
means  of  oil  blessed  by  the  Apostles,  seems  not  improbable.’'2 

The  outward  signs  of  this  sacrament  are  “the  signing  of  the 
neophyte  with  the  Cross,  with  oil  blessed  by  the  Church  mixed 
with  other  oleaginous  substances  to  symbolize  the  manifold 
gifts  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  and  at  the  same  time  the  pronouncing  of 
the  words:  ‘The  seal  of  the  gift  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  Amen’.”3 
The  use  of  the  “myrrh”  or  “chrism”’,  now  made  of  some  forty 
sweet-smelling  ingredients,4 * 6  is  a  substitute  for  the  laying  on 
of  hands,  and  consequently  the  latter  .  .  .  “is  not  necessary 
in  the  administration  of  the  sacrament.’”  Mesolora  would  not 
say  that  the  laying  on  of  hands  is  abolished,8  but  that  its  sub¬ 
stitute  is  the  myrrh,  “made  by  the  laying  on  of  hands  of  the 
bishop  who  blessed  and  hallowed  it.”  According  to  Kritopou- 
los,  the  myrrh  must  be  prepared  by  the  bishops,  who  distribute 
it  to  the  churches  in  their  jurisdiction,7  and  to  Mogila,  it  must 


1  St.  Cyprian  testifies  to  “Chrism”  administered  by  the  Bishop 
with  the  laying  on  of  hands  ( Epist .  73,  9);  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp. 
338-339. 

2  Op.  cit.,  p.  72.  This  same  explanation  is  given  by  Mesolora.  op.  cit., 
IV.  p.  225.  On  the  basis  of  1  St.  John  7,  26-27,  and  2  Cor.  1,  21,  he 
concludes  that  Chrism  was  used  by  the  Apostles  (ibid.). 

3  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  341. 

4  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  77;  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  pp.  232-233. 

6  Dyobouniotes,  ibid.,  p.  75. 

6  Op.  cit.,  IV.  p.  234.  But  it  does  not  constitute  the  outward  sign 
of  the  sacrament,  according  to  Dyobouniotes:  “The  Grace  of  the  Holy 
Spirit  is  bestowed  by  the  myrrh  and  not  by  the  laying  on  of  hands” 
(op.  cit.,  p.  6  and  note  2). 

7  In  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  1,  p.  321. 


322 


V.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 


be  had  from  the  highest  bishop.1  This  is  an  early  usage,  as 
the  ruling  of  the  synod  of  Carthage  (318),  the  testimony  of 
the  Fathers,  and  of  the  early  heresies  shows.2  “The  consecra¬ 
tion  of  the  myrrh  belongs  from  ancient  customs  to  the  bishop; 
its  administration  to  the  priest.’'3 4  If  certain  Fathers  witness 
that  the  bishops  on  occasion  used  to  administer  the  sacrament, 
this  was  only  as  St.  Jerome  says:  ad  honorem  potius  sacerdotii 
quarn  ad  legis  necessitated!  *  “Each  autocephalous  Church  can 
bless  its  own  myrrh.  The  Church  of  Greece  receives  it  from 
the  Ecumenical  Patriarch  as  a  token  of  respect  to  him  and 
a  memorial  of  its  former  union  with  the  Patriarchate,”5  which 
Church,  says  Mesolora,  “we  call  Mother.”6  The  right  to  ad¬ 
minister  this  sacrament  is  inherent  in  the  priesthood  and  is 
bestowed  with  ordination.7  In  the  administration  of  the  sac¬ 
rament  the  priest  anoints  the  various  members  of  the  body  of 
the  baptized  with  myrrh  episcopally  consecrated,  at  the  same 
time  using  the  formula  given  above.  The  anointing,  done 
with  the  sign  of  the  Cross  on  the  different  parts  of  the  body, 
has  most  ancient  authority,  hence  the  Roman  custom  of  anoint¬ 
ing  the  forehead  alone  is  contrary  to  Tradition.8  The  words 
of  the  formula  come  from  Holy  Scripture  and  are  of  very 
early  origin.9 

The  gifts  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  which  constitute  the  Grace 
conveyed  by  the  sacrament,  are  enumerated  either  according 
to  Isaiah  11,  2,  3,  or  Gal.  5,  22.10  These  are  manifested  in  the 
recognition  on  the  part  of  the  recipient  of  Christian  verities, 
in  his  progress  in  the  spiritual  life,  and  in  his  growth  in  Chris- 


1  Ibid.,  p.  426. 

2  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  342,  with  copious  references. 

3  Dvobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  pp.  78-79. 

4  Androutsos,  ibid.,  St.  Jerome,  adv.  Lucifer,  9.  The  present  prac¬ 
tice  of  the  Roman  Church,  both  writers  claim,  is  anomalous  and  with¬ 
out  justification;  cf.  loc.  cit. 

5  Dvobouniotes,  ibid.,  p.  81. 

6  Op.  cit.,  IV.  pp.  232-233,  note  3. 

7  Dvobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  80  note  1. 

8  Ibid.,  pp.  77-78;  cf.  notes  and  ad  loc. 

9  Ibid.,  and  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  341. 

10  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  81. 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  PARTICULAR 


323 


tian  character.1  They  provide  against  the  contingencies  and 
difficulties  that  beset  the  Christian  in  the  course  of  his  war¬ 
fare  against  sin,  strengthen  him,  and  equip  him  for  this  strug¬ 
gle.2  It  is  the  complement  and  fulfilment  of  the  Grace  of  Bap¬ 
tism,  the  further  potential  development  of  the  Christian  life 
thereby  initiated.3  As  the  connection  with  Baptism  is  so  inti¬ 
mate  and  the  nature  of  the  sacraments  so  similar,  two  con¬ 
clusions  follow:  (a)  the  sundering  of  the  administration  of  the 
two  sacraments  in  the  West  is  totally  unjustifiable.  It  is  not 
only  not  primitive4  and  contrary  to  Tradition,5 6 7  but  illogical 
as  well.  If  it  be  argued  that  Confirmation  should  be  had  when 
the  child  has  come  to  an  age  to  understand,  why  does  not 
this  argument  apply  as  well  to  Baptism?  Yet  Infant  Baptism 
is  as  universal  in  the  Roman  as  in  the  Orthodox  Church.8  Fur¬ 
thermore,  both  Churches  regard  the  sacraments  as  functioning 
ex  opere  operator  (b)  The  sacrament  may  not  be  iterated, 
anymore  than  may  Baptism.8  Only  those  who  return  from 
heresy  having  once  been  anointed  in  the  Orthodox  Church, 
are  to  be  anointed  again.  This  is  the  principle  involved  in 
the  case  of  Orthodox  who  had  lapsed  into  the  Paulitian  heresy 
and  on  their  return  were  anointed  again.9 

“But  this  second  anointing,”  says  Dyobouniotes,  “neither  is, 
nor  may  be  regarded  as,  a  repetition  of  the  sacrament  of 
Chrism.”10  It  is  like  the  reception  of  ex-Arians  by  the  laying 
on  of  hands  in  the  Western  Church,  which  Pope  Gregory  I. 
distinguished  carefully  from  Confirmation.11  “Since  Chrism  is 
the  confirmation  and  as  it  were  the  complement  (lit.  “roofing 

1  Ibid.,  p.  82,  provided  of  course  he  cooperate  in  will,  and  act  with 
the  Grace  bestowed. 

2  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  339. 

8  Ibid.,  and  Dyobouniotes,  loc.  cit. 

4  “As  it  only  arose  in  the  13th  century,  as  an  innovation,”  Androut¬ 
sos,  op.  cit.,  p.  344. 

5  For  evidence,  cf.  ibid.,  p.  343. 

6  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  pp.  83-84. 

7  Ibid.,  and  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  344. 

8  Dyobouniotes,  p.  84;  cf.  Mogila,  in  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  I.  p.  426. 

9  Cf.  Rhalle  and  Potle,  Uvuraypa  tCjv  de'uov  teal  ieptiv  navovuv,  Athens, 
vols.  I.  and  II.  1852;  (vol.  II.  p.  169). 

10  Op.  cit.,  p.  84. 

11  Epist.  11,  67. 


324 


V.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 


in,,=£7rt<TTeyacr/xa)^  of  Baptism,  its  .  .  .  Grace  is  only  be¬ 
stowed  once.  .  .  In  the  cases  of  a  second  administration  of 
Chrism  to  those  coming  in  from  heresy  or  returning  from  it 
to  Orthodoxy,  .  .  .  there  is  no  iteration  of  the  sacrament, 
properly  speaking.  Those  who  come  from  heresy  are  anointed 
for  the  first  time,  for  even  if  they  had  previously  been  anointed, 
according  to  Orthodox  principle,  sacraments  administered  out¬ 
side  the  Church  are  invalid.  For  those  returning  to  Orthodoxy 
the  Chrism  is  the  service  of  readmission  of  penitents  into  the 
bosom  of  the  Church.”1  He  compares  the  anointing  of  Churches 
and  ikons  in  the  service  of  consecration,  to  this  use  of  Chrism 
in  the  case  of  the  returning  Orthodox  who  had  lapsed  into 
heresy  or  schism,  and  adds :  “This  intinction  with  myrrh  has 
never  been  considered  as  an  iteration  of  the  sacrament,  but  is 
as  it  were  the  rededication  of  the  new  life  of  those  returning 
to  Orthodoxy,  by  the  prayers  and  blessings  of  the  Church  and 
the  invocation  of  the  Holy  Spirit/12 3  The  anointing  of  a  king 
is  also  utterly  different  from  the  sacrament  of  Chrism,  as  it  is 
analogous  to  that  in  the  Old  Testament  and  bestows  the  Grace 
necessary  for  a  ruler  to  fulfil  his  office  and  duties.* 

3.  The  Holy  Eucharist:  (a)  Definition  and  Institution 

The  Holy  Eucharist,  “which  excells  all  the  other  sacraments 
and  is  more  than  all  of  them  necessary  for  our  salvation”4  is 
that  sacrament  “in  which  he  who  receives  the  Bread  and  Wine, 
consecrated  and  changed  by  the  priest  into  the  Body  and  Blood 
of  the  Lord,  receives  this  very  Body  and  Blood  of  Christ  for 
the  forgiveness  of  sins  and  eternal  life.”5 * *  Mesolora’s  definition8 
mentions  explicitly  the  “transubstantiated  Bread  and  Wine”, 
while  Androutsos  speaks  of  the  Real  Presence  of  our  Lord 

1  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  340. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  341,  and  cf.  note  3,  p.  339. 

3  Cf.  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  p.  231,  note  4,  quoting  Macarius;  Dyo- 
bouniotes  op.  cit.  p.  84. 

4Mogila,  in  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  I.  p.  427. 

6  So  Dyobouniotes,  Ta  Mvarripia,  p.  86.  The  last  phrase  (“for  the 
forgiveness  of  sins  and  eternal  life”)  is  part  of  the  sentence  of  ad¬ 

ministration  in  the  Liturgy, — cf.  ,E7/c6\7rtoj'  \eiTovpync6p,  Odessa,  1911, 

p.  91. 

8  Op.  cit.,  TV.  p.  244. 


# 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  PARTICULAR 


325 


“under  the  forms  of  bread  and  wine.”1  As  the  Great  Sacra¬ 
ment  of  the  Christian  Religion,  it  was  prefigured  and  fore¬ 
shadowed  in  the  Old  Testament.  Of  these  prophecies  and 
antitypes  the  chief  are:  (a)  the  Passover,  the  commemoration 
by  the  Jews  of  the  passing-over  of  the  Angel  to  slaughter  the 
First-born  of  the  Egyptians,  and  to  deliver  the  children  of 
Israel  from  bondage,  and  the  passage  of  the  Red  Sea.  “The 
celebration  of  Passover”,  says  Dyobouniotes,  “was  first  of  all 
a  propitiatory  sacrifice,  by  which  the  Jewish  folk,  conscious  of 
sin  .  .  .  sought  remission  of  sins,  and  also  a  sacrifice  of 
Thanksgiving,  by  which  the  people  gave  thanks  to  God  for 
their  deliverance  and  miraculous  salvation.”  The  fulfilment 
and  term  of  the  Passover  is  found  in  the  Passover  of  the  New 
Covenant,  as  the  paschal  lamb  was  the  foreshadowing  of  the 
true  Paschal  Lamb,  Christ.  (b)  The  Manna,  the  heavenly 
food,  is  a  type  of  Christ  who  gives  Himself  in  the  Eucharist 
as  the  true  Food  of  the  soul,  (c)  The  general  prophecies  in 
the  Old  Testament  concerning  the  true  sacrifice  found  their 
fulfilment  in  that  of  the  Eucharist,  (d)  “The  sacrifice  of 
Melchisedek  is  regarded  by  the  writer  of  the  Epistle  to  the 
Hebrews  ...  as  the  foreshadowing  of  the  true  Sacrifice,  the 
Holy  Eucharist.”2 

The  Divine  Institution  of  the  Eucharist  was  proclaimed  in 
advance  and  promised  by  our  Lord  Himself,  in  His  discourses 
in  St.  John  6, 3  of  which  vs.  32-51  may  be  taken  as  a  “discourse 
about  the  food  of  the  soul,  the  divine  teaching  made  available 
through  faith,  and  the  latter  part  (vs.  51-63),  as  a  discourse 
about  the  Holy  Eucharist  as  the  Body  and  Blood  of  Christ.”4 
Thus  may  be  explained  the  absence  of  the  account  of  the  In¬ 
stitution  in  St.  John,  for  his  Gospel  supplements  what  was  al¬ 
ready  set  down  in  the  first  three  gospels,  and  he  presents  here 
the  summary  of  the  doctrine  of  the  Eucharist,  to  be  taken  not 
allegorically  nor  generally,  but  literally  and  specifically.5  The 
account  of  the  Institution  we  have  explicitly  in  four  places 

1Op.  cit.,  p.  344,  subjected  to  a  very  sharp  criticism  by  Dyobouni¬ 
otes,  which  will  be  discussed  later. 

2  Ta  MvcrripLa,  pp.  94-95. 

3  Mesolora,  IV.  p.  254. 

4  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  90,  note  1. 

6  Ibid.,  pp.  89-90,  and  cf.  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  346. 


326 


V.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 


in  the  New  Testament — St.  Mark  14,  22-24;  St.  Matt.  26, 
26-28;  St.  Lnke  22,  19-20;  and  1  Cor.  11,  23-25.1  It  is  not 
necessary  here  to  summarize  the  well-known  words,2 3  but  to  call 
attention  first  to  what  they  do  not  mean  and  then  to  what  they 
do. 

The  words,  “this  is  my  body  ....  this  is  my  blood”, 
may  not  be  taken  metaphorically,  as  if  the  word  is  meant 
“shows”,  “stands  for”,  “represents”,  or  the  words  my  body  .  . 

my  blood  meant  “the  likeness  of”  my  body . of  my 

blood ,  or  as  if  the  demonstrative,  this,  meant  i(this  bread  under¬ 
stood  in  a  spiritual  and  symbolic  sense”.  “These  metaphorical 
interpretations  are  alike  arbitrary  and  erroneous.”8  As  against 
these  conceptions  it  may  be  urged :  while  the  copula  is  may  some¬ 
times  bear  an  allegorical  significance,  as  obviously  it  does  in 
Gen.  41,  26  ff.,  or  Gal.  4,  24,  yet  “the  reasons  involving  the  ac¬ 
ceptance  of  an  allegorical  sense  do  not  prevail  here;  .  .  .hence 
the  literal  meaning  is  the  natural  and  unforced  one.”  Espe¬ 
cially  must  it  be  interpreted  literally  in  this  case,  as  it  is  the 
sense  in  which  the  Apostles  and  the  Church  have  always  taken 
it.  To  impugn  their  understanding  of  our  Lord’s  meaning 
would  be  to  shake  the  very  basis  of  faith  in  Him,  as  if  our 
Lord  in  the  Institution  of  the  Eucharist  spoke  so  enigmatically 
and  figuratively  that  His  very  Apostles  misunderstood  Him.4 5 
Besides  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  the  same  small  word  could  in 
the  same  passage  serve  both  as  a  copula  and  as  implying  the 
meaning  “represents”  or  “stands  for”.6  The  notion  that  my 
body  meant  the  “likeness”  or  “figure”  of  my  body,  is  also  im¬ 
possible  :  there  is  no  symbolic  resemblance  between  bread  and 
the  human  body,8  nor  do  the  wands  body  and  blood  in  Greek 
ever  mean  “figure”  or  “representation”  of  the  body  and  blood.7 

1  The  Narrative  of  the  Institution  in  the  Liturgy  presents  an  in¬ 
teresting  conflated  text  based  on  all  four  accounts,  together  with  some 
few  additions  not  there  found;  cf.  ’^kSXttiov,  pp.  78-79  (St.  John 
Chrysostom). 

2  Cf .  Dyobouniotes,  pp.  87-89. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  92. 

4  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  348. 

5  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  82. 

8  Androutsos,  ibid.,  p.  349. 

7  Dyobouniotes,  ibid.,  p.  93. 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  PARTICULAR 


327 


As  a  symbol,  the  Passover  would  have  been  far  better  and  more 
comprehensible.1  Furthermore,  ‘‘in  the  institution  of  the  great¬ 
est  sacrament  of  the  New  Testament  .  .  .  our  Lord  would 
have  taken  care  that  the  terms  He  used  in  founding  and  es¬ 
tablishing  this  sacrament  should  be  clear  and  free  of  possible 
misinterpretation,  since  at  that  time  He  was  ‘speaking  plainly 
and  not  in  proverbs5.2  Besides,  what  would  the  words  take, 
eat,  .  .  .  drink  ye  all  of  it,  mean,  if  the  bread  and  wine  of 
the  Eucharist  were  simply  ‘signs  and  likenesses5  of  His  Body 
and  Blood?  How  could  the  Eucharist,  if  bestowing  no  more 
than  the  Passover,  be  the  fulfilment  of  it?  Finally  such  pas¬ 
sages  as  1  Cor.  10,  3  ff.,  and  11,  27,  show  plainly  that  the  Words 
of  the  Institution  must  be  taken  in  their  obvious  and  usual 
sense.**3  It  is  clear  from  the  circumstances  and  purpose  that 
our  Lord  was  not  speaking  figuratively  or  symbolically,  and 
the  overwhelming  unanimity  of  evidence  demands  the  literal 
and  proper  sense  of  these  words.4  This  is  clear  also  from 
a  consideration  of  the  discourse  in  St.  John  6,  wdiich  prophetic 
message  confirms  the  strict  and  simple  interpretation  of  the 
words  of  the  Institution.’  The  words,  eat  my  flesh,  have,  it  is 
true,  another  meaning  in  the  Old  Testament,  namely,  “to 
slander55,6 7  but  this  is  obviously  inapplicable  here.  It  is  quite 
certain  that  the  words  must  be  taken  as  the  people  of  Caper¬ 
naum  understood  them,  in  their  obvious  and  clear  meaning 
with  prophetic  application  to  the  Eucharist,  the  promise  of 
which  they  convey.  This  is  the  sense  in  which  the  Fathers  have 
always  taken  the  passage.' 

The  interpretation  the  Church  has  always  put  on  the  New 
Testament  text  is  that  born  out  and  testified  to  by  Tradition : 
it  was  our  Lord  who  instituted  the  Eucharist,  and  His  words 


1  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  349. 

■E.  g.,  St.  John  16,  29. 

3  Dyobouniotes,  ibid.,  p.  93. 

4  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  349. 

5  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  pp.  89-90,  e.  g.,  vs.  55:  “My  flesh  is  truly 
food  and  my  blood  truly  drink”  (A.  V.  translates  aXgdus,  indeed; 
W.  H.  has  aXgdTjs, — adj.  instead  of  adv. ). 

6E.  g.,  Ps.  27,  2  (LXX  26,  2)  ;  Mic.  3,  3;  Ezek.  59,  17,  18;  St.  Jas. 
5,  3. 


7  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  346-347. 


328 


V.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 


mean  that  the  bread  and  wine  are  changed  into  His  Body  and 
Blood.  This  is  the  simple  and  obvious  interpretation  of  the 
passages  in  the  Hew  Testament,  and  is  the  clear  teaching  of 
the  Church  from  the  earliest  times.  The  bread  and  wine 
could  not  be  considered  ordinary  bread  and  wine,  “but  the  very 
Body  and  Blood  of  the  Lord”.1 2  This  belief  is  shown  in  the  rev¬ 
erence  paid  to  the  Consecrated  Species,  in  the  preference,  by 
Christians,  of  death  to  the  betrayal  of  them  to  the  heathen.3  St. 
Ignatius  is  quite  clear  in  teaching  that  the  Eucharist  is  the 
Body  of  the  Saviour :  “the  Medicine  of  immortality,  the  Pre¬ 
ventative  (‘Antidote’)  of  death.”3  So  too,  St.  Justin  Martyr,4 
St.  Irenaeus,5  and  St.  Cyril  of  Jerusalem,  who  say:  “That 
which  seems  bread  is  not  bread,  even  if  it  is  so  perceived  by  the 
taste,  hut  is  the  Body  of  Christ.”6  This  was  taught  by  St. 
Gregory  of  Nyssa,  and  by  the  Ecumenical  Councils.7  All  the 
early  liturgies  give  the  same  testimony,  even  those  of  the 
early  heretics  and  schismatics.8 9  This  teaching  may  be  summed 
up  as:  the  belief  in  the  Beal  Presence  of  our  Lord  and  in  the 
Change  (Conversion)  of  the  elements  into  TIis  Body  and  Blood? 


(b)  The  Doctrine  of  the  Change  (Conversion), 
or  Transubstantiation 

The  early  teaching  of  the  Fathers  and  the  Church  regard¬ 
ing  the  Change  (Conversion),  or  their  doctrine  of  the  Real 
Presence ,  was  neither  explicit  nor  fully  developed.  If  certain 
passages  culled  out  of  their  context  seem  to  imply  doctrine  not 
in  accord  with  what  came  to  be  explicitly  defined  by  the  Church 

1  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  96. 

2  Ibid. 

3  Ad  Smyrnos  7;  ad  Eplies.  20;  ad  Philad.  4;  cf.  Androutsos,  op. 
cit.,  p.  350,  note  2. 

4  Apol.  1,  66. 

*Adv.  Baer.,  IV,  18;  V,  2. 

6  Cat.  22-3,  6,  9. 

7  Cf.  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit. 

8  Ibid.  ' 

9  Androutsos  uses  the  former  more  frequently,  while  Dyobounio¬ 
tes  uses  the  latter,  cf.  op.  cit.,  passim.  Mesolora  adheres  strictly  to  the 
word  transubstantiation. 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  PARTICULAR 


329 


— such  as  Tertullian's  use  of  repraesentare,  figura  corporis,1 
and  St.  Augustine's,  of  signum,  figura  corporis  et  sanguinis, 
sacramentum  memoriae 2 3 — “such  phrases,”  says  Dyobouniotes, 
“do  not  represent  the  teaching  of  these  very  Fathers  ...  as 
the  investigation  of  their  teaching  as  a  whole  plainly  shows.” 
Tertullian  elsewhere  “emphasizes  and  teaches  the  Change”,* 
as  does  St.  Augustine  explicitly  in  other  passages.4  “If  the 
Fathers  spoke  .  .  .  about  the  Eucharist  without  clearness 
and  definiteness,  such  passages  may  not  be  taken  to  mean  .  . 

.  that  the  Real  Presence  was  not  universally  taught  .  .  . 

but  that  it  had  not  yet  been  subject  to  question,  and  that  theo¬ 
logical  definitions  which  were  exact  and  definitely  formulated 
had  not  been  formed”.0  The  same  remarks  made  above  in  re¬ 
gard  to  Tertullian  and  St.  Augustine  apply  as  well  to  the 
teaching  of  the  Alexandrian  School,  for  Origen  and  St.  Clem¬ 
ent,  in  spite  of  a  phrase  here  and  there  cut  out  of  its  context, 
did  teach  the  doctrine  of  the  Change.8  The  early  terminology, 
says  Dyobouniotes,  clearly  demonstrates  the  conviction  of  the 
Fathers  as  to  the  fact  of  the  Change,  for  example,  the  words : 
“become”  (St.  Athanasius)  “to  become  other”  (hepav  ytyvecrOaL 
in  Theodoret),  “to  be  re-formed”  (peTaTroidadai,  St.  Gregory  of 
iNyssa),  “to  be  converted'5 6,  “transelemented”  ([xeTao-TOixetovaSai) , 
“transfigured55,  and  the  like.7  All  such  words  take  the  Change 
for  granted,  and  the  various  terms  are  simply  phrases  of 
equal  force  and  significance,  to  mean  the  Change  (peTafSoXrj) , 
but  do  not  show  the  manner  of  its  accomplishment.8  “As  to 

1  Adv.  Marc.  1,  14,  et  3,9;  4,  14;  on  whicli  Androutsos  says:  “If 
these  words  do  not  apply  to  the  elements  before  consecration,  they 
are  said  in  the  symbolic  use  peculiar  to  the  Fathers,  according  to 
which  a  symbol  did  not  stand  for  something  not  there  but... mani¬ 
fested  something  actually  existing  in  the  symbol”  (op.  cit.,  pp.  350-351 ) . 

2  On  Ps.  3;  contra  Adimantum,  12,  3;  contra  Faustina,  10,  21; 
Epi8t.  23. 

3  E.  g.f  de  pud.  9;  de  idol.  7;  de  orat.  6,  etc. 

*  De  Civitate  Dei,  21,  20,  et  al.;  Enarr.  in  Ps.  33;  contra  adv.  leg. 

et  proph.,  2,  33;  contra  Cresc.,  1,  5;  cf.  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  98. 

6  Androutsos  op.  cit.,  p.  98. 

8  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  pp.  98-99. 

7  Ibid.;  for  the  fuller  list,  cf.  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  353,  and  Meso- 
lora.  op.  cit.,  IV.  p.  271,  note  2  (and  p.  272). 

8  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  99. 


330 


V.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 


the  manner  in  which  the  Presence  of  the  Lord  is  effected  in 
the  Eucharist”,  says  Mesolora,  “the  primitive  Church  never 
defined/'1  as  Dyobouniotes  also  states  emphatically.  The  vari¬ 
ous  attempts  made  in  the  early  Church  “to  illuminate  the 
doctrine  of  the  Change  and  make  it  accessible  to  human  reason” 
were  futile  and  doomed  to  failure.2  Thus  St.  Irenaeus,  and  St. 
Cyril’s  attempts  were  unhappy/  as  the  method  and  manner  of 
the  Change  are  not  within  the  power  of  our  minds  to  apprehend. 

Orthodox  thought  has  always  held  strongly  to  this  posi¬ 
tion,  saying  with  St.  John  Damascene:  “If  now  you  ask,  how 
the  bread  becomes  the  Body  of  Christ  and  the  wine  and  water 
His  Blood?  I  say,  the  Holy  Spirit  descends  and  achieves  it, — 
(an  accomplishment),  above  reason  and  comprehension.  .  . 
The  bread  and  wine  are  not  Types’  of  His  Body  and  Blood .  . 

.  but  His  Body  and  Blood  in  very  fact  .  .  .”4  “The  bread 
and  wine  .  .  .  are  by  the  invocation  and  descent  of  the  Holy 
Spirit  converted  into  the  Body  and  Blood  of  Christ.”5  “But 
the  manner  of  this  Change  is  unknown  to  us  and  inscrutable: 
the  solution  and  explanation  are  reserved  for  the  elect  in  the 
Kingdom  of  Heaven.”6  This  reverent  agnosticism  is  the  char¬ 
acteristic  of  Orthodox  writers  generally,  from  St.  John  Damas¬ 
cene/  who  says  that  the  manner  of  the  Change  cannot  be 
searched  out,  to  the  present  day  Orthodox  theologians,  who  reit¬ 
erate  this  view.8  But  this  attitude  of  reserve  has  not  hindered 
a  growth  in  explicitness  and  definiteness  in  regard  to  the  doc¬ 
trine  of  the  Change. 

In  a  rather  sweeping  indictment  of  Androutsos'  definition 
of  the  Eucharist  (that  it  is  “that  divinely  instituted  sacrament 
in  which  Jesus  Christ  is  present  actually  and  really  under  the 
forms  of  bread  and  wine”/),  Dyobouniotes  says:  “This  expres- 

1  Op.  cit.,  IV.  p.  269,  and  cf.  Dyobouniotes,  ibid.,  and  p.  101. 

2  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  353-354. 

3  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.}  pp.  99-100. 

*  ''EkSocis,  IV.  14. 

5  Jeremiah  11,  in  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  I.  p.  228. 

6  Kritopoulos,  ibid.,  p.  327. 

2  "E/cSocm,  IV.  13. 

8  On  which  all  lay  emphasis, — Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  354 ;  Mesolora, 
op.  cit.,  IV.  pp.  269  ff.,  but  especially  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  pp.  99, 
101  ff. 

•  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  344. 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  PARTICULAR 


331 


sion,  .  .  .  used  frequently  by  the  writer,  ...  is  based  on 
the  Roman  doctrine  ...  of  transubstantiation,  and  cannot 
be  accepted  in  the  Eastern  Church,  whose  Fathers  teach  that 
the  bread  and  wine  are  changed  (converted),  into  the  Body  and 
Blood  of  Christ  .  .  .  (Our  Lord)  said:  “Take  eat,  this  is 
my  body/  not  ‘ under  this  is  my  body’  .  .  .  If  we  repudiate 

in  every  way  the  Protestant  attempt  to  interpret  these  words 
to  mean  this  ‘represents,  stands  for’  .  .  .  how  much  less  may 
we  dare  to  substitute  under  this  for  His  word,  ‘this?”1  .  .  . 
Dyobouniates  expounds  his  views  at  length  in  his  ’O^aAo/xevr? 
aTravTr/aLs,  and  as  they  represent  his  individual  teaching  they 
may  be  summarized  here.  He  says  that  the  conviction  of  the 
Change  was  accepted  and  known  in  the  early  Church;2  that 
in  the  4th  century  new  terms  came  into  use,  yet  without  any 
attempt  to  search  deeper  into  the  manner  of  the  Change,  but 
only  further  to  express  the  fact.3 4 5 6  In  the  Western  Church, 
from  the  11th  century  on,  there  began  to  be  developed  the  the¬ 
ory  of  transubstantiation  as  an  attempt  to  explain  the  Change. 
This  is,  in  brief,  that  the  substance  of  the  bread  and  wine  is 
changed  into  that  of  the  Body  and  Blood  of  Christ,  while  the 
accidents  (color,  taste,  etc.)  remain.  In  the  15th  century 
the  Eastern  Church  took  over  the  term  without  the  theory,  and 
used  it  as  synonymous  with  the  term  “Change”  (Conversion) 
(fiera(3oXr])  .*  “The  Eastern  Church,”  he  says,  “does  not  recog¬ 
nize  that  the  substance  of  the  bread  and  wine  is  changed  into 
the  Body  and  Blood  of  Christ  while  the  accidents  remain,  un¬ 
der  which  the  Body  and  Blood  of  Christ  exist,  but  simply  says 
that  the  bread  and  wine  are  changed  into  the  Body  and  Blood 
of  Christ  by  the  descent  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  through  whom 
these  things  surpassing  reason  and  understanding  are 
achieved.”"  He  quotes  Dositheus’  Confession  as  showing  that 
the  manner  of  the  Change  is  incomprehensible  to  us,  and  de¬ 
nies  that  the  Orthodox  Church  holds  that  the  substance  of  the 

1  'H  \oy  par  ikt)  tov  k.  ’A vdpovraov  KpivofjLevrj,  p.  58. 

2P.  142. 

3P.  143. 

4Pp.  143-144. 

5  P.  144,  quoting  St.  John  Damascene, "ExSocns,  IV.  14. 

6  In  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  1.  p.  119.  * 


332 


V.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 


elements  is  changed,  but  asserts  that  she  teaches  that  “the 
elements  as  a  whole  are  changed  into  the  Body  and  Blood  of 
Christ,  without  searching  into  the  manner  of  the  Change.”1 
Hence  the  phrase  under  the  forms  of  bread  and  wine  is  errone¬ 
ous  and  wrong.  The  theory  of  transubstantiation,  he  says  fur¬ 
ther,  is  “contrary  not  only  to  the  teaching  of  Holy  Scripture 
and  Tradition,  but  to  the  natural  sciences  and  the  universal 
experience  of  man.”  He  goes  on  to  criticize  the  distinction  of 
substance  and  accidents  as  “a  false  and  incomprehensible  the¬ 
ory  of  the  nature  of  bodies.”2  This  same  position  he  develops 
at  length  in  his  treatment  of  the  Eucharist,  where  he  calls  the 
Roman  doctrine  of  transubstantiation,  taken  over  from  Hilde- 
bert  of  Tours,  the  “attempt  to  explain  the  manner  of  the 
Change,”  on  the  basis  of  an  ancient  philosophy  which  distin¬ 
guished  substance  and  accidents .8  “The  Western  Church  uses 
the  word  ...  to  present  its  own  peculiar  theory  of  the  man¬ 
ner  of  the  Change  of  the  bread  and  wine  into  the  Body  and 
Blood  of  Christ,  .  .  .  while  the  Eastern  Church  uses  it  as 
equivalent  to  the  term  ‘'Change’,  and  still  continues  to  believe 
as  did  the  primitive  Church,  that  the  manner  of  the  Change 
is  incomprehensible  to  the  human  mind.”4  He  quotes  the 
same  passage  of  Dositheus’  Confession,  in  which  the  latter 
states  that  the  term  transubstantiation  (jue-nnmwo-is)  does  not 
explain  the  manner  of  the  Change,  and  refers  to  Kritopoulos/ 
Macarius,®  Chrysostom  Papadopoulos,7  and  the  Synod  of  1691 
(Constantinople).8  The  word,  according  to  him,  means  thq 
same  as  “Change,”  does  not  explain  the  manner  of  the  Change, 
and  may  not  be  used  to  imply  the  distinction  of  substance  and 
accidents  and  the  Change  of  the  substance  of  the  elements 

1  Op.  tit.,  p.  145. 

2  Pp.  145-146. 

3  Ta  MvcTTjpia,  pp.  100-101. 

4  Ibid.,  p.  101. 

6  Quoted  above  p.  330  from  Mesolora,  op.  tit.,  I,  p.  327. 

*  “The  word  transubstantiation  does  not  explain  the  manner....  of 
the  Change, ...  for  no  one  can  understand  it  save  God...  The  word 
means  that  the  Bread  and  Wine  are  changed  (converted)  by  the 
Consecration  into  the  Body  and  Blood  of  Christ”  [op.  tit.,  II.  pp.  405  ff. ). 

7  Aocr ideos,  Uarpiapxvs  'lepoaoXvpuav,  Jerusalem,  1907,  pp.  27-28,  who 
is  much  of  Dyobouniotes’  mind,  judging  from  the  passage  quoted. 

8  On  which,  cf.  Mansi-Petit  ( Contil .)  vol.  XXXVII,  cols.  465  ff. 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  PARTICULAR 


333 


while  the  accidents  remain-1  “All  of  the  bread  and  wine  is 
changed,”  says  he,  “into  the  Body  and  Blood  of  Christ,  and 
not  only  a  part  of  them.”2  He  inveighs  again  against  the  schol¬ 
astic  theory,  quotes  St.  John  Damascene  again,  and  the  part  of 
Dositheus’  Confession  twice  referred  to.3 

In  all  the  above  it  is  exceedingly  difficult  to  acquit  Dyo- 
bouniotes  of  misrepresenting  the  facts.  For  one  thing,  he 
quotes  frequently  one  passage  from  Dositheus’  Confession ,  and 
entirely  omits  to  mention  the  following:  “(In  the  Eucharist) 
the  Lord  Jesus  Christ  is  present  not  typically,  nor  symboli¬ 
cally,  nor  figuratively  .  .  .  nor  contingently  .  .  .  but 

truly  and  really,  so  that  after  the  consecration  of  the  bread  and 
wine,  they  are  converted,  transubstantiated,  transformed, 
changed — the  bread  into  the  very  same  true  Body  of  Christ, 
which  was  born  in  Bethlehem  of  Mary  ever-Virgin,  which  was 
baptized  in  Jordan,  suffered,  was  buried,  rose  again,  etc. — 
the  wine  is  converted  and  transubstantiated  into  the  very  true 
Blood  of  Christ  which,  when  He  was  crucified,  was  poured 
out  for  the  life  of  the  world.  Yet  after  the  consecration  of 
the  bread  and  wine,  the  substance  of  the  bread  and  wine  no 
longer  remains,  but  the  Body  and  Blood  of  Christ,  in  the  form 
and  type  of  the  bread  and  of  the  wine,  that  is  to  say,  under  the 
accidents  of  the  bread.  .  .  The  Body  and  Blood  of  Christ 
are  cut  and  divided  by  hands  and  teeth  accidently,  or  accord¬ 
ing  to  the  accidents  of  bread  and  wine,  in  which  they  are  con¬ 
fessed  to  be  visible  and  tangible,  but  in  themselves  to  remain 
undivided  and  inseparable.”4  “The  word  transubstantiation 
means  .  .  .  not  that  an  accident  of  the  bread  and  wine  is 

transformed  into  an  accident  of  the  Body  and  Blood  of  Christ, 
but  that  truly,  actually,  and  substantially  the  bread  becomes 
His  Body  and  the  wine  His  blood.”5  Androutsos’  definition, 
including  the  phrase  under  the  forms  of  bread  and  wine,  is 
justified  by  reference  to  Mogila  who  uses  the  words :  “under 

1  Op.  cit.,  pp.  102-103. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  105. 

3  Ibid.,  pp.  105-106. 

4  Section  17  of  the  Confession,  in  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  II.  p.  117. 

6  This  is  the  immediate  sequence  of  the  passage  quoted  by  Dyoboun- 
iotes,  in  fact  the  latter  half  of  the  same  sentence  of  which  he  quotes 
only  the  first  part  (p.  119,  ibid.). 


334 


V.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 


the  appearance  (Oewplav)  of  bread  and  wine”,1  and  “under 
the  covering  (lit.  vestment,  garment — evSvpa),  of  bread  and 
wine.”2  In  his  rejoinder  to  Dyobouniotes’  criticism  Androut- 
sos  quotes  Macarius,  Antonius,  and  Rhosse,  as  being  in  agree¬ 
ment  with  his  position,3  as  was  Dyobouniotes  himself  at  an 
earlier  period.4 

The  doctrine  of  transubstantiation,  that  is,  “that  the  ele¬ 
ments  are  changed  into  the  Body  and  Blood  of  the  Lord,  and 
only  their  outward  forms  remain”,  is  held  in  common  by 
both  the  Eastern  and  Western  Churches.5 *  It  is  based  funda¬ 
mentally  on  the  words  of  the  Institution.  “The  words  this 
is  my  body  .  .  .  this  is  my  blood,  literally  .  .  .  taken  do 
not  mean :  ‘in  the  bread  exists  my  body’  and  ‘in  the  wine  my 
blood’  .  .  .  but :  That  which  is  given  you  is  in  its  substance 
(tear  overlay )  my  body’,  or  (which  is  the  same  thing),  That 
which  appears  to  you  to  be  bread,  is  my  Body ’  etc.”8  The 
Lutheran  doctrine  is  without  force  and  absolutely  unjustifi¬ 
able  :  the  elements  cannot  contain  the  Body  and  Blood  of 
Christ,  for  there  is  no  suggestion  that  our  Lord  intimated 
that  this  would  be  the  case,  nor  is  there  any  natural  conform¬ 
ity  in  the  nature  of  bread,  that  it  should  be  understood  to  con¬ 
tain  a  human  body.  This  is  cannot  by  any  stretch  of  logic 
be  referred  to  an  unseen  and  supernatural  content  of  the  bread. 
It  is  clear  on  exegetical  grounds  that  the  words  of  our  Lord 
signify  a  Change,  and  not  consubstantiation.7  The  term  tran¬ 
substantiation,  originating  probably  with  Hildebert  of  Tours, 
in  1134,  speedily  became  part  of  Western  terminology.8  It 
seems  first  to  have  been  used  in  the  East  by  Michael  Paleolo- 
gus  (tl282)  in  writing  to  Pope  Gregory  X.  Gennadius  Schol- 
arius  (11460),  in  his  homily  on  the  Body  of  our  Lord,  uses 
the  word,  saying  that  it  was  identical  with  the  Western  theory 

1  In  Mesolora,  I.  p.  420. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  428. 

3  Aoyixa.TLK.al  MeXerat,  A’,  pp.  122-123. 

4  Cf.  Dyobouniotes,  ’loapv^s  6  Aafxaai <r,vos,  p.  152. 

5  Androutsos,  Aoy/xaTLKri,  pp.  351-352. 

«lbid.,  p.  352. 

7  Androutsos,  AoyfxaTiKTj,  pp.  351-352. 

8  Note  1,  ibid. 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  PARTICULAR 


.  .  .  “the  change  of  substance  into  Substance  occurring  in  an 
instant  (by  the  words  of  Consecration),  while  the  accidents 
remain  unchanged.”1 2 3  As  we  have  seen,  it  appears  explicitly 
with  the  distinct  and  characteristic  meaning  attached  to  it,  in 
Dositheus’  Confession,  and  in  the  17th  century  its  use  became 
widespread,  as  the  only  possible  word  to  deny  Protestant  heresy 
and  at  the  same  time  affirm  the  Orthodox  belief.  Mogila  says: 
“Immediately  upon  the  words  (of  Consecration),  transub¬ 
stantiation  takes  place,  and  the  bread  changes  into  the  true 
Body  of  Christ,  and  the  wine  into  His  true  Blood.  There  re¬ 
main  only  the  forms  by  which  they  appear,  and  this  is  accord¬ 
ing  to  the  divine  economy  .  .  .  that  we  may  believe,  though 
we  may  not  see  how  these  words  (are  true)  :  'this  is  my  Body."' 
Before  Dositheus,  manv  Greek  writers  had  used  the  term — 
George  Coresius,  the  Protosynkellos  Dionysius,  Gabriel  of  Phil¬ 
adelphia,*  and  also  Maximus  of  Cytheraea,  Meletius  Pigas, 
Patriarch  of  Alexandria,  and  Nectarius  of  Jerusalem.  The 
latter  are  quoted  by  the  Synod  of  Constantinople  in  1691,  which 
strongly  vindicated  the  use  of  the  term,  as  not  being  a  novelty, 
and  having  good  Orthodox  authority  for  its  use,  saying : 
“This  term  the  Church  employs  constantly  from  one  end  to 
the  other,  nor  has  anyone  protested  against  its  use  by  the 
Church  save  heretics.”4  Mesolora  constantly  uses  it,  and  says: 
“We  believe  and  maintain  .  .  .  that  after  the  consecration 
.  .  .  the  bread  and  wine  (even  though  after  their  external 
form  .  .  .  and  taste  they  still  seem  to  be  such),  in  their  es¬ 
sence  are  the  Body  and  Blood  of  the  Lord,  who  is  present  truly 
and  really  in  the  Holy  Eucharist.  This  Change  or  conversion 
is  generally  called  transubstantiation  .  .  “The  Orthodox 
and  the  Westerns  accept  the  Real  Presence  of  the  Body  and 
Blood  of  Christ,  transubstantiated  by  the  coming  down  of  the 
Holy  Spirit.  ...  We  hold  that  after  the  consecration  (there 
is)  the  transubstantiation  of  the  Holy  Gifts  .  .  .  into  the 

1  Dyobouniote*,  op.  cit.,  p.  101,  note  1. 

2  In  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  p.  427. 

3  Palmieri,  op.  cit.,  I,  p.  500  quoting  Simon,  Fides  ecclesiae  Orien- 
talis,  p.  119. 

*  In  Mansi-Petit,  XXXVII,  col.  465. 

R  Op.  cit.,  IV.  p.  271. 


336 


V.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 


Body  and  Blood  of  Christ  under  the  accidents  of  bread  and 
wine.”1 *  Everywhere  he  speaks  of  the  transubstantiation  of  the 
elements,  for  example,  in  his  definition  of  the  sacrament/  and 
elsewhere,  in  preference  to  using  ‘‘Real  Presence”  or  “Change”.3 

Essentially  there  then  is  no  distinction  in  Orthodox  teach¬ 
ing  between  the  Orthodox  doctrine  of  transubstantiation  and 
the  Roman  doctrine,4 5  the  only  difference  on  this  point  between 
West  and  East  being  one  of  temperament :  the  Orthodox  disa¬ 
vows  any  attempt  to  explain  the  manner  of  the  Change,  but 
uses  the  term  and  maintains  the  theory  of  transubstantiation. 
Such  evidence  as  that  of  the  Symbolic  Books — some  implicitly, 
others  (Mogila  and  Dositheus),  explicitly — of  many  ecclesi¬ 
astical  writers,  and  all  modern  theologians  (except  Dyobounio- 
tes),  to  the  fact  that  the  doctrine  of  transubstantiation  is  part 
of  the  official  teaching  of  the  Orthodox  Church/  tends  to  dis¬ 
credit  the  contentions  advanced  by  Dyobouniotes.  In  short, 
the  teaching  of  the  Orthodox  Church  as  to  the"  Real  Presence 
is  indistinguishable  from  that  of  the  Roman  Church  as  de¬ 
fined  in  the  Council  of  Trent.  Putting  the  matter  in  another 
way,  both  Roman  and  Orthodox  Churches  agree  distinctly  and 
explicitly  in  their  doctrine  of  the  Holy  Eucharist,  and  define 
it  in  the  term  and  by  the  theory  involved,  as  transubstantia¬ 
tion. 


(c)  The  Eucharist  as  Sacrament 

The  Eucharist  is  distinguished  from  the  other  sacraments 
not  only  by  reason  of  its  preeminent  and  unique  character, 
in  that  our  Lord’s  presence  is  vouchsafed  “not  in  the  way  of 
superabounding  Grace  as  in  the  other  sacraments  .  .  .  but 

1 P.  288. 

-  Ibid.,  p.  244. 

3  E.  g.,  p.  263,  p.  266,  p.  286,  etc. 

4  Aoy/juiTucai  MeXerai,  A’,  p.  122;  A07 /xar lkt} ,  pp.  351-352;  Mesolora, 
loc.  tit. 

5  Even  Kritopoulos,  in  his  section  on  the  Eucharist  (under  the 
title,  “The  Lord’s  Supper”),  cannot  be  regarded  as  teaching  anything 
less  than  this  doctrine,  despite  the  obviously  irenic  form  in  which 
his  Confession  is  cast  and  its  predominantly  apologetic  aim,  as  dis¬ 
tinguished  from  the  purely  objective,  dogmatic,  polemic,  and  didatic 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  PARTICULAR 


337 


truly  and  really”,1  whereby  He  gives  Himself  “as  spiritual  food 
for  the  faithful,  quickening  the  soul  and  leading  man  into 
immediate  fellowship  with  Him”,2  but  in  the  peculiar  and  dis¬ 
tinctive  difference  which  characterizes  the  Eucharist  as  both 
a  sacrament  and  a  sacrifice.  The  eucharistic  nomenclature 
clearly  manifests  this  two-fold  aspect :  as  sacrament  is  it  called 
in  accordance  with  its  various  aspects,  Eucharist  or  Blessing 
( euAoyta) ,  .  .  .  the  Lord’s  Supper,  with  reference  to  the  time 
of  the  Institution,  the  Body  of  Christ  and  the  Holy  Cup ,  by 
reason  of  the  Real  Presence  of  our  Lord’s  Body  and  Blood, 
Communion  and  Viaticum,  because  of  its  action  and  results; 
as  sacrifice,  it  is  termed,  the  Sacrifice,  the  Oblation ,  with  vari¬ 
ous  adjectives  qualifying  these  nouns,  for  example,  holy,  rea¬ 
sonable,  mystic,  unbloody,  and  the  like.3  In  it  is  revealed  both 
the  superabounding  love  of  God  for  man,  as  well  as  His  wis¬ 
dom”,4  which  correspond  in  general  to  the  two  aspects  of  the 
Eucharist. 

As  a  sacrament  the  Eucharist  possesses  the  three  consti¬ 
tuent  features  of  sacraments  in  general — the  outward  signs, 
the  minister,  and  the  Grace  bestowed.  The  outward  signs  or 
the  “matter”5  of  the  sacrament  include  the  proper  elements, 
bread  and  wine,  and  the  prayer  of  consecration.  Following 
our  Lord’s  example  we  may  be  certain  that  bread  and  wine 
must  be  used,  and  the  Church  in  early  times  forbade  the  use 
of  any  other  matter  than  this.6  The  bread  for  the  Eucharist 
must  be  leavened,  may  not  be  unleavened,7  and  must  be  wheat- 
en.  The  evidence  for  the  use  of  leavened  bread  may  be  sum- 

character  of  other  Confessions ;  cf.  in  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  I,  pp.  322- 
330.  It  was  as  a  scientific  theological  term  that  transubstantiation  was 
formally  adopted  into  the  official  formulations  of  Orthodoxy;  cf.  Papa- 
doupolos,  op.  cit.,  p.  30. 

1  Dositheus,  in  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  II,  p.  117. 

2  Kephala,  XpujroXoyia,  p.  197. 

3  Androutsos,  Aoyp.a.Tu<i ),  pp.  344-345. 

4  Mesolora  op.  cit.,  IV.  p.  244. 

5  So  ibid.,  p.  255. 

6  Dvobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  108. 

7  Kritopoulos  devotes  several  pages  to  proving  that  leavened 
brea’d  is  the  only  proper  element  for  the  Eucharist  (in  Mesolora,  I.  pp. 
322-326)  and  specifies  that  it  must  be  in  one  loaf,  “as  Christ  is  one 
.  .  His  Body  one.  .  .and  we  are  one  in  Him”  (p.  326  ibid.). 


t 


338  V.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 

marized  as  follows :  it  was  leavened  bread  which  our  Lord 
used,  as  the  Institution  took  place  on  Thursday  the  13th  of 
Nisan  and  the  use  of  unleavened  bread  began  the  next  night, 
the  eve  of  the  Passover  (on  the  Sabbath)  ;*  the  symbolism  of 
the  Eucharist  would  be  both  more  effective  and  more  appropri¬ 
ate  if,  in  the  sacrament  which  was  to  be  universal  in  scope  and 
for  all  times,  the  bread  used  were  that  common  to  all  men, 
and  not  that  peculiarly  associated  with  the  distinctive  rite 
of  a  certain  people  at  one  particular  season  ;1  the  use  of  our 
Lord  and  of  the  early  Church*  must  be  maintained,  and  there 
is  no  reason  justifying  the  innovation  made  by  the  West  in 
the  11th  century;4  not  only  does  the  universal  practice  of  the 
early  Church,  the  rubrics  in  the  early  liturgies,  and  the  prac¬ 
tice  of  Orthodoxy  show  an  unvarying  use  of  leavened  bread, 
but  the  liturgies  and  usages  of  the  early  heresies  also  prove 
the  same/  Even  up  to  the  11th  century  the  Western  Church 
used  leavened  bread/ 

The  wine  of  the  Eucharist  must  be  grape  wine,  pure,  and 
red  in  color.7  As  our  Lord  used  a  “mixed  chalice'7  the  prac¬ 
tice  of  the  Church  has  followed  His  example,  on  the  basis 
also  of  St.  John  19,  34/  This  was  enjoined  by  several  early 
councils/ 

The  prayer  which  constitutes  the  other  part  of  the  out¬ 
ward  sign  of  this  sacrament  is  that  which  is  the  essential  ele¬ 
ment  in  the  liturgy.  “For  the  sanctification  of  the  Precious 

*Cf.  St.  John  18,  28. 

3  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  363. 

*  Dyobouniotes  claims  that  the  Apostles  and  the  primitive  Church 
used  leavened  bread  only, — op.  cit.,  p.  109. 

*  “The  use  of  unleavened  bread  was  introduced  in  a  later  time 
among  the  Latins  in  opposition  to  and  as  a  distinction  from,  the 
Orthodox  Church  from  which  they  had  split  off”  ( Dyobouniotes, 
op.  cit.,  note  1.  p.  110). 

5  Ibid.,  p.  110. 

*  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  p.  256,  and  cf.  his  whole  discussion,  pp 
255-259. 

7  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  111. 

8  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  363. 

9  E.  g.,  Carthage  397,  and  that  “in  Trullo”  (2uvo5os  UevOeKrrj,)  692; 
cf.  note  3,  Androutsos,  ibid.;  cf.  also  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV,  pp. 
259-261. 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  PARTICULAR 


339 


Gifts/’  says  Dyobouniotes,  "it  is  certainly  necessary  that  the 
whole  liturgy  be  read,  especially  the  secret  prayer,  but  chiefly 
(necessary  is)  the  prayer  to  God  for  the  Change  of  the  bread 
and  wine  into  the  Body  and  Blood  of  Christ  by  the  operation 
of  the  Holy  Spirit,  by  which  the  Sanctification  and  Change  of 
the  elements  is  effected.”1  While  the  whole  liturgy  constitutes 
the  rite  or  the  service  of  the  Holy  Eucharist,2 *  the  part  which 
follows  the  Liturgy  of  the  Catechumens,  properly  beginning 
with  the  sursum  corda,  is  the  central  section  of  it  and  essential 
part  of  it.8  According  to  Mesolora,  the  narrative  of  the  Insti¬ 
tution  and  the  Consecration  "constitute  one  and  the  same  in- 
divisable  act,  the  consummation  of  the  sacrament  of  the  Holy 
Eucharist  in  which  the  bread  and  wine  are  transubstantiated 
into  the  Body  and  Blood  of  Christ.”4 5  "After  the  historical 
account  of  the  Institution  .  .  .  the  celebrant  prays  and  sup¬ 
plicates  God  to  send  His  Holy  Spirit  on  him  that  he  may  be 
fit  to  offer  the  reasonable  and  bloodless  Sacrifice,  and  over 
the  gifts  .  .  .  which  he  blesses,  he  says  ‘and  make  this  bread 
the  Precious  Body  of  thy  Christ  .  .  .  and  that  in  this  cup 
the  Precious  Blood  of  thy  Christ’,  and  blessing  both  the  forms, 
says  ‘changing  them  by  thy  Holy  Spirit’.6 7  At  this  ...  in¬ 
stant,  through  the  prayer  and  blessing  of  the  officiant,  the 
bread  is  transubstantiated  into  the  Body,  and  the  wine  into 
the  Blood  of  our  Lord,  God,  and  Saviour,  by  the  coming  down 
of  the  Holy  Spirit  and  by  His  power  and  operation.”6  The 
whole  liturgy  is  a  preparation  and  fulfilment  directed  toward 
the  consecration  of  the  Holy  Gifts/  which  is  effected  at  that 
instant  when  the  officiant  prays  God  to  send  the  Holy  Spirit 
.  .  .  to  change  them  into  the  Body  and  Blood  of  Christ.8 

The  words  of  Institution  form  only  the  introduction,  and  the 
prayer  for  the  Holy  Spirit  "constitutes  the  essential  part  of 

1Op.  cit.,  p.  115. 

2  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  p.  261. 

8  Ibid.,  p.  262. 

4  Ibid.,  p.  263. 

5  Cf.  ’'EyKoXiriov,  pp.  80-81. 

a  Ibid.,  p.  264. 

7  Cf.  Jeremiah,  11,  in  Mesolora,  I,  p.  157. 

8  Mesolora,  IV.  pp.  265,  266. 


340 


V.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 


the  Liturgy.”1  The  epiklesis  is  contained  in  practically  all 
the  early  Liturgies,  which  unite  with  the  testimony  of  the  Fath¬ 
ers,  the  early  Church,  and  even  the  heretical  Liturgies,  in  af¬ 
firming  that  the.  Consecration  is  effected  by  it  and  not  by  the 
words  of  Institution.2  “So  all  the  Confessions  of  our  Church”, 
says  Mesolora,  “teach  with  one  accord  that  the  bread  and 
wine  are  transubstantiated  into  the  Body  and  Blood  of  Christ, 
through  the  operation  of  the  Holy  Spirit  whom  the  officiant 
invokes.  .  .  After  these  words  the  transubstantiation  is  ef¬ 
fected  immediately.”3  Consequently  the  Orthodox  Church  re¬ 
jects  the  novel  teaching  and  practice  of  the  Roman  Church  in 
ascribing  the  Consecration  to  the  words  of  Institution,  “which 
do  not  constitute  the  outward  sign  of  the  sacrament.”4 

From  what  has  been  said  certain  doctrinal  and  practical 
conclusions  follow,  (a)  After  the  consecration  the  bread  and 
wine  “have  been  supernaturally  changed  into  the  Body  and 
Blood  of  Christ,  and  they  are  not  two,  but  one  and  the  same.”5 
“The  bread  is  not  only  changed  into  the  Body  but  also  into  the 
Blood  of  our  Lord,  and  the  wine  not  only  into  His  Blood  but 
into  His  Body  as  well.”  This  is  shown  by  the  practice  in  ex¬ 
traordinary  circumstances  of  communicating  the  sick  under 
one  species  alone.6  (b)  “Not  only  is  Christ  present  whole  and 
entire  under  both  kinds,  but  in  every  particle  of  the  bread  and 
the  wine.”7  The  subdivided  Elements  are  not  so  many  parts 
of  His  Body  and  Blood  but  each  is  “our  Lord  entire,  perfect 
God  and  perfect  Man.’”  (c)  Therefore  “one  and  the  same  Body 
and  Blood  of  the  one  Christ  exist  everywhere  in  all  the  Churches 
.  .  .  where  the  Eucharist  is  celebrated.”8  (d)  His  Pres- 

1  Androutsos,  op.  cit .,  pp.  3G3-364. 

2  For  patristic  quotations,  the  evidence  of  early  liturgies,  etc.  cf. 
Androutsos,  ibid.,  and  notes,  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  pp.  114-116, 
and  notes. 

3  Op.  cit.,  IV.  p.  268;  cf.  Mogila,  in  Mesolora,  I.  p.  427;  Jeremiah 
II.  ibid.,  pp.  156-157,  228,  229;  Dositheus,  ibid.,  II.  pp.  117-119,  etc. 

4  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  116;  cf.  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  pp. 
267-268,  and  notes. 

5  Jeremiah  II.  in  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  I.  p.  228. 

6  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  112. 

7  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  354-355. 

8  Dositheus,  in  Mesolora,  II.  p.  118. 

9  Androutsos,  ibid.,  p.  355,  and  cf.  Dositheus,  loc.  cit. 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  PARTICULAR 


341 


ence  does  not  cease  with  the  end  of  the  Liturgy,  as  is  wrongly 
imagined  by  heretics,  but  “just  as  a  piece  of  cloth  once  dyed 
remains  of  the  same  fixed  color  which  may  not  be  washed  out,  so 
the  Consecration  in  this  sacrament  abides  always  ineffaceable.” 
“The  Reserved  Sacrament  does  not  lose  its  consecration  which 
it  received  once  for  all”,  but  this  remains  indelible.1  The 
practice  of  Reservation  is  a  definite  indication  of  the  faith 
of  the  Church  in  this  regard,  for  “after  the  Consecration  the 
Body  of  the  Lord  remains  the  same,  before  being  used,  in  be¬ 
ing  used,  and  after  it.”2  (e)  The  Real  Presence  of  our  Lord 

is  not  dependent  upon  Communion,  for  “our  Lord  in  giving 
the  Bread  and  Wine  .  .  .  was  present  in  them  before  the 
Apostles  communicated.”3  At  the  Institution  our  Lord  gave 
His  disciples  His  very  Body  and  Blood,  and  the  Eucharist  of 
the  Church  to-day  is  essentially  and  fundamentally  identical 
with  the  First.4  As  then,  so  it  is  now:  He  is  present  before 
and  independently  of,  the  communion  of  the  faithful.5  (f)  The 
belief  of  the  Church  is  further  manifested  “in  the  reverence 
and  worship  of  the  Eucharist  as  such,  independently  of  Com¬ 
munion.”'6  The  faithful  pay  worship  to  the  Holy  Gifts  after 
they  have  been  consecrated,  and  the  Church,  by  virtue  of  the 
Presence  of  our  Lord,  “abiding  under  the  form  of  bread  and 
wine”,  is  not  a  meeting  place,  but  the  house  of  God.  “This 
worship  belongs  to  the  Consecrated  Elements,”  .  .  .  says 

Androutsos,  “not  abstractly  but  concretely,  in  their  union  with 
the  Person  of  the  Word  of  God.7  As  the  human  nature  of  our 

1  Kritopoulos,  in  Mesolora,  I.  p.  329. 

2  Dositheus,  ibid.,  II.  pp.  118,  119;  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  128; 
Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  355.  The  Mass  of  the  Presanctified  is  another 
proof  of  the  Church’s  doctrine  on  the  subject,  cf.  Androutsos,  loc.  cit., 
and  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  pp.  226-227,  note  1,  and  Dyobouniotes,  loc. 
cit. 

3  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  355. 

4  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  91  note  1. 

5  Ibid.,  p.  127. 

6  Ibid. 

7  Against  this  expression  and  its  context  Dyobouniotes  brings  to 
bear  two  charges:  (a)  Androutsos  seems  to  speak  of  the  union  of  our 
Lord  with  the  elements,  and  (b)  consequently  teaches  the  theory  of 
a  spiritual  Presence  and  Communion,  as  against  the  Orthodox  view  of 
the  Change  of  the  elements  into  His  Body  and  Blood,  which  does  not 


342  V.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 

Lord  is  an  object  of  worship  not  as  regarded  in  itself,  abstractly, 
but  by  virtue  of  the  hypostatic  union,  ...  so  the  Holy  Gifts 
are  worshipped,1  not  as  viewed  of  themselves,  but  by  reference  to 
the  Person  of  the  God-man  to  whom  they  belong.  .  .  His 
Presence  with  soul  and  Divinity  ...  in  every  particle  of 
the  Consecrated  Elements  ...  is  implied  in  the  Church's 
doctrine  of  His  Eucharistic  Presence.  .  .  But  the  Bread  is 
not  converted  into  His  Soul  but  into  His  Body,  .  .  .  and 

neither  element  .  .  .  into  His  Divinity.  Neither  before  the 
Institution  nor  after  the  Resurrection  were  His  Body  and 

Blood  separated  .  .  The  Risen  Christ,  into  whose  Body  and 

Blood  the  Elements  are  transmuted,  never  dies,  having  a  spir¬ 
itual  and  glorified  Body  undivided  from  His  Blood.  In  the 
Eucharist  He  is  present  with  all  His  constituent  elements, 
His  soul  and  His  Divinitv,  .  .  .  Bodv  and  Blood  undivided ; 

.  .  .  division  and  multiplicity  belong  to  the  forms  of 

bread  and  wine.  .  .  So  the  fraction  of  the  Host  or  the  di¬ 

vision  of  the  Reserved  Particles  is  not  regarded  as  a  new  break 
or  division  of  the  supernatural  Food,  but  a  Communion  of  the 
Christ  entire.”2 

With  regard  to  the  question  here  involved,  whether  the  Pres¬ 
ence  of  our  Lord  in  each  particle  of  the  Bread  and  Wine  oc¬ 
curs  before  or  after  the  Fraction  and  Division  of  the  Ele¬ 
ments,1  Androutsos  seems  to  hold  the  former  view.  Those 
arguing  for  the  latter,  use  as  an  illustration  the  breaking  of 

exist  “in”  or  “under”  them,  but  involves  the  statement  that  “each 
particle  of  Bread  and  Wine  is  Christ”  CH  A07/U.  ’A.v5p.  npiv.,  p. 
56).  Androutsos’  rejoinder  is  that  this  distorted  and  twisted  per¬ 
version  of  his  meaning  would  be  impossible  if  one  take  into  account 
his  further  statements:  that  our  Lord’s  Presence  is  without  bodily 
extension,  but  nevertheless  real  and  actual,  and  not  merely  “spiritual” 
(in  the  Calvinistic  sense  which  Dyobouniotes  imputes  to  him, — ’0<p€i\. 
dTrai>TT)ais,  pp.  120-122).  Dyobouniotes’  reiteration,  elaborated,  will  be 
found  on  pp.  136-141  of  his  ’O <pei\.  aTrdvTTjais, 

1  “The  Body  and  Blood  of  our  Lord  in  the  sacrament  of  the  Euchar¬ 
ist  must  be  reverenced  exceedingly  and  adored  with  worship  (Xarp*v- 
tikCjs),  for  the  same  reverence  is  due  the  Holy  Trinity  and  the  Body  and 
Blood  of  our  Lord”  (Dositheus,  in  Mesolora,  II,  p.  118). 

3  Androutsos,  &oyp.a.TiKT],  pp.  356-368. 

3  Dyobouniotes  presents  both  views  in  a  foot-note,  without  espousing 
either  {op.  cit.,  pp.  112-113,  note  2). 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  PARTICULAR 


343 


a  mirror  which  when  whole  reflects  one  single  image,  and  after 
being  broken,  each  fragment  completely  reflects  the  whole 
ima°'e.  Those  who  defend  the  former,  hold  that  the  Presence 
of  onr  Lord  is  like  that  of  the  soul  in  the  body,  nowhere  local¬ 
ized  but  yet  everywhere  present ;  so  in  the  Eucharist  our 
Lord  is  everywhere  present  in  the  Elements  after  consecra¬ 
tion.  The  view  that  He  becomes  present  in  each  particle  after 
the  fraction  would  seem  to  imply  a  second  Change  of  the  Ele¬ 
ments.  In  any  case,  says  Androutsos,  “the  apprehension  of 
the  sacrament  of  the  Eucharist  is  impossible  for  our  under¬ 
standing.”  Our  Lord  is  not  circumscribed  by  the  elements,  nor 
is  He  present  with  physical  extension.  The  analogies  and  il¬ 
lustrations  used  in  the  attempts  to  reason  out  this  mystery, 
such  as  a*  “second  creation”,  “natural  change”  (the  figure 
drawn  from  nourishment  by  food),  “spiritual  regeneration”, 
are  all  alike  futile.  “In  the  Eucharist  one  substance,  losing 
its  own  being,  is  converted  into  another  which  previously  ex¬ 
ists.  .  .”  Consequently  the  examples  and  likenesses  adduced 
have  no  resemblance  or  essential  similarity.  We  may  come  to 
the  knowledge  of  this  Mystery  only  through  faith.1 

Certain  practical  consequences  result  from  the  doctrines 
given  in  summary  above.  No  liturgical  recognition  follows 
upon  the  recitation  of  the  words  of  Institution,  but  after  the 
epiklesis  the  celebrant  and  congregation  all  worship  and  adore 
our  Lord  under  the  forms  of  bread  and  wine.2 3  The  Holy  Com¬ 
munion  is  given  to  all  the  baptized  who  are  prepared  to  receive 
It,  in  both  kinds.  Infant  Communion  is  based  upon  St.  John 
6,  53,  and  is  vouched  for  by  the  primitive  practice  of  the 
Church.8  As  it  is  absolutely  necessary  for  salvation,  every  bap¬ 
tized  person  has  the  right  to  receive,  and  there  is  no  reason 
why  infants  should  be  denied  that  privilege.  “It  is  the  prim¬ 
itive  and  devout  practice  of  the  Church.”4 *  The  words  of  St. 
Paul  in  1  Cor.  11,  29,  cannot  be  applied  to  forbid  the  Euchar¬ 
ist  being  administered  to  children,  “since  from  their  age  they 

1  Op.  cit.,  358-360. 

3  Not  prescribed  by  rubric  ad  loc.,  but  an  almost  universal  custom. 

3  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  365  and  cf.  evidence  in  Dyobouniotes, 

4  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  p.  291. 

op.  cit.,  p.  127. 


344 


V.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 


are  unable  to  distinguish  the  Body  and  Blood  of  our  Lord 
(from  ordinary  food),  and  in  consequence  are  incapable  of 
making  unworthy  Communions."1 2  The  arguments  against  it, 
based  on  the  lack  of  faith  on  the  part  of  infants,  cannot  be 
held  to  apply,  since  the  Sacraments  do  not  depend  upon  the 
faith  of  the  recipient  but  work  ex  opere  operato*  The  same 
arguments  both  for  and  against,  apply  equally  to  Infant  Bap¬ 
tism  and  Chrismation.  “If  infants  are  capable  of  receiving 
Baptism  .  .  .  they  ought  to  be  entirely  fit  to  receive  the  Eu¬ 
charist."3  Consequently  Orthodoxy  repudiates  as  a  novelty  and 
perversity  the  innovation  in  Church  custom  introduced  by  the 
Latin  Church,  of  restricting  Communion  to  those  of  more  ad¬ 
vanced  age.4  Withholding  the  cup  from  the  laity  is  again  a 
modern  innovation  of  the  Roman  Church,  unjustified  by  neces¬ 
sity  or  expediency,  and  lacking  precedent  and  authority  in 
ancient  usage.  The  Roman  innovation  is  both  arbitrary  and 
irreverent.5 6  The  Orthodox  custom  is  loyal  to  our  Lord’s  in¬ 
junction0  (“Drink  ye  all”),  and  faithful  to  the  witness  of  the 
early  Church  and  Fathers,  for  the  practice  of  Communion  in 
one  Kind  was  unknown  save  in  very  exceptional  circumstances.7 
The  Roman  custom — to  borrow  the  words  of  Pope  Leo  I 
— is  a  “sacrilege”,8  and  is  strongly  condemned  by  all  Orthodox 
writers.9  The  theory  of  concomitance  ought  not  be  brought 
in  to  justify  the  Roman  practice,  for  its  true  reason  is  not 
based  on  this  but  is  simply  the  desire  to  exalt  the  clerical  or¬ 
der.  “Since  Christ  commanded  Communion  under  both  forms, 
every  attempt  to  correct  His  ordinance  for  a  dogmatic  or  prac- 


1  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  365-36G. 

2  Ibid.,  and  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  126;  cf.  Kritopoulos,  in  Meso- 
lora,  I.  p.  327. 

3  Dyobouniotes,  ibid.,  p.  127. 

4  Loc.  cit.,  and  Mesolora,  IV.  pp.  290-291. 

5  Mesolora,  ibid.,  IV.  p.  278. 

6  Both  Species  are  administered  together,  that  of  Bread  being 
“impregnated”  with  that  of  Wine,  and  given  into  the  recipient's  mouth 
by  the  spoon,  the  labis ;  cf.  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  112  note  1. 

7  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  366. 

8  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  113. 

9  Cf.  Kritopoulos,  in  Mesolora,  I,  p.  327;  Mogila,  ibid.,  p.  428,  etc.; 
cf.  Mesolora’s  discussion,  op.  cit.,  IV.  pp.  277-283. 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  PARTICULAR 


345 


tical  reason,  is  both  sacrilege  as  well  as  insolence  and  arbitra¬ 
riness  unheard  of  in  the  history  of  the  Church.”1 

Bishops  and  priests  only  have  the  right  of  celebrating  the 
Holy  Eucharist.  Deacons  may  in  emergency  communicate  the 
faithful,  and  in  absolute  necessity  it  is  possible  for  laymen  to 
administer  the  Sacrament,  but,  of  course,  it  is  not  possible 
for  them  to  consecrate  It.  Women  cannot  administer  It  in 
any  case.2 

The  Grace  bestowed  in  the  sacrament  of  the  Holy  Euchar¬ 
ist  is  suggested  by  the  definition:  he  who  receives  the  sacra¬ 
ment  receives  the  Bodyr  and  Blood  of  Christ.  “By  the  Eucha¬ 
rist,  in  the  communion  of  His  Body  and  Blood,  we  are  united 
with  our  Lord  and  made  partakers  in  the  divine  virtue.  .  . 
We  are  fed,  quickened,  endued  with  power,  and  perfected  spir¬ 
itually  by  the  gift  of  divine  Grace.”3  All  that  He  did  for  us 
on  the  Cross  is  made  available  to  us  in  the  Eucharist.  Our 
spiritual  life  is  strengthened  and  developed,  and  we  are  united 
with  Him  and  as  well  with  each  other  in  the  “sacrament  of 
unity".4  “The  Holy  Eucharist,  developing  and  strengthening 
the  spiritual  life,  bestows  everything  that  makes  for  devotion 
and  a  holy  life,  developes  love,  and  opens  up  the  view  into  the 
blessed  kingdom  beyond  death  into  which  after  the  Resurrec¬ 
tion  the  faithful  are  to  enter.”5 6  “This  union  on  our  part  with 
our  Lord,  which  is  had  through  the  Eucharist,  brings  remission 
of  sins  and  life  eternal.  .  .  So  the  Eucharist  is  the  earnest 
of  our  resurrection  through  union  with  our  Risen  Lord.”8  The 
words  of  administration  “for  remission  of  sins  and  eternal  life” 
might  seem  to  indicate  that  the  Eucharist  is  the  means  of  for¬ 
giving  sins,  but  “this  cannot  mean  the  forgiveness  of  mortal 

1  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  367;  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  pp.  113-114 
note  1  (pp.  114-115.)  gives  a  summary  of  Roman  arguments. 

2  Cf.  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  125  where  references  are  given,  and 
Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  364-365. 

3  Vlesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  pp.  283-284.  St.  John  Damascene  in  his 
'E/cSocrts  (IV.  13)  distinguishes  “Communion”  (KOLvuvia)  and  “Recep¬ 
tion”  (/uerdXTjgts) . 

4  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  pp.  117-118,  which  cf.  for  patristic  refer¬ 
ences. 

5  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  361. 

6  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  118. 


346 


V.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 


sins,  since  they  are  absolved  in  the  sacrament  of  Penance.  .  .  . 
The  word  ‘remission’  is  here  used  only  in  a  general  sense.”1 
“The  chief  energy  or  operation  of  the  sacrament  .  .  .  is  not 
remission  of  sins,  but  union  with  our  Lord.  Remission  of  sins 
and  eternal  life  are  secondary  effects  and  consequences  of  the 
chief  operation  of  the  sacrament.”2  The  gift  of  this  Grace 
is  independent  of  the  state  of  the  recipient,  but  its  appropri¬ 
ation  by  him  is  conditioned  by  his  preparation  for  the  sacra¬ 
ment,  if  he  be  an  adult.  He  “must  prepare  himself  by  re¬ 
pentance  and  obtain  absolution  by  confession”,  lest  the  threat 
of  the  Apostle  be  fulfilled  in  him.8  Wilful  indifference  to 
Communion  or  carelessness  in  regard  to  it  precludes  the  possi¬ 
bility  of  blessedness.  Everyone  of  the  faithful  must  receive  the 

•j 

Eucharist  after  careful  preparation,  as  its  Grace  is  absolutely 
necessary  to  salvation,4  and  this  preparation  includes  both  con¬ 
fession  and  fasting,  in  accordance  with  the  early  custom  of  the 
Church.5 


1  Androutsos,  ibid.,  note  1. 

2  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  119.  He  adds  a  note  on  frequent  Com¬ 
munion,  saying  that  “not  only  may  the  faithful  communicate  fre¬ 
quently,  but  they  ought  to  do  so”.  The  ordinarily  devout  Orthodox 
receives  the  Eucharist  after  the  quarterly  fasts, — at  Christmas,  Easter, 
the  Feast  of  the  Apostles  (SS.  Peter  &  Paul),  and  the  Falling  Asleep 
of  the  Mother  of  God  (Aug.  15)  ;  cf.  note  1.  p.  286  of  Mesolora,  op.  cit., 
IV. 

3  1  Cor.  11,  29;  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  365. 

4  Ibid.,  and  cf.  Mesolora,  op.  cit,  IV.  pp.  283-287 ;  Mogila  in  ibid., 
I.  pp.  428-429;  Kritopoulos,  ibid.  I.  p.  328;  Jeremiah,  I.  p.  228,  etc. 

5  On  which,  in  some  detail,  cf.  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  pp.  125-126. 
Dyobouniotes  seems  to  have  changed  his  views  of  the  fruits  of  the 
Holy  Eucharist  since  he  wrote  his  criticism  of  Androutsos’  Dogmatic. 
The  latter  says  that  the  sentence  of  administration  (et’s  acpecnv  apapTiur 
Kai  els  $ut)v  aluvLov)  may  not  be  understood  to  refer  to  the  remission 
of  mortal  sins,  (for  Penance  does  this)  but  “remission  of  sins  is 
here  said  in  a  general  sense”  (Aoy /xaTiKT),  p.  361  and  note  1).  Dyoboun¬ 
iotes  ('H  Aoyp.  ’A vdp.  Kptv.,  p.  59)  finds  fault  with  this  and  Androutsos’ 
general  treatment  of  the  fruits  of  the  Holy  Eucharist,  saying  that 
“he  departs  from... and  in  part  denies... the  Orthodox  doctrine  on 
the  subject,  holding  that  the  Eucharist  does  not  confer  the  remission 
of  sins  and  eternal  life,  but  simply  the  hope  of  immortality  and  the 
preservation  from  mortal  sins”  Androutsos  answers:  “If  he  thought 
that  Penance  is  an  indispensable  means  for  (receiving)  the  Holy  Com¬ 
munion,  and  is  the  remission  of  all  sins,  he  would  then  understand 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  PARTICULAR 


34' 


(d)  The  Eucharist  as  Sacrifice 

The  Eucharist  is  not  only  a  sacrament  hut  “the  one  propi¬ 
tiatory  sacrifice  offered  to  God  for  the  quick  and  the  dead/’1 
“As  sacrifice,  it  is  the  continuation  and  application  of  the  sacri¬ 
fice  of  Golgotha,  inasmuch  as  the  Saviour  as  Priest  and  Vic¬ 
tim  offers  the  Father  His  Body  and  Blood  under  the  forms  of 
bread  and  wine.”2  The  very  words  and  method  of  the  Insti¬ 
tution  clearly  show  this.  The  use  of  bread  and  wine  manifest 
the  separation  of  the  Body  and  Blood  of  our  Lord,3  the  terms 
our  Lord  used,  “mv  Body  given  .  .  .  broken  for  you”,  “my 
Blood  .  .  .  slied  for  many'’  for  the  remission  of  sins”,7  “the 
Hew  Testament  in  my  Blood  .  .  .  shed  for  you”,  indicate 

surely  that  the  Eucharist  is  itself  a  propitiatory  sacrifice,  and 
may  not  primarily  he  referred  to  Calvary.  So  also  the  words 
.  .  .  “my  flesh,  which  I  will  give  for  the  life  of  the  world'” 
characterize  the  Eucharist  as  a  sacrifice.9  St.  Paul  clearly  im¬ 
plies  that  the  Eucharist  is  a  sacrifice,  when  he  contrasts  “the 
table  of  the  Lord”  and  “the  table  of  devils",  when  in  the  pre¬ 
vious  verse  he  had  spoken  of  the  Gentiles  sacrificing  to  devils, 

that  the  Eucharist  is  not  the  remission  of  sins,  since  they  were  absolved 
in  the  sacrament  of  Penance  which  preceded  the  Eucharist.  .  .This 
he  implies  is  Orthodox  doctrine.  As  to  his  account  of  the  fruits 
of  the  Eucharist  he  refers  his  critic  to  Macarius,  whose  enumeration 
is  the  same  as  his  (Androutsos’)”  (Aoyp.  MeXeVat,  A'  pp.  143-144). 
In  Dyobouniotes’  rejoinder  to  this  work  (’O0ei\.  air  avr  pats)  he  main¬ 
tains  his  former  view  of  Androutsos  (pp.  148-149)  quoting  Timothy 
Anastasius’  TI  9e ia  E cyaptuTt'a,  p.  100,  that  “through  the  Holy  Euchar¬ 
ist  remission  of  sins  is  sought  and  obtained”  (p.  150  ibid.).  This 
general  contention  he  seems  to  have  abandoned  by  the  time  of  writing 
his  Ta  'Mvarripia,  the  teaching  of  which  on  this  subject  substantially 
agrees  with  Androutsos’  (op.  cit..  pp.  118  and  119). 

1  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  p.  244. 

2  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  367. 

3  “The  mystical  sundering  of  body  from  blood  indicates  the  sacri¬ 
ficial  character  of  the  Eucharist”  ibid. 

4  St.  Luke  22,  19,  20. 

*  1  Cor.  11,  24,  25. 

8  St.  Mark  14,  24. 

7  St.  Matt.  26,  28. 

8  St.  John  6,  51. 

9  Androutsos,  ibid. 


348 


V.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 


not  to  Gocl.1  The  references  in  Hebrews  10  are  to  the  sacrifices 
of  the  Old  Testament,  to  which  Calvary2  and  the  Eucharist  are 
compared  as  fulfilment  and  antitype  to  prefigured  type.  This 
is  clear  from  the  terminology:  “altar,  .  .  .  eat,  .  .  .  meats, 

.  .  .  serve  the  Tabernacle/*3  The  foreshadowings  of  the 
Eucharist  in  the  Passover,  the  sacrifice  of  Melchisedek,  and 
the  prophecy  in  Mai.  1,  10,  11,  surely  indicate  the  sacrificial 
character  of  the  Eucharist.4 5  “It  follows  then  that  the  Euchar¬ 
ist  offered  on  the  Lord's  table  is  a  Sacrifice,  ...  to  which 
fact  Sacred  Tradition  with  a  single  and  unbroken  witness 
testifies."  The  writings  of  the  early  Fathers,  the  Bidache,  the 
early  Liturgies  and  the  early  synods,  all  unanimously  proclaim 
this  great  fact/  “The  altars  which  the  early  churches  used, 
as  shown  in  the  symbolic  representation  in  the  catacombs,  .  .  . 
all  the  figures  and  illustrative  representations  of  the  eucha- 
ristie  sacrifice,  and  above  all,  the  Liturgies,  present  the  Eucharist 
as  a  sacrifice  prepared  for  in  the  oblation  (irpoaKOfuBr]) ,  and 
consummated  in  the  Change,  and  manifest  .  .  .  the  unceas¬ 
ing  faith  of  the  Church  in  the  Eucharist  as  a  sacrifice.”6 

The  essence  of  the  sacrificial  character  of  the  Eucharist 
may  be  discerned  by  discovering  the  relation  between  the  Euchar¬ 
ist  and  the  sacrifice  of  the  Cross.  The  Eucharist  as  a  memo¬ 
rial  of  the  death  on  the  Cross  is  a  re-presentation  and  com¬ 
memoration  of  the  sacrifice  of  Calvary-7  “But  it  is  not  merely 
a  representation  of  the  death  of  our  Lord,  but  an  actual  and 
real  sacrifice,  in  which  the  Offerer  and  the  Victim  are  one 
and  the  same,  our  Lord,  even  if  the  sacrifice  be  offered  by  the 
priest;”8  it  is  “not  simply  a  reminder  or  commemoration  of  the 
historical  fact  of  Golgotha,  but  an  actual  and  objective  sacri- 

1  Cor.  10,  20,  21;  Androutsos,  ibid.,  p.  368,  and  Dyobouniotes, 
op.  cit.,  pp.  120-121. 

2  Cf .  note  1,  p.  121,  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit. 

3  Heb.  13,  9-10  etc.;  cf.  Androutsos  and  Dyobouniotes,  loc.  cit. 

4  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  369  and  Dyobouniotes,  p.  121. 

5  Androutsos,  ibid. 

6  Ibid.,  p.  370.  For  the  Symbolic  Books,  cf.  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  Mo- 
gila,  I,  pp.  426-429;  Jeremiah  II,  ibid.,  162-163,  228;  Dositheus 
II.  p.  117. 

7  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  370;  cf.  1  Cor.  11,  26. 

8  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  122. 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  PARTICULAR 


349 


fice,  inasmuch  as  our  Lord  in  His  high  priestly  office  is  really 
present.”1  The  bond  between  the  sacrifice  of  the  Eucharist 
and  that  of  Calvary  is  so  intimate  and  necessary  that  one  might 
sav  that  “they  coincide,  inasmuch  as  both  have  the  same  Offerer 
and  the  same  Thing  Offered,  the  same  Sacrificer  and  the 
same  Victim — our  Lord  Jesus  Christ.”2  The  first  historical  evi¬ 
dence  we  have  that  this  doctrine  was  questioned,  is  the  case  of 
Soterichos  Panteugonos  in  the  12th  century,  who  in  his  recan¬ 
tation  was  made  to  profess  his  faith  in  the  “one  and  the  same 
sacrifice”  of  Calvary  and  the  Eucharist.3  In  the  negotiations 
with  the  Old  Catholics  the  words  “representation  and  presence” 
of  the  one  Oblation,  as  used  by  the  latter,  could  be  taken  in  an 
Orthodox  sense,  as  Rhosse  says,  “if  by  these  words  ...  is 
not  meant  (merely)  a  tangible  and  apparent  re-presentation, 
but  if  the  internal  bond  of  union  between  the  sacrifice  in  the 
Eucharist  and  that  in  heaven  be  thereby  professed.”4  “In  the 
Eucharist  the  same  sacrifice  is  consummated  as  that  on  the 
Cross.”5 

What  then  are  the  differences  and  likenesses  between  the 
sacrifice  of  the  Eucharist  and  that  of  the  Cross?  The  resem¬ 
blance  consists  in  the  identity  of  Victim,  Offerer,  and  Act.  The 
differences  are  in  the  form,  purpose,  and  circumstances  of  the 
Eucharist  as  distinguished  from  Calvary.  The  death  of  Christ 
occurred  once  for  all,  and  may  not  be  repeated.6  “By  the 
death  of  the  Cross  our  Lord  wrought  the  Redemption  of  man¬ 
kind  in  general,  reconciling  man  with  God ;  the  aim  of  the 
sacrifice  of  the  Eucharist  is  the  personal  appropriation  and 
reception  of  the  benefits  of  the  Cross.  .  .  On  Golgotha  our 
Lord  offered  His  bodily  life  in  a  bloody  sacrifice;  in  the  Eu¬ 
charist  He  sacrifices  Himself  by  the  priest  in  a  bloodless  and 
mystical  way.”  The  bond  between  the  two  sacrifices  is  brought 


1  Androutsos,  ibid. 

2  Ibid.,  and  p.  371. 

3  Given  in  the  Tiibinger  Quartalschrift  for  1833,  note  1,  p.  173. 

4  In  his  ’'EkSoctis  7rpds  rgv  'I epav  'Zvvodov  tt}s  EXXdSos,  Athens,  1874, 
p.  25. 

5  Dvobouniotes,  ibid. 

6  Ibid. 


350 


V.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 


out  clearly  in  the  Liturgies.1  Androutsos  says  elsewhere  :2 *  “The 
Eucharist  is  not  a  new  act  of  immolation  of  Jesus  Christ  differ¬ 
ent  from  that  of  Golgotha  as  to  its  content  and  its  power, 
but  a  new  representation  before  God  of  that  sacrifice  made  once 
for  all,  and  a  new  mystical  (sacramental)  reiteration  of  it. 
The  sacrifice  of  the  Eucharist  is  both  a  re-presentation  of  the 
sacrifice  of  the  Cross,  and  also  itself  an  actual  sacrifice.  It 
is  a  representation,  in  that  by  the  consecration  of  the  bread 
and  wine  it  presents  or  symbolizes  the  bloody  sacrifice,  the  ac¬ 
tual  separation  of  Body  and  Blood  ...  on  the  Cross.  It 
is  an  actual  sacrifice,  in  that  Jesus  Christ,  the  Great  High 
Priest,  really  present  in  the  Eucharist,  consummates  on  earth 
what  He  does  in  Heaven ...  As  such  it  must  be  a  reitera¬ 
tion  of  the  death  of  the  Cross,  the  manner  of  its  accomplish¬ 
ment — whether  through  blood,  or  sacramentally,  and  whether 
with  a  more  restricted  scope  than  that  of  Golgotha — not  being 
significant.  .  .  It  must  be  in  a  sense  a  new  oblation  and 
offering  of  Christ.  .  .  If  He  who  was  sacrificed  on  Calvary 
is  sacrificed  (in  the  Eucharist),  without  blood  .  .  .  then  we 
have  in  the  Eucharist  an  actual  sacrifice  or  a  mystic  (sacra¬ 
mental)  reiteration  of  the  death  of  the  Cross*.  .  .  In  the 
Eucharist,  our  Lord,  actuated  by  the  same  love  and  obedience 
from  which  the  sacrifice  of  Golgotha  proceeded,  presents  anew 
the  sacrifice  consummated  on  Golgotha,  for  the  personal  ac¬ 
ceptance  and  application  of  its  benefits.”4  “It  is  not  a  new  act 

1  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  371;  cf.  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  pp.  122- 
123.  Macarius  brings  out  the  resemblances  and  differences  very 
clearly :  “On  the  Cross  the  Saviour  offered  visibly  His  most  holy  Body 
and  Blood;... in  the  Eucharist  He  offers  the  same  under  the  forms 
of  bread  and  wine... By  the  Sacrifice  of  the  Cross  was  accomplished 
the  Redemption  of  all  mankind,  and  the  divine  righteousness  was 
satisfied  for  the  sins  of  all  the  world.  The  Bloodless  Sacrifice  makes 
propitiation  for  the  sins  of  those  only  for  whom  it  is  offered,  convey¬ 
ing  the  fruits  of  the  Sacrifice  of  the  Cross  to  them  only;”  op.  cit., 
II.  p.  429,  and  cf.  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  pp.  247-249. 

2  In  his  A07 fi.  MeX.  A’,  in  answer  to  Dyobouniotes’  criticism  that 
Androutsos  would  “diminish  the  boundless  efficacy  of  the  death  of 
Christ  on  the  Cross”  ('H  Aoyp..  ’AvSp.  icpiv.,  pp.  58-59)  ;  cf.  also  the ’O0etX. 
&TrivTr]<TiS,  pp.  146-148. 

5  Aoyfi.  MeX.,  A’,  pp.  124-126  and  cf.  AoypariKri,  pp.  372-373. 

4  &oyp.ariKri,  p.  374. 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  PARTICULAR 


351 


of  immolation  of  Christ,  but  a  new  presentation  of  the  sole 
and  final  sacrifice.1 

In  answer  to  the  question,  in  what  does  the  sacrificial  as¬ 
pect  of  the  Eucharist  consist?  various  theories  have  been 
propounded.  The  meaning  of  the  word  “sacrifice”  involves 
three  things — a  priest,  a  victim,  and  the  act  of  sacrificing — 
either  immolation  or  destruction  of  the  victim  by  death  or  burn¬ 
ing,  or  its  change  (immutatio)  .2 3  One  theory  would  make  the 
essential  sacrificial  element  of  the  Eucharist  to  consist  in  the 
“Consecration,  the  essential  act  of  the  sacrifice,  whereby  the 
Body  and  Blood  of  Christ  are  present  on  the  altar,  sundered 
from  each  other,  under  the  form  of  bread  and  wine,  and  a 
symbolic  representation  is  made  of  the  actual  separation  of  the 
two  (the  “'destruction”  or  “immolation”  of  the  Victim),  which 
took  place  in  the  death  on  the  Cross.  .  .  This  symbolic  re¬ 
presentation  is  only  satisfactory  ...  in  the  case  in  which  a 
sacrifice  is  relative  (as  in  the  Eucharist),  and  not  absolute  (as 
on  the  Cross).”  Others  regard  the  Consecration  as  only  point¬ 
ing  to  the  death  of  Christ,  in  which  the  Body  and  Blood  were 
sundered,  and  which  constitutes  the  fundamental  immolative 
note  of  the  Eucharist.  The  Consecration,  however,  may  only 
be  referred  to  the  glorified  Body  and  Blood,  in  regard  to  which 
there  can  be  no  question  of  sundering  or  separating.  Others 
view  the  Consecration  as  the  epitome  of  our  Lord’s  humility 
in  descending  to  become  our  Food,  and  thereby  being  the  act 
of  sacrifice.  But,  Androutsos  says,  the  latter  is  certainly  im¬ 
possible,  since  Communion  presupposes  the  sacrifice,  and  the 
sacrifice  could  not  be  constituted  by  the  Change  of  the  ele¬ 
ments  since  our  Lord  suffers  no  change,  but  the  Change  takes 
place  only  in  the  bread  and  wine."  This  view  is  inacceptable, 
for  the  essential  element  of  sacrifice  is  absent,4  and  there  is  no 
obvious  connection  between  the  sacrifice  of  the  Eucharist  and 
that  of  Calvary.  “The  act  of  the  sacrifice  must  then  be  found 

1  Ibid . 

'Ibid.,  p.  371. 

3  This  view  Dyobouniotes  also  rejects, — Ta  M vorypia,  pp.  120-121, 
note  1. 

4  Dyobouniotes,  ibid :  “This  is  much  less  acceptable.” 


352 


V.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 


in  the  Consecration."1  “The  sacrifice  of  the  Eucharist  is  rela¬ 
tive,  being  predetermined  by  the  sacrifice  of  the  Cross  in  re¬ 
gard  to  its  content  and  its  merit  or  worth,  and  the  act  of  im¬ 
molation  of  Christ's  manhood  is  that  surrender  of  His  life 
made  on  the  Cross  which  our  Lord  offers  anew  to  God  as  the 
sacrifice  once  for  all  made  in  behalf  of  the  world."2 

The  sacrificial  character  of  the  Eucharist  has  a  three-fold 
aspect.  The  Eucharist  is  an  expiatory  and  propitiatory  sacri¬ 
fice,  a  sacrifice  of  “Praise  and  Thanksgiving",  and  an  impetra- 
tory  and  intercessory  sacrifice.  These  constitute  the  essential 
character  of  the  Eucharist  as  a  sacrifice,  as  well  as  the  fruits  of 
that  sacrifice.3  Inasmuch  as  the  sacrifice  of  the  Cross  had  as 
end  and  purpose  the  reconciliation  of  man  with  God,  the  atone¬ 
ment  for  the  sins  of  man  and  their  expiation,  and  the  Redemp¬ 
tion  of  man  by  its  means,  so  the  sacrifice  of  the  Eucharist  has 
this  same  character,4  differing  only  in  the  application  of  this 
end,  as  we  have  seen :  whereas  the  sacrifice  of  Calvary  was  made 
generally  for  all,  the  Eucharist  is  offered  for  specific  people,  in 
order  that  application  of  the  general  benefits  of  the  death  of  the 
Cross  may  be  made  for  those  for  whom  the  Eucharist  is  cele¬ 
brated.  “The  fruits  of  the  Eucharist”,  says  Mogila,  “are  .  .  . 
the  commemoration  of  the  sinless  Passion  and  Death  of  Christ, 
the  benefits  accruing  to  us  of  propitiation  .  .  .  for  our  sins, 
both  for  the  living  and  the  dead.  .  .”5  “It  is  a  true  and  ex¬ 
piatory  sacrifice'1,  says  Dositheus,  “offered  for  all  the  devout, 
living  and  dead,  and  in  behalf  of  the  needs  of  all  men.'’6  “By  it 
we  propitiate  and  appease  God.”7  As  a  Sacrifice  of  Thanksgiv¬ 
ing,  Worship,  and  Praise,  we  offer  God  thanks  and  praise  for 
His  goodness  and  loving  kindness  “which  (praise)  the  con¬ 
gregation,  joined  with  the  priest,  sends  up  on  high  because  of 

1  “According  to  the  most  probable  and  generally  prevailing  opinion, 
the  conception  of  the  eucharistic  sacrifice  lies  in  the  separation  of  the 
bread  and  wine,  the  Body  and  Blood  of  Christ,  which  thus  symbolically 
and  mystically  presents  again  the  slaughtered  and  sacrificed  Lord 

( ibid. ) . 

2  Androutsos,  AoynaTucri,  pp.  372-374. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  374. 

4  Ibid. 

5  In  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  I.  pp.  428-429. 

6  Ibid.,  II.  p.  118. 

7  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  123. 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  PARTICULAR 


353 


God’s  infinite  beneficence,  offering  Him  Jesus  Christ  as  a  worthy 
expression  of  gratitude.”1  “As  a  sacrifice  of  supplication  and 
intercession  is  it  the  request  not  only  for  spiritual,  but  even  for 
material  goods,  as  these  may  serve  for  spiritual  ends.”2  This 
three-fold  character  of  the  eucharistic  sacrifice  the  Holy  Scrip¬ 
tures,  the  Fathers,  and  the  Liturgies  all  teach  with  one  voice.3 
Its  impetratory  and  efficacious  power  is  not  dependent  on  us  or 
our  failings,  but  on  the  intrinsic  worth  and  merits  of  Him  who 
is  offered.  It  is  only  as  Holy  Communion  that  personal  condi¬ 
tions  enter  into  the  question  as  determining  the  effects  and 
fruits  of  this  great  Sacrifice.  As  a  sacrifice  of  intercession  it 
is  predetermined  in  its  scope  by  the  will  of  the  all-wise  and 
all-loving  God  alone.4 

1  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  374. 

2  Ibid.,  and  p.  375. 

3  For  copious  references  and  quotations,  cf.  loc.  cit.,  in  Androutsos 
and  Dyobouniotes,  also  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  pp.  244-249,  283-293. 

4  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  375-376;  cf.  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  pp. 
125-126. 


LECTURE  VI. 

THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 
(Concluded)  AND  OF  THE  LAST  THINGS 


LECTURE  VI. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS  (concluded) 

AND  OF  THE  LAST  THINGS 


Contents 

Pages 

Pages 

I. 

The  Sacraments 

in  Particular 

(concluded ) 

358-393 

4. 

Penance 

358-370 

5. 

Holy  Order 

V 

370-378 

6. 

Matrimony 

378-386 

t . 

LTnction 

386-393 

II.  The  Doctrine  of  the  Last  Things 


1.  The  Particular  Judgment  395-416 

(a)  The  Doctrine  of  the  Particular 

Judgment  395-399 

(b)  Relation  of  Church  Militant  to 

Church  Triumphant  399-404 

(c)  Relation  of  Church  Militant  to 

the  Departed  404-415 

2.  The  Consummation  of  all  Things 

(a)  The  Second  Coming  416-417 

(b)  The  Resurrection  of  the  dead  417-420 

(c)  The  Life  of  the  world  to  come  420-422 


394-422 


416-422 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS  (con¬ 
cluded)  AND  OF  THE  LAST  THINGS 

4.  Penance 

Of  the  seven  means  of  saving  Grace  founded  by  our 
Lord,  the  Orthodox  Church  reckons  the  sacrament  of  Penance 
(/xeravoLa)  as  the  fourth.  It  is  defined  as  that  “sacrament  in 
which  the  forgiveness  of  sins  committed  after  Baptism  is  be¬ 
stowed  by  God  through  a  priest  on  a  person  who  confesses  his 
sins  and  sincerely  repents  of  them.”1 2  According  to  Kritopoulos 
it  is  one  of  the  three  sacraments  universally  “necessary  for 
salvation”,  and  lie  finds  in  the  triad  of  Baptism,  the  Eucharist, 
and  Penance  a  type  of  the  Holy  Trinity:  Baptism  is  the  sacra¬ 
ment  of  our  adoption  as  sons  by  the  Father,  the  Eucharist  is 
that  of  union  with  the  Son,  and  Penance  is  “a  witness  of  the 
abiding  presence  of  the  Holy  Spirit  in  the  soul,  piercing  the 
heart  whenever  one  sins”  ...  By  Penance,  whatever  injury 
be  done  to  divine  Grace  by  sinning  voluntarily  .  .  .  “may  be 
repaired  and  recovered"."  Mesolora  says  that  “Penance  or  Con¬ 
fession  of  Sins  with  the  absolution  by  the  priest,  is  that  sacra¬ 
ment  ordained  of  God  whereby  through  the  merit  of  Christ 
is  given  by  means  of  priestly  absolution  the  forgiveness  of 
sins  for  reconciliation  with  God,  to  one  who  has  sinned  after 
Baptism  and  has  repented  seriously  and  sorrowfully."3  Since 
one  who  is  baptized  may  fall  into  grievous  sin,  the  Saviour 
established  this  particular  sacrament  to  cleanse  from  sin  and 
to  bind  up  again  the  sinner  with  God.  “Since  the  personal 
conditions  in  this  sacrament  are  indispensable — not  only  for 
the  saving  energy  of  it,  as  in  the  other  sacraments,  but  for 

1  Dyobouniotes,  Ta  Mvar^pia,  p.  129. 

2  In  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  I,  pp.  313-314. 

5  Op.  cit.,  IV. p.  296  note.  His  name  for  it  is  Confession  (e$QpQ\6yT)<ris} 
cf.  ibid.,  p.  293  et  al.) . 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  PARTICULAR 


359 


its  very  constitution — it  is  clear  that  these  must  be  examined 
along  with  the  essence  of  the  sacrament  of  which  they  form 
the  chief  part.”1 

Our  Lord  instituted  this  sacrament  after  His  Resurrec¬ 
tion,  in  the  fulfilment  of  the  promise  of  power  and  authority 
to  absolve  given  in  St.  Matt.  16,  19,  and  18,  17-18,  in  the  words 
(St.  John  20,  22-23):  “Receive  ye  the  Holy  Ghost:  whose 
soever  sins  ye  remit,  they  are  remitted  unto  them;  and  whose 
soever  sins  ye  retain,  they  are  retained.”2  “From  these  texts 
it  is  clear  that  Christ  gave  His  Apostles  and  their  successors 
the  power  and  authority  to  forgive  sins.  .  .  This  absolution 
of  sins,  as  we  learn  from  Tradition,  takes  place  by  means  of  a 
certain  rite,  which,  being  founded  by  our  Lord  and  conveying 
Grace,  constitutes  it  a  sacrament.”3  The  general  authority  com¬ 
mitted  to  the  Church  is  exercised  in  a  concrete  and  outward 
act,  “which  is  in  harmony  with  the  nature  of  the  Church  as 
a  visible  foundation,  associating  with  visible  things  the  be¬ 
stowal  of  divine  Grace  which  she  conveys  through  them.”4  Tra- 
dition  of  the  earliest  date5  testifies  to  the  exercise  of  the  power 
of  absolution  by  the  Church,  so  it  becomes  apparent  that  the 
Church  from  the  earliest  times  received  and  recognized  the 
sacrament  of  Penance.  This  is  confirmed  by  the  practice  of 
the  early  heresies  as  well.6 

As  to  the  province  and  scope  of  this  absolution  and  re¬ 
mission  of  sins,  the  study  of  ancient  Church  history  and  the 
Fathers  confirms  the  present  doctrine  of  the  Church :  all  sins 
may  be  forgiven,  and  no  limit  is  set  to  the  exercise  of  the  forgiv¬ 
ing  Grace  of  God.  No  restriction  is  made  in  either  Holy  Scripture 
or  Tradition.  “The  blasphemy  against  the  Holy  Spirit”7  and 
the  sins  “unto  death”8  are  explained  in  part  by  Heb.  6,4-10 : 

1  Androutsos,  Aoy /acltikti,  pp.  376-377. 

2  Dyobouniotes,  op.  tit.,  pp.  129-130. 

3  Ibid.,  pp.  130-131. 

4  Androutsos,  op.  tit.,  p.  377. 

5  E.  g.,  Hermas,  St.  Irenaeus,  St.  Barnabas,  St.  Clement  of  Rome, 
Tertullian,  etc.;  Dyobouniotes,  op.  tit.,  pp.  131-132  (references  ad 
loo.)  and  Androutsos,  op.  tit.,  pp.  378-379. 

6  Dyobouniotes,  ibid.,  p.  133. 

7  St.  Matt.  12,  31-32. 

8  1  St.  John  5,  16. 


360 


VI.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 


certain  grievous  “sins  are  unforgivable,  not  as  from  the  pow¬ 
erlessness  of  God  or  the  Church,  but  because  by  their  nature 
they  make  those  committing  them  unrepentant  and  callous,  so 
that  in  such  cases  divine  Grace  cannot  operate.”1  Absolution 
is  extended  to  all  sorts  of  sins  even  the  most  grievous,2  if  there 
is  any  contrition  and  penitence  on  the  part  of  the  sinner.3  This 
doctrine  is  confirmed  by  the  practice  of  the  Church  in  con¬ 
demning  the  early  “disciplinary”  heresies,  such  as  those  of  the 
Xovatians,  Donatists,  Montanists,  and  the  like,  who  would  have 
set  bounds  to  the  exercise  of  forgiveness.4 *  The  ruling  of  the 
VII  Ecumenical  Council  settled  this  question  finally.6  The  ac¬ 
tion  of  the  early  Church  in  excommunicating  certain  persons 
and  barring  them  from  Church  fellowship  did  not  mean  that 
their  sins  were  not  forgivable,  but  that  the  conditions  of  for¬ 
giveness  were  not  fulfilled  in  such  given  cases.  “The  general 
rule  and  practice  of  the  Church  has  always  been  in  accord  with 
what  she  teaches,  that  every  sin  may  be  forgiven,  if  the  neces¬ 
sary  personal  conditions  be  present.”*6 

These  personal  conditions  form  part  of  the  outward  signs 
of  this  sacrament,  and  are  three:  (a)  confession  proceeding 
from  penitence,  (b)  the  laying  on  of  the  hands  of  the  officiant 
on  the  penitent,  and  (c)  the  prayer  of  absolution.7  Confession 
as  a  part  of  the  outward  sign  of  the  sacrament  is  necessary  in 
order  that  the  priest  may  know  the  sins  of  the  penitent  and  his 
interior  dispositions,  and  may  absolve  his  sins  with  the  neces¬ 
sary  exhortations  and  counsel/  Confession  must  proceed  from 
penitence.  Vesolora  counts  five  factors  in  penitence,  the  first 
part  of  the  sacrament:  (a)  the  sense  of  sin  and  the  knowl¬ 
edge  of  it:  (b)  contrition:  (c)  firm  resolve  for  amendment, 
and  faith  in  the  saving  power  of  Christ  alone;  and  (e)  rec¬ 
onciliation  with  one’s  neighbor  against  whom  one  has  sinned. 
All  these  constitute  the  first  element  from  which  confession 

1  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  379. 

2  Dvobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  142. 

3  Androutsos,  ibid. 

*  Ibid.,  and  p.  380. 

Dvobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  pp.  143-144,  quotes  canon  5. 

6  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  380. 

7  Following  Dvobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  133. 

s  Ibid. 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  PARTICULAR 


361 


naturally  and  inevitably  follows.1  Androutsos  regards  peni¬ 
tence  as  necessarily  first,  and  true  penitence  of  itself  issues 
in  confession.  “Penitence  is  that  interior  sorrow  and  con¬ 
trition  of  soul  for  sins  committed,  flowing  from  faith  and  love, 
together  with  the  firm  determination  to  amend/1  It  may  not 
proceed  from  fear,  for  fear  may  not  be  regarded  as  a  proper 
condition  for  justification.2  Dyobouniotes  names  two  consti¬ 
tuent  elements  in  repentance:  (a)  contrition  and  compunction 
of  heart  because  of  sins,  and  (b)  a  steadfast  determination  of 
amendment.3  “True  penitence/’  he  says,  “is  the  more  neces¬ 
sary  for  the  operation  of  the  sacrament  inasmuch  as  sacramental 
Grace  never  coerces  man,  but  operates  where  there  is  no 
opposition.  In  a  person  who  has  not  sincerely  turned  away  from 
sin,  who  has  not  resolved  upon  correction  of  himself,  in  whom, 
in  short,  there  is  no  true  penitence,  the  subjective  factor  abso¬ 
lutely  indispensable  for  the  operation  of  the  sacrament  is  absent. 

.  .  .  So  true  penitence  is  absolutely  necessary  for  the  remis¬ 
sion  of  sins."4 * 6 7 8 9 *  “It  is  the  condition  which  makes  remission  of 
sins  possible,  since  it  is  the  beginning  and  point  of  departure  of 
the  moral  life,  when  ...  it  begets  a  fixed  resolve  of  con¬ 
version.115 

“'Where  there  is  a  true  internal  penitence  there  is  also  the 
desire  for  confession.  So  much  is  this  true  that  one  may  say 
that  where  there  is  no  desire  for  confession  it  is  a  result  and 
manifestation  of  the  absence  of  true  penitence.116  “Verbal  con¬ 
fession  of  all  sins  one  by  one  ought  to  follow  upon  contrition  of 
heart11/  says  Mogila.  The  necessity  of  confession  may  be  shown 
in  several  ways :  it  is  a  necessary  test  and  proof  of  penitence  and 
the  desire  of  amendment/  as  we  have  seen  above,  it  is  necessary 
in  order  that  the  priest  may  know  the  sins  of  the  penitent/  and 


1  Op.  cit.,  IV.  p.  302. 

2  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  381. 

3  Op.  cit.,  note  3,  pp.  136-137. 

4  Ibid.,  p.  137. 

6  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  381. 

6  Dyobouniotes,  ibid.,  p.  133. 

7  In  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  I,  p.  431. 

8  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  p.  303. 

9  Ibid.,  and  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  133;  Mogila,  in  Mesolora, 

I.  p.  431. 


362 


VI.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 


give  due  counsel,  and  “prescribe  remedies  for  the  wounds  appro¬ 
priate  to  the  nature  of  the  sins.”1  It  is  necessary  also  from  the 
nature  and  manner  of  the  divine  institution  of  the  sacrament. 
He  who  has  the  power  to  bind  and  loose  must  first  know  the 
sins  committed  before  he  can  exercise  that  power.  “Hence  the 
stipulation  of  confession  of  sins  is  involved  in  the  very  power 
of  binding  and  loosing  with  which  the  Church  is  endowed  by 
our  Lord.”2  This  power  implies  and  presupposes  confession 
of  sins,  without  which  its  exercise  would  be  both  arbitrary  and 
pointless.  “Confession  of  sins  was  deemed  necessary  for  re¬ 
ceiving  absolution  in  the  early  Church”,3  as  the  evidence  of 
the  early  Fathers  shows.  It  is  likewise  necessary  on  the  basis 
of  man’s  nature.  “In  human  nature  lies  the  necessity  for  ex¬ 
pressing  externally  one’s  inner  feelings  and  especially  those 
which  are  vital.”4  “That  confession  is  psychologically  an  in¬ 
dispensable  manifestation  of  perfect  love  and  true  penitence, 
is  obvious”,  says  Androutsos.  “As  every  mental  process  must 
find  external  expression,  as  every  thought  finds  its  natural 
fulfilment  and  complement  in  the  spoken  word,  so  penitence, 
when  it  is  true  and  real,  issues  in  confession  of  sins  by  the 
law  of  psychological  necessity,  and  souls  weighted  down  by 
sins  find  peace  and  repose  in  the  confessional.”5 6 

Confession  must  be  sincere,  and  must  involve  evidence  of 
sorrow  for  sin.8  It  must  be  by  word  of  mouth,  full,  complete, 
and  explicit.7  It  involves  the  statement  and  acknowledgment 
of  concrete  sins,8  “humbly,  devoutly,  truly,  sincerely,  categori- 

1  Jeremiah,  in  Mesolora,  I,  p.  184,  “for  a  physician  could  not  heal 
a  disease  except  he  first  know  of  what  nature  it  is”  ( Kritopoulos,  in 

Mesolora,  I.  p.  331). 

3  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  381. 

3  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  pp.  134-135,  q.  v.  for  references  from 
Tertullian,  St.  Irenaeus,  St.  Cyprian,  St.  Gregory  of  Nyssa,  the 
early  Councils,  the  primitive  terminology,  etc. ;  cf.  also  Androutsos, 
ibid.,  though  the  latter  says  that  there  is  no  definite  indication  of 
the  manner  of  such  confession.  “Later  on  public  confession  gave  way 
to  private  confession”  (ibid.,  p.  382). 

4  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  133. 

5  Op.  cit.,  p.  382,  and  cf.  Mesolora,  TV.  p.  294. 

6  Ibid.,  p  381. 

7  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  135. 

8  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  p.  302. 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  PARTICULAR  868 

cally.”1 2  Irrelevant  matter  must  be  kept  out  of  confession,  “for 
the  priest  wants  only  a  general  notion  of  the  sins  of  the  peni¬ 
tent^.  So  Kritopoulos  says  it  is  not  necessary  for  the  priest 
to  inquire  about  the  persons,  the  manner,  and  the  time  of  the 
commission  of  sins,3  and  Jeremiah  says:  “Such  things  as  are 
not  explicitly  acknowledged  because  of  grief  or  shame  .  .  . 
leave  to  the  mercy  of  God  for  forgiveness.”4  In  this  sense 
Mesolora  says  that  the  Orthodox  Church  does  not  absolutely 
demand  a  detailed  confession.5 6  Yet  as  Dyobouniotes  observes: 
“It  must  be  understood  that  where  there  is  true  penitence  there 
is  also  such  a  consciousness  of  the  necessity  for  confession  that 
a  sense  of  shame  is  easily  distinguished  from  egoism.  Other¬ 
wise  it  would  be  both  paradoxical  and  absurd  that  a  man  who 
was  shameless  enough  to  commit  a  certain  sin,  would  be  too 
ashamed  to  express  his  penitence  for  having  committed  it.”8 
“Both  interior  penitence  and  confession  are  indispensable  con¬ 
ditions  and  terms  for  the  forgiveness  of  sins  bestowed  through 
a  priest.”7  From  what  has  been  said  of  the  necessity  of  peni¬ 
tence  “it  does  not  follow  that  it  of  itself  entails  forgiveness  of 
sins,  as  certain  Western  theologians  think. ”8  There  is  no 
authority  in  Holy  Scripture  or  in  Tradition  for  this  view. 
Logically,  the  notion  that  a  sincerely  penitent  person,  desirous 
of  making  his  confession  to  a  priest  and  yet  unable  to  do  so 
for  any  good  and  sufficient  reason,  by  reason  of  his  penitence 
thereby  secures  remission  of  sins,  is  both  futile  and  pointless, 
since  we  have  no  revelation  on  the  subject  in  Holy  Scripture.9 
Furthermore  it  makes  of  priestly  absolution  only  what  it  is 
held  to  be  by  Protestants:  a  declaration  and  pronouncement 
of  the  fact  of  forgiven  sins,  rather  than  a  mediation  of  such 


1  Jeremiah,  II.  in  Mesolora,  I.  p.  184. 

2  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  136. 

"In  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  I,  p.  321. 

4  Ibid.,  p.  148. 

6  In  note  1,  (op.  cit.,  IV,  p.  303);  cf.  Jeremiah,  op.  cit.,  I,  pp.  184 

and  148. 

6  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  note  2,  p.  136. 

7  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  387. 

8  Dyobouniotes,  ibid.,  p.  137. 

9  Androutsos,  ibid.,  p.  388. 


364 


VI. — THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 


forgiveness.1  The  notion  that  one  may  secure  forgiveness  im¬ 
mediately  from  God  without  confession  to  a  priest,  is  regarded 
by  the  Orthodox  as  impious  and  silly.2 3  Penitence  and  confes¬ 
sion  to  a  priest  are  therefore  absolutely  necessary  for  receiv¬ 
ing  absolution  from  sin.® 

The  second  outward  sign  of  the  sacrament  is  the  laying 
on  of  hands  by  which  the  absolution  is  conveyed, — which  was 
the  primitive  custom.  “ Absolution  of  sins”,  says  Dyobouniotes, 
“according  to  the  explicit  testimony  of  ancient  tradition  was 
conveyed  by  the  laying  on  of  hands.”4 

The  third  outward  sign  is  the  prayer  of  absolution,  which 
is  pronounced  by  the  priest  while  laying  his  hands  upon  the 
penitent.  The  formula  for  absolution  is  precatory,  not  declar¬ 
ative  :  .  .  .  “What  thou  hast  said  to  me  .  .  .  and  what  thou 
hast  not  succeeded  in  saying  whether  from  ignorance  or  for¬ 
getfulness,  may  God  forgive  thee  now  and  for  the  future.”5 6 * 
“From  a  comparison  of  the  two  forms”,  says  Dyobouniotes, 
“it  becomes  clear  that  in  the  Eastern  Church  the  priest  prays 
God  to  forgive  the  penitent,  and  in  the  Western  Church  he 
appears  to  forgive  the  penitent  himself.  The  precatory  form 
of  the  Eastern  Church  is  more  ancient  and  more  in  accord 
with  the  conception  of  the  sacrament  than  is  that  of  the  West¬ 
ern  Church,  which  up  to  the  twelfth  century  usually  employed 
the  precatory  form.”8  “The  difference  between  Orthodox  and 
Latins  lies  in  the  despotic  spirit  of  the  latter,  reaching  out 
in  their  form  of  this  sacrament  not  only  to  a  sovereignty  over 
souls  and  consciences,  but  to  an  exaltation  of  the  officiant’s 
office,  as  if  he  were  reckoned  as  God;  yet  we  too  acknowledge 

1  Ibid.,  and  Dyobouniotes,  p.  138,  who  quotes  (note  1)  Kritopoulos: 
“God  willed  to  administer  forgiveness  of  sins  through  man.”  (Cf.  Meso- 
lora,  op.  tit.,  I.  p.  331.) 

2  Androutsos,  ibid.,  p.  387. 

3  Dyobouniotes  ( loc .  tit.)  implies  the  possibility  of  holding  that 
God  may  forgive  sin  directly  in  the  case  of  a  genuinely  penitent  person 
who  cannot  get  to  a  priest.  Androutsos  says  “no  one  can  say  with 
certainty”  (p.  387,  ibid.). 

4  Cf .  op.  tit.,  p.  138,  and  Mesolora,  loc.  tit. 

5  Cf.  E vxo\oyLop  to  peya,  pp.  234-235,  for  full  formula,  and  other 
prayers  used  at  the  administration  of  this  sacrament. 

6  Op.  tit.,  p.  139;  cf.  references,  St.  Cyprian,  Epist.  55,  28;  St.  Am¬ 

brose,  de  Spiritu  Sancto,  3,  28;  St.  Leo,  Epist.  108,  2,  and  268,  2,  etc. 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  PARTICULAR 


365 


that  ‘the  sins  are  forgiven  that  very  instant  by  God  through 
the  priest/."1  Androutsos  observes  that  “the  only  difference 
between  the  two  forms  is  that  the  precatory  form  is  consonant 
with  the  nature  of  the  sacrament,  with  historical  usage,  and 
with  the  general  spirit  of  the  Orthodox  Church  ,  .  .  for 
it  is  our  Lord  who  consummates  the  sacrament,  and  the  priest 
acts  only  as  His  representative  and  organ ;  .  .  up  to  the 

12th  century  it  prevailed  universally  in  the  Church  .  .  .  and 
the  request  for  pardon  of  sins  in  the  sacrament  ...  is  more 
in  accord  with  the  spirit  of  the  Orthodox  Church,  which  never 
exalts  the  clerical  order  above  the  laity,  but,  as  it  were,  hides 
the  officiant  under  the  sacraments,  the  Grace  of  which  is  con¬ 
veyed  through  a  form  of  words  (phrases)  in  the  passive  voice, 
or  by  the  invocation  of  the  Holy  Spirit.”2  hfevertheless  between 
the  two  forms  there  is  no  essential  difference;  “whether  one 
say,  as  do  the  Orthodox,  that  God  or  the  divine  Grace  pardons 
sins  through  the  priest,  or,  as  do  the  Westerns,  that  the  priest 
absolves  the  penitent  through  the  power  with  which  he  is  in¬ 
vested  bv  our  Lord,  the  case  is  in  essence  the  same  either  way, 
for  he  who  is  truly  penitent  is  in  fact  forgiven  by  God  through 
the  priest."3  So,  too,  Hyobouniotes  denies  that  there  is  any 
substantial  difference,  as  some  Protestants  seem  to  think,  “for 
the  two  forms  concur  and  coincide.”4 5 

The  minister  of  the  sacrament  must  be  either  a  bishop  or 
a  priest.  The  power  of  binding  and  loosing  given  to  the  Apos¬ 
tles  was  passed  on  to  their  successors,  as  all  Church  Tradition 
shows  clearly."  It  is  not  allowed  to  a  deacon  or  lay  person  to 
absolve.6  The  Roman  view  that  in  case  of  necessity  confes¬ 
sion  should  be  made  to  a  layman,  thereafter  to  be  repeated  to 
a  priest,  is  not  admissible.  “In  necessity  confession  should 
better  be  made  to  God  than  to  a  layman,”  says  Dyobouniotes.7 

1  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV,  pp.  31S-319.  He  quotes  Mogila, — op.  cit., 
I,  p.  431. 

2  Op.  cit.,  pp.  383-384. 

3  Ibid. 

4  Op.  cit.,  p.  139. 

5  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  139,  and  p.  140  for  references  and  quota¬ 
tions. 

6  Ibid.,  and  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  384. 

7  Op.  cit.,  p.  141,  note  2. 


366 


VI.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 


The  Protestant  view  that  in  early  times  confession  was  made 
to  God  alone  and  not  before  a  priest,  is  not  correct,1  as  the 
true  explanation  of  the  several  proof  texts  shows.  The  priest 
receives  at  his  ordination  the  power  to  absolve  but  he  must 
receive  a  faculty  or  authorization  from  the  bishop,  in  order  to 
be  a  confessor.  This  permission  or  authority  from  the  chief 
shepherd  of  the  flock  gives  him  the  right  to  exercise  the  power 
committed  to  him  with  his  priesthood,  and  may  be  either  tem¬ 
porary  or  indefinite  in  its  character.1 3  The  priest  as  confessor 
acts  as  judge  and  representative  of  God,*  having  been  given 
the  authority,  agreeable  to  the  law  of  God  and  the  state  of 
the  sinner,  either  to  release  him  or  not  to  release  him  from 
the  bonds  of  sin.  The  one  difference  between  him  and  the 
worldly  judge  is  that  while  the  latter  not  only  acquits  but  also 
pronounces  guilty,  the  priest  pronounces  judgment  only  of 
acquittal  and  not  condemnation,  since  not  to  absolve  from  sin 
is  something  negative.”4 

In  the  administration  of  the  sacrament  the  priest  asks  any 
necessary  questions,  weighs  the  case,  and,  as  a  good  physician, 
gives  counsel  and  prescribes  the  appropriate  remedies.  “God, 
ever-loving  and  ever-benevolent  in  His  care  for  man,  knows  the 
weakness  of  our  nature  and  its  tendency  to  fall,  and  .  .  . 
provided  in  advanced  the  medicine  of  Penance.”3 *  “It  is  neces¬ 
sary  for  those  who  believe  in  the  economy  of  the  sacraments 
to  confess  their  sins.  .  .  The  priest  applies  the  medicines 
for  the  wound  opposite  to  the  nature  of  the  sins  committed.”* 
The  priest  is  to  assign  certain  penances7  in  the  nature  of  reme¬ 
dial  and  salutary  devotions,  imposing  them  “upon  those  whom 
he  absolves,  for  the  healing  of  their  spiritual  ailments,  to  es¬ 
tablish  them  in  their  state  of  pardon,  and  to  guard  them  from 
new  occasions  of  falling,  .  .  .and  upon  those  whom  he  does 

1  Ibid.,  p.  140. 

2  Ibid.,  and  note  2,  pp.  140-141,  but  not  so  in  Russia, — cf.  Mesolora, 
op.  cit.,  IV.  p.  331,  note  4. 

3  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  p.  318. 

*  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  382-383. 

*  Kritopoulos,  in  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  I.  p.  330. 

«lbid.,  p.  184. 

7  Mogila,  ibid.,  pp.  431-432.  cf.  St.  James  5,  16. 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  PARTICULAR 


367 


not  absolve,  to  elicit  in  them  true  penitence.”1  These  penal¬ 
ties  he  imposes  as  a  good  physician,2  with  a  view  not  to 
punishment  but  to  healing.  Such  are,  for  example,  frequent 
prayer,  spiritual  reading,  almsgiving,  pilgrimage  to  shrines, 
fasting,  exclusion  from  Communion  for  a  time,  and  the  like.* 
“These  penances  are  not  vindictive  punishments  by  which  sat¬ 
isfaction  is  made  for  sin  committed,  but  they  are  remedial,  as 
a  safeguard  for  the  preservation  of  convalescence  and  a  pro¬ 
tection”4  against  relapse.  The  authority  for  the  imposition  of 
such  penances  is  found  both  in  Holy  Scripture5  and  in  Tradi¬ 
tion.9  The  relation  of  penances  to  absolution  will  be  seen  after 
the  exposition  of  the  Orthodox  doctrine  of  absolution,  especially 
in  contrast  to  that  of  the  Roman  Church. 

The  absolution  is  a  full,  complete,  and  entire  forgiveness 
and  remission  of  all  sins  and  a  restoration  and  return  to  the 
state  of  Grace.7  It  covers  all  sins  committed  after  Baptism, 
and  involves  the  deliverance  from  external  penalties  of  sin, 
the  recovery  of  the  hope  of  eternal  salvation  and  of  peace  with 
God.8  As  the  fruits  of  absolution  Mogila  enumerates :  the  re¬ 
gaining  and  reacquisition  of  the  state  of  baptismal  innocence 
lost  by  sin,  of  the  gift  of  Grace  forfeited  by  sin,  of  the  gift  of 
freedom  from  the  power  of  the  Devil,  and  of  the  gift  of  peace 
and  confidence,  instead  of  fear.9  Furthermore,  the  absolution 
is  so  complete  and  full  as  to  demand  no  further  supplement¬ 
ing.10  So  penances  may  not  be  conceived  of  as  the  fulfilment 

1  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  144,  and  note  4,  and  Androutsos,  op.  cit., 
p.  384. 

2  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  p.  306.  Such  are  assigned  “not  for  money 
or  as  in  barter  but  as  remedies  for  each  sin”  by  the  priest  as  physician 
(Jeremiah  in  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  I,  p.  150). 

3  Cf .  Androutsos,  ibid.,  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  for  references,  c.  g.,  St. 

4  Androutsos,  ibid. 

5  Cf.  note  3,  p.  144  of  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  for  references,  e.  g.,  St. 
Matt.  18,  18;  1  Cor.  5,  1-5.  On  the  canonical  aspect  of  penances,  cf. 
Rhalli  and  Potli,  op.  cit.,  pp.  59  ff. 

6  Cf.  e.  g.,  1  Ecumenical  Council,  Canons  11  and  12;  Tertullian 
de  Poenitentia;  St.  Cyprian,  Epist.  6,  52;  Apostolic  Const.  11,  16,  18, 
41;  St.  Irenaeus,  adv.  Haer.  1,  13,  V.  3,  4. 

7  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  382. 

8  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  pp.  141-142. 

9  In  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  I,  p.  432  (question  114). 

10  Dyobouniotes,  ibid.,  p.  144. 


368 


VI.—' THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 


and  completion  of  something  left  undone  in  either  the  confes¬ 
sion  or  the  absolution.  They  may  not  be  thought  of  as  supple¬ 
menting  either  the  work  of  penitence  or  the  operation  of  Grace ; 
they  are  not  demanded  by  God  as  a  reparation  and  satisfaction 
for  sins  committed;,  nor  to  placate  His  wrath,  but  are  solely 
remedial  and  medicinal,  and  not  vindictive  or  punitive.  The 
magnitude  and  vastness  of  our  Lord’s  merit  precludes  any 
“satisfaction”  on  our  part,  and  “according  to  the  fundamental 
teachings  of  Christianity  The  Blood  of  Jesus  .  .  .  cleanses 
us  from  all  sin’1  .  .  .  nor  is  There  (any)  condemnation  to 
them  which  are  in  Christ  Jesus’,2  that  is,  those  justified  through 
the  sacrament  of  Penance.  .  .  To  demand  therefore  any 
other  satisfaction  from  man,  cannot  but  mean  that  the  Blood 
of  the  Lord  has  not  the  needed  expiatory  power  always  and 
for  all  sins,  and  that  God  in  pardoning  sin  still  reserves  to  Him¬ 
self  a  spark,  as  it  were,  of  wrath  which  must  be  extinguished 
by  expiatory  work  on  man’s  part  .  .  .  propitiating  the  di¬ 

vine  justice.”3  When  the  Apostle  imposed  a  penance  on  the 
incestuous  Corinthian  he  did  so  “that  the  spirit  may  be  saved”4 
and  not  as  a  satisfaction  of  divine  righteousness.5 

On  this  point  Orthodoxy  comes  into  sharp  conflict  with 
Boman  teaching.  According  to  the  latter,  there  are  two  sorts 
of  penalties  due  to  sin — eternal  and  temporal.  Baptism  re¬ 
mits  both,  but  Penance  only  the  former.  Hence  there  remains 
in  the  case  of  sin  forgiven  in  Penance  a  certain  temporal  pen¬ 
alty  due  to  that  sin,  which  must  be  worked  off,  as  it  were,  by 
the  penitent.  These  temporal  penalties  and  consequences  due 
to  sin  are  normally  discharged  in  Purgatory,  since  the  span 
of  natural  life  does  not  suffice  for  the  task,  but  they  may  be 
remitted  by  the  Church  drawing  upon  the  treasury  of  mer¬ 
its,  due  to  the  superabounding  Grace  emanating  from  our 
Lord’s  Passion  and  the  works  of  supererogation  done  by  the 
Saints.  Hence  the  doctrine  of  indulgences.  “All  of  this 
teaching”,  says  Androutsos,  “falls  to  the  ground  if  the  theory 
of  temporal  penalties  and  supererogatory  works  be  impugned, 

1  1  St.  John  1,  7. 

2  Rom.  8,  1. 

3  Androutsos.  op.  cit.  pp.  385-386. 

4  1  Cor.  5,  5. 

B  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  pp.  145-146. 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  PARTICULAR 


369 


of  which  they  are  the  necessary  consequents.”1  Neither  of 
these  two  doctrines  may  be  held  by  Orthodoxy,  as  we  saw 
above,  for  the  doctrine  of  works  of  supererogation  does  violence 
to  the  spirit  and  nature  of  Christianity,  is  without  authority, 
and  is  in  itself  vicious  and  false.  The  theory  of  “purgatorial 
fire”  is  likewise  impossible  of  acceptance.  “The  fallacious  no¬ 
tion  of  penances”,  according  to  Dyobouniotes,  “among  other 
things  takes  away  the  absolute  worth  and  power  of  our  Lord’s 
redeeming  work  .  .  .  conceiving  of  it  as  imperfect  and  as 
standing  in  need  of  completion.”  “The  use  of  indulgences  in 
the  Western  Church  is  erroneous  not  only  because  it  is  based 
on  erroneous  premises  (the  idea  of  the  necessity  of  propitiat¬ 
ing  the  divine  righteousness  by  means  of  penalty),  but  be¬ 
cause  it  involves  the  false  doctrine  of  superabounding  merits. 

.  .  Neither  upon  Holy  Scripture  nor  upon  Tradition  may 
the  Western  Church  base  the  doctrine  of  indulgences.  .  . 
In  the  early  Church  they  were  often  given,  it  is  true,  .  .  .  . 
but  not  on  the  basis  of  the  merits  of  the  martyr  .  .  .  but  on 
that  of  the  Penance  to  which  the  confessors  and  martyrs  wit¬ 
nessed.”2 3 4 5 *  This  radical  divergence  in  teaching  and  practice  con¬ 
stitutes  one  of  the  greatest  differences  between  Orthodoxy  and 
Koman  Catholicism.  It  is  the  subject  of  denunciation  and 
refutation  in  all  Orthodox  writings  devoted  either  to  the  ex¬ 
position  of  theological  teaching,1  polemic2  and  controversy,  or 
irenic.8 

Penances  are  not  of  the  esse  of  the  sacrament  of  Penance, 
as  all  Orthodox  theologians  teach.  Such  “satisfactions”  .  .  . 
“may  not  be  conceived  of  generally  as  an  indispensable  part  of 
the  sacrament,  since  they  are  not  always  imposed”,  as  Meso- 

1  Androutsos,  ibid.,  note  1,  p.  386. 

2  Dyobouniotes  op.  cit.,  pp.  146-147,  q.  v.,  for  references  and 
quotations.  For  a  more  complete  treatment  of  the  subject,  cf.  Androut¬ 
sos,  2i’/i/3oXt/c)7,  pp.  320,  ff. 

3  Vide  supra. 

4  Cf.  works  of  Gabriel  Severus,  metropolitan  of  Philadelphia  ( e .  g., 
his  VE K0ecTLs,  p.  5;  Maximus  Peloponnesiacus  ’Ey Macarius 
of  Patinos’  vEAeyxoi;  Tantalides’  IIa7r{<7Tt/cot  eAeyyot;  the  II^SdAioj'; 
Timothy  Anastasius’  ’Etuo-toXt]  wepl  hue rews...pp.  10-13,  et  al.;  on 
which  cf.  Palmieri,  op.  cit.,  I.  pp.  763-805,  and  vol.  II. 

5  E.  g.,  Ambraze,  'H ’0 pdo8o£os  ’E/c/cXiyo-ta,  pp.  54-56,  et  al.;  cf.  Meso- 

lora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  pp.  306-313,  316. 


370 


VI.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 


lora  says.4  So  also  Androutsos,  who  says  that  “the  imposition 
of  penances  cannot  be  considered  as  universally  necessary  since 
.  .  .  the  thief,  the  prostitute,  the  Ninevites,  and  others  were 

forgiven  without  having  to  undergo  any  temporal  punishment, 
as  Holy  Scripture  testifies.’72  They  are  neither  an  essential 
part  of  the  sacrament,  as  they  come  after  repentance  and  con¬ 
fession,  nor  a  complementary  part  of  it.  They  are  not  in¬ 
tegrally  connected  with  the  sacrament  at  all,  for  the  benefits 
of  the  sacrament  are  bestowed  not  on  the  basis  of  penances  to 
be  performed,  but  on  that  of  repentance  and  confession.  In 
the  early  Church  they  were  not  considered  as  conditions  of 
receiving  absolution,  but  as  preparation  for  righteousness,  and 
help  for  eliciting  sincerity  of  intention  and  disposing  to  true 
penitence.  “The  assignment  of  works  of  penitence  after  the 
absolution  looks  to  the  moral  betterment  of  the  penitent,  to 
the  preservation  of  his  present  state  of  healing  just  attained, 
and  to  guarding  him  in  advance  from  new  occasions  of  falling 
into  sin.”1 2 3  Thus  the  essential  conditions  for  absolution  are 
penitence  and  confession  only,  and  these  are  absolutely  indis¬ 
pensable  for  receiving  remission  of  sins,  which  is  conveyed 
only  by  the  priest.  He  may  assign  penances,  but  they  are 
beneficial  and  remedial,  and  may  never  be  considered  as  condi¬ 
tions  of  absolution,  or  as  its  completion. 


5.  Holy  Order 

The  usual  word  now  current  to  designate  this  sacrament  is 
iepoavvr),  literally,  “priesthood”.  Among  other  terms,  two — 
\eipoTovia  and  yetpo^e crta  (yetpo€7rt#eo'ta) , — were  anciently  em¬ 
ployed  to  denote  the  sacrament  of  Holy  Order.  The  former 
means  “extension  of  the  hands”  and  the  latter,  “laying  on  of 
hands”.  Later  there  came  about  a  distinction  by  which 
yet porovLCL  was  especially  and  properly  applied  to  ordination, 
and  yetpo^eo-t'a,  to  any  other  rite  or  service  of  the  laying  on  of 

1  Op.  cit.,  IV.  p.  305. 

2  Op.  cit.,  p.  387. 

3  Ibid.,  pp.  388-389;  they  “are  useful  but  not  necessary”,  Mesolora, 
op.  cit.,  IV.  p.  316. 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  GENERAL 


371 


hands — as,  for  example,  the  sacrament  of  Chrism.1  It  may  not 
be  without  interest  to  note  that  there  have  been  substantial 
contributions  to  the  literature  on  this  sacrament  on  the  part 
of  Greek  Orthodox  writers2  in  recent  days,  such  as,  for  ex¬ 
ample,  the  works  of  Basil  of  Smyrna,3  Eutaxia,4  Petrakakos,5 
and  Androutsos.6  Holy  Order  is  “that  sacrament  in  which, 
through  the  laying  on  of  hands  of  a  bishop,  with  prayer,  the 
Grace  of  the  Holy  Spirit  comes  down  upon  the  ordinand, 
sanctifying  him,  and  constituting  him  a  worthy  minister 
(Aetrov/oyo?)  of  the  Church,”7  and  “ordaining  the  candidate  to 
one  of  three  orders  of  the  ministry.”8 

“Our  Lord  in  founding  His  Church  established  the  means 
of  salvation  and  assigned  their  administration  to  certain  per¬ 
sons,  the  Apostles,  whom  He  sent  to  preach  the  Word,  .  .  . 

to  administer  the  sacraments,  .  .  .  and  to  govern  the  Church.” 
As  this  office  and  ministry  was  to  endure  permanently,  it  must 
needs  be  transferable  and  communicable.  This  necessity  is 
apparent  from  the  facts  recorded  in  the  New  Testament.  “Or¬ 
dination  was  had  by  the  laying  on  of  hands,  by  which  .  .  . 

divine  Grace  was  conveyed,  .  .  .  and  this  laying  on  of  hands 

and  bestowal  of  Grace  .  .  .  was  not  (instituted)  according 

to  a  personal  ruling  of  the  Apostles  .  .  .  but  in  obedience 

1  Cf.  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  148  note  1;  Mesolora,  op.  cit., 
IV7.  pp.  322-324,  note  5:  “Xeipodeaia  means  laying  on  of  hands  in  gen¬ 
eral,  allowed  to  priests  in  the  sacrament  of  Penance,”  while  x€LPOTOP^a 
means  specifically  ordination.  Gabriel  of  Philadelphia  in  Ilept  tup  Beiup 
/j.vo’ttjp Lup  says:  “'lepoavpiq  is  derived  from  irjpu,  to  send ,  for  the  priests 
‘send  up’  sacrifices  to  God;  or  else  from  iepevu,  to  sacrifice”  (ch.  2, 
p.  91). 

2  Few  such  monographs  or  treatises  on  the  particular  sacraments 
have  appeared. 

3  UpaypLCLTeia  rrepl  tov  Kvpovs  rrjs  x€LPOTOVia^  tw v  in to  eTTiaKOTrov 
KaGrjp-rjfxepov  Kal  ax^P-ctTiKov  xet-POT°v'n0epTUp ,  Smyrna,  1887. 

4  Toi"  kclpopikov  dLKaiov  rrjs  dpBodo^ov  apa.To\ucrjs  ’E/c/cX^cfas  ra  tt epl 
iepcLTiKijs  e^ovaias,  Athens,  1872. 

5  T Lvd  irepl  tov  Kvpovs  tup  xo-POToplup  in  ’Efc/cA-ncrtcurTt/G)  ’AX nOeia.  vol. 

30,  (1910)  pp.  134-408.  ® 

6  Op.  cit.,  on  Anglican  Orders  (T6  Kvpos  tup  ’Ayy\t.Kup  xeLPOTOV L<np)  ; 
cf.  also  Comnenos,  2yu/3oAa!  ...7 rpds  'ipuaiv,  Constantinople,  1921. 

7  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  148,  q.  v.  for  other  names  used  for  the 
sacrament;  cf.  also  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  p.  321. 

8  Androutsos,  Aoy paTiK-r),  p.  389. 


VI.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 


to  an  express  injunction  of  our  Lord.”1  By  ordination  Tim¬ 
othy  was  advanced  to  the  episcopal  order.  The  passage  2  Tim. 
1,  6,  is  especially  remarkable,  in  that  the  Grace  given  by  the 
laying  on  of  hands,  “is  not  simply  .  .  .  the  Grace  of  an  of¬ 

fice,  but  ...  a  power  inherent  in  him,  sanctifying  him,  and 
leading  him  into  all  virtue.”2  It  is  “as  a  sacrament,  founded 
by  our  Lord  and  bestowing  Grace  through  outward  signs,  that 
Holy  Sripture  regards  Holy  Order.”3  This  is  amply  wit¬ 
nessed  to  by  the  Fathers,  and  by  Tradition,  as  the  writings  of 
St.  John  Chrysostom,  St.  Basil,  St.  Gregory  of  Nyssa,  and 
St.  Ambrose  testify.4  The  same  evidence  is  afforded  by  the 
heretical  bodies  of  the  fourth  and  fifth  centuries.5  It  is  con¬ 
sequently  more  than  a  mere  setting  apart  of  certain  official 
representatives  to  conduct  Church  worship:6  as  a  sacrament, 
Holy  Order  is  not  only  useful  but  necessary  to  the  life  of  the 
Church.7  “In  general”,  observes  Androutsos,8  “the  significance 
of  Holy  Order  is  brought  out  strongly  in  Sacred  Tradition,  in¬ 
asmuch  as  without  it  no  authoritative  or  infallible  teaching 
of  the  Word,9  no  celebration  of  the  Holy  Eucharist  and  of  the 
other  sacraments,  and  no  administration  of  the  Christian  com¬ 
munity  in  the  Holy  Spirit,  is  possible.” 

The  outward  signs  of  the  sacrament  of  Holy  Order  are 
two — the  laying  on  of  the  hands  of  the  bishop,  and  the  prayer. 

1  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  pp.  149-150,  q.  v.  for  copious  references. 

2  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  389-390. 

3  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  151.  Androutsos  observes  ( loc .  cit.)  that 
while  no  express  mention  is  made  in  the  New  Testament  of  the  out¬ 
ward  sign  of  the  sacrament  as  being  of  divine  institution,  still  the 
apostolic  practice  must  be  referred  back  to  our  Lord  “according  to 
whose  injunction  and  institution  the  Apostles  acted  in  all  matters 
relating  to  the  Kingdom  of  God.” 

4  Cf.  Androutsos,  ibid.,  and  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  pp.  151-152,  for 
references  and  quotations. 

5  Dyobouniotes,  p.  152. 

6  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  p.  322. 

7  Dyobouniotes,  ibid. 

8  Op.  cit.,  p.  390. 

9  In  answer  to  Dyobouniotes’  criticism  of  this  phrase,  Androutsos 
explains  it  as  meaning  that  “the  hierarchy  is  the  authentic  inter¬ 
preter  and  teacher  of  the  divine  writings”  (A07/Z.  MeX^rat,  A.’  p.  137). 
For  Dyobouniotes  ad  loc.,  cf.  ‘II  A07/A.  ’A vdp.  xpiv.,  p.  60,  and  ’0 0eiA. 
airavT.,  pp.  150-151. 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  GENERAL 


oro 

0(0 


Both  are  essential,  and  both  are  of  the  earliest  authority.1  The 
consent  of  the  laity  expressed  formally  in  the  present  service 
of  ordination  of  the  Orthodox  Church  by  the  cry  of  “he  is 
worthy11  (<z£ios),  does  not  constitute  one  of  the  outward  signs 
of  the  sacrament.2  As  Eutaxia  observes :  “The  right  of  choice 
in  regard  to  bishops  as  well  as  other  clerics  has  belonged  from 
early  days  to  the  clergy  and  people,  but  it  does  not  follow  that 
these  have  also  the  authority  to  ordain.  By  their  choice  is 
designated  only  the  person  felt  to  be  worthy  for  ordination, 
but  the  actual  ordination  is  an  act  absoutely  distinct  from  this 
choice  or  election.1'3  Both  the  imposition  of  hands  and  the 
prayer  of  ordination  are  referred  to  apostolic  practice.4 5  Meso- 
lora  regards  the  prayer  as  the  form  of  ordination,  but  after 
recounting  the  various  steps  in  the  rite  of  ordination  says : 
“All  these  things  as  well  as  the  whole  service  combined  with 
the  holy  Liturgy,  without  which  ordination  is  not  performed, 
constitute  the  outward  signs  and  form  of  it.113  The  formula 
of  ordination  as  given  in  the  prayer  is,  in  accordance  with  Or¬ 
thodox  custom,  impersonal :  “The  divine  Grace,  everywhere 
healing  weaknesses  and  fulfilling  all  that  is  lacking,  ordains 
N.  to  the  grade  of  deacon  (priest,  or  bishop).  Let  us  there¬ 
fore  pray  for  him  that  the  Grace  of  the  All-Holy  Spirit  may 
come  down  upon  him.11 

The  minister  of  the  sacrament  must  be  a  bishop,  according 
to  Holy  Scripture,  the  Fathers,  and  the  laws  and  custom  of 
the  Church.  St.  John  Chrysostom,  St.  Epiphanius,  Theodoret, 
St.  Jerome,  and  St.  Athanasius6  “all  regard  (the  power  of) 
ordination  as  (constituting)  the  essential  superiority  of  the 

1  Dyobouniotes,  Ta  Mucrr^pia,  pp.  153-154,  q.  v.  for  quotations  and 
authorities. 

2  Ibid. 

3  Op.  cit.,  p.  161. 

4  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  pp.  327-328.  “The  Orthodox  regard  as  the 
outward  sign  and  form  of  this  sacrament,  the  laying  on  of  the  hands 
of  the  bishop  with  the  accompanying  prayer  and  supplication”  (p.  337). 

5  Ibid.,  pp.  328-329 ;  cf.  his  AeLrovpyucr],  pp.  206-212.  Kritopoulos 
specifies  the  two  essentials,  the  laying  on  of  hands  and  the  prayer, 
in  his  Confession,  Chapter  II.  in  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  I.  p.  332,  and  cf. 
Mogila,  ibid.,  p.  429.  (The  latter  counts  Holy  Order  as  the  fourth, 
and  Penance  as  the  fifth  sacrament.) 

6  References  in  notes  2-6,  p.  395  of  Androutsos,  op.  cit. 


374 


VI.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 


episcopal  order  as  above  the  priest.’*1  It  is  the  distinguishing 
and  peculiar  prerogative  of  the  bishop,  who  only  may  ordain.2 * 
The  words  of  St.  Paul :  “the  gift  in  thee — given  by  prophecy, 
with  the  laying  on  of  the  hands  of  the  presbytery”, 5 *  may  not 
be  taken  to  mean  that  priests  may  ordain.  St.  Paul  the 
Apostle  ordained  St.  Timothy  himself,4  and  the  latter  part  of 
the  passage  refers  “to  the  consent  and  recognition  on  the  part 
of  the  presbytery  of  the  election,  without,  however,  (conveying) 
the  gift  of  Grace  which  the  Apostle,  the  celebrant  of  the  sac¬ 
rament,  bestowed.’”  In  the  case  of  the  ordination  of  any 
cleric  save  a  bishop,  one  bishop  suffices  to  administer  the  sac¬ 
rament.'5  For  the  consecration  of  a  bishop  it  is  necessary  that 
at  least  two,7  preferably  three,8  bishops  officiate,  with  atten¬ 
dant  priests  and  deacons.  Commenting  on  the  fourth  Canon 
of  the  First  Council  (which  embodies  this  prescription), 
Eutaxia  says:  “The  reason  why  one  bishop  may  not  alone  per¬ 
form  canonically  the  consecration  of  an  (other)  bishop,  even  if 
he  should  have  the  consent  thereto  of  the  others  concerned,  is 
that  by  this  act  ...  is  proclaimed  the  fact  that  no  one 
bishop  has  the  authority  to  ordain  a  shepherd  for  (a  part  of) 
the  Church  not  consigned  to  his  jurisdiction,  and  that  only  in 
conjunction  with  others  may  he  rightly  do  anything  outside 
his  own  jurisdiction  without  impairing  the  rights  of  others 
and  transgressing  the  bounds  of  his  own  authority  laid  down 
by  the  canons.’*9 

1  Ibid,  text. 

2  Dvobouniotes,  op.  tit.,  p.  154. 

8  1  Tim.  4,  11. 

4  2  Tim.  1,  6. 

‘  Dvobouniotes,  op.  tit.,  note  1,  pp.  154-155  and  cf.  St.  John  Chrysos¬ 
tom,  Homily  13,  1,  on  1  Tim. 

8  Dvobouniotes,  and  Androutsos,  op.  tit.,  ibid. 

7  Thus  the  moderns. 

8  The  4tli  Canon  of  1  Nicaea  allows  three  only  as  the  minimum,  so 
also  Kritopoulos:  “(Bishops)  are  ordained  by  three  bishops  at  least” 
(in  Mesolora,  op.  tit.,  I,  p.  333).  Mesolora  says:  “At  the  consecration 
of  a  bishop  three  or  at  least  two,  bishops  concelebrate.”  He  gives  the 
place  in  the  Liturgy  where  each  order  is  ordained  and  comments  in¬ 
terestingly  on  the  significance  of  the  differences  {op.  cit.,  TV,  note  3, 
and  text,  p.  329). 

9  Op.  cit.,  p.  202,  and  cf.  pp.  203-266.  The  Apostolic  Constitutions 
allow  two  bishops  as  a  minimum;  cf.  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  156,  for 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  GENERAL 


375 


As  we  have  seen,  there  are  but  three  orders  of  the  min¬ 
istry — bishops,  priests,  and  deacons.1  In  addition  to  these 
are  certain  dignities — such  as  those  of  metropolitans,  arch¬ 
bishops,  patriarchs,  and  the  like2 — and  a  series  of  so-called 
“minor  orders”.  On  the  latter  Mogila  says :  “The  priesthood 
includes  in  it  all  the  grades  .  .  .  with  all  appertaining  to 
each  of  them:  reader,  singer,  lamp  lighter  (XafnraSdpios) ,  sub¬ 
deacon,  and  deacon.”3  According  to  Kritopoulos,  “the  orders 
of  the  ministry  (kpoavvrj)  are  .  .  .  seven,  of  which  the  first 
and  highest  is  that  of  bishops  .  .  .  then  of  priests,  third  of 
deacons,  after  which  that  of  subdeacons,  fifth  of  readers,  sixth 
of  exorcists,  seventh  of  door  keepers.'”4  But  the  modern  Greek 
theologians  seem  to  be  unanimous  in  maintaining  the  three-fold 
order  of  the  ministry,  and  in  stating  that  it  consists  of  those 
three  orders  only — bishops,  priests,  and  deacons.  “The  Or¬ 
thodox  Church  accepts  three  grades  of  the  ministry.”3  “The 
lower  grades  .  .  .  (of  which  our  Church  recognizes  three)”, 
says  Dyobouniotes,  “do  not  constitute  a  part  of  the  sacrament 
of  Holy  Order,  since  the  rite  was  not  instituted  by  our  Lord, 
nor  does  it  convey  any  special  Grace  as  do  the  sacraments.  . 
They  are  not  part  of  the  sacrament  of  Holy  Order  .  .  .  but 
are  only  sacramentals 

Candidates  for  Holy  Orders  must  be  persons  who  are  fit 
by  reason  of  good  moral  character,  knowledge,  and  training, 
and  are  physically  whole.7  They  must  be  baptized  males,  en- 

patristic  and  conciliar  references.  Dositheus  says:  “The  episcopal 
office  is  so  necessary  in  the  Church  that  without  it  there  could  be 
neither  Church  nor  Christian.  The  bishop  is  not  ordained  by  a  priest, 
but  by  two  or  three  bishops’’  (in  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  II,  p.  108-109). 

1  Cf.  Lect.  IV.  “On  the  Constitution  and  Organization  of  the  Church” 
(11,  §  4.  pp.  246-248).  “The  divinely  instituted  hierachy  embraces 
three  orders,  deacons,  priests,  and  bishops,  bound  together  but  yet 
distinguished  from  each  other”  (Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  384). 

2  On  which  cf.  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  note  4,  pp.  329-330,  pp.  60,  70- 
81 ;  Gabriel  of  Philadelphia,  Ilepi  rw:  p.vaT'qpiwv,  pp.  96-97. 

3  In  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  I,  p.  430. 

4  Ibid.,  p.  332.  He  gives  a  summary  of  the  duties  of  each  office, 
ibid.,  and  p.  333. 

5  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  p.  336;  cf.  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  284  ff. 

6  Op.  cit.,  note  1,  p.  157. 

7  Mogila,  in  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  I,  p.  430.  For  the  qualifications  of 
a  candidate  according  to  Kritopoulos,  cf.  ibid.,  p  334. 


376 


VI— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 


dowed  with  the  necessary  equipment  of  faith,  piety,  and  knowl¬ 
edge,  with  which  qualifications  Canon  Law  deals.1  All  the 
prescriptions  regarding  ordinands  are  regulated  by  early  and 
later  canonical  definitions,  as  for  example,  those  of  the 
Apostolic  Constitutions,  the  Ecumenical  Councils,  and  the  like. 
Dyobouniotes  summarizes  these  necessary  qualifications  and 
conditions  as  follows:  (a)  that  the  ordinands  be  Orthodox 
Christians,  not  recently  converted,  of  irreproachable  faith  and 
moral  character;  (b)  that  they  be  learned  in  Holy  Scripture 
and  Canon  Law;  (c)  that  they  be  healthy  in  body  and  with¬ 
out  any  physical  impairment  which  would  prevent  the  fulfillment 
of  the  duties  of  their  ministry  duly  and  canonically;  (d)  that 
the  candidate  for  the  diaconate  be  25  years  old,  and  for  the 
priesthood  and  episcopate  30  years;  (e)  that  he  be  unmarried 
or  already  married  if  he  be  a  candidate  for  the  diaconate  or 
priesthood,  and  unmarried  or  else  living  apart  from  his  wife, 
if  he  be  a  candidate  for  the  episcopal  office — since  no  one  may 
marry  after  ordination,2  and  bishops  must  be  celibate. 

The  Grace  of  the  sacrament  is  the  spiritual  authority  to 
fulfil  all  that  which  pertains  to  the  office,  together  with  which, 
in  the  case  of  one  worthily  receiving  the  sacrament,  the  partic¬ 
ular  assistance  of  God  enabling  him  to  fulfil  all  his  duties 
worthily  and  in  a  manner  pleasing  to  God,  and  to  live  a  vir¬ 
tuous  life  in  conformity  with  his  calling.3  This  Grace,  consti¬ 
tuting  the  ordained  a  worthy  and  fit  minister  of  the  Church, 
is  distinctly  spoken  of  in  Holy  Scripture,  and  expressly  taught 
by  Tradition.4  It  is  one,  and  is  bestowed  on  the  ordinands  in 
varying  measure  for  the  grade  to  which  they  are  being  or¬ 
dained,  and  the  service  to  which  they  are  thereby5  designated. 
There  are  not  different  graces,  so  to  speak,  imparted  in  each 
ordination,  but  “one  only,  apportioned  in  gradations — to  the 
deacon  receiving  it,  for  his  elevation  to  the  higher  order,  and 
to  the  priest,  for  his  advancement  to  the  highest  office.  Thus 
the  bishop  is  the  preacher  of  truth  par  excellence ,  the  admin¬ 
istrator  of  the  sacraments,  and  the  shepherd  over  the  flock  of 

1  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  385-38. 

-Op.  cit.,  pp.  167-168,  notes  and  references;  cf.  also  Androutsos,  ibid. 

3  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  390-391. 

4  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  156,  q.  v.  for  references. 

6  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  p.  333. 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  GENERAL 


377 


the  Church;  the  priest  preaches  the  word  of  God  and  performs 
all  sacraments  save  ordination  and  the  consecration  of  the 
myrrh,  ruling  his  church  in  obedience  to  the  bishop ;  the  deacon 
assists  the  bishop  and  priest  in  the  services,  but  has  not  the 
right  to  teach,  perform  the  sacraments,  or  shepherd  the  Church. 
All  three  orders  .  .  .  constitute  one  sacrament,  of  which  the 
Grace  and  the  effects  are  bestowed  in  part  and  in  degree.  The 
three-fold  character  of  the  Holy  Order  does  not  abrogate  the 
unity  of  the  sacrament  .  .  .  nor  does  the  unity  of  the  sac¬ 
rament  take  away  the  three-fold  mystic  act,  since  ordination 
must  be  regarded  as  the  ordination  not  only  of  a  priest  but 
as  well  of  a  bishop  and  a  deacon.”1  The  phrase  “stewards  of 
the  mysteries  of  God"2  Mogila  quotes  as  the  summary  of  sac¬ 
erdotal  duties,  saying:  “Two  things  are  involved  in  this  stew¬ 
ardship  :  first,  the  power  and  authority  to  forgive  .  .  .  sins 
.  .  .  and  second,  the  power  and  authority  to  teach,”  under 
which  he  includes  pastoral  work  and  the  administration  of 
the  other  sacraments.3  Kritopoulos  epitomizes  the  work  of  a 
priest  as  “the  ministry  of  the  Word  and  the  celebration  of  the 
sacraments.”4 5 

“As  in  the  other  sacraments,  so  also  in  that  of  Orders,  the 
Grace  bestowed  is  so  stamped  into  the  soul  of  the  ordained 
that  it  cannot  be  lost  at  all.’”  Since  in  a  sense  all  sacraments 
imprint  an  indelible  seal,  so  especially  in  Orders  and  Baptism 
is  the  Grace  once  bestowed  a  permanent  and  inalienable  pos¬ 
session.  “Baptism  and  Orders  occupy  a  parallel  position,”6  in 

1  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  pp.  157-159. 

2  1  Cor.  4,  1. 

3  In  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  I,  p.  430. 

4  Ibid.,  p.  335.  cf.  Kephala:  ‘'The  priesthood  as  a  sacrament  desig¬ 
nates  the  priest  as  the  organ  of  divine  Grace,  as  the  minister  of  the 
holy  sacraments,  as  the  teacher  of  piety  and  the  acceptable  mediator 
between  God  and  man,  that,  like  God’s  angel,  he  may  offer  up  the 
prayers  and  supplications  of  the  faithful  to  God  and  bring  down 
from  heaven  divine  gifts... Holy  Order  is  that  sacrament  by  which 
a  man  from  among  men  stands  for  men  in  relation  to  God”  (op.  cit., 
pp.  187-198). 

5  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  159,  and  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  pp.  333 
ff.;  cf.  the  discussion  of  indelible  character  in  Lecture  V,  pp.  283-286, 
and  Dvobouniotes’  tlieorv  ibid. 

6  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  393. 


378 


VI.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 


that  the  character  of  the  Grace  bestowed  is  such  that  by  its 
nature  it  is  non-iterable.  One  may  be  baptized,  chrismated, 
and  ordained  only  once,  since  the  effect  achieved  by  the  Grace 
of  these  sacraments  is  of  a  once-for-all  character.  The  other 
sacraments  are  never,  properly  speaking,  repeated,  since  the 
condition  of  the  recipient  creates  anew  the  need  for  a  further 
access  of  the  Grace  which  they  mediate.  But  no  such  possible 
contingency  can  occur  in  relation  to  Baptism  or  Holy  Order. 
One  who  is  baptized  is  born  again,  and  cannot  be  “un-bom”. 
One  who  is  ordained  is  once  for  all  set  apart  into  the  ranks 
of  the  hierarchy.  Consequently  Holy  Order  may  neither  be 
iterated,  nor  may  its  Grace  be  repudiated  and  thereby  be  ex¬ 
cised  or  deleted  from  the  soul  which  has  once  received  it.1 
As  we  have  seen,  the  teaching  and  practice  of  the  Orthodox 
Church  in  relation  to  heretical  orders  may  be  reconciled  on 
the  basis  of  the  principle  of  economy.  Similarly  she  accepts 
the  Orders  and  Baptism  of  Orthodox  who  have  lapsed  into 
heresy  or  schism,  because  of  the  original  validity  of  these  sac¬ 
raments  and  by  reason  of  their  non-iterable  character.  The 
recent  action  of  the  Church  of  Russia  in  allowing  the  return 
to  lay  life  of  clerics,  acceding  to  their  express  request,  cannot 
be  justified.  “The  renunciation  of  the  clerical  office  and  its 
abdication  is  not  allowed  by  the  canons  under  any  condition.  . 

.  .  The  ruling  recently  made  in  Russia  by  which  permission 
is  given  (to  clerics  to)  ask  release  from  their  spiritual  order 
and  rank,  and  to  return  to  the  ranks  of  the  laity,  is  destitute 
of  anv  canonical  basis”,2  and  “is  contrarv  to  the  canons  of  the 
Church.”8 


6.  Matrimony 

In  the  sacrament  of  Marriage  or  Holy  Matrimony,  the 
Grace  of  the  Holy  Spirit  is  bestowed  to  sanctify  the  union  of 
man  and  wife,  and  to  enable  them  to  attain  the  end  which 
marriage  has  in  view:  the  preservation  and  increase  of  the 
human  race,  particularly  of  members  of  the  Church,  the  pro- 

1  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  159,  and  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  391. 

Androutsos,  ibid.,  note  3. 

3  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  note  3,  pp.  159-160.  Both  refer  to  Milas, 
Kirchenrecht,  pp.  392  ff.  (translation  of  M.  Apostolopoulos ) . 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  GENERAL 


379 


motion  of  mutual  helpfulness,  the  restraint  of  the  passions  and 
their  submission  to  the  moral  la w,  and  the  Christian  nurture 
and  upbringing  of  children.1  It  is  “an  holy  act  of  divine  ori¬ 
gin,  in  which  the  Grace  of  the  Holy  Spirit  is  imparted  by 
the  priest  to  two  people  freely  and  willingly  coming  together, 
to  sanctify  and  uplift  the  otherwise  natural  bond  of  their 
union.*'2  Kritopoulos  specifies  the  procreation  of  children  in 
his  definition  of  the  sacrament,3  as  does  Jeremiah  II.4  Mogila 
emphasizes  the  confirmation  and  ratification  by  the  priest  of 
the  bond  freely  and  publicly  entered  upon.5  Mesolora  enu¬ 
merates  the  objects  of  marriage  as  the  lawful  relation  of  man 
and  wife  and  their  cohabitation  in  purity,  the  procreation  of 
children  and  their  upbringing  as  Christians,  and  the  mutual 
partnership  and  succour  in  sickness  and  times  of  difficulty.5 

All  Orthodox  Confessions  count  Marriage  as  a  sacrament, 
which  implies  that  it  must  have  a  divine  foundation  and  must 
through  outward  signs  eonvev  Grace.  The  divine  foundation 
or  establishment  of  the  sacrament  is  nowhere  explicitly  al¬ 
luded  to  in  the  Hew  Testament.  That  our  Lord  elevated  and 
exalted  the  bond  of  union  between  man  and  wife,  which  was 
a  natural  law  with  its  origin  in  God's  decree  and  which  had 
God's  blessing.1 8  is  apparent  from  Holy  Scripture.  “But  yet 
we  have  no  clear  and  definite  statement  in  the  Hew  Testament 
witnessing  to  this  elevation  of  marriage  into  a  sacrament  bv 
our  Lord."?  Yet  our  Lord  accepted  and  uplifted  the  existing 
institution  of  marriage,  made  a  wedding  the  occasion  of  His 
first  miracle,  and  gave  laws  concerning  marriage.9  But  the 
significant  passage  “upon  which  both  in  early  times  and  to- 

1  Dyobouniotes,  op.  ext.,  pp.  169-170,  q.  v.  for  references. 

•  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  396. 

3  In  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  I,  pp.  141,  224. 

4 /Me?.,  p.  335. 

5  P.  433  :  for  Dositheus’  definition  cf.  ibid.,  II.  p.  114. 

8  Op.  cit.,  IV.  p.  340. 

T  Cf.  Mesolora,  ibid.,  p.  342,  where  he  gives  an  account  of  the 
origin  of  marriage.  In  view  of  this  aspect,  cf.  Kephala’s  definition  of 
Marriage  as  “the  sacrament.  .  .in  which  the  Church  consecrates  the 
blessing  given  to  the  human  race  in  Paradise’’  (Gen.  1,  28),  in  his 
Xpi<rroXo7ta,  p.  198. 

8  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  396-397. 

9E.  g.,  in  St.  Matt.  19,  4-6. 


380 


VI.—1 THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 


day  the  doctrine  of  the  sacrament  of  Marriage  is  based”1  is 
Eph.  5 ,  22-33.  Here  the  Apostle  speaks  of  the  relation  of  hus¬ 
band  and  wife  as  like  that  of  Christ  and  His  Church,  and  uses 
the  words:  “This  is  a  great  mystery”2  (/xvar^pLov) .  The  phrase 
may  not  be  understood  to  imply  directly  that  marriage  is  a 
sacrament,  but  “nevertheless  from  the  context  it  is  clear  that 
it  is  conceived  by  the  Apostle  as  something  conveying  divine 
Grace  or  at  least  based  upon  it  and  presupposing  it.”3  “The 
elevation  by  our  Lord  of  the  natural  bond”,  says  Androutsos, 
“into  spiritual  union,  in  accordance  with  the  prototype  of  the 
union  of  Christ  with  the  Church,  must  needs  he  manifested 
in  mutual  love,  and  is  impossible  of  being  constituted  without 
the  blessing  of  the  Saviour  and  the  influence  of  divine  Grace.”4 
This  exegesis  is  entirely  consistent  with  the  mind  of  the  Apos¬ 
tle  as  expressed  elsewhere.5  Nevertheless,  there  is  a  gap  be¬ 
tween  the  conception  of  marriage  as  under  the  influence  of 
divine  Grace  .  .  .  and  as  a  sacrament,  “an  effectual  means  of 

grace”  in  the  Church’s  sense  of  the  word.'1  This  lacuna  between 
Marriage  “as  founded  upon  and  presupposing  divine  Grace”7 
and  developed  sacramental  doctrine  is  filled  in  by  the  evidence 
presented  by  Sacred  Tradition. 

Tradition  teaches  “that  Holy  Scripture  holds  that  Grace 
is  given  through  the  service  (rite)  of  Marriage,  which  rite  was 
established  by  our  Lord  or  His  Apostles,  .  .  .  and,  conse¬ 
quently,  views  Marriage  as  a  sacrament.”6  According  to 

1  Androutsos,  ibid. 

2  vs.  32. 

3  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  171. 

4  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  397. 

5  As  e.  g.,  in  Tim.  2,  15;  Col.  ff. ;  1  Cor.  7,  14,  39,  etc. 

6  Androutsos,  ibid.,  p.  397-398. 

7  Dyobouniotes  ibid.,  p.  172.  Christ  did  not  found  the  institution 
of  marriage,  but  exalted  and  uplifted  it  into  a  sacrament  (Androutsos, 
op.  cit.,  pp.  396-398).  When  did  He  establish  the  sacrament  of  Mar¬ 
riage?  One  opinion  is  that  He  did  so  at  the  Marriage  of  Cana  (St. 
John  2,  1)  ;  another,  on  the  occasion  of  His  conflict  with  the  Pharisees 
(St.  Matt.  19,  4-6).  “But,”  says  Dyobouniotes,  “there  is  nothing  said 
in  Holy  Scripture  about  the  Institution  of  the  sacrament. .  .by  our 
Lord,  or  about  the  circumstances.  ...The  most  probable  view  is  that 
its  Institution  occurred ...  in  the  time  between  the  Resurrection  and 
Ascension”  {op.  cit.,  pp.  173-174). 

8  Ibid.,  p.  173. 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  GENERAL 


881 


Mesolora :  “All  the  Fathers  of  the  Church,  in  view  of  the  words 
of  Holy  Writ  about  it,  taught  and  wrote  that  Marriage  is  a 
sacrament  divinely  established,  constituting  the  natural  bond 
and  law  a  holy  union,  through  prayers,  through  appropriate 
signs,  and  through  the  blessing  of  the  Church's  ministers."1 
This  evidence  for  the  sacramental  character  of  Holy  Matrimony 
is  gathered  from  the  Fathers,2  the  early  office  books,  the  con¬ 
tinuous  and  constant  teaching  of  the  Church,  and  is  even 
proved  by  the  teaching  and  practice  of  the  early  heretics,  such 
as  the  Copts,  Armenians,  Maronites,  Abyssinians,  and  Nestor- 
ians,  all  of  whom  regard  Marriage  as  a  sacrament.3  Dyoboun- 
iotes  says  in  summary:  “Both  Holy  Scripture  and  Sacred  Tra¬ 
dition  regard  and  recognize  Marriage  as  a  sacrament.”4 5 * 

The  outward  signs  in  the  sacrament  of  Marriage,  Mesolora 
reckons  as  four :  the  profession  publicly  before  the  Church,  of 
willing  and  free  consent  by  both  parties;  the  rings  exchanged 
in  the  ceremony ;  the  crowns  used ; '  and  the  various  prayers 
and  blessings, —  .  .  .  the  form  properly  being  the  actual  words 
of  marriage,  that  is,  the  prayer  to  God  to  stretch  forth  His 
Hand  upon  the  two  persons,  and  the  formulae :  “N.  the  ser¬ 
vant  (handmaid)  of  God  is  espoused”  .  .  .  “A7,  the  servant 

1  Op.  cit.,  IV.  p.  343. 

2  For  references  and  quotations,  cf.  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  pp.  174- 
175,  and  notes;  Androutsos  op.  cit.,  p.  398. 

3  Cf.  ibid.,  and  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV,  pp.  343-344. 

4  Op.  cit.,  p.  176. 

5  “Tlie  rings  are  a  symbol  of  the  earnest,  the  betrothal, ...  .which 
takes  place  before  the  wedding.”  Formerly  the  man's  ring  was  of  gold 

...and  the  woman’s  of  silver,  which  symbolized  the  sun  and  moon 
respectively.  The  betrothal  now  ordinarily  takes  place  privately,  but 
may  be  made  part  of  the  service  in  which  the  two  people  are  married. 
“The  crowns  are  the  sign  of  the  bond  between  the  newly  married,  and 
of  the  glory  and  honor  which  crowns  them  in  the  sacrament.”  In  Rus¬ 
sia  the  crowns  are  replicas  of  the  Royal  Crown  and  are  kept  among 
the  Church  vessels.  In  the  Greek  Church  they  are  of  flowers  or  ever¬ 
green.  Wine  is  taken  as  a  remembrance  of  the  Marriage  in  Cana  where 
our  Lord  performed  His  first  miracle.  “It  denotes  the  mutual  sharing 

in  the  sorrow  and  trials  of  life.”  The  rite  of  crowning  is  of  such 
significance  that  Marriage  is  usually  known  as  artycs,  arecpdi'Wfj.a., — cf. 
Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  p.  346.  and  notes;  ibid.,  XeiTovpyLK-rj,  pp.  212-218; 
on  the  canonical  aspects  of  the  relation  of  the  Betrothal  to  the  Mar¬ 
riage,  cf.  ’EKKXgaiacTTLKbv  ditcaio v,  by  Christodoulos,  pp.  436-440  and  ff. 


382 


VI.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 


(handmaid)  of  God  is  crowned.”1  Both  Dyobouniotes  and 
Androutsos,  however,  reduce  the  outward  signs  to  two  only: 
the  declaration  publicly  of  free  consent  and  agreement  on  the 
part  of  the  two  parties,  and  the  blessing  of  the  priest.  The 
consent  of  each  of  the  two  persons  is  demanded  by  the  priest, 
and  is  an  integral  part  of  the  sacrament.  “As  ...  in  the 
sacrament  of  Penance”,  writes  Dyobouniotes,  “confession  is 
absolutely  necessary  for  the  operation  of  the  sacrament,  so  in 
the  sacrament  of  Marriage  the  willing  and  free  consent  of 
both  persons  is  absolutely  necessary  for  the  operation  of  the 
sacrament  of  Marriage.”2 3 4 

The  blessing  of  the  priest  is  likewise  essential  for  the  con¬ 
summation  of  the  sacrament.  Early  testimony  to  the  neces¬ 
sity  of  the  priestly  blessing  is  found  in  the  writings  of  such 
Fathers  as  St.  Ignatius,  St.  Basil,  St.  Clement  Alex.,  Tertul- 
lian,  St.  John  Chrysostom,  and  St.  Ambrose.8  It  is  true  that 
there  are  instances  of  the  acceptance  by  the  Church  of  mar¬ 
riages  not  blessed  by  a  priest,  as  valid,  but  this  does  not  in¬ 
dicate  that  the  Church  ordinarily  gave  such  recognition.  The 
similar  case  of  the  recognition  of  the  validity  of  the  marriages 
of  heterodox,  heretics,  or  schismatics,  comes  under  the  same 
principle :  the  use  of  economy*  The  Church  does  not  recognize 
any  sacraments  not  performed  by  herself,  and  prescribes  that 
the  officiant  be  a  priest  in  every  case.5 * *  In  all  the  sacraments, 
as  we  saw  above,  the  priest  is  the  minister  of  the  Grace  be¬ 
stowed,  and  Marriage  is  no  exception  to  this  rule.  The  Roman 
view  that  the  ministers  of  the  sacrament  are  the  two  parties 
who  are  to  be  made  man  and  wife,  is  both  wrong  and  vicious. 
It  is  wrong  because  it  is  contrary  to  Tradition,  to  the  practice 
of  the  Church,  and  to  the  sacramental  principle  just  referred 
to.  It  is  vicious,  in  that  it  regards  the  religious  service  not  as 


1  Op.  cit.,  IV.  pp.  347-348. 

2  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  176,  and  cf.  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  398. 

3  Cf .  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  177  and  note  1,  for  references. 

4  Ibid.,  note  5  (pp.  177-178),  and  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  399  note.  .  . 

6  The  one  possible  case  of  clinical  Baptism,  or  Baptism  in  any  pres¬ 

sing  necessity,  by  a  layman,  only  allowable  and  “validatable”,  so  to 

speak,  by  the  exercise  of  economy,  may  not  be  appealed  to  (as  the  Roman 
theologians  do  in  this  instance)  as  it  has  no  bearing  on  the  question 

whatever  (cf.  Androutsos,  loc.  cit.). 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  GENERAL 


383 


conveying  the  necessary  Grace,  but  only  as  “laudable”  and  “edi¬ 
fying”,  and  consequently  does  not  view  it  as  essential.1 2  As  a 
result  of  this  view,  marriage  and  the  sacrament  of  Marriage 
would  coincide."  The  Roman  “view  leads  directly  to  civil  mar¬ 
riage,  and  makes  the  logical  basis  on  which  Roman  theologians 
found  their  opposition  to  it  absolutely  untenable.”3  “The 
Church  has  declared  her  mind  on  the  subject  of  the  ministers 
(of  the  sacrament)  of  marriage,  not  only  in  the  penalties  she 
imposes  on  those  who  have  been  joined  together  as  man  and 
wife  without  the  use  of  the  prescribed  ceremony,  but  also  in 
her  practice  and  her  decrees,  (where)  she  makes  the  comple¬ 
tion  of  the  sacrament  dependent  .  .  .  upon  the  Church's 
blessing.”4 5 6 7 

It  is  presupposed  that  the  two  people  to  be  married  are 
Christians,  for  the  Church  forbids  marriage  with  a  non-Chris¬ 
tian.’  Formerly  she  prohibited  any  marriage  with  heretics  or 
schismatics  as  well.  At  the  beginning  of  the  19th  century  she 
began  to  allow  the  marriage  of  an  Orthodox  with  a  Roman, 
Protestant,  or  Schismatic."  In  such  a  case  the  Church  pre¬ 
scribes  that  an  orthodox  priest  perform  the  sacrament  and 
that  a  promise  shall  have  been  made  to  bring  up  the  children 
in  the  Orthodox  Faith.'  Such  “mixed  marriages”  are  strongly 
discouraged.  There  must,  of  course,  be  no  impediment  in  the 
case  of  either  party.  They  must  be  of  proper  age,  physically 
capable  of  being  married,  not  already  married,  and  there  must 
be  no  impediment  by  reason  of  consanguinity,  affinity  by  mar¬ 
riage,  or  spiritual  relationship.8 

“The  inward  Grace  bestowed  by  the  sacrament  sanctifies 

1  Cf.  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  TV.  pp.  350-351,  q.  v.  for  references. 

2  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  177. 

3  Ibid. 

4  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  note  4,  pp.  398-399. 

5  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  401;  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  178;  cf. 
Can.  14  of  the  IV  Ecum.  Council,  and  72  of  that  in  Trullo. 

6  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  p.  353,  and  note  1. 

7  Op.  cit.;  for  a  treatise  on  the  subject  from  the  standpoint  of 
Canon  Law,  cf.  M.  J.  Theotoka,  Ta  Kparovvra  irepl  /juktuv  yd/iwv  iv  tt/ 
6pdo86&  dvaroXLKy  'E/c/cA^cria,  Constantinople,  1899;  and  ibid.,  'Nop.oXoyia, 
pp.  354  ff. 

8  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  p.  345,  and  note  2,  q.  v.  for  references  to 
Canon  Law  on  the  subject. 


384 


VI.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 


the  natural  bond  and  uplifts  it  to  become  the  center  of  moral 
perfection  and  mutual  love.”1  This  effect  of  Grace  is  given 
that  “marriage  be  honorable  in  all,  and  the  bed  undefiled.”2 
It  assists,  makes  attainable,  and  promotes  the  end  for  which 
Marriage  is  designed,  and  involves  two  things — monogamy  and 
the  indissolubility  of  the  bond,3  which  are  both  presupposed  and 
demanded  by  Christian  Marriage.  “When  by  reason  of  the 
Fall  the  permanent  and  indissoluble  character  of  Marriage  had 
been  perverted  through  polygamy  and  easy  divorce — not  only 
among  the  heathen  but  also  among  the  Jews  as  well — our  Lord 
came  and  restored  Marriage  to  its  first  and  rightful  place,  ex¬ 
alting  its  permanent  and  indissoluble  character.”4  “Polygamy 
is  opposed  to  the  teaching  of  Holy  Scripture  and  Sacred  Tra¬ 
dition,  defeats  the  moral  aims  of  Marriage,  since  it  oppresses 
and  degrades  woman,  subverts  the  well-being  of  the  household 
.  .  .  and  is  detrimental  to  the  nurture  of  children.”5 

“Both  Holy  Scripture  and  Tradition  emphasize  the  indis¬ 
soluble  character  of  Marriage,  recognizing  but  one  sole  cause 
for  the  dissolution  of  the  marriage  tie — ‘fornication’.”  This 
does  not  mean  that  in  case  of  such  sin  divorce  is  absolutely 
necessary  or  obligatory,  for  upon  reconciliation  and  by  agree¬ 
ment  the  bond  of  marriage  may  still  be  preserved  intact.6  But 
inasmuch  as  the  express  words  of  our  Lord  allow  dissolubility 
of  marriage  on  this  ground,  it  is  erroneous  to  say,  as  do  the 
Bomans,  that  marriage  is  absolutely  indissoluble,7  or  to  con¬ 
ceive  this  exception  as  not  being  a  real  one  or  as  not  actually 
dissolving  the  bond.8  According  to  Androutsos,  the  natural 
solvent  of  the  bond  of  marriage  is  death,  after  which  the  sur¬ 
viving  partner  may  contract  a  second,  or  by  special  dispensa¬ 
tion,  even  a  third  marriage-8  The  indissolubility  of  marriage 
is  subject  to  one  limitation,  since  divorce  is  allowed  in  the 

1  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  398-399. 

2  Heb.  13,  4;  and  cf.  1  Tliess.  4,  3-4;  Eph.  5,  22-33. 

3  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  178. 

4  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  399 ;  cf.  Dyobouniotes,  ibid.,  and  p.  179. 

5  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  179. 

6  Ibid.,  and  note  4. 

7  Ibid .,  p.  181. 

8  As  Dyobouniotes  seems  to  think  that  Androutsos  holds.  Cf.  his 
'H  A07 /JL.  ’Aj 'dp.  Kpiv.,  p.  60;  ’0 06i\.  airavr.,  pp.  151-152. 

9  Op.  cit.,  pp  399-400;  cf.  Kritopoulos,  in  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  I.  p.  336. 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  GENERAL 


885 


case  of  “fornication”  according  to  the  words  of  our  Lord.  In 
case  of  a  separation  a  rnensa  et  toro  the  innocent  party  should, 
according  to  the  text,  have  the  right  of  remarriage,  which  the 
Roman  Church  will  not  admit,  as  it  holds  to  the  absolute  in¬ 
dissolubility  of  the  bond  in  defiance  of  Holy  Scripture.  “Our 
Lord  in  giving  the  right  to  dissolve  the  bond  does  not  preclude 
the  right  to  remarry,  nor  is  there  the  least  reason  why  the 
innocent  party  should  be  deprived  of  the  right  to  form  a  new 
marriage."1  The  Roman  theory  and  practice  are  both  unjus¬ 
tifiable  according  to  the  Orthodox  view.  “By  the  interpreta¬ 
tion  of  St.  Matt.  5,  32,  and  19,  9  .  .  .  and,  in  connection  with 
it,  of  St.  Luke  16,  18,  and  St.  Mk.  10,  2-12,  .  .  .  dissolution 
of  marriage  is  allowed  by  reason  of  ‘Fornication’.”  The  Roman 
exegesis  which  would  make  the  last  word  mean  “an  illicit 
union”,  in  order  to  maintain  the  absolute  indissolubility  of 
marriage,  is  forced  and  inacceptable,  as  it  does  violence  to  the 
meaning  of  the  words.  The  words  “her  that  is  put  away”  may 
not  be  taken  in  a  general,  but  in  a  specific  sense,  and  in  connec¬ 
tion  with  the  passage  from  St.  Matthew.  They  mean:  (St. 
Luke  16,  18),  “he  who  marrieth  her  that  is  put  away  from 
her  husband  for  any  other  reason  and  not  because  of  fornica¬ 
tion  committeth  adultery”.  .  .  “Yet  even  if  the  passage  is 
of  general  application,  it  would  still  mean  that  the  marriage  of 
the  member  put  away  is  forbidden,  but  not  that  of  the  innocent 
party”.  .  .  “The  separation  a  toro  et  mensa  of  the.  Roman 
Church  was  utterly  unknown  in  the  early  Church”.  .  .  The 
patristic  basis  of  the  Roman  argument  is  not  found  in  the 
general  teaching  of  the  primitive  Church  as  a  whole,  but  solely 
in  certain  Fathers  who  were  interested  in  forbidding  second 
marriages  (which  they  felt  were  wrong), if  necessary, “conceiving 
them  as  evidence  of  incontinence  and  as  only  a  seemly  form  of 
adultery.”2  It  is  true  that  second  and  third  marriages  are  not 
looked  upon  with  favor  by  the  Church,  but  yet  they  are  al- 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  400.  In  the  case  of  the  reunion  of  divorced  people,  they 
are  not  remarried,  “since  the  sacrament  is  not  repeated,  for  there  it 
is  not  a  question  of  a  new  relationship  but  of  the  same  one”  (Dyo- 
bouniotes,  op.  cit.,  pp.  182-183;  cf.  N.  Demetracopoulos,  in  'EWrjvoyaW acrj 
’i$o/Ao\oyia  [1906-1907],  vol.  XXVI.  ’Avaavaraais  \vdivrov  ydfxov,  pp. 
271 

2  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  pp.  180-181  note  2. 


386 


VI.—' THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 


lowed.  A  fourth  marriage  is  absolutely  prohibited.1 *  Though 
neither  Androutsos  nor  Dyobouniotes  treat  of  the  matter,  Mes- 
olora  asserts  definitely  that  “the  Orthodox  allow  divorce  gen¬ 
erally  for  the  cause  of  adultery  and  also  for  other  grave  causes 
which  make  married  life  impossible,  giving  permission  for  a 
second  and  third  marriage.’''  Among  these  ‘other  causes’  for 
which  divorce  is  granted  are:  a  plot  against  the  life  of  one  or 
the  other  by  the  husband  or  wife;  adultery;  causes  leading  or 
related  to  adultery;  procuring  or  inducing  abortion  or  mis¬ 
carriage;  assuming  the  office  of  God-parent  of  the  same  child 
at  a  Baptism ;  physical  impotence ;  insanity ;  the  monastic 
state.  “But  the  reason  for  divorce  is  generally  adultery,  .  .  . 
as  well  as  anything  related  to  it  when  it  is  officially  certified 
and  proven.”3 

Inasmuch  as  the  Orthodox  Church  rates  the  state  of  vir¬ 
ginity  as  higher  than  that  of  matrimony  in  the  scale  of  moral 
perfection,  following  the  Bible  and  Tradition,4  she  demands 
that  the  bishops  be  celibate,  and  that  monks  who  have  taken  the 
tonsure  or  have  received  ordination  remain  unmarried.  In 
the  case  of  bishops,  her  ruling  has  in  view  not  only  this  idea 
but  also  the  “work  of  the  episcopal  office,  which  with  its  many 
cares  and  duties  could  not  be  adequately  attended  to  .  .  .  in 

the  married  state  with  the  domestic  duties  it  involves,  nor 
could  the  bishop  show  that  self-denial  and  self-sacrifice  which 
his  office  demands  and  presupposes.”5 6 

7.  Unction 

The  seventh  sacrament  is  that  of  Holy  Unction,  which  is 
a  divinely  instituted  sacrament  in  which  a  sick  person  is  anointed 
with  oil,  and  divine  Grace  heals  both  his  bodily  and  his 

1  Ibid.,  p  182  and  cf  notes  for  references  ad  rem. 

-Op.  cit.,  IV.  p.  351. 

3  Ibid.,  note  6,  pp.  349-350;  for  legal  and  canonical  aspect  of 
divorce  and  the  proper  measures  in  instituting  proceedings,  cf.  Sakel- 
laropoulos,  ’E kk\.  binaiov,  pp.  538-550;  Christodoulos,  op.  cit.,  pp. 
443-448. 

4  Cf.  1  Cor  7,  38,  40;  St.  Matt  19,  11;  St.  Augustine,  de  bon.  conj., 

8,  8;  St.  Cyprian,  de  hab.  virg.,  3;  St.  Jerome,  adv.  Jov.  1,  21;  etc. 

6  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  183,  and  note  2,  ibid.;  cf.  also  Meso- 
lora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  p.  352  and  note  1,  and  2. 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  GENERAL 


387 


spiritual  ills.1  The  name  now  applied  to  the  sacrament 
(evyeAcu ov),  is  probably  due  to  the  monk  Job,  who  formed  the 
term  by  a  combination  of  two  words  expressing  the  outward 
signs  of  the  sacrament — "prayer”  (euy^)  and  "oil”  (e'Aaioi/).2 
The  passage  in  the  New  Testament  which  refers  to  this  sac¬ 
rament  is  St.  James  5,  14-15.  A  careful  examination  of  the 
text  will  yield  the  following  conclusions:  (a)  "When  St. 
James  enjoins  this  practice  he  is  not  establishing  something 
new,’”  nor  could  it  be  "something  unknown  to  the  Christians, 
.  .  .  but  it  had  been  a  well  known  institution  before  that 
time,  since  the  Apostles  preached  nothing  of  themselves  but 
only  what  the  Lord  had  commissioned  them  to  do.”4  In  the 
words  of  Kritopoulos  written  in  this  connection:  "The  Apos¬ 
tles  would  not  have  dared  do  what  they  had  not  been  commanded 
to  do.”5  In  this  passage,  says  Androutsos,  "we  have  an  out¬ 
ward  action — the  anointing  with  oil — to  which  is  joined  a 
supernatural  operation:  in  other  words  (we  have)  the  con¬ 
stituent  elements  of  a  sacrament.  Certainly  .  .  .  there  is 
no  mention  of  the  other  essential  note,  .  .  establishment 

by  our  Lord.  But  if  we  reason  that  St.  James  could  not  of 
himself  have  enjoined  a  practice  of  such  consequence,  then  the 
certainty  and  conviction  with  which  he  pronounces  in  regard 
to  the  effects,  cannot  be  otherwise  accounted  for,  save  on  the 
basis  that  the  Apostle  knew  that  the  Church’s  practice  of 
anointing  with  oil  was  an  institution  established  by  our  Lord; 
so  we  do  have  in  this  passage  a  witness  to  the  divine  origin 
of  this  sacrament.”8  (b)  Secondly,  we  do  not  have  here  merely 
a  reference  to  "a  well-known  and  customary  means  of  heal¬ 
ing.  .  .  Oil  was  used  by  almost  all  peoples  .  .  .  for  this 
purpose,  it  is  true,  .  .  yet  this  cannot  be  the  topic  here  under 

discussion,  since  this  anointing  ...  is  said  to  heal  all  dis- 

1  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  401. 

2  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  note  1,  p.  184,  and  note  1,  Mesolora,  op. 
cit.,  IV.  p.  363.  Job  also  thought  Unction  was  to  be  limited  to  those 
in  articulo  mortis;  cf.  ITept  twv  deiojv  fivar-pp.  of  Gabriel  of  Philadelphia, 
pp.  136-141,  for  the  other  titles  and  terms  applied  to  the  sacrament; 
cf.  text  ibid.,  and  p.  185;  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  p.  355 

3  Mesolora,  ibid.,  p.  357. 

4  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  185. 

5  In  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  1,  p.  337;  cf.  Gal.  1,  11-12. 

6  Op.  cit.,  p.  402. 


388 


VI.—1 THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 


eases,  and  to  confer  remission  of  sins,  while  the  healing  power 
of  medicinal  anointing  has  only  a  limited  scope,  being  employed 
for  certain  specified  diseases  only,  .  .  .  and  never  confers 
the  remission  of  sins.  Besides,  it  is  emphasized  that  this  anoint¬ 
ing  must  be  performed  by  priests  of  the  Church  with  prayer, 
which  would  certainly  not  have  been  necessary  in  the  case  of 
ordinary  medicinal  anointing  which  anyone  could  do.”1  “Fur¬ 
thermore,  St.  James  makes  the  healing  dependent  not  simply 
on  the  anointing  but  on  the  prayer  of  faith  ”  In  the  case  of 
medicinal  unction  anyone  could  perform  it  for  the  sick  w'ith- 
out  having  to  call  in  priests.2 3  Thirdly,  (c)  “it  is  not  spoken 
of  as  a  ‘gift  of  healing/*  .  .  .  which  was  a  general  charisma, 
not,  as  here,  something  expressly  restricted  to  priests,  and 
which  did  not  impart  the  forgiveness  of  sins  but  only  the  heal¬ 
ing  of  bodily  ills.”4  Fourthly,  (d)  “this  sacrament  is  not  called 
the  last  anointing  or  extreme  unction  ( extrema  unctio,  unctio 
in  extremis,  sacrarnentum  exeuntium )”  says  Kritopoulos,  “but 
‘prayer-oil’  (eix^Xatov).  For  we  do  not  wait  till  the  last  and 
then  have  recourse  to  it,  but  use  the  sacrament  while  there  is 
yet  good  hope  of  recovery.  .  .  So  it  is  to  be  used  not  once 
in  a  lifetime  but  often,  .  .  .  just  as  we  use  medical  rem¬ 
edies  as  often  as  we  are  sick.”5 * * *  “St.  James  says  simply:  ‘is 
any  sick  among  you  ?’  that  is,  ‘whenever  anyone  is  sick  he  is 
not  dealing  with  grievous  illnesses  in  which  the  sick  person 
is  drawing  his  last  breath.”9  In  practice  the  Orthodox  Church 
“differs  essentially”  from  the  Roman  Church,  which  withholds 

1  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  186. 

2  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  402. 

3  Cf.  St.  Mark  6,  13,  and  1  Cor.  12,  9.  “The  view...  that  (St.  Mk. 
6,  13)  refers  to  Unction  is  incorrect, ...  and  the  opinion  that  the  in¬ 
stitution  of  the  sacrament  is  based  upon  this  passage  is  erroneous” 
(Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  note  3,  p.  186).  The  latter  thinks  that  the 
institution  of  this  sacrament  “like  that  of  Baptism  and  Penance, 
took  place... in  the  time  between  the  Resurrection  and  Ascension” 
(note  4,  ibid.,  and  p.  187). 

4  Dyobouniotes,  ibid.,  p.  186,  and  cf.  Androutsos,  loc.  cit. 

5  In  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  I,  p.  339.  But  Dyobouniotes  seems  to  recog¬ 

nize  a  proper  use  of  the  expression  extrema  unctio  [eaxarr]  XP^£S) 

as  meaning  “the  last  of  the  anointings”,  in  which  sense  it  is  legitimate 

(note  1,  p.  185,  op.  cit.). 

*  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  note  I.  p.  356. 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  GENERAL 


389 


the  sacrament  from  the  ordinarily  sick  and  restricts  it  to  those 
nearing  death.  The  Roman  practice  violates  both  spirit  and 
letter  of  the  text,  and  is  contrary  to  the  universal  custom  of  the 
Church  up  until  the  twelfth  century.1 2 *  Fifthly,  (e)  “the  no¬ 
tion  .  .  .  that  it  is  the  ‘prayer  of  faith  of  the  sick ’  which 
saves  him  is  erroneous,  since  .  .  .  the  context  shows  that 
this  prayer  means  that  said  by  the  priest  over  the  sick,  which 
together  with  the  anointing  (the  other  outward  sign),  con¬ 
veys  divine  Grace.'"'  On  the  basis  of  the  evidence  afforded  by 
this  passage  we  may  conclude  “that  before  the  occasion  of  the 
writing  of  this  Epistle,  the  practice  of  anointing  the  sick  with 
oil  .  .  .  existed  in  the  Church  and  was  a  true  sacrament, 
founded  by  our  Lord,  having  outward  signs,  and  conveying 
Grace. 1,3 

“The  evidence  given  by  Sacred  Tradition,  if  not  as  abun¬ 
dant  as  that  for  the  other  sacraments  (since  Unction  was  .  .  . 
often  joined  with  Penance,  of  which  it  was  regarded  as  the 
complement),  is  yet  not  altogether  lacking.”4  Such  refer¬ 
ences  as  those  in  Origen,  St.  John  Chrysostom,  and  St.  Cyril  of 
Alexandria,  speak  only  of  Unction  in  connection  with  Penance.5 
Victor  of  Antioch,  Pope  Innocent  I,  and  Caesarius  (f542j,  all 
refer  to  it  as  a  sacrament.6  The  antiquity  of  the  rite  is  shown 
by  its  preservation  in  the  Coptic  and  Jacobite  Churches.7  The 
evidence,  from  the  seventh  century  on,  is  full  and  definite.  All 
the  Orthodox  Confessions  teach  that  Unction  is  the  seventh 
sacrament.8 

The  outward  signs  of  the  sacrament  are  three :  the  oils,  the 

1  Ibid.,  pp.  355-356;  cf.  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  note  1,  p.  185;  An- 
droutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  406. 

2  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  note  1,  p.  187. 

s  Ibid.,  pp.  186-187. 

4  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  403,  and  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  187. 

s  Ibid.,  and  note. 

6  Dyobouniotes,  ibid.,  p.  188. 

7  Ibid.;  “The  Syrians  and  Maronites  call  it  the  ‘sacrament  of  the 
lamps’  from  their  custom  cf  using  the  oil  from  the  lamps  in  the 
church  and  especially  that  of  the  everburning  lamp  inside  the  Iconos¬ 
tasis  for  the  sacrament”  {ibid.,  p.  185). 

8  Cf.  in  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  Kritopoulos,  I,  pp.  37  ff:  Jeremiah,  II, 
I,  p.  141;  Mogila  I,  pp.  433-434:  Synod  of  Constantinople  ibid.,  II, 
p.  140. 


390 


VI.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 


anointing  therewith  of  the  bodily  members  of  the  sick  person, 
and  the  prayer.1  The  oil  must  be  pure  and  unmixed  with  any 
other  matter.2  In  the  early  Church,  the  practice  varied  in 
regard  to  the  parts  of  the  body  anointed:  the  breast,  the  part 
affected  by  the  sickness,  the  head,  the  forehead,  cheeks,  hands, 
feet,  were  each  severally  anointed,  by  the  one  anointing  used 
in  the  service,  at  various  times  in  the  history  of  the  Church. 
According  to  present  use  the  priests  in  succession  anoint  the 
forehead,  nostrils,  cheeks,  lips,  breast,  and  hands  of  the  sick 
person.8  The  prayer  used  is:  “Holy  Father,  Physician  of  soul 
and  body,  who  didst  send  thine  only-begotten  Son  our  Lord 
Jesus  Christ,  the  Healer  of  every  ill  and  the  Redeemer  from 
death,  heal  this  thy  servant  N.  of  his  present  bodily  and  spir¬ 
itual  weakness  and  quicken  him  by  the  Grace  of  thy  Christ/14 

The  ministers  of  the  sacrament  are  normally  seven  priests,6 
though  one  may  suffice  in  case  of  necessity.6  The  oil  is  blessed 
by  the  priests  and  not  by  the  bishop.  The  custom  of  restrict¬ 
ing  this  office  to  the  bishop  is  contrary  to  the  text  of  Holy 
Scripture  and  primitive  practice.7  “The  sacrament  is  admin¬ 
istered,  according  to  the  words  of  institution  and  the  most 
ancient  tradition  of  the  Church,  to  all  sick  persons  irrespec- 

1  Mogila,  in  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  I.  p.  433;  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit., 
pp.  188-189. 

2  Among  others,  Mogila  (in  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  I.  p.  338)  prescribes 
oil  and  wine,  with  reference  to  the  Parable  of  the  Good  Samaritan. 
This  is  the  custom  in  the  Russian  Church  (cf.  Mesolora,  op  cit.,  IV. 
note  2,  p.  359 ) ,  but  not  in  the  Greek  ( Dyobouniotes,  ibid. ) . 

3  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  pp.  189-190. 

*  Cf.  the  Eux<Ao7tov  to  /j.eya  (p.  270).  It  is  almost  the  same  as 
that  given  by  Kritopoulos  (Mesolora,  I.  p.  338)  ;  on  it  cf.  Symeon  of  Thes- 
salonica,  'H  reAer?)  tov  eu^eXaiou,  chapter  2.  Mesolora  gives  the  follow¬ 
ing  cases  in  which  the  use  of  the  sacrament  is  forbidden:  (a)  sick 
persons  who  have  lost  consciousness,  (b)  infants,  (c)  those  who  are 
well  but  are  in  imminent  danger  of  death,  as  e.  g.,  soldiers  going  into 
battle,  condemned  criminals,  etc.  (op.  cit.,  IV,  note  2,  pp.  360-361). 
For  the  canonical  aspects  of  the  administration  of  the  sacrament,  cf. 
Christodoulos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  418  ff.  Full  text  of  the  prayer  in  Dyobounio¬ 
tes,  loc.  cit.,  and  in  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  note  3,  p.  403. 

BAs  the  rubrics  direct,  and  as  the  various  references  in  the  Symbolic 
Books  indicate;  cf.  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  191. 

6Cf.  Kritopoulos,  loc.  cit.;  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  405. 

7  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  p.  356,  loc.  cit.,  and  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit., 
p.  190. 


391 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  GENERAL 


tive  of  the  gravity  of  their  sickness  or  of  the  lightness  of  the 
attack."1 2 3  “All  sick  people  may  be  anointed,  not  only  those 
in  serious  danger”  .  .  .  The  sacrament  is  not  only  a  viati¬ 
cum  but  is  to  be  used  in  any  case  of  sickness.  Restricting  its 
use  to  the  last  moments  perverts  the  object  for  which  it  was 
instituted  and  frustrates  one  of  the  two  effects  of  the  Grace 
given.'  “The  incorrectness  of  this  view  of  the  sacrament,”  savs 
Dyobouniotes,  “is  made  clear  by  reference  to  the  words  used  by 
St.  James":  sick  and  ill  (aaOevelv,  Kdgmv) ,  neither  in  the  New 
Testament  nor  in  Greek  generally  mean  exclusively  and  only 


those  ‘grievously  sick’  or  ‘at  the  point  of  death 

In  the  sacrament  of  Unction  “the  Church  by  her  prayers 
heals  the  sick  in  body  and  soul,  raises  him  from  his  bed  of 
sickness,  and  manifests  him  whole  and  healthy  in  both  re¬ 
spects."4  The  Acts  of  the  Synod  of  Constantinople  specify  two 
effects  of  this  sacrament,  “one  applied  to  the  healing  of  the 
soul,  the  other,  to  that  of  the  body.”5  The  teaching  of  the 
passage  in  St.  James,6  of  the  early  Church,  and  of  the  Symbolic 
Books,7  is  that  the  Grace  “conveyed  in  the  sacrament  of  Unc- 
tion  serves  for  the  healing  of  the  body  and  for  the  forgiveness 
of  sin.”8  The  chief  fruit  of  the  sacrament  is  the  former,9  as 
is  evident  from  the  text  of  St.  James.  “Those  who  belonged 
to  Him  our  Lord  did  not  wish  to  leave  in  their  weaknesses,” 
says  Androutsos,  “so  it  pleased  Him  to  institute  a  sacrament 


1  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  191. 

2  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  40G.  Macarius  (op.  cit.,  II.  pp.  267-268) 
seems,  on  the  contrary,  to  hold  that  it  should  he  reserved  for  those 
seriously  sick,  with  whom  Dyobouniotes  (op.  cit.,  p.  91,  cf.  note  4) 
and  Androutsos  (loc.  cit.,)  disagree. 

3  Op.  cit.,  p.  191. 

4  Kephala,  op.  cit.,  p.  198. 

6  In  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  II,  p.  140. 

0  Idle  text  may  not  be  interpreted  figuratively,  to  mean  only 
the  remission  of  sins,  since  this  latter  effect  “is  added  as  a  new  opera¬ 
tion  (of  the  Grace)  of  the  sacrament,  which  the  writer  contrasts  with 
the  preceding  one,  which  must  consequently  be  different  from  the  re¬ 
mission  of  sins”  ( Dyobouniotes,  °P-  cit.,  note  1,  p.  192). 

7  Cf.  ibid.,  and  references  above  in  the  symbolic  texts. 

8  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  403. 

9  So  Macarius,  op.  cit.,  II,  p.  561  ;  Athanasius  of  Paros,  ’EniTopp 
tC)v  Qeiiov  doy/juxTuu,  p.  383;  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  404;  Dyobouniotes, 
op.  cit.,  p.  193. 


392 


VI.— THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS 


of  particular  help  and  blessing.  If  the  Grace  conveyed  by  it 
does  not  always  work  the  healing  of  the  body,  this  must  not 
generally  be  attributed  to  the  weakness  of  the  faith  of  the  re¬ 
cipient,  but  in  general  is  consistent  with  the  intention  of  the 
Founder,  who  in  establishing  this  sacrament  did  not  mean  to 
deliver  His  followers  .  .  .  from  all  bodily  illness.”1'  That 
healing  of  body  is  the  chief  object  of  the  sacrament  is  true 
and  certain,  yet  in  the  cases  where  such  restoration  to  health 
does  not  ensue  upon  the  use  of  Unction,  we  may  not  attribute 
it  to  lack  of  faith  entirely,  says  Dyobouniotes,2 3  for  “God  knows 
which  is  better  in  a  given  case,  the  healing  of  sickness  and  res¬ 
toration  to  life  or  the  reverse.  We  must  not  forget  that  this 
sacrament  was  not  given  to  men  by  God  for  our  earthly  im¬ 
mortality.”* 

Mogila  observes  that  while  often  the  healing  of  the  body  may 
not  occur,  yet  the  forgiveness  of  sins  always  ensues  upon  peni¬ 
tence,4  in  the  use  of  this  sacrament.  Restoration  to  health 
follows  upon  the  will  of  the  Lord  in  any  given  instance.5  The 
forgiveness  of  sins  imparted  by  this  sacrament  does  not  supply 
or  supplant  the  effects  of  Penance,  nor  does  it  diminish  the 
value  of  the  latter  sacrament.  “Unction  completes  the  opera¬ 
tion  of  Penance,  but  not  in  the  sense  that  Penance  is  deficient 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  404.  But  Dyobouniotes  (in  his  TI  Aoyp..  ’A vdp.  npiv.,  p. 
61)  objects,  that  this  violates  the  terms  of  the  foundation  of  the 
sacrament:  “is  amy  sick  among  you?”,  in  which  it  is  said  generally 
that  “ any  sick  person  among  you”  is  promised  the  healing  of  all  his 
ills,  not  only  of  certain  ones,  by  unction  with  oil  and  the  prayer  of 
faith.  “We  must  accept  these  words  literally”,  says  he,  and  “be¬ 
lieve  it,  even  if  we  cannot  understand  it  completely”  (‘0 (peiXop-evy 
aTravTT)(Tis,  pp.  152-153).  Androutsos  rejoins  that  if  this  were  so  no 
Christian  would  die,  and  it  would  follow  that  if  any  Christian  die, 
he  must  have  been  without  faith.  Hence  we  are  driven  back  to 
the  statement  that  “Christ  does  not  always  work  the  recovery  of  those 
who  are  suffering  from  physical  ills  by  the  sacrament  of  Unction,  as 
our  experience  testifies.  The  reason  is  not  always  lack  of  faith... 
but  the  will  of  the  Founder  of  the  sacrament...”  (cf.  AoypaTiKal 
MeX £tcu,  A',  pp.  138-139). 

2  In  his  treatise,  Ta  M varypia,  which  seems  to  be  at  variance  with 
his  former  position  as  presented  in  the  preceding  note. 

3  Op.  cit.,  p.  194. 

4  In  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  I,  p.  434. 

6  Mesolora.  op.  cit.,  IV.  pp.  361,  354-355. 


THE  SACRAMENTS  IN  GENERAL 


393 


and  needs  fulfilling,  but  because  of  its  conditions  (of  which 
confession  of  sins  is  one),  which  often  cannot  be  satisfied  on 
account  of  illness.  So  in  Unction  is  bestowed  forgiveness  of 
sins  in  general,  and  chiefly  of  those  which  the  sick  man  is  un¬ 
able,  because  of  his  condition,  to  confess.”1  “The  prayer  of 
faith  is  always  heard”,  says  Androutsos,  “for  forgiveness  of 
sins  is  conveyed  by  the  sacrament  to  the  sincerely  penitent, 
since  bodily  infirmities  are  often  the  result  of  sin.  With  this 
in  view  the  Orthodox  Church  joins  Unction  with  Penance  .  . 

.  as  also  with  Holy  Communion.  Thus  the  second  fruit  of  the 
Grace  bestowed  in  the  sacrament  of  Unction  is  the  remission 
of  our  spiritual  sickness,  sin,  the  more  so  because  sin  is  often 
the  cause  of  our  bodily  sickness.”2  By  the  Grace  of  this  sac¬ 
rament  the  soul  is  strengthened  to  withstand  the  powers  of  evil 
and  to  fight  against  the  repetition  of  sins  which  may  have  be¬ 
come  besetting  sins  from  the  frequency  of  their  occurrence. 
In  Orthodox  practice  the  usual  order  followed  is  Penance,  Unc¬ 
tion,  and  the  Holy  Communion.3 

The  sacrament  of  Unction  is  then  not  a  preparation  for 
death,  as  the  Eoman  Church  teaches4  (for  which  the  early 
Church  used  the  Eucharist5),  but  its  purpose  is  the  healing  of 
a  sick  person  in  body  and  soul.  Consequently  any  baptized 
person  may  rightly  have  recourse  to  this  sacrament,  and  may 
use  it  as  often  as  is  necessary.6  The  Roman  view  of  it  distorts 
its  purpose,7  depreciates  its  chief  object,  and  promotes  to  the 
first  place,  the  secondary  end  of  the  sacrament.8 

1  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  193. 

-Op.  cit.,  p.  405;  cf.  Kritopoulos,  in  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  I.  p.  337. 

3  Dvobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p  194. 

4  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  p.  195. 

6  Cf.  13  Can.  of  1st  Ecumenical  Council,  and  St.  Gregory  Nvssa, 
Epist.  ad  Letaeon,  5. 

6  Dyobouniotes,  op.  cit.,  pp.  195-196. 

7  Ibid.,  cf.  note  2. 

8  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  406;  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  pp,  362-363,  365. 


II.  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  LAST  THINGS 


The  seven  sacraments  are  the  channels  and  means  of  the 
Grace  flowing  from  the  redemptive  work  of  our  Lord,  of  which 
the  Church  is  the  steward  and  administrator.  As  we  said 
above,  according  to  St.  Paul’s  own  division1  there  are  three 
stages  or  steps  in  the  process  of  the  operation  of  Grace:  the 
; preparation ,  including  the  “calk’,  “conversion”,  and  the  like; 
justification ,  and  sanctification,  including  “regeneration”;  and 
the  third  term,  glory — the  consummation  and  fulfilment  of  the 
working  of  Grace.2 3 4  This  life  is  the  sphere  of  Grace.  The  life 
beyond  is  its  term  and  completion.  “At  death  men  pass  on 
out  of  the  process  of  development  and  progress  here  into  a 
state  incapable  of  change,  the  final  term  of  their  whole  life 
here.  The  whole  world  also  is  to  be  renewed  and  perfected 
in  correspondence  with  man’s  perfection  and  glory,  since  it 
had  both  a  beginning  and  a  cause,  and  an  end  and  purpose  to 
which  it  was  ordered,  namely,  this  very  perfection  and  renewal.”8 
The  last  section  of  dogmatic  is  concerned  with  this  mysterious 
verity  and  is  called  “eschatology” (since  it  concerns  the  last 
things),  or  “consummation”,  or  “glory”.1  All  religious  truths 
have  a  practical  value,  and  this  is  especially  true  of  those  con¬ 
cerned  with  the  hereafter :  the  life  beyond  the  grave,  as  one  of 
happiness  and  blessedness,  is  the  incentive  for  man  to  work 
for  good  here,  and  as  a  possible  state  of  horror  and  terror,  acts 
as  a  deterrent  from  evil  in  the  life  of  this  world.5  The  content 
of  Orthodox  doctrine  on  these  subjects  will  be  presented  under 
the  two  topics  the  Particular  Judgment  and  the  General  Judg¬ 
ment. 


1  Rom.  8,  30. 

2  Cf.  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  338  ff. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  407. 

4  Note  1,  ibid. 

5  Ibid.,  p.  408. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  LAST  THINGS 


395 


1.  The  Particular  Judgment 

Physical  death,  the  separation  of  soul  and  body,  is  both 
a  punishment  and  result  of  sin,  and  is  universal.1  Never¬ 
theless  it  loses  its  fearful  aspect  for  those  who  are  redeemed  in 
Christ,2  who  believe  with  conviction  in  the  fundamental  truth 
of  the  immortality  of  the  soul.3  According  to  the  teaching  of 
the  Orthodox  Church,  death  ends  man’s  probation,  and  im¬ 
mediately  after  death  lie  is  judged.  His  fate  in  eternity  is 
determined  by  his  whole  moral  state  at  the  moment  of  death.4 
This  “whole  moral  state”  on  which  his  future  lot  depends  is 
not  each  of  his  works  but  the  whole  result  of  the  deeds  and 
thoughts  of  his  life,  that  is,  his  relation  and  attitude  to  the 
Eedemption  wrought  by  Christ :  whether  he  accepted  it  and 
made  it  his  own ;  whether  he  rejected  the  Grace  offered  him ; 
or  whether,  having  once  accepted  it,  he  fell  away  from  it.  In 
the  “particular”  or  “individual”  judgment  men  are  divided 
into  the  justified  or  saved,  and  the  sinners  or  damned.  The 
ensuing  bliss  or  pangs  are  relative  and  proportional,  differ¬ 
ing  each  case  with  the  moral  state  of  each  individual,5  and 
though  all  the  dead  are  thus  judged,  they  do  not  receive  the 
full  measure  either  of  reward  or  punishment  until  the  general 
judgment,  at  which  soul  and  body  are  reunited  for  eternity. 
This  state  of  the  dead,  from  the  time  of  departure  from  the 
world  until  the  General  Judgment,  is  called  the  “intermediate 
state”.  During  this  time  the  soul  is  apart  from  the  body,  but 
has  consciousness  and  exercises  its  own  energies,  for  the  word 
“sleep'*6  applies  only  to  the  body.7  This  doctrine  is  declared 
in  the  Confession  of  Dositheus  (and  so  embodied  in  the  Acts 
of  the  Synod  of  Constantinople,  1672),  as  follows:  “We  be¬ 
lieve  that  the  souls  of  the  departed  are  in  either  repose  or  tor¬ 
ment  as  each  one  wrought,  for  immediately  after  the  separation 
from  the  body  they  are  pronounced  either  for  bliss  or  for  suf¬ 
fering  and  sorrow,  yet  we  confess  that  neither  the  joy  nor  the 

1  Cf.  Lecture  III,  pp.  170-171. 

2  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  164. 

3  Cf.  p.  161  of  these  Lectures,  and  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  408-409. 

4  Androutsos,  ibid.,  p.  409. 

6  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  410. 

6  E.  g.,  1  Cor.  15,  51. 

7  Androutsos,  ibid.,  p.  411. 


396 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  LAST  THINGS 


condemnation  are  as  yet  complete.  After  the  general  resur¬ 
rection,  when  the  soul  is  united  to  the  body,  each  one  will  re¬ 
ceive  the  full  measure  of  joy  or  condemnation  due  to  him  for 
the  way  in*  which  he  conducted  himself,  whether  well  or  ill.”1 

The  doctrine  of  the  Particular  Judgment  is  based  upon 
Holy  Scripture  and  Sacred  Tradition,  as  are  all  the  dogmas 
of  the  Faith.  Holy  Writ  distinguishes  two  states  of  the  soul: 
that  after  death,  and  that  after  the  General  Judgment.  Some 
of  the  Apostles  and  early  Christians  overlooked  the  intermedi¬ 
ate  state  in  their  expectation  of  the  immediate  Coming  of  our 
Lord.  “This  mistake  is  attributable  to  the  fact  that  our  Lord 
revealed  His  Coming  to  no  one.”2  So  they  confused  the  two, 
regarding  the  judgment  after  the  resurrection  as  taking  place 
in  general  after  death.  2  Cor.  5,  10,  explicitly  teaches  a  gen¬ 
eral  judgment  by  Christ,  in  which  each  man  is  rewarded  ac¬ 
cording  to  his  deeds  in  the  body,  and  in  St.  Matt.  16,  27 ;  25,  37, 
this  is  associated  with  our  Lord’s  Second  Coming.  Heb.  9,  27, 
refers  not  to  the  Particular  but  to  the  General  Judgment,  with¬ 
out  specifying  the  time,  except  to  state  that  it  is  after  death. 
From  the  context  we  understand  that  this  Judgment  is  con¬ 
nected  with  the  Second  Coming.3  By  a  logical  inference  from 
the  words  of  Holy  Scripture  we  are  compelled  to  acknowledge 
the  truth  of  the  Particular  Judgment.  “If  souls  passing  out 
from  the  world  are  not  judged  by  God,  then  they  do  one  of 
two  things:  await  impassively  the  general  Judgment,  or  per¬ 
fect  themselves  in  the  development  of  their  own  individual 
spiritual  states.  .  .  According  to  the  first  theory,  the  inter¬ 
mediate  interval  is  a  time  either  of  rest  or  slumber,  or  of  un¬ 
easy  expectation — sorrowful  alike  for  both  righteous  and  sin¬ 
ful  souls.  According  to  the  second,  .  .  .  it  is  a  continuation 
of  the  present  (condition)  and  there  is  no  difference  between 
the  state  of  the  soul  there  and  here  .  .  .  except  the  absence 
of  the  body.  Both  these  hypotheses  are  contrary  to  the  teach¬ 
ing  of  Holy  Scripture.”  The  parable  of  the  Rich  Man  and 
Lazarus  teaches  definitely  that  “of  the  souls  passing  from  this 

1  In  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  II,  p.  119. 

2  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  4il;  cf.  St.  Mark  13,  32;  Act  1,  6,  7;  and 
Androutsos,  ibid.,  pp.  437-438. 

3  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  412. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  LAST  THINGS 


397 


world,  the  righteous  go  to  the  presence  of  God,  and  the  sin¬ 
ners  to  a  place  of  torment.”  This  is  implied  also  in  Phil.  1, 
21,  23,  and  in  the  Church’s  conviction  that  “the  Saints  are 
glorified  and  blessed  in  Heaven.”1  That  this  world  is  different 
from  the  world  to  come  in  being  the  sphere  (lit.  “arena”)  of 
Grace,  on  which  depends  the  state  of  the  future  life,  and  that 
the  lot  of  man  after  death  is  fixed  and  permanent,  is  clear  from 
Holy  Scripture.2  Heath  is  the  term  limiting  the  moral  energy 
of  man,  and  the  present  life  is  the  probation  and  testing  on 
which  depends  the  eternal  destiny  of  the  individual. 

The  Fathers,  with  a  few  exceptions,3  taught  a  distinction 
between  the  condition  of  the  righteous  and  the  sinners — in 
fact,  “that  a  special  judgment  of  each  individual  takes  place 
immediately  after  death.”4  This  is  implicit,  for  example,  in 
St.  Cyril’s  doctrine  of  the  evil  spirits.5  In  condemning  the 
TTniversalism  of  Origen,  the  Church  was  governed  by  the  pre¬ 
mise  that  the  state  of  the  soul  at  the  end  of  the  life  here  is  fixed 
and  unalterable.6  Hot  only  did  the  Church  condemn  the  notion 
of  a  development  or  progress  after  death,  but  also  the  theory  of 
the  “sleep  of  the  soul”.7  These  speculations — and  others  like 
them  on  the  problem  of  the  state  of  the  unbaptized  heathen,  of 
unbaptized  infants,  of  those  cut  off  before  having  the  opportu- 

1  Ibid.,  pp.  412-413.  In  note  2  lie  says  that  the  mention  of  the 
Saints’  names  in  the  Liturgies  “is  not  made  by  the  Church  for  ex¬ 
piation  of  their  sins,  as  if  they  were  not  justified  or  already  in  bliss,  but 
the  Church  gives  thanks  to  the  Saviour  for  His  Grace  in  the  saints.  .  . 
and  in  making  memorial  of  them  beseeches  the  Lord  to  hearken  to 
their  prayers  for  all  men,  both  the  quick  and  the  dead.  .  .As  St.  Cyril 
of  Jerusalem  explains  it:... “that  God  by  their  prayers  and  interces¬ 
sions  may  receive  our  prayer”  ( Catechet .  Mystagog.  V.  9;  cf.  St.  John 
Chrysostom,  on  Acts,  Homily  21,  4)  and  St.  Augustine;  cum  martyres 
recitantur  ad  altare  Dei,  non  pro  ipsis  oratur ;  injuria  est  enim  pro 
martyre  orare ,  cujus  nos  debemus  orationibus  commendari  ( Sermo 
159).'” 

2  For  references,  cf.  notes  1  and  2,  p.  414  op.  cit. 

3  As  e.  g.,  St.  Justin,  Tertullian,  and  Origen. 

*  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  414. 

5  Cf.  his  Trcpi  e£odov  yj/vxys. 

6  Androutsos,  ibid.,  p.  415.  , 

7  This  developed  chiefly  in  Semitic-Christian  circles;  cf.  Eusebius 
H  E  VI.  37,  and  The  Sleep  of  the  Soul  in  the  early  Syriac  Church, 
F.  Gavin,  JAOS,  April  1920,  pp.  103-120. 


398 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  LAST  THINGS 


nity  to  develop  and  grow  spiritually  in  this  life — are,  to  say  the 
least,  hazardous.  Every  such  theological  theory,  says  An* 
droutsos,  “must  be  based  on  clear  and  unmistakable  passages 
of  Holy  Writ,  must  be  self-consistent,  and  neither  in  itself  nor 
in  its  corollaries  may  it  in  any  degree  run  counter  to  the  for¬ 
mulated  dogmas  of  the  Church.  The  hypotheses  and  attempts 
...  by  which  certain  theologians  force  the  meaning  of  scrip¬ 
tural  texts  by  trying  to  penetrate  into  the  province  of  the  un¬ 
known  or  to  render  the  mysterious  and  hidden  accessible  to 
our  minds,  and  in  satisfying  human  curiosity  and  the  thirst 
for  the  knowledge  of  the  occult  and  secret,  must  not  find  their 
way  into  Orthodox  dogmatic,  which  holds  firmly  to  the  positive 
and  defined  field  of  Revelation.'’1 2 

The  two-fold  state  as  fixed  by  the  Particular  Judgment, 
whether  for  weal  or  woe,  is  an  anticipation  of  the  verdict  of  the 
General  Judgment.  But  the  cases  of  any  two  individual  souls 
could  not  be  exactly  alike,  since  each  life  has  been  ordered  dif¬ 
ferently  from  every  other.  Inasmuch  as  justification  and  sanc¬ 
tification  are  neither  mechanical  processes  nor  forensic  pro¬ 
nouncements,  the  state  of  each  person,  as  in  life  so  after  death, 
is  different  from  that  of  every  other.  Hence  “the  Orthodox 
conception  of  justification  demands  various  grades  in  the  in¬ 
termediate  state  .  .  .  and  the  state  after  death  is  without 
doubt  analogous  to  the  moral  state  of  each  individual.”'  Holy 
Scripture  is  neither  detailed  nor  definite  as  to  the  form  of  the 
bliss  or  pangs  of  the  intermediate  stage,  or  as  to  the  distinction 
between  the  Particular  and  the  General  Judgment.  The  va¬ 
rious  figurative  and  symbolic  terms  used3  do  not  give  us  defi¬ 
nite  information.  From  them  “at  the  most  we  ascertain  that 
the  blessedness  of  the  righteous  and  the  misery  of  the  sinners 
is  not  only  something  inward — a  peace  or  remorse  of  con¬ 
science — but  is  also  determined  by  external  goods  or  torments.”4 

From  the  standpoint  of  our  present  limitations  we  are  na- 
lurally  unable  to  distinguish  between  the  state  of  the  soul  at 
the  Particular  Judgment  and  at  the  General,  except  by  char- 

1Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  416. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  417. 

8  For  references  cf.  Androutsos,  ad.  loc. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  418. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  LAST  THINGS 


309 


acterizing  one  as  incomplete  and  the  other  as  complete.  Two 
extremes  are  to  be  avoided — one,  of  exalting  the  General  Judg¬ 
ment  at  the  expense  of  the  Particular  Judgment,  and  the  re¬ 
verse.  As  an  instance  of  a  too  great  emphasis  on  the  Parti¬ 
cular  Judgment  to  be  the  detriment  of  the  truth  of  the  General 
Judgment,  may  be  taken  the  teaching  and  practice  of  the  Ro¬ 
man  Church,  which  really  makes  the  General  Judgment  super¬ 
fluous.1 2  It  is  contrary  to  patristic  teaching,  which  did  not  re¬ 
gard  the  Saints  as  having  fully  attained  their  reward,  and  held 
that  this  would  only  be  consummated  at  the  Last  Judgment.' 
Various  hyperbolic  expressions  of  certain  Fathers  in  oratorical 
and  eulogistic  style,  with  much  said,  as  it  were,  proleptically, 
cannot  in  this  matter  be  construed  to  mean  that  the  Saints 
are  now  in  complete  enjoyment  of  their  reward.  In  dogmatic 
treatises  by  these  same  Fathers  may  be  found  explicitly  the 
doctrine  that  “the  righteous  enjoy  eternal  joys  in  advance, 
but  for  the  full  enjoyment  of  them  must  await  the  General 
Resurrection.”3  This  is  clearly  illustrated  in  the  cases  of  St. 
Gregory  Nazianzen  and  St.  Photius,  both  of  whom  in  orator¬ 
ical  and  panegyric  discourses  spoke  in  ways  which  allow  of  an 
interpretation  forbidden  by  their  dogmatic  teaching.4 

According  to  the  teaching  of  the  Orthodox  Church,  death 
does  not  dissolve  the  bond  of  union  between  the  members  of  the 
Church.5  The  Church  is  conceived  of  as  of  two  great  sections, 
the  Church  Militant  and  the  Church  Triumphant,  but  in  a 
sense  also  includes  a  third  division,  the  Church  of  Repentance.6 
Death  serves  but  to  establish  a  “mutual  relation  of  the  living 
with  the  members  of  the  Church  Triumphant,  the  Saints,  that 
is,  all  who  having  departed  in  faith  and  love  .  .  .  enjoy  the 

1  Cf.  Androutsos,  Ze,u/3oAiKi7,  pp.  339  ff.  Tlie  whole  Roman  system 
is  contrary  to  Orthodox  teaching,  as  is  clear  from  what  was  said  above 
on  the  doctrine  of  works  of  supererogation,  the  superabundant  merits 
of  the  Saints,  etc. 

2  Androutsos,  A oynarucfi ,  p.  419. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  420,  and  cf.  notes. 

4  Ibid.,  pp.  420,  421,  and  notes  ad  loc. 

5  Ibid.,  p.  421. 

6  As  Androutsos’  treatment  of  the  subject  matter  would  seem  to 
imply.  §  69  is  on  “the  Relation  of  the  Church  Militant  to  the  Church 
Triumphant”  and  §  70  on  “the  Relation  of  the  Church  Militant  to  the 
Sinners”  (pp.  421-426,  426-437,  ibid.). 


400 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  LAST  THINGS 


glory  of  God  and  taste  in  advance  eternal  blessedness.”1  With 
the  Saints  are  included  the  Angels,  who  likewise  possess  the  en¬ 
joyment  of  the  Lord.  Both  Angels  and  Saints  intercede  for 
the  living,  by  so  doing  showing  their  concern  for  and  fellow¬ 
ship  with  them,  and  the  living  in  turn  hold  communion  with 
them  by  asking  their  prayers  and  “venerating  them  as  models 
of  the  perfect  Christian  life  and  virtue.”  This  doctrine  is 
not  explicitly  taught  by  Holy  Scripture.  Yet  we  are  told  that 
the  Angels  intercede  for  the  living  before  God,  and  “if  they, 
how  much  more  the  Saints,  who  are  so  much  nearer  us  by 
reason  of  their  oneness  with  our  nature?”  If  our  prayers  for 
each  other  are  both  reasonable  and  useful,  why  should  death 
bring  about  an  intermittance  of  the  interest,  care,  and  concern 
of  the  best  of  our  race  in  relation  to  the  rest  of  us  ?  In  2  Macc. 
15,  12,  Judas  Maccabaeus  saw  in  a  dream  Onias  and  Jeremiah 
interceding  for  the  people.2  “The  Saints  then  do  intercede 
not  only  for  the  whole  Church,  but  for  individual  persons.” 
If  the  Angels  of  God  “rejoice  over  one  sinner  that  repenteth” 
how  much  more  do  the  Saints?  If  a  finite  Angel  know  of 
the  individual  case  in  a  way  which  is  not  comprehensible  to  us, 
there  is  nothing  which  would  suggest  that  the  Saints,  though 
they  be  human  beings,  should  be  precluded  from  having  this 
same  intimate  knowledge  of  our  needs  and  circumstances. 
There  is  no  question,  in  the  case  of  the  intercessions  of  the 
Saints,  of  any  impairment  to,  or  diminution  of,  the  Interces¬ 
sory  Office  or  Merit  of  Christ.  Since  prayer  for  others  by  liv¬ 
ing  people  is  both  reasonable  and  right,  and  is  always  con¬ 
sidered  useful  and  beneficial,  without  any  detriment  to  the 
Intercession  of  the  Great  High  Priest,  there  is  certainly  noth¬ 
ing  derogatory  to  His  Office  as  the  One  Mediator,  in  the  doc¬ 
trine  of  the  Communion  and  Intercession  of  the  Saints.3 

Kritopoulos  uses  as  an  illustration  the  growth  in  means  of 
knowledge  among  men,  whereby  they  had  come  to  know  “what 
is  going  on  in  America  and  in  Ethiopia,”4  and  says:  “The 
Saints  must  have  some  means  of  knowing  what  is  happening  at 

1  Ibid.,  p.  422. 

12  Ibid.,  p.  422. 

3  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  423. 

4  In  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  I,  p.  344. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  LAST  THINGS 


401 


a  distance,  otherwise  they  would  he  less  than  us  in  that  re¬ 
spect,  .  .  .  and  this  is  .  .  .  the  revelation  by  the  All-holy 
Spirit,  everywhere  present  and  ignorant  of  nothing  .  .  . 
who  makes  known  as  He  wills,  what  the  needs  of  men  are'1 2 .  . 

“We  do  not  say  to  a  saint,  “Saint  N.,  save,  or  redeem,  or  see 
that  I  obtain  such  and  such  goods’  .  .  .  but  ‘Saint  A7.,  pray 
for  us’  .  .  .  Nor  do  we  call  the  Saints  ‘Mediators,’  for  there 
is  only  one  Mediator  between  God  and  man,  .  .  .  Jesus 
Christ,  who  only  is  able  to  mediate  between  the  Father  and 
us.  .  .  Not  as  mediators  do  we  call  upon  the  Saints,  but 
as  intercessors  .  .  .  before  God  for  us,  who  are  our  breth¬ 
ren.  .  .  .  ”1  “The  Holy  Spirit  makes  known  to  them  the  needs 
of  those  who  invoke  them  .  .  .  and  they  intercede  saying, 
‘not  in  our  own  deeds  or  merits — for  we  have  nothing  worthy  in 
Thy  sight — but  in  the  deeds  and  merits  of  thy  Onlv-Begotten 
Son,  ...  do  we  pray  to  Thy  Majesty,  0  Thou  Most  High  God’ 
.  .  .  Whence  the  Church  asks  nothing  more  from  the  Saints 
than  that  they  intercede  to  God  for  us  and  beseech  Him  for  all 
things  needful  to  us.”3 

“The  Church  Triumphant,  which  cannot  be  insensible  to 
the  needs  and  sufferings  of  the  Church  Militant  on  earth,  .  .  . 
as  if  immersed  in  sleep,  drugged  by  a  narcotic,”4  is  related  to 
the  Church  on  earth  in  “this  bond  of  love  which  never  may  be 
severed  and  which  those  who  are  perfected  preserve  for  those 
who  are  left  on  earth  as  they  did  in  life.”5  This  relationship 
the  Church  on  earth  expresses  in  three  ways — by  the  invoca¬ 
tion  of  the  Saints,  the  veneration  of  holy  ikons,  and  of  the 
relics  of  the  Saints.6  Inasmuch  as  the  intercession  of  the 
Saints  does  not  violate  the  Mediatorship  of  Christ,  “it  follows 
that  we  are  justified  in  invoking  their  intercession,  as  being 
both  reasonable  and  useful.”7  The  Church  bears  witness  to 
the  practice  in  the  writings  of  the  Fathers  and  in  the  Litur- 


1  Ibid.,  p.  345. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  344. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  346. 

4  Ibid.,  p.  344. 

5  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  TV.  p.  411. 

6  Kritopoulos,  in  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  I.  p.  340. 

7  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  423. 


402 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  LAST  THINGS 


gies,1  and  condemned  the  opposite  view  of  the  Eustatliians  in 
the  synod  of  Gangra.2  Of  the  Saints,  the  Church  particularly 
asks  the  prayers  of  the  Mother  of  God  addressed  “to  Him  whom 
she  bore”,  and  honors  her  above  others,  “since  she  was  marked 
out  by  God  for  this  great  and  distinguished  function.”3  Yet, 
as  Kritopoulos  says,  she  was  not  without  original  sin,4  though 
“she  received  the  special  gift  from  God  enabling  her  to  have 
lived  without  the  commission  of  any  actual  sin.  God  bestowed 
upon  her  the  great  and  wonderful  gift  of  being  sinless.”5  Meso- 
lora  says  of  the  Invocation  of  Saints:  “There  is  in  mankind 
a  sense  and  reverence  for  moral  greatness”  (which  finds  ex¬ 
pression  in  the  veneration  of  the  Saints).  “.  .  .  If  the 
Saints  are  before  God  in  glory,  and  live  in  Him,  having  at¬ 
tained  honor  from  Him,  how  ought  not  we,  who  are  less  than 
they,  give  them  honor  and  reverence,  and  invoke  their  help 
and  intercession  before  God,  who  rejoice  in  His  glory  and  in 
the  Vision  of  Him?”6  Jeremiah  points  out  that  the  memorial 
of  the  Saints  strengthens  our  faith,  and  that  our  invocation 
of  them,  though  relative  and  different  from  our  prayer  to  God, 
is  both  useful  and  valuable.7  Hositheus  is  even  more  explicit 
in  the  phrasing  of  this  doctrine,  since,  says  he,  the  Saints  in 
their  enjoyment  of  the  Beatific  Vision  see  our  needs  the  more 
clearly,  and  are  in  a  position  the  better  to  help  us  by  their 
intercession,  as  in  glory  and  honor  before  God.8  “The  benefit 
accruing  to  the  believer  from  honoring  and  invoking  the 
Saints”,  concludes  Mesolora,  “is  the  greatest:  he  is  brought 
into  the  circle  of  the  Elect  of  God,  and  is  made  greater  than 


1  Cf.  ibid.,  note  2,  pp.  413-414. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  424,  note  1.  Canon  20  of  the  acts  of  Gangra  anathematizes 
those  who  refuse  to  assist  at  the  synaxcs  of  the  Martyrs,  their  me¬ 
morials,  etc.;  cf.  St.  Jerome’s  contra  Vigilantium.  The  latter  main¬ 
tained  that  the  Saints  before  the  General  Resurrection  were  not  in 
Heaven,  and  consequently  could  not  know  of  the  requests  of  men 
to  them  for  their  intercession. 

3  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  p.  412. 

4  He  refutes  at  some  length  the  Roman  doctrine  of  the  Immacu¬ 
late  Conception,  cf.  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  I.  pp.  346-347. 

5  Ibid.,  p.  347. 

6  Op.  cit.,  IV.  p.  414. 

7  Cf.  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  I,  p.  181. 

*  Ibid.,  TI.  p.  107. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  LAST  THINGS 


403 


himself  through  his  converse  with  them;  he  is  strengthened  and 
invigorated  in  the  accomplishment  of  good  works ;  his  faith  to¬ 
ward  God  is  made  strong,  in  Him  as  the  one  who  crowns  those 
who  do  the  good;  finally,  his  desire  is  aroused  for  union  with 
the  Saints,  that  the  Church  Triumphant  in  Heaven  may  be 
increased/'1 

The  honor  and  reverence  paid  to  the  Saints,  as  persons  em¬ 
inent  in  the  struggle  for  faith  and  in  virtue,  who  have  been 
deemed  worthy  of  glory  and  blessedness,  is  distinguished  from 
that  given  only  to  God.  The  ecclesiastical  terms,  however, 
7r pocTKvvTjCTLs  and  \arpda  ( “worship” ) ,  are  not  always  restricted 
in  actual  usage  to  their  legitimate  reference  to  God  alone,  but 
are  sometimes  used  of  the  “veneration”  and  “reverence”  given  to 
the  Saints.  Nevertheless  the  distinction  between  “worship”  and 
“veneration”  remains  clearly  marked.  It  is  shown  in  the  keep¬ 
ing  of  the  Feasts  of  the  Saints,  in  the  veneration  of  ikons  and 
of  the  holy  relics,  as  well  as  in  the  Invocation  of  Saints.2  Of 
the  Feast-days  of  the  Saints,  Mesolora  says  that  they  “were  kept 
of  old  by  the  Church,  not  only  to  excite  the  faithful  to  emulate 
their  lives  and  works,  but  also  to  express  the  intimate  bond  be¬ 
tween  the  Church  Militant  and  Triumphant.  In  these  Feasts 
.  .  .  is  manifested  the  true  and  dynamic  power  of  the  Chris¬ 
tian  Faith  which  through  the  Saints  conquered  the  world.”3 
“Me  keep  their  Feast-days”,  says  Jeremiah  II,  in  his  first  An¬ 
swer,  “honoring  them  as  the  friends  of  God.”4  Yet  the  Church 
never  confuses  the  veneration  of  the  Saints  with  the  worship 
due  to  God  alone,  for  “distinguishing  these  carefully,  she  still 
accords  to  the  Saints  great  honor,  as  her  martyrologies,  the  in¬ 
scriptions  in  the  Catacombs,  the  Liturgies,  and  the  doctrine  of 
the  Fathers,  show.”5  Furthermore,  no  passage  in  Holy  Writ 
can  be  adduced  against  the  veneration  of  ikons  and  relics.6 
The  Church  very  early  placed  relics  in  the  altars7  and  gave 

1  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  pp.  414-415. 

2  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  424. 

3  Op.  cit.,  IV.  pp.  432-433,  q.  v.  (pp.  ff.)  for  an  extended  treatment 
of  the  subject;  cf.  also  Dositlieus,  ibid.,  II.  p.  122. 

4  In  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  I,  p.  168. 

6  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  425. 

6  Cf.  notes,  ibid. 

7  Ibid.,  for  references. 


404 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  LAST  THINGS 


them  great  honor.  Many  Fathers  spoke  of  the  miracles  wrought 
by  the  relics  of  the  Saints.1  Neither  practice  may  be  stigma¬ 
tized  as  idolatry,  as  St.  Augustine  and  the  YII  Council  prove. 
“The  veneration  of  ikons  and  relics  is  relative  only,  and  is  re¬ 
ferred  not  to  the  things  in  themselves  but  in  relation  to  the 
persons  to  whom  the  reverence  is  being  offered.  .  .  Thus 
faith  is  elicited,  and  the  desire  for  the  imitation  of  these  ex¬ 
amples  of  the  Christian  life  is  stimulated.772 3 

The  Church  Militant  has  a  further  relation  to  “those  who 
have  departed  from  this  world  with  the  stains  of  sin,  yet  in 
the  Faith  and  Communion  of  the  Church.773  The  exact  bounds 
of  this  relationship,  and  the  conception  of  the  state  of  such 
persons  and  of  their  condition  before  the  General  Judgment 
do  not  seem  to  be  very  clear  from  current  Orthodox  teaching. 
The  determining  factors  in  defining  the  conformation  of  such 
doctrine  have  been  a  dislike  of  Roman  teaching  and  a  reluctance 
to  be  precise  where  there  is  no  explicit  revelation.  In  the  main, 
it  may  be  stated  that  the  vagueness  of  teaching  of  the  early 
Church  developed  into  fairly  definite  form  in  the  Symbolic 
Books.  The  teaching  not  fully  expounded  in  these  sources  sub¬ 
sequent  theologians  have  preferred  either  to  leave  more  or 
less  undeveloped  and  uncorrelated,  as,  for  example,  Androutsos, 
or  have  engaged  to  elucidate,  by  expounding  the  implications 
and  developing  them  through  reverent  theological  speculation, 
as,  for  example,  Macarius  and  Dybouniotes.  Before  examining 
the  evidence  of  the  Symbolic  Books,  certain  of  the  chief  aspects 
of  the  problem  may  well  be  presented. 

Holy  Scripture  nowhere  explicitly  enjoins  prayers  for  the 
dead.4  In  2  Mac.  12,  43  Judas  made  “a  sin  offering  for  the 

1  Ibid. 

2  Androutsos,  ibid.,  p.  426.  Mogila  (Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  I.  pp. 
340-343)  devotes  two  chapters  to  the  subject;  Mesolora  (op.  cit.,  IV. 
pp.  418-428)  two  whole  sections  q.  v.  for  fuller  treatment  and  refer¬ 
ences.  Dositheus  is  also  most  explicit  and  detailed,  cf.  in  Mesolora, 
op.  cit.,  II.  p.  107,  and  pp.  128-129. 

3  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  427. 

4  Though  Macarius,  op.  cit.,  II.  pp.  710,  ff.  attempts  to  base  the 
practice  on  the  precarious  foundation  of  such  texts  as  St.  Jas.  5, 
16;  1  Tim.  2,  1 ;  1  St.  John  5,  16,  etc.  For  a  refutation  of  these 
views  cf.  Androutsos,  ibid.,  note  1,  pp.  427-428. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  EAST  THINGS 


405 


dead'’,  “which  is  the  first  very  early  witness  to  such  memo¬ 
rials.”1  Yet  all  the  Liturgies,  the  practice  of  the  early  Church, 
and  the  writings  of  the  Fathers  demonstrate  clearly  the  belief 
that  “through  charitable  works,  the  prayers  of  the  Church, 
and  the  Holy  Eucharist,  help  and  comfort  are  afforded  to  those 
who  have  died  in  the  Faith.”2  Such  good  works  and  prayers 
however,  are  of  no  avail  to  the  entirely  evil  or  to  the  incorrig¬ 
ible.  It  is  manifestly  difficult  to  discern  the  principle  guid¬ 
ing  such  devotional  practices  and  regulating  the  relation  of  the 
assistance  and  help  thereby  afforded  the  souls  of  the  departed, 
to  the  truth  of  the  Particular  Judgment.  If  by  the  good  offices 
of  the  Church  on  earth  comfort  and  help  are  given  to  such 
souls,  it  may  not  be  understood  to  imply  a  change  in  their  state, 
for  this  would  violate  the  verdict  already  passed  on  the  soul 
in  the  Particular  Judgment.  To  reconcile  the  two — the  bene¬ 
fit  given  the  souls  by  the  Church’s  prayers,  and  the  final  and 
irrevocable  character  of  the  Particular  Judgment — two  views 
are  advanced:  (a)  the  souls  are  punished  only  for  a  time  for 
their  deeds  in  this  life,  or  (b)  the  souls  are  perfected  in  the  ex¬ 
ercise  of  moral  qualities  which,  as  it  were,  lay  dormant  and  in 
germ  in  their  life  on  earth.  According  to  the  first  theory  the 
Church’s  efforts  result  in  a  diminution  or  removal  of  punish¬ 
ment;  according  to  the  second,  the  souls  are  capable  of  Grace 
and  satisfy  the  conditions  necessary  for  the  saving  work  of 
prayer  and  the  offering  of  the  Holy  Sacrifice.3  Both  specula¬ 
tions,  according  to  Androutsos,  are  inacceptable.  The  first 
leads  to  the  Boman  teaching  about  Purgatory,  and  involves  the 
two  ancillary  doctrines  of  the  superabounding  merits  of  the 
Saints  and  of  works  of  supererogation.  As  was  shown  above, 
this  is  all  quite  impossible  in  Orthodox  theology.  The  Roman 
teaching  further  implies  the  doctrine  of  penances  as  satisfac¬ 
tions  rather  than  as  medicines,  for  sin.  It  impugns  the  doc¬ 
trine  of  the  Grace  of  Penance  as  sufficient  and  complete.4  The 
second  theory  is  likewise  “inacceptable,  ...  as  inexorably  in- 


1  Androutsos,  ibid.,  p.  427. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  428. 

3  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  429. 

*  Cf.  ibid.,  p.  430;  pp.  385  ff.,  and  his  ’(jl(3o\ikti,  pp.  320  ft‘. 


406  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  LAST  THINGS 

volving  a  violation  of  the  doctrine  of  the  Particular  Judg¬ 
ment.”1 

The  theory  that  there  is  a  place  for  the  moral  and  spiritual 
development  of  those  who  have  died  in  the  faith  of  the  Church 
but  still  with  the  stain  of  sin  upon  them,  presents  certain  real 
difficulties,  says  Androutsos.  In  the  first  place,  it  is  hard  to 
see  why  this  development  should  be  restricted  to  those  souls 
only  which  had  a  certain  moral  endowment  here,  and  should  not 
be  extended  to  all  sinners  alike.  Tt  is  an  arbitrary  limitation, 
he  says,  since  the  soul  is  not  inactive  after  death  but  may  develop 
and  perfect  itself  (according  to  this  theory).  It  involves  the 
notion  that  the  gate  of  penitence  is  open  even  after  death,  and 
that  the  possibility  of  conversion  is  still  offered  to  the  soul.  “If 
we  confine  this  development  to  the  repentant  only,”  says  An¬ 
droutsos,  “then  we  do  not  take  repentance  in  the  same  sense  as 
they,  and  this  theory  contradicts  the  dogma  of  the  Particular 
Judgment  .  .  .For  if,  according  to  Orthodox  teaching,  the 
departing  soul  truly  and  really  repents  .  .  .  (and  makes  con¬ 
fession),  this  repentance  (jj-eravoia)  is  a  full  and  complete  re¬ 
mission  of  sins  .  .  .  which  justifies  and  saves  the  person.  If 
the  person  did  not  succeed  in  repenting,  he  then  naturally  does 
not  belong  to  those  for  whom  the  Church’s  prayers  are  offered."2 
What  this  theory  really  comes  to,  says  Androutsos,  is  this,  that 
“besides  the  unrepentant  and  hardened  sinners  there  are  other 
souls  distinguished  from  them,  who  are  stained  with  sin  and 
may  not  enter  either  into  the  Kingdom  of  Heaven  or  into  ever¬ 
lasting  punishment.”  But  according  to  Orthodox  teaching,  peni¬ 
tence  and  confession  secure  a  full  and  perfect  remission  of  sins 
and  a  restoration  of  the  baptismal  state  of  innocence.  In  this 
state  one  is  justified  and  saved  without  the  performance  or  sat¬ 
isfaction  of  any  additional  remaining  penances  or  penalties, 
“for  there  is  no  room  in  the  Orthodox  system  for  expiatory  pun¬ 
ishments.”3  This  theory  then  is  contrary  to  the  dogma  of  the 
Particular  Judgment  and  the  involved  truth  that  there  is  no 
place  for  repentance  beyond  the  grave.  “The  acceptance  of  this 
theory  of  perfection  depreciates  the  moral  value  of  the  life  here. 


1  AoynaTiKr),  p.  431. 

Ibid.,  p.  431. 
s  Op.  cit.,  p.  432. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  LAST  THINGS 


407 


fosters  the  adjournment  of  reformation  and  amendment  to  the 
life  beyond  the  grave,  and  destroys  the  view  of  Heaven  and 
Hell  ...  on  which  Christians  rest  their  belief.”1 

Before  examining  further  the  interpretation  of  the  practice 
of  the  Orthodox  Church  of  praying  for  the  dead,  it  may  be 
well  to  indicate  the  teaching  on  this  subject  of  the  Symbolic 
Books.  Jeremiah  II  speaks  of  almsgiving  and.  the  offering  of 
the  Holy  Sacrifice  for  the  dead,  as  being  “useful  to  them”,  “af¬ 
fording  them  needed  help”,  “as  giving  them  assistance”,  and 
“as  being  a  benefit  and  gain  to  them”.2  Chapter  20  of  Krito- 
poulos’  Confession  is  devoted  to  this  topic.  He  refers  to  the 
teaching  of  the  Fathers  on  the  subject3  and  then  says:  “Two 
things  are  especially  to  be  noticed :  .  .  .  one,  that  certain  per¬ 
sons  immediately  after  death  attain  converse  with  Christ;  .  .  . 
the  other,  that  others  do  not  attain  to  the  operation  of  salva¬ 
tion  immediately  after  death  except  potentially,  and  receive  it 
in  hope.  But  it  is  in  a  sure  and  certain  hope — for  having  first 
experienced  the  fatherly  correction  of  God  they  are  then  made 
worthy  in  time  of  actually  laying  hold  of  salvation.  The 
Church,  knowing  this,  .  .  .  discovered  the  way  to  show  them 
kindness,  which  is  to  offer  up  prayers  and  intercessions  to  God 
for  them  that  one  of  two  things  may  occur — either  that  they 
may  speedily  find  relief  from  the  miseries  which  encompass 
them,  or  that  rest  and  consolation  from  God  may  be  given  them 
in  their  prison.”  Kritopoulos  is  quite  explicit  in  denying  that 
these  agonies  and  pangs  are  physical  or  material,  and  says  that 
they  are  “afflictions  and  sorrows  of  conscience,  the  torment  of 
remorse”  for  sins  committed  in  life.4  As  to  the  term  of  con¬ 
finement  or  the  time  of  release,  nothing  may  be  defined.  There 
is  no  “purgatorial  fire”  but  only  the  torment  of  conscience — yet 
not  without  hope — which  will  endure  so  long  as  God  wills  it 
to.5 

Mogila  expounds  the  doctrine  of  the  Particular  Judgment 
clearly  and  definitely,  saying  that  each  knows  his  lot  immedi- 

1  Ibid.,  p.  433. 

2  In  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  I,  pp.  154-155;  cf.  also  pp.  106-167,  ibid. 

3  Ibid.,  pp.  352-353. 

4  Ibid.,  pp.  353-354. 

5  Ibid.,  p.  354. 


408 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  LAST  THINGS 


ately  after  death — the  righteous,  the  hliss  in  store,  and  the  sin¬ 
ner,  his  torment  to  come.  “But  neither  righteous  nor  sinners 
receive  their  full  reward  before  the  Last  Judgment,  nor  are 
they  sent  to  the  same  place.  Yet  the  Particular  Judgment 
must  needs  be”,  in  order  that  this  separation  may  take  place.1 
He  proceeds  to  state  the  fact  of  the  different  steps  or  degrees 
in  blessedness  or  punishment.2  In  answer  to  the  questions3 
about  the  state  of  men  who  die  and  yet  are  neither  of  the  saved 
or  lost,  he  says:  “There  are  none  of  such  a  sort.  Yet  cer¬ 
tainly  many  of  the  sinners  are  delivered  from  the  bonds  of 
hell,  yet  not  by  their  own  penitence  or  confession  .  .  .  but 
by  the  good  works  of  the  living,  the  prayers  of  the  Church,  and 
the  Bloodless  Sacrifice  which  the  Church  offers  daily  for  all, 
both  quick  and  dead — since  Christ  died  for  all.  They  are  not 
freed  by  their  own  efforts,  as  Theophylact  says  on  St.  Luke  6, 4 * 6 
commenting  on  the  words  of  Christ  (where  He  says  “that  the 
Son  of  man  hath  power  on  earth  to  forgive  sins’')  :  ‘Notice,  it 
is  on  earth  that  sins  are  forgiven.  So  long  as  we  are  on  earth 
we  can  blot  out  our  sins;  after  we  have  departed  from  the 
earth  we  are  no  longer  able  to  blot  them  out  by  confession,  for  the 
door  is  shut’.  And  on  St.  Matthew  21/  interpreting  the  words 
‘Bind  him  hand  and  foot’  to  mean  the  practical  powers  of  the 
soul,  he  says:  ‘In  this  world  it  is  possible  to  do  and  practise, 
but  in  the  world  to  come,  all  the  practical  powers  of  the  soul 
are  bound,  and  it  is  not  possible  to  do  anything  as  reparation 
for  sin’.  From  which  words  it  is  apparent  that  after  death 
the  soul  cannot  be  freed,  nor  can  it  repent,  nor  can  it  do  any 
work  to  redeem  itself  from  the  bondage  of  hell;  the  Holy  Lit¬ 
urgy  only,  and  the  prayers  and  alms  deeds  which  are  done  for  it 
by  the  living,  these  help  it  very  greatly,  and  free  it  from  the 
bonds  of  hell.”8  In  answering  the  next  question7  he  quotes 
Theophylact  again,  on  St.  Luke  12,  5,  who  distinguishes  be- 

1  Ibid.,  p.  407. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  408. 

3  (No.  63). 

4  This  should  be  5.  The  citation  is  from  St.  Luke  5,  24. 

6  Vs.  13. 

6  Ibid.,  pp.  408-409. 

7  “What  should  we  think  about  alms  deeds  and  good  works  done 

in  behalf  of  the  dead?”  (no.  65.) 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  LAST  THINGS 


409 


tween  “the  power  to  east  into  hell"  and  the  excercise  of  that 
power.  God  who  has  the  power  to  condemn  has  the  power  to 
forgive.  '‘This  I  say  of  the  oblations  and  offerings  made  for 
the  dead,  that  they  help,  not  a  little,  even  those  who  have  died 
in  grievous  sin.  Tor  He  does  not  call  all  into  hell  whom  He 
has  slain,  though  He  has  the  power  to  do  so.”  By  good  offices 
wrought  for  the  dead  we  can  propitiate  Him  to  stay  the  exer¬ 
cise  of  this  power,  and  forgive  them.  We  can  do  these  for  the 
dead,  giving  them  a  very  real  help,  and  thereby  do  for  them 
what  they  are  incapable  of  doing  for  themselves.1  The  theory 
of  the  fire  of  Purgatory  is  not  mentioned  in  Holy  Scripture,  nor 
any  temporal  punishment  purifying  the  soul  after  death.' 
Since  the  soul  can  receive  no  sacraments,  the  Church  offers  for 
it  the  Bloodless  Sacrifice  and  prayers,  asking  forgiveness  of 
its  sins.  It  cannot  of  itself  repent  or  secure  forgiveness.3 

Dositheus  is  even  more  explicit  After  a  brief  statement 
of  the  doctrine  of  the  Particular  and  the  General  Judgments.4 
he  discusses  the  condition  of  those  who  had  committed  mortal 
sins  for  which  they  had  repented,  yet  had  not  had  space  to 
show  forth  the  fruit  of  repentance  in  this  life.  ‘'Such  souls 
go  to  hell  for  a  time  and  remain  there  to  work  off  the  punish¬ 
ment  due  for  these  sins.  Thev  are  conscious  of  coming  deliver- 
anee  from  that  condition,  and  are  freed  bv  the  Sublime  Goodness 

y  k- 

because  of  the  prayers  of  the  priests  and  the  good  works  which 
their  relatives  perform  for  them.  Of  the  greatest  efficacy  is  the 
offering  of  the  Bloodless  Sacrifice  which  the  .  .  .  Church  . 

V — 

.  .  makes  dailv.  We  mav  not  know  the  time  of  their  deliver- 

«.  1 » 

ance :  that  they  are  freed  from  these  afflictions  we  know  and 
believe,  but  as  to  when  this  takes  place,  we  are  ignorant.'” 

In  one  sense,  suggested  in  the  above  texts,  the  good  deeds 
done  for  the  departed  are  done  as  it  were  by  himself,  since  be¬ 
fore  death  he  may  leave  instructions  for  the  performance  of 
certain  good  works,  the  giving  of  certain  alms,  and  the  like.6 

^Ibid.,  p.  409. 

-  Ibid.,  question  66. 

'Ibid.,  p.  410. 

4  Ibid.,  II.  p.  119. 

z  Ibid.,  p.  120. 

6  Cf.  Jeremiah  II,  above,  in  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  I,  p.  155  et  al. 


410 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  LAST  THINGS 


These  good  works  include  primarily  the  memorial  of  the  dead 
by  name  in  the  Oblation  of  the  Holy  Sacrifice,  memorials  on 

the  various  days  connected  with  the  departed,1 2  almsdeeds  in 

memory  of  the  dead,  and  the  offering  of  the  collybes.  This 
custom  of  offering  roasted  grain  in  connection  with  the  me¬ 
morials  of  the  departed  has  a  double  significance.  It  is  a  re¬ 
minder  of  the  miracle  wrought  by  the  Martyr  St.  Theodore 
under  Julian  the  Apostate  (362),  when  the  Christians  ate  grain 
for  a  whole  day  because  the  meats  vended  in  the  markets  were 

polluted  by  the  blood  of  the  idol  sacrifices,  and  also  a  repre¬ 

sentation  and  foreshadowing  of  the  Eesurrection  of  the  Dead, 
according  to  the  parable  of  St.  John  12,  24.  Such  grain  of¬ 
fered  at  this  time  is  “one  form  of  charity  toward  the  poor,  for 
the  pardon  of  the  souls  of  the  departed.”'  The  general  prac¬ 
tice  of  the  Church  takes  varied  forms  and  is  very  interesting 
from  the  historical  point  of  view.3  Mesolora4  thus  summarizes 
the  doctrines  involved :  “We  do  these  things  believing  that 
God  will  forgive  the  sins  of  the  departed,  ‘not  in  our  own  right¬ 
eousness'  nor  by  reason  of  any  return  payment  of  Grace  nor 
by  offering  money,  but  by  the  righteousness,  the  Grace,  and  lov¬ 
ing-kindness  of  Him,  these  prayers  and  Liturgies  become  ac¬ 
ceptable  and  well  pleasing  to  the  Glory  of  God  and  (avail)  for 
the  benefit  of  the  soul,  for  the  ‘prayer  of  a  righteous  man  avail- 
eth  much  in  its  working,'  among  the  faithful  and  those  worthy 
of  Divine  Grace/’5 

From  the  above  quotations  the  evidence  offered  by  the  Svm- 
bolic  Books  may  be  thus  summarized:  Jeremiah  states  that  the 
prayers  of  the  Church  and  the  good  works  done  by  her  in  be¬ 
half  of  the  dead,  help  and  benefit  the  departed,  and  implies  the 
possible  interpretation  that  such  good  deeds  are,  by  a  kind  of 
extension,  done  by  the  person  himself  by  deputy.  He  does  not 


1  Cf.  Kritopoulos,  ibid.,  p.  353  for  a  list  of  such  days. 

2  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  note  2,  p.  397. 

3  On  the  subject,  historically  and  doctrinally,  Nectarius  Kephala, 

Metropolitan  of  Pentapolis,  wrote  an  interesting  work:  McXctt;  7 repl 
adavaaias  rijs  Ka'L  ^^P1  T^v  iepwv  hvtip-octvvojv,  Athens,  1901,  es¬ 

pecially  pp.  104-158. 

4  Cf.  his  whole  section  devoted  to  the  subject,  op.  cit.,  IV,  p.  395-399. 

5  Ibid .,  p.  399. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  LAST  THINGS 


411 


attempt  to  explain  how  they  are  thus  helped.  Kritopoulos  di¬ 
vides  those  who  depart  in  the  Faith  (excluding  from  further 
mention  those  certainly  damned),  into  the  classes  of  the  al¬ 
ready  perfected  and  those  potentially  saved,  which  latter  are 
greatly  helped  by  the  Church’s  good  offices.  He  specifies  that 
the  torments  and  afflictions  of  the  latter  are  subjective  and 
are  of  the  nature  of  remorse  of  conscience  and  regret.  Mogila 
holds  fast  to  the  doctrine  of  the  probationary  character  of  the 
life  here  and  of  the  final  and  irrevocable  fixing  of  the  state 
of  the  soul  by  death.  Yet  he  admits  that  certain  souls  are  re¬ 
leased  from  hell  by  the  good  works  and  prayers  of  the  Church, 
which  stay  the  hand  of  God  from  condemning  the  soul  of  the 
sinner,  and  by  means  of  the  merits  of  Christ  interpose  to  re¬ 
deem  from  the  pangs  of  hell  a  soul  which  would  otherwise  be 
damned.  The  souls  of  the  departed  are  themselves  helpless  and 
incapable  of  any  effort  to  assist  themselves.  The  Church  may 
do  for  them  what  they  cannot  do  for  themselves.  Dositheus 
seems  clearly  to  imply  a  doctrine  of  Purgatory,  which  is  ap¬ 
parently  otherwise  not  met  with  in  Orthodox  thought.  He 
seems  to  consider  punishment  for  a  time  as  in  the  nature  of 
expiation  and  satisfaction  for  sins  committed  in  the  flesh.  Such 
punishment  is  only  temporary  and  is  in  some  way  alleviated  by 
the  work  of  the  Church.  All  the  Symbolic  Books  unite  in  teach¬ 
ing  the  doctrine  of  the  Particular  and  of  the  General 
Judgment.  All  of  them  hold  clearly  the  Orthodox  doctrine 
that  no  self-initiated  repentance  is  possible  after  death,  and  that 
death  closes  the  door  to  a  voluntary  change  of  attitude  to¬ 
wards  God.  Dositheus  alone  seems  to  imply  the  expiatory  char¬ 
acter  of  temporal  chastisement  inflicted  on  the  soul  after 
death,  which  is  also  implicit  in  a  lesser  measure  in  Kritopoulos. 
It  is  clear,  then,  that  such  teaching  stands  in  need  of  interpre¬ 
tation  and  correlation,  if  it  is  to  become  consistent  and  uni¬ 
fied.  This  has  been  the  task  of  theologians  subsequent  to  the 
time  of  the  Symbolic  Books. 

At  this  point  the  facts  suggest  a  comment  which  may  not 
be  out  of  place  here.  The  progress  and  development  of  Ortho¬ 
dox  teaching  on  the  subject  of  the  state  of  the  departed  appar¬ 
ently  betrays  the  tendencies  which  would  lead  to  a  modified 
doctrine  of  Purgatory.  The  principle  so  often  operative  in  con- 


412 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  LAST  THINGS 


ditioning  the  form  of  later  Orthodox  teaching  seems  here  again 
to  be  in  force :  by  reaction  against  Roman  doctrine,  Orthodox 
theologians  have  gone,  as  it  were  by  instinct,  as  far  as  possible 
in  a  different  direction.  This  has  been  apparent  at  many 
points  in  these  Lectures.  For  example,  we  noticed  that  Dyo- 
bouniotes  contended  that  the  Orthodox  theory  of  justification 
could  not  be  the  same  as  that  of  the  Roman  Church.  Similarly, 
much  of  the  Orthodox  opposition  to  the  term  transubstantia- 
tion  is  due  entirely  to  a  reaction  against  the  Roman  use  of  the 
word,  but  not,  as  was  pointed  out,  to  the  intrinsic  doctrine  in¬ 
volved  in  it.  So  in  this  case  the  prinicple  which  seems  to  have 
controlled  the  form  (or  the  “formlessness”!)  of  later  Ortho¬ 
dox  teaching  on  the  state  of  the  departed,  seems  to  be  a  vio¬ 
lent  reaction  against  the  Roman  doctrine  of  Purgatory — not 
on  the  basis  of  its  intrinsic  character  so  much  as  of  its  origin 
and  its  advocates — joined  with  a  powerful  reluctance  inhibit¬ 
ing  agreement  with  Rome  on  the  subject.  This  repugnance  to 
Roman  teaching  is  clearly  manifested  in  this  matter :  Dosith- 
eus’  teaching  is  the  Roman  doctrine  of  Purgatory,  yet  without 
all  the  corollaries  involved  in  the  latter,  and  without  the  ter¬ 
minology.  The  term  “Intermediate  State”  in  Orthodox  usage 
does  not  mean  the  state  of  the  departed  who  are  not  good  enough 
for  heaven  or  bad  enough  for  hell,  but  the  state  of  all  the  de¬ 
parted,  saint  and  sinner  alike,  from  death  to  the  Last  Judgment. 
As  we  have  seen,  when  the  theologian  delves  more  deeply  into 
the  question,  three  categories  of  persons  are  immediately  dis¬ 
cerned  :  the  Saints,  those  who  have  attained  perfection  in  this 
life;  the  sinners,  the  reprobate,  unrepentant  and  incorrigible, 
who  are  damned  to  hell;  and  those  who  are  imperfect  penitents 
and  potential  saints,  who  stand  in  need  of  further  purgation 
and  development  before  being  fit  for  heaven.  In  general  the 
Orthodox  repudiate  a  third  place  for  the  latter  class.  The 
Saints  are  in  the  hands  of  the  Father;  the  damned  in  a  place 
of  torment;  what  of  the  imperfectly  penitent?  The  Symbolic 
Books  would  seem  to  give  them  a  term  in  hell,  for  purgation  and 
expiation,  and  then  admit  them  to  blessedness.  In  this  con¬ 
nection  Androutsos  says:  “In  general,  Orthodox  theologians  re¬ 
pudiate  unnecessary  distinctions  (such  as  the  Latin  limbus 
puerorum,  limbus  pat  rum,  and  the  like),  and  not  only  these, 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  LAST  THINGS 


413 


but  also  that  of  a  third  or  middle  place  between  Paradise  and 
Hell — the  place  or  state  of  those  who  have  not  committed  mortal 
sins  and  are  not  reprobate.  Even  though  this  distinction  of 
itself  is  not  devoid  of  truth  (since  the  Orthodox  theologians 
too  distinguish  between  the  Lost  and  those  who  are  to  be  de¬ 
livered  from  Hell),  yet,  on  account  of  (the  doctrine  of)  pur¬ 
gatorial  fire  with  which  this  intermediate  state  is  presented  by 
Papist  theologians,  this  theory  is  always  strongly  rejected  by 
the  Orthodox.’'1  Androutsos,  it  may  be  noted,  in  lending  even 
this  little  support  to  the  doctrine  of  a  “third  or  middle  place”, 
laid  himself  open  to  a  sharp  attack  by  Dyobouniotes,2  and  in 
his  defense  carefully  disavowed  any  attempt  to  teach  it.3 

Modern  theological  opinion  is  divided  on  the  questions  of 
the  state  of  the  departed  and  on  the  relation  of  the  prayers  of 
the  Church  to  them.  Mesolora,  as  we  have  seen,  held  that  the 
dead  could  receive  forgiveness  of  sins  by  means  of  the  good 
works  and  prayers  of  the  Church.  This  implies  that  such  souls 
had  not  received  forgiveness  in  this  life,  and  that  they  are  cap¬ 
able  of  receiving  it  hereafter.  The  two  great  difficulties  are 
these :  If  no  progress  or  development  is  possible  after  death,  how 
may  any  change  occur  in  the  state  of  the  departed,  and  how 
may  prayers  assist  or  benefit  the  dead?  If  a  progress  or  de¬ 
velopment  is  possible,  then  the  verdict  of  the  Particular  Judg¬ 
ment  is  not  final,  and  the  life  here  is  not  what  it  is  taught  to 
be :  the  one  and  only  place  of  probation,  terminating  with  death. 
As  we  saw  above,  Mogila,  for  example,  denied  the  possibility  of 
development,  yet  allowed  that  of  deliverance  from  hell.  Sub¬ 
jective  change  is  therefore  impossible,  but  the  Church’s  prayers 
may  work  a  change  in  the  soul's  condition  without  its  own  in¬ 
itiation  or  cooperation.  Kritopoulos  and  Dositheus  both  rec¬ 
ognize  the  finality  of  the  verdict  of  the  Particular  Judgment, 
but  postpone  its  fulfilment  (in  the  case  of  the  imperfectly  peni- 

1  Op.  tit.,  note  2,  pp.  435-436. 

2 'H  Aoy/JL.  ’Avdp.  Kpiv.,  p.  63;  ’0<pei\.  air  dvr-q  a  is,  pp.  156-159. 

3  AoypaTLKal  MeAeVcu  A’,  pp.  132-133.  He  draws  attention  to  tlie 
fact  that  Dyobouniotes  himself  had  been  driven  practically  to  the 
recognition  of  a  third  place  in  acknowledging  a  distinction  between 
the  “higher”  and  the  “lower”  Paradise”.  Cf.  Dyobouniotes,  'H  y.i<rr\ 
KaraaracLs  tuv  \pvxuv,  pp.  69-70:  “The  lower  Paradise  may  well  be 
in  Heaven  and  at  the  same  time  belong  to  Hell.” 


414 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  LAST  THINGS 


tent),  until  these  have  been  purged  and  chastised  for  a  time. 
In  view  of  the  dilemma  suggested  above  Androutsos  sayss 
“These  prayers  (for  the  dead)  must  be  defined  negatively  with¬ 
in  the  limits  in  which  the  early  Church  determined  them,  ex¬ 
cluding  all  theological  speculation  as  to  the  manner  or  char¬ 
acter  of  the  ‘relief’  they  afford  the  departed.”1  The  sufferings 
they  undergo  may  not  be  thought  to  he  expiatory,  nor  may  it 
be  held  that  the  prayers  of  the  Church  dispense  from  certain 
of  such  sufferings.  They  are,  however,  beneficial  to  the  de¬ 
parted,  as  we  believe.  The  manner  of  the  operation  of  such 
help  and  benefit  is  inscrutable,  as  is  the  whole  larger  question 
of  answers  to  prayer.  These  prayers,  like  all  others,  are  sub¬ 
ject  to  the  laws  and  conditions  of  prayer  in  general;  hence  the 
limitation  made  by  the  Fathers  as  to  the  subjects  of  such  in¬ 
tercession — those  who  have  repented  imperfectly,  and  not  those 
who  have  sinned  mortally — is  reasonable  and  logical.2  “These 
prayers  express  the  full  fellowship  of  love  on  the  part  of  the 
living  with  the  departed,  for  death  but  changes  location,  and 
does  not  sever  the  bond  of  .  .  .  love.”3  Any  attempt  to  fill 
the  void  in  our  knowledge  by  speculation  about  a  third  place 
for  souls,  or  by  the  theory  of  the  fire  of  Purgatory,4  or  the 
temporal  character  of  punishments,  are  “efforts  simply  of  hu¬ 
man  curiosity,  since  they  serve  no  religious  ends.’”  Since  we 
do  not  know  who  are  lost  and  who  have  not  sinned  to  the  death, 
the  prayers  of  the  Church  are  made  for  all.6  “The  general  in¬ 
tercession  for  all  the  departed  ...  is  the  expression  of  the 
communion  between  the  living  and  the  dead.”7 

On  the  contrary,  Macarius  and  Dyobouniotes  both  hold  to 
some  sort  of  development  and  progress  beyond  the  grave, 
which  is  assisted  and  promoted  by  the  good  works  and  prayers 
of  the  Church.  Says  Macarius :  “Our  prayers  are  offered  for 
those  who  have  died  in  the  true  Faith  and  in  true  repentance. 
Since  they  departed  in  the  Communion  of  the  Church,  they 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  433. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  434. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  435. 

4  Cf.  Mesolora  on  Purgatory,  op.  cit.,  IV,  pp.  105-117. 

6  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  435. 

6  Ibid.,  p.  436. 

7  Ibid.,  p.  437. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  LAST  THINGS 


415 


have  in  them  the  beginnings  of  good,  and  the  germ  of  the  new 
life  which  they  had  not  time  to  develop  here.  Under  the  in¬ 
fluence  of  our  fervent  prayers  by  means  of  the  offering  of  the 
Holy  Liturgy,  they  are  enabled  gradually  to  develop  and  bring 
to  fruition  what  they  had  here  only  in  germ,  just  as  a  good  seed 
grows  on  earth  under  the  quickening  influence  of  the  sun.  .  . 
So,  on  the  contrary,  those  who  have  died  in  impiety  and  have 
not  repented,  .  .  .  are  incapable  of  receiving  such  succor 
from  the  prayers  of  the  living,  since  the  influence  of  the  sun  . 

.  .  cannot  quicken  the  seeds  which  have  lost  all  power  of 
growth.”1  Such  is  the  teaching  also  of  Dyobouniotes,2  who  says 
that  “if  there  can  be  no  change  after  death  in  the  Intermediate 
State,  it  follows  that  the  prayers  of  the  Church  on  behalf  of 
the  dead  have  no  meaning.”3  He  acknowledges  that  the  Early 
Church  did  not  develop  this  teaching,  but  claims  that  its  de¬ 
velopment  is  incumbent  upon  later  generations  in  the  Church.4 
He  refuses  to  share  Androutsos’  reluctance  to  go  beyond  the 
negative  limitations  of  the  doctrine  as  found  in  early  teaching, 
and  says :  “The  Orthodox  Church  has  the  right  ...  to  en¬ 
gage  upon  the  development  and  deeper  understanding  of  dog¬ 
mas  not  developed  by  the  early  Church.  .  .  It  is  certainly 
no  question  of  ‘subverting  the  dogmas’5  of  the  Faith.”8  He 
holds  that  there  is  a  development  and  progress  in  the  state  of 
the  dead,  helped  and  furthered  by  the  Church’s  prayers,  and 
that  this  theory  does  not  militate  against  either  of  the  truths 
of  the  Particular  Judgment  or  the  Orthodox  teaching  as  to  Re¬ 
pentance.  ‘  In  other  words,  no  radical  or  absolute  change  may 
be  effected  after  death.  The  direction  and  destination  of  the 
soul  is  fixed  by  the  verdict  of  the  Particular  Judgment.  But 
the  realization  of  this  destiny  may  be  postponed,  that  the  soul 
may  be  the  better  prepared  to  enjoy  blessedness. 

1  Macarius,  op.  tit.,  II.  p.  714  ff.  Souls  lay  the  foundation  in  this 
life  for  the  pardon  which  they  may  attain  perfectly  hereafter,  there¬ 
by  becoming  worthy  of  the  Church’s  good  offices  in  their  behalf, 
(ibid.,  p.  719). 

2  'H  fiiaT]  KaTaaTacris  rwv  ypvx&v,  pp.  98  ff. 

3  'H  Aoyp..  ’A v8p.  Kpiv.,  p.  63,  ’0 (peCk.  airavT.,  pp.  159-160. 

4  'H  Aoyp.  ’Avd p.  Kpiv.,  p.  62. 

5  As  Androutsos  says,  Aoyp..  MeXerat  A',  p.  139. 

6  ’0 0et\.  airavTffis,  p.  156. 

7  Ibid.,  pp.  156-160. 


416 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  LAST  THINGS 


2.  The  Consummation  of  All  Things 

The  last  topic  of  Orthodox  dogmatic  is  discussed  in  three 
divisions,  in  accordance  with  the  arrangement  of  the  subject 
matter  in  the  Creed.  The  first  of  these  divisions  is  that  on  the 
Second  Coming  of  our  Lord,  based  on  the  words:  “He  shall 
come  again,  with  glory,  to  judge  both  the  quick  and  the  dead; 
whose  kingdom  shall  have  no  end."  The  next  two  sections 
treat  of  “the  Resurrection  of  the  dead’’  and  “the  Life  of  the 
world  to  come.” 

The  Second  Coming  of  our  Lord  is  to  be  distinguished  from 
His  first  Advent,  when  He  came  “in  humility,  for  the  emanci¬ 
pation  of  the  human  race  from  sin”,1  since  He  is  to  come  in 
glory.2  At  this  Corning  He  is  to  judge  all,  the  righteous  and 
the  wicked,  by  a  righteous  and  triumphant  vindication  of  God’s 
justice,  in  His  rewarding  of  the  good  and  His  condemnation  of 
the  wicked.  This  Judgment  is  called  the  General  or  the  Last 
Judgment.3  The  doctrine  of  our  Lord’s  Coming  in  glory  con¬ 
stitutes  one  of  the  fundamental  Christian  truths,4  and  is  based 
on  ample  authority  both  of  the  Old5  and  New6  Testaments  in 
which  His  Coming  in  judgment  is  definitely  predicted.  All 
the  creeds  and  the  teaching  of  the  Fathers  combine  to  reiterate 
the  conviction  of  the  Second  “Coming  of  the  Lord  and  the  ex¬ 
pectation  of  the  Resurrection  of  the  dead  and  eternal  life.”7 
The  time  of  the  Coming  has  not  been  revealed,  hence  our  Lord’s 
injunction  to  His  Apostles  to  watch,  and  their  constant  em¬ 
phasis  on  this  duty.  “The  mysterious  hiddenness  as  to  the  day 
of  Judgment  is  not  illuminated  by  the  signs  which  are  to  pre¬ 
cede  it,  according  to  our  Lord’s  and  His  Apostles  words.8  These 
‘signs’  fall  into  five  groups:  (a)  the  preaching  of  the  Gospel 

1  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  p.  117. 

2  St.  Matt.  24,  30. 

3  Mesolora,  ibid.,  p.  118. 

4  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  437. 

5  Cf.  Isaiah  66,  15,  ff . ;  Joel  2,  30,  ff. ;  3,  2,  ff. ;  Mai.  4,  1,  14,  ff.;  etc. 

e  Cf.  St.  Matt.  25,  3;  St.  Mark  13,  24,  ff.;  St.  Luke  21,  27;  Acts 

10,  42;  17,  31;  Rom.  2,  3,  5;  2  Tlies.  1,  5,  etc.  For  fuller  references 

cf.  notes  2  and  3,  p.  118,  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV. 

7  Androutsos,  ibid.,  p.  438. 

8  Ibid.,  and  cf.  notes  for  references  ad  loc. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  LAST  THINGS 


417 


to  all  nations;1  (b)  the  return  of  Israel  to  Christ;2  (c)  the 
coining  of  Elijah  and  Enoch  in  the  last  days;3  (d)  the  coming 
of  Antichrist;  and  (e)  “the  falling  away  from  the  Christian 
Faith  ...  of  many  nations,  under  the  influence  of  false 
teachers  and  false  prophets,  the  great  portents  in  external  na¬ 
ture,  and  revolutions  and  wars  among  men.  .  A1  The  com¬ 
ing  of  the  Antichrist5  has  given  rise  to  many  speculations  as 
to  his  person  and  character,  but  for  lack  of  definite  revelation 
we  must  confine  ourselves  to  what  is  made  known  to  us,  in  this 
matter  as  well  as  in  that  of  the  coming  of  Enoch  and  Elijah; 
these  truths  “are  enshrouded  in  mysterious  darkness. ??6 

The  Resurrection  of  the  dead  precedes  the  General  Judg¬ 
ment,  “which  is  followed  by  the  end  of  the  world,  the  separa¬ 
tion  of  men  into  inheritors  of  eternal  glory  and  sharers  in  eter¬ 
nal  punishment. r,<  This  temporal  sequence  of  the  last  things 
may  not  be  understood  literally,  but  presents  simultaneous 
events  as  in  a  series.8  Thus  the  Resurrection  of  the  dead  coin¬ 
cides  with  the  end  of  the  world,  which  in  turn  is  not  its  ex¬ 
tinction  and  destruction,  but  a  change  and  renewal,  consonant 
with  the  nature  of  renewed  and  glorified  humanity.9  Since  the 
Last  Things  do  not  take  place  in  a  time  sequence,  there  is  no 
room  in  the  Orthodox  conception  of  them  for  chiliasm.  Ac¬ 
cording  to  the  chiliastic  theory — based  on  a  misinterpretation 
of  Rev.  20 — -“God  will  first  raise  up  the  righteous  and  with 
them  will  reign  on  earth  for  a  period  of  a  thousand  years.  In 
the  various  forms  of  this  theory,  a  space  of  a  thousand  years 

JCf.  St.  Matt.  24,  14;  St.  Mk.  13,  10. 

2  Cf.  Hosea  3,  5;  Rom.  II,  25-26. 

3  Rev.  11. 

4  Cf.  St.  Matt.  24,  4,  ff;  St.  Mk.  13,  7-13;  St.  Lk.  21,  4-19;  2  Tlies.  2, 
2,  4,  ff;  etc.  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  438-439.  Mogila  gives  much 
this  same  enumeration,  in  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  I.  pp.  406-407,  cf.  also 
Mesolora,  IV.  pp.  119-120. 

5  1  St.  John  2,  18;  2  Tlies.  2,  3-4,  6-7.  In  this  latter  passage  the 
words  to  Karexov  involve  difficulties  of  interpretation.  Androutsos 
discusses  them,  op.  cit.,  note,  pp.  440-441 

6  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  439,  and  cf.  note  5  (ibid.,  and  pp.  440-441) 
on  Antichrist. 

7  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  440. 

8  Ibid. 

9  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  p.  123. 


418 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  LAST  THINGS 


is  to  intervene  between  the  Resurrection  of  the  righteous  and 
the  General  Resurrection  and  Judgment.  .  .  ”  But  chiliasm 
is  in  opposition  to  Holy  Scripture,  which  knows  but  one  Resur¬ 
rection  and  Judgment,  and  Sacred  Tradition,  since  early 
Fathers,  such  as  Dionysius  of  Alexandria,  Origen,  and  others, 
opposed  it  strongly.1 

“By  the  Resurrection  of  the  dead  we  understand  the  raising 
of  all  the  bodies  of  those  who  have  ever  died  and  their  reunion 
with  their  souls,  through  the  might  and  operation  of  the  Al¬ 
mighty  God."2  “The  Resurrection  is  a  complete  reunion  of 
soul  and  body,  the  second  state  of  the.  living  unit  after  dissolu¬ 
tion.  .  .  It  is  not  impossible  with  Him  who  in  the  beginning 
made  man  of  earth,  after  his  dissolution  and  return  to  that  from 
which  he  had  been  taken,  again  to  restore  him.  If  there  be  no 
Resurrection,  let  us  eat  and  drink,  let  us  live  a  life  of  pleasure 
and  enjoyment.  If  there  be  no  Resurrection,  in  what  respect 
are  we  different  from  the  beasts?  If  there  be  no  Resurrection, 
there  is  no  God,  no  Providence,  and  all  things  are  driven  me¬ 
chanically.’53  St.  John  Damascene  elsewhere  says:4  “If  the 
soul  alone  exerted  itself  in  the  battle  for  virtue,  then  it  alone 
should  be  crowned.  If  it  alone  was  defiled  with  sensual  pleas¬ 
ures,  in  justice  it  alone  should  be  punished.  But  since  neither 
soul  nor  body  had  existence  the  one  apart  from  the  other,  nor 
did  the  soul  apart  from  the  body  exercise  itself  in  virtue  or 
vice,  quite  rightly  are  both  to  receive  their  due  reward  togeth¬ 
er.”5  This  notion  of  the  unity  of  human  nature,  of  the  soul 
and  body  constituting  the  whole  man,  inhibits  every  dualistic 
conception  of  man’s  nature,6  and  affirms  the  truth  that  man  is 
one,  consisting  of  body  and  soul — a  significant  conception  in 
view  of  the  strong  bias  towards  dualism  of  speculative  thought. 
Androutsos  conceives  of  the  Resurrection  as  “  a  creative  act  of 
divine  greatness  and  might,  dissolving  the  rule  of  death  and 
raising  up  all  the  dead  along  with  the  living  before  the  divine 
bar  of  judgment.  Just  as  God  created  all  things  of  naught, 

1  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  441-442. 

2  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  p.  120. 

3  St.  John  Damascene,  vEfc5o<m,  IV.  104. 

4  In  nepi  dvacrraaeus,  p.  209,  quoted  by  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV,  p.  121. 

5  An  idea  common  in  Rabbinic  thought,  cf.  Sanhedrin,  91  b. 

6  Cf.  Sec.  2,  Lecture  III,  above. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  LAST  THINGS 


419 


thus  through  this  same  creative  might  He  restores  human  bodies 
to  their  first  essential  form.’'1  This  truth  was  suggested  and 
taught  more  or  less  clearly  in  the  Old  Testament,  but  at  the 
hands  of  our  Lord  and  His  Apostles  it  took  definite  form,  and 
is  proclaimed  as  one  of  the  most  remarkable  of  the  events 
connected  with  the  consummation  of  the  world,  without  which 
the  whole  edifice  of  the  Christian  Faith  crumbles  into  ruin.”2 

According  to  Orthodox  teaching,  following  St.  Paul  chiefly, 
the  bodies  of  the  dead  will  be  transformed  into  incorruptible 
and  spiritual  bodies,  the  righteous  rising  to  life  eternal,  and 
the  wicked  to  punishment.  The  bodies  will  be  the  same  bodies, 
materially  and  essentially,  though  they  will  differ  in  their  pro¬ 
perties,  since  they  are  then  to  be  spiritual ;  like  the  angels,  they 
will  not  have  the  marriage  relation;  they  are  to  be  incapable  of 
corruption,  impervious  to  death,  and  "in  general,  conformed  to 
the  spiritual  state  of  each  individual  after  the  general  Resur¬ 
rection/'3  It  is  essential  that  the  bodies  of  men  be  raised,  "in 
order  that  they,  as  his  organs,  as  an  essential  half  of  him, 
should  attain  to  blessedness  or  receive  the  same  condemnation 
as  his  soul.”4  Some  early  heresies  impugned  the  doctrine  of  the 
Resurrection  of  the  Body,  notably  Origen  and  the  Origenists, 
Carpocrates,  Basilides,  and  certain  Gnostics.5  According  to 
one  such  early  speculation,  the  soul  possessed  by  nature  a  cer¬ 
tain  plastic  principle  or  power  ( forma  corporeitatis) ,  by  which 
it  at  the  Resurrection  could  form  a  new  body  with  which  it 
would  be  hypostatically  united.  Another  speculation  had  it 
that  the  soul,  after  the  Resurrection,  acquires  an  ethereal  and 
attenuated  body,  or  by  its  nature  already  possessed  an  organ 
which  was  gradually  to  develop  into  such  a  body.  "Certainly 
the  notion  of  bodies  with  spiritual  properties  is  completely 
counter  to  the  dictates  of  the  physical  sciences,  nor  is  anyone 
able  to  reconcile  the  properties  of  the  Resurrection  bodies  witn 
the  laws  of  physics,  chemistry,  and  physiology,  since  the  latter 
are  based  upon  the  principle  that  matter  with  its  powers  is 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  442. 

2  Ibid.,  q.  v.  for  Old  Testament  references. 

3  Cf.  1  Cor.  15,  53;  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  442-443;  Mesolora, 
op.  cit.,  IV.  pp.  120  ff. 

4  Cf.  2  Cor.  5,  10;  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV,  pp.  122-123. 

6  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  p.  122  note  1;  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  443. 


420 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  LAST  THINGS 


something  eternal  and  necessary.  The  whole  question,  how¬ 
ever,  becomes  entirely  different  if  one  accepts  in  faith  (the 
truth)  that  beyond  the  powers,  energies,  and  phenomena  of  the 
empirical  world  there  exist  supernatural  powers  capable  of 
changing  and  uplifting  them.*'1 2 

The  well-known  passages  in  the  Xew  Testament  which  have 
to  do  with  the  Resurrection  and  the  General  Judgment'  do  not 
give  us  all  the  facts  about  them,  nor  “must  they  be  taken  liter- 
ally,  since  they  are  pictures  portraying  to  us  the  inconceivable 
grandeur  of  that  day."  We  do  know  this  much:  that  it  is  our 
Lord  who  is  to  be  the  J udge ;  that  “the  basis  and  standard  of  the 
General  Judgment  will  be  the  works  of  each  individual  or  his 
faith  as  manifested  in  love ....  according  to  the  well-known  in¬ 
timate  bond  between  faith  and  works.”3  Along  with  the  Judg¬ 
ment  will  come  the  end  of  the  world,  which  must  not  be  con¬ 
ceived  of  as  its  destruction,  but  as  its  renovation  and  altera¬ 
tion  according  to  a  new  pattern.  Xot  only  must  nature  share 
in  the  fruits  of  the  final  conquest  and  destruction  of  evil  and 
death,4 5  by  becoming  new  and  by  being  changed  into  a  new  en- 
titv,  but  man  in  glorv  will  stand  in  need  of  a  new  habitation 
fit  for  his  eternal  life.'  While  the  time  and  occasion  are  unknown 
to  man,  we  are  to  watch  and  await  its  coming.  The  transforma¬ 
tion  of  the  world  is  to  be  accomplished  by  fire,6  which  is  not  to 
dstroy  and  annihilate,  but  to  purify  and  purge  the  world  and 
surviving  humanity.7  The  Resurrection  of  the  dead,  the  end 
of  the  world,  and  the  General  Judgment  are  to  constitute  the 
culmination  and  consummation  of  life  in  this  sphere.8 

“The  result  of  the  General  Judgment  is  the  eternal  life  of 
the  righteous  and  the  eternal  punishment  of  the  sinners — the 

1  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  pp.  443-444,  following  Scheeben,  Handbuch 
der  katholischen  Dogmatik,  IV.  pp.  918,  927. 

2  As  e.  g.,  St.  Matt.  25,  31-46;  St.  John  3,  18;  5,  24;  1  Cor.  3,  13; 
Rom.  2,  6;  1  Cor.  3,  13,  etc. 

3  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  444. 

4  Ibid.,  and  p.  445. 

5  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  p.  123. 

6Cf.  2  St.  Pet.  3,  7,  etc. 

T  Thus  the  Fathers,  e.  g.,  St.  Clement  Alex.,  Strom.  VII;  Origen, 
contra  Celsum,  V.  25;  cf.  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  445  note  3. 

8  For  references,  cf.  op.  cit.,  and  notes;  Mogila,  in  Mesolora,  op.  cit., 
I.  pp.  406,  434-435. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  LAST  THINGS 


421 


former  inheriting  the  Kingdom  of  God,  and  the  latter  being 
east  into  hell  fire."1  Of  the  manner,  place,  and  state  of  this 
blessedness  or  anguish  we  know  little,  for  it  is  all  a  mystery 
inaccessible  to  us  in  this  life.2 3  Yet  in  certain  general  ways 
we  may  say  that  the  bliss  of  those  in  Heaven  is  to  consist  in 
deliverance  from  pain,  suffering,  grief,  corruption,  and  the 
like ;  in  the  enjoyment  of  the  Beatific  Vision ;  and  in  reunion 

and  fellowship  with  all  other  righteous  souls.  So  the  torment 

and  suffering  of  the  wicked  will  involve  a  deprivation  of  all 
good — joy  and  consolation — in  their  separation  from  the  vision 
of  God,  in  their  torment  of  conscience,  in  remorse  and  regret, 
and  in  certain  external  punishments.4 5 6 7  Both  bliss  and  punish¬ 
ment  are  to  be  different  in  each  instance,  since  judgment  is 
meted  out  on  the  basis  of  individual  acts  of  good  or  evil."  This 
graduated  verdict  is  not  only  implied  in  Holy  Writ,  but 
is  unanimously  taught  by  the  Fathers. b 

The  great  difficulty  in  the  Church's  dogma  on  this  subject 

is  the  eternal  character  of  Heaven  and  Hell.  “The  theory  of 

Origen  and  Gregory  of  Xyssa  about  the  restoration  of  all  and 
the  conversion  eventually  of  the  demons  and  the  impious,  was 
condemned  by  the  Church."'  Any  speculation  which  would 
lead  to  this  type  of  universalism  is  in  flat  violation  of  the  words 
of  Holy  Scripture.  But  if  it  be  kept  in  mind  that  in  God's 
plan  for  His  world,  life  here  is  a  definitely  limited  opportunity 
for  ethical  exercise  and  self-determination,  the  verdict  passed 
on  the  results  of  this  time  of  testing  must  be  regarded  as  final. 
The  objections  brought  against  eternal  blessedness  and  eternal 
punishment  are  chiefly  of  a  rationalist  origin  and  may  be 
summarized  as  follows :  eternal  blessedness  or  punishment  is 
inconsistent  with  the  mercy,  the  justice,  and  the  vision  of 
God;  with  His  mercy,  in  that  this  property  demands  that  sin¬ 
ners  should  be  brought  through  punishment  to  repentance  and 

1  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  445. 

2  Ibid.,  pp.  447-448. 

3  Mesolora  op.  cit.,  IV.  p.  126. 

4  Ibid.,  pp.  129-130;  cf.  on  this,  Kritopoulos,  in  Mesolora,  I.  pp. 
353,  348;  Mogila,  ibid.,  p.  410;  etc. 

5  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  p.  447. 

6  Ibid.,  note  1. 

7  Ibid.,  pp.  445-446. 


422 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  LAST  THINGS 


salvation;  with  His  justice,  in  that  small  sins  done  in  time 
cannot  conceivably  entail  eternal  punishment ;  and  with  His  wis¬ 
dom,  in  that  the  purpose  of  the  creation  of  men  being  their  hap¬ 
piness,  it  is  brought  to  naught  by  eternal  punishment.  Others 
say,  that  since  the  soul  still  possesses  its  free-will,  there  must 
be  provision  for  amendment  and  salvation.  According  to  an¬ 
other  view,  the  happiness  of  the  Blessed  is  impossible,  since 
they  know  that  others  of  their  own  race  are  being  punished 
eternally.  So,  others  argue,  God  in  His  foreknowledge  ought 
freely  to  have  refrained  from  creating  men  who  were  destined 
to  damnation.  “But  all  these  objections”,  says  Androutsos, 
“are  founded  on  the  principle  that  reason  is  the  standard  and 
criterion  of  all  things,  and  that  in  accordance  with  it  even  the 
divine  wisdom  and  righteousness  are  to  be  estimated  ...  If, 
on  the  other  hand,  reason  be  made  subject  to  faith,  then 
may  come  about  the  recognition  of  these  truths,  impossible  of 
investigation  by  the  human  understanding,  which  lie  beyond  us.”1 
“If  the  believer  reason  that  (the  wicked)  have  constituted  them¬ 
selves  incapable  of  sharing  in  Blessedness,  that  no  one  can 
sanctify  the  free-will  of  man  by  force,  nor  coerce  him  into 
fellowship  with  God,  he  will  sufficiently  comprehend  the  pos¬ 
sibility  of  alienation  from  God  by  the  persevering  act  of  man’s 
free-will,  and  in  consequence,  the  possibility  of  eternal  punish¬ 
ment.”2 3 *  The  dogma  is  fundamentally  a  mystery,  apprehended 
through  faith  but  not  by  reason  alone,  “for  all  these  things 
are  the  object  of  our  faith  and  hope,  until  the  ‘seeing  through 
a  glass,  darkly’  gives  wav  to  the  Open  Vision.”8  Then  shall 
God  be  “all  in  all”. 

1  Androutsos,  op.  cit.,  note  4,  pp.  446-447. 

■Ibid.,  (text)  p  446. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  448.  Cf.  Mesolora,  op.  cit.,  IV.  pp.  125-134;  Mogila,  in 

ibid.,  I.  pp.  407,  408-410,  435. 


INDEX 


A 

Absolute,  pages 

conception  of .  75-78 

negative  in  form  ....  78 

A.  and  infinite,  .  77-78 

God  as  absolute,  .  81 

A.  attributes  of  God,  .  .  81-82 

cf.  s.  v.  Attribute 

Absolution 

complete  and  full  in 
Sacrament  of  Penance, 


.  359,  3G0,  3G7 

conditions  of  A,  .  359-363 

formula  of  A.,  Orthodox 

and  Roman  .  364-365 

cf.  s.  v.  Penance 

Ad  min  is  trati  o  n 

of  Church,  .  246-249 

of  Sacraments,  .  286-305 

Anglican  Church 

Doctrine  of,  on  Sacra¬ 
ments,  .  280 

validity  of  A.  Baptism.  287,  n.  1 
validity  of  A.  Orders  .  .  302-303 

Apostolic  Succession ,  ....  246-249 


298-303 

Apostolicity  of  Church  .  .  .  246 

Argument 

for  existence  of  Ood  71-80 

criticism  of  it  .  79-80 

Aseity  of  Ood  87 

Atonement 

of  Christ,  dogma  and  theo¬ 
ries  of .  191-197 

Attributes  of  Ood  82-107 

Absolute  A .  81-82 

“Absolute”  and  Relative 

A .  81-82 

“Active  and  “Quiescent” 

A .  81-82 

arrangement  of  .  80-81 

aseity  .  87 

character  of  A .  69-70 

definition  of  .  80 

Eternity  . .  86-89 

Ethical  A.  (Holiness  and 

Righteousness)  .  101-107 

Foreknowledge  .  95-100 

Holiness  .  101-102 

Justice  and  Righteous¬ 
ness  .  102-104 


PAGES 

Logical  A.  (Omniscience 


and  Wisdom)  .  91-101 

Omnipotence  .  89-91 

Omnipresence  .  84-86 

Omniscience  .  93-100 

“  content  of.  .  93-95 

Personality  .  92-93 


Physical  attributes  of  God 
(Omnipresence,  Etern¬ 
ity,  Omnipotence)  . .  .  84-91 

Positive  and  Negative  A. 


of  God  .  81 

Quiescent  and  Active  A.  81-82 

Relative  A .  81-82 

Attributes  of  Ood 

Righteousness  or  justice  102-104 

Wisdom  .  100-101 

B 

Baptism, 

Sacrament  of  .  306-316 

definition,  institution, 

minister,  and  signs  .  .  306-310 

Grace  bestowed  .  310-313 

Infant  Baptism  .  312-315 

B.  non-iterable  .  315-316 

B.  of  blood  and  of  desire  312 

Bible,  Holy, 

Canon  and  Text  of  ....  19-20 

Inspiration  of  .  21-24 

B.  and  Dogma  .  24-25 

B.  and  Tradition  .  25-30 

Church’s  Interpretation 

of  .  18-19 

Body, 

Resurrection  of  b.  and 

nature  of  it  . 417-420 

Branch  Theory 

of  the  Church .  259-263 

c 

Catholicity 

of  Church  .  245-246 

of  Orthodox  Church  ....  250-256 


Certainty 

in  Religion,  of  a  double 
character,  Objective  & 

Subjective  .  34 

“Religious”  and  “Scien¬ 
tific  . 45,  n.l  ;  48-49 


424 


INDEX 


Change  pages 

doctrine  of  the,  in  the 

Eucharist  .  328-336 

cf.  s.  v.  Transubstantiation 
Character,  Indelible, 

Theory  of  ....  283.  286 ;  292 

. 295 ;  375 

Chrism 

Sacrament  of  .  316-324 

laying  on  of  Bishop’s 

hands  or  anointing  .  .  317-322 

Christ,  Jesus, 

as  Author  of  Sacra¬ 


ments  . 274-275;  277-279 

instituted  each  Sacra¬ 
ment,  Baptism  .  306 

Chrism  .  316 

Holy  Eucharist  325-328 

Penance  .  359 

Holy  Order  .  . .  370-372 
Matrimony  .  . .  379-381 

Unction  .  386-387 

Atonement  by  .  191-196 

Death  of  .  195-196 

Descent  into  Hell  .  199-200 

Doctrine  of  J.  C.,  Incar¬ 
nate  God  .  171-202 

Theory  of  Incarnation  . .  171-179 

of  Person  .  179-202 

Two  Natures  .  179-183 

Communicatio  idiom atum  184-186 
Worship  paid  to  Him.  187 

Sinlessness  of, . 1S7-189 

of  Work  .  190-202 

Three  Offices .  190-191 

Priest  .  191-197 

Prophet  .  197-198 

King  .  198-201 

as  Redeemer  and  Saviour  201-202 

Virgin  Birth  of .  181 

Second  Coming  of,  in 

glory . 416-417,  417-420 

Church 

Conception  and  Mission 

of  .  237-239 

Constitution  and  Organi¬ 
zation  .  246-249 

Doctrine  of  .  237-267 

Infallibility  of  .  239-240 

Nature  of  . 241-246 

C.  as  Interpreter  of  Bible  18-19 

Notes  of  .  243-246 

not  “Invisible”  or  “I- 

deal”  .  237-239,  241-243 

Orthodox  Church .  249-263 

Outside  Church  no  Sal¬ 
vation  .  240-241 

“Militant”  and  “Trium¬ 
phant”  .  399-404 


Coming,  Second 

of  our  Lord  in  Glory...  416-420 


PAGES 

Communicatio  idiomatum.  184-186 
Confession 

of  Faith,  of  Cyril  Lu- 

car  . n.  2,  214-217 

of  Dositheus  .  216-7  and  n.  1 
of  Gennadius  .  211,  and  n.  1 
of  Metrophanes  Krito- 

poulos  .  212 

of  Peter  Mogila  ....  212-214 

C.  of  Sins,  see  s.  v.  Penance 
Confirmation  cf.  s.v.  Chrism 
Consecration, 

Moment  of,  in  Eucharist  338-340 
Content 

of  our  Knowledge  of 


God  .  81-107 

Conversion  or  Change, 
at  Consecration  in 

Eucharist  .  328-336 

Cosmological 

argument  for  Existence 

of  God  .  71-72 

Councils,  Ecumenical, 

importance  of .  206-208 

and  see  s.v.  Synods 

Creation 


Doctrine  of,  involves:..  148-171 
creation  freely  from 


nothing  .  150-151 

in  time  .  152-153 

with  an  end  and  pur¬ 
pose  .  153-154 

according  to  an  order 

and  method  .  155 

God  rules  C.  by  His 
Divine  Providence 

(q.v.)  155-158 

Cause  of  Creation  .  .  .  148 

P  r  o  v  i  d  e  n  c  e  in  C. 
shown  by  preserva¬ 
tion  of  it, .  156 

and  governance  of 

world  . 156-158 

C.  of  man  .  158-165 


D 

Dead, 

Resurrection  of  . 417-41S 

State  of  .  406-417 

Prayers  for . 404,  406-416 

Death 

as  result  of  sin  .  170-171 

conquered  by  our  Lord..  171-172 
D.  and  Particular  Judg¬ 
ment  .  395-396 

Development, 

of  dogma  . 35-45(51-56) 

as  vs.  “evolution”  .  32 

vs.  Protestant  and  R.  C. 

views  .  41-45 


INDEX 


425 


PAGES 

d.  and  progress  of  de¬ 
parted,  spiritually  and 

morally  . 397,  404-415 

Dichotomy 

of  man’s  nature  .  159 

Divorce 

teaching  regarding  ....  384-386 
Doctrine 

organic  nexus  of  .  244 

(see  s.v.  Dogma) 

Dogma 

definition  of  .  4-10 

Orthodox  view  of  D.  in¬ 
volves  three  things  :  12-14 

form  and  matter  of,  .  .  35 

Unitary  principle  of .  .  .  .  37 

development  of,  xxii-xxiii,  35-45 
Palmieri,  on  development 

of,  .  51-56 

in  relation  to  faith  and 

reason  .  35-45 

and  Bible  .  25-27 

doctrines  of  Faith  and 

Dogma  .  245-246 

no  “secondary”  dogmas  259-263 
Dogmatic, 

definition  of  .  4-10 

and  other  theological  dis¬ 
ciplines,  . . . .  .  .  50 

of.  s.v.  sources  (of  d.) 

Dubia  or  Theologoumana .  .  17 

E 

Economy 

theory  of .  262-267 


292-303 

Epiklesis 

the,  is  the  moment  of 
consecration  in  Euch¬ 
arist  .  338-340 

Episcopate 

function  and  nature 

of  . 248-249,  254-257 

origin  of  .  246-247 

Eschatology  .  394-422 

Ethical 

argument  for  existence 

of  God  .  74 

attributes  of  God .  101-107 

character  of  Orthodoxy  xx-xxi 

Eucharist,  Holy 

Sacrament  of  .  336-346 

definition  and  institution  324-328 
Doctrine  of  the  Change 

or  Tran  substantiation  328-336 
E.  as  Sacrament  and  Sac¬ 
rifice  . 336-346,  347-353 

bread  of  E.  must  be 

leavened  .  338 


Evolution,  PAGES 

theory  of  evolution,  of 
doctrine,  as  vs.  "devel¬ 
opment”  .  32 

Ex  opere  operato 

manner  of  sacramental 

working  .  305 

Faith 

nature  of  . 30-49,  63-66 

F.  and  good  works  ....  231-236 
F.  and  knowledge  or  rea¬ 
son  .  30-45 

in  relation  to  religion .  .  30-35 

in  relation  to  dogma  .  .  35-45 

Fall,  of  Man 

doctrine  of  .  165-166 

original  righteousness.  .  164-165 

sin  of  Adam  .  165-166 

original  sin  .  166-171 

brought  death  .  170-171 

Father 

God  the  F.  in  New  Tes¬ 
tament  .  110-111 

Begetter  of  Son,  Spira- 

tor  of  Holy  Ghost  .  .  124 

Filioque  Clause 

history  of  .  126-132 

Greek  Fathers  on  . 127-128 

Photius  on  .  129-131 

Additional  Note  on  ....  136-143 

Foreknowledge 

of  God  .  95-100 

and  foreordination  ....  221-225 


F 

Forgiveness  of  sins, 

possible  by  virtue  of 
Atonement  wrought 

by  Christ _ 191-196,  201-202 

in  Penance  (q.v.)..360,  362,  365 


in  Unction  (q.v. )  392,393 

in  Eucharist  (q.v.) .  345-346 

after  death  impossible.  .  406-415 

Form  and  matter 

of  dogmas  .  37-41 

Free  Will  of  man  .  .  72-73,  158-165 
in  relation  to  God’s 

Foreknowledge  .  96-100 

and  Grace  . 226-231 

G 

dory,  the  consummation 

of  grace  .  394 

Ood 

doctrine  of .  60-143 

as  Object  of  Knowledge,  60-70 
argument  for  existence 

of .  71-80 

content  of  our  knowl¬ 
edge  of,  .  80-107 


42G 


INDEX 


PAGES 

“Being”  and  “Existence” 

of,  .  60-61 

God  as  highest  Reason, 

Will,  Knowledge,  .  . .  72-73 

God  as  Purpose  and  End 

of  world .  73-74 

God  as  Highest  Good 
and  End  of  Rational 

Life,  .  75 

God  as  Absolute,  .  75-78 

God  as  Spirit,  .  84-85 

God  as  Personal .  92-93 

God  as  Omniscient .  93-100 

God  as  All-Wise,  .  100-101 

God  as  Holy . 101-102 

God  as  Righteous . 102-104 

God  as  Love,  .  104-107 

God  as  Foreknowing  and 

Foreordaining .  221-225 

God,  Knowledge  of,  free 

and  necessary,  .  92-97 

God  as  Spaceless  and  In¬ 
comprehensible,  .  84-85 

God,  Immaterial  and 

Pure  Spirit,  .  84 

God  as  Transcendent 

and  Immanent .  85-86 

Eternity  of  God,  in  rela¬ 
tion  to  time  .  86-89 

Modes  of  Presence  of 

God  .  8o-86 

Power  and  Will  of  God  89-91 
Three  Persons  in  One 

God  .  107-143 

(see  s.v.  Trinity ) 

Grace 

doctrine  of  .  218-236 

importance  of  doctrine 

of  G .  218-220 

nature  of  G .  218-225 

“necessary”  and  “free” 

G .  220-221 

God’s  Foreknowledge, 
Foreordination  and 
Grace  in  relation  to 

free-will  of  man .  221-225 

operation  of  G .  226-231 

relation  of  G.  to  faith 

and  good  works  .  231-236 

universality  of  G .  221 

G.  does  not  operate  out¬ 
side  Church  .  239-241 

G.  of  Sacraments  .  276-277 

of  Baptism  .  310-315 

of  Chrism  .  317-319  ;  322-324 
of  Holy  Eucharist.  .  336-338 

of  Penance  .  358,365 

of  Holy  Order  .  376-378 

of  Matrimony  .  383-384 

of  Unction  .  391-393 

G.  consummated  in  Glory  394 


H 


Heaven  pages 

eternal  character  of  .  .  421-422 

Hell 

Our  Lord’s  descent  into,  199 

eternal  character  of  ...  421-422 

Hierarchy 

of  Church  .  246-249 

Historical 

argument  for  existence 

of  God  .  78-79 

Holiness 

of  God  .  101-102 

of  Church  .  244-245 

II  ypostatic  Union  .  179-183 

involves  sinlessness  of 

our  Lord  .  187-189 

I 

Incarnation 

doctrine  of,  .  171-189 

cause  and  purpose  of  .  .  171-179 

Scotist  and  Thomist 

views  of,  .  172 

Preparation  for,  .  177-178 


Place  of  Doctrine  of,  ...178-179 
and  cf.  s.v.  Christ,  Per¬ 
son  of 

Indelible  Character 

cf.  s.v.  Character,  Indel¬ 
ible 

Indissolubility  of  Marriage 

Bond  .  384 

Infallibility 

of  Church  .  239-240 

Organ  of  I.  is  Episcopate  248-249 

Exercise  of  .  255-257 

Orthodox  Church  is  In¬ 
fallible,  as  being  the 
Catholic  Church  ....  254-259 

Infant  Baptism  .  312-314 

Inspiration 

or  “internal”  revelation  11 

of  Bible,  defined  .  22-24 

fact  of  I.  of  Bible  is  a 

Dogma  .  22-24 

theories  of  .  22-24 

Intention 

necessity  of  priest’s  I., 
in  order  to  consum¬ 
mate  the  Sacraments  290-291 

Iterable  and  non-iterable 


Sacraments  :  .  283 

Baptism  .  315 

Chrism  .  323-324 

Holy  Order  .  377-378 


cf.  s.v.  Economy  and 
Character,  Indelible 


INDEX 


427 


Judgment ,  pages 

Particular  J .  395-399 

doctrine  of,  in  Bible  .  .  396-397 

in  Tradition  .  397-398 

and  Last  J .  398 

doctrine  of . 398,  420-422 

state  of  departed  before  406-417 

Justification 

doctrine  of .  216-236 

forensic  and  actual,  .  .  228-230 

,T.  and  Sanctification,...  227-231 
preparation  for  J .  226-227 

K 

Knowledge  of  God . 

possibility,  sources  and 
method  of,  on  our 


part  .  60-70 

content  of,  .  80-107 

God’s  K.,  “free’’  and 

“necessary”  .  91-92 

nominalistic  view  of,  .  .  68-69 

pragmatic  view  of  ...  .  68 

L 

Last  Things, 

doctrine  of  .  394-422 

Love,  of  God  .  106-107 


M 

Man 

creation  of . 158-165 

Origin  of  soul  of,  and  its 

immortality,  .  160-161 

fall  of  M .  165-166 

original  righteousness  of 

M .  164-165 


cf.  s.v.,  Sin,  Original ; 

Christ,  Sinlessness  of; 
Marriage 

cf.  s.v.  Matrimony 
Mary 

the  Blessed  Virgin  M.  is 

0  eoroKos .  187 

Ever  Virgin,  .  181,  n.  2 

on  Immaculate  Concep¬ 
tion  of,  .  166,  n.  5 

Sinlessness  of,  .  402 

Matrimony, 

Sacrament  of,  . 378-386 

definition  and  sources,..  378-381 

outward  signs,  .  381-382 

recipients  of,  .  383 

grace  of,  .  383-384 

monogamy  and  indissolu¬ 
bility  of  Marriage,  .  .  384-386 
cf.  s.v.  Divorce 
Merit, 

merit  of  our  Lord,  and 

Atonement  . 191-197,  201 

merits  of  the  Saints,  and 
Orthodox  teaching  235,368-370, 

399 


Minister  pages 

of  all  Sacraments  must 

be  Priest,  .  289-290 

Baptism,  .  . .  307 

Chrism,  Bishop  required 

to  consecrate  oil  ....  318-321 

Eucharist,  .  324 

Penance,  .  365-366 

Holy  Orders,  demands  a 

Bishop,  . 373-374 

Matrimony,  .  382-383 

Unction  .  390 

Ministry 

Sacred,  origin  of,  .  246 

three-fold  M.,  and  func¬ 
tion .  247-248 

Episcopate,  necessity  of 

in  defining  dogma,...  248-249 

Minor  Orders  of,  . 256-258 

Miracle 

definition  of . .  13 

relation  of  “natural" 

and  “supernatural”,..  15 

M.  not  a  violation  of 

natural  law,  .  15 

possibility  of,  .  91 

relation  to  inspiration 

and  revelation,  .  16 

Incarnation  as  the  Mir¬ 
acle  .  16 


N 

“ Natural ”  and  ‘‘Superna¬ 
tural”  .  13-15 

Nature 

as  aid  to  Knowledge  of 

God,  .  66,68,71 

N.  of  man,  .  158-165 

dichotomistic,  .  159 

“image”  and  “likeness” 


of  God,  .  162-163 

Natures  of  our  Lord,..  179-183 
relation  of  N.  to  Person  179-183 

Nominalistic 

view  of  our  Knowledge 

of  God  .  68-69 

s 

O 

Offices  of  Christ  .  190-201 

Omniscience  of  uod  .  95-100 

Ontological 

argument  for  existence 

of  God  .  75-78 

Order,  Sacrament  of  Holy 

0 .  370-378 

definition,  .  370-371 

Divine  institution  of,...  371-372 

outward  signs,  .  372-373 

minister  of .  373-374 

candidates  for,  .  375-376 


428 


INDEX 


PAGES 

grace  of,  .  376-377 

non-iterable,  .  377-378 

Anglican  Orders,  cf.  s.v., 
validity 

minor  orders  .  375 

Original  righteousness 
cf.  s.v.  Righteousness, 

Original  sin. 

Sin,  Original 


P 

Penance, 

Sacrament  of . 358-370 

definition  .  358 

divine  institution  .  350 

outward  signs  and  min¬ 
ister  . 360-365,365-366 

grace  of  .  367-370 

“penances”  .  366-367 

P  cr  ichor  esis, 

of  Persons  in  Holy  Trin¬ 
ity  .  123-124 

of  Natures  in  our  Lord  182-183 

Person 

of  Christ  :  doctrine  of  .  .  170-189 
two  Natures  in  one  P. .  .  170-183 
relation  of  Natures  to  P.  170-183 
corollaries  of  this  doc¬ 
trine  .  184-180 

cf.  s.v.  Communicatio 
Idiomatum ;  Mary  the 
Blessed  Virgin; 

Christ,  worship  of, 
Sinlessness  of 

Personality  of  God  .  92-93 

Philosophy  and  Religion..  31-32 

Photius  on  Filioquc  Clause  120-132 

Pli  ysico-teleological 

argument  for  existence 

of  God  .  73-75 

Pragmatic 

view  of  our  Knowledge 

of  God  .  68 

Predestination,  .  221-225 

(cf.  s.v.  Foreordination, 
Foreknowledge) 

Predicates  of  God  .  80 

Presence,  Real, 

doctrine  of  _ 324-325,  328-336 

Priest 

necessity  of  P.  as  min 
ister  of  every  Sacra¬ 
ment  . 289-290,  372-376 

our  Lord  as  High  P. .  .  .  191-197 

Properties 

of  God  .  80-81 

of  Persons  in  Holy  Trin¬ 
ity  .  124-132 


Prophet,  pages 

w'ork  and  inspiration  of,  11 

preparation  by  prophets 

for  Incarnation  .  178 

Holy  Spirit  speaks 

through  P .  114 

our  Lord  as  Prophet  .  .  197-198 

Purgatory,  . 368-369;  411-412 

Psychological 

argument  for  existence 
of  God  .  72-73 


R 


Reason 

in  relation  to  Religion..  30-35 

in  relation  to  dogma.  .  .  35-45 

R.  is  organ  for  formula¬ 
tion  of  dogma  .  38 

It.  is  means  for  appre¬ 
hension  and  appropria¬ 
tion  of  Faith  .  30-44 

R.  is  means  for  Vindi¬ 
cating  dogma  .  44-45 

It.  and  Knowledge  re¬ 
lated  to  faith  .  45-50 


Redemption  and  Atonement, 

wrought  by  Christ  ....  101-197, 


201-202 

Religion, 

definition  of,  .  6 

Faith  and  reason  in  re¬ 
lation  to  It .  30-35 

Resurrection, 

of  our  Lord  .  200 

of  the  dead  .  417-418 

of  the  body  .  418-420 

Revelation  .  11-16 

reason  for,  .  11 

external  and  internal,  .  .  11 

criteria  of .  11 

R.  and  miracle,  .  14-16 

R.  in  wider  and  restrict¬ 
ed  meaning  of  word,  17-18 

R.  in  Bible,  .  18 

R.  possible  through 

Faith  .  32-33 

Our  Lord  the  perfect 

Revelation  .  16 

Righteousness 

of  God,  .  102-104 

original  R.  of  man,  ....  164 

lost  by  Fall,  .  165-166 

R.  and  justification,...  226-231 
R.,  imparted  and  im¬ 
puted  .  227-228 


INDEX 


429 


S 

PAGES 

Sacramentals  .  305,375 

Sacraments 

in  general,  .  272-305 

definition,  notes,  classi¬ 
fication,  and  evidence 

of .  272-2S6 

administration  of  .  286-305 

grace  of.  necessary  to 

salvation  .  277 

S.  outside  of  Church  in¬ 
valid,  but  may  be  rec¬ 
ognized  by  “economy" 

(q.v.)  263-267 

certain  S.  not  iterable.  .  283 

subjective  conditions  for 

reception  of,  . 304,314,346 

Sacrament  of 

Baptism  .  314-315 

Eucharist  .  343-347 

Penance  .  358-320 

Holy  Order  .  370-378 

Matrimony  .  378-386 

Unction  .  386-393 

Sacrifice 

of  our  Lord  .  191-197 

of  Eucharist  .  347-353 

Saints, 

Intercession  of .  400-401 

Veneration  and  Invoca¬ 
tion  of .  401-402 

Ikons  of  .  403-404 

Salvation 

needed  because  of  Fall,  171-177 


S.  and  original  sin,  51-52,165-171 
Grace  of  Sacraments 


necessary  to  S.,  ....  277 

no.  S.  outside  Church...  240-241 
Church  is  “House  of  S".  240 

Sanctification 

and  justification  .  227-231 

and  Grace  .  230-231 


Saviour 

cf.  s.v.  Christ 
Secoyid  Coming 

of  our  Lord  in  Glory..  416-417 
Septuagint, 

status  of  .  20 

Signs, 

outward,  second  essen¬ 
tial  note  of  Sacra¬ 
ments,  ..275-276,287-288,290, 


n.  2,  292-293 

of  Baptism,  .  307-310 

Chrism .  321-322 

Eucharist .  337-340 

Holy  Order,  .  372-373 

Matrimony,  .  381-382 

Penance,  .  360-365 

Unction  .  3S9-390 


Sin  TAGES 

of  man,  . .  165-171 

original  S .  190 

S.  and  Salvation  .  190 

Sinlessness 

of  Christ .  187-189 

sinlessness  ( i.e .  freedom 
from  actual  sin)  of  B. 

V.  M . 402  and  n.  4 

Son 

the  doctrine  of,  in  New 

Testament  .  112-113 

S.  as  Begotten  . 125-126 

cf.  s.v.  Christ 

Soul 

origin  of .  160-161 

immortality  of,  .  161 

after  death,  in  relation 
to  Judgment  .  161 

Sources  of  dogmatic  17-18,  206-218 

Spirit, 

the  Holy,  in  New  Testa¬ 
ment  .  113 

Procession  of  .  126-132 

cf.  s.v.,  Filioque 


Supererogation, 

works  of.  ....  235,  368-370,  399 
Roman  teaching  on,  re¬ 
jected  by  Orthodox  . 

“ Supernatural  and  “Na¬ 
tural”  .  13-14 

Symbolic  Boohs  ....28-29,  206-218 

Synods, 

decrees  of  local,  and 

their  authority  .  .  4-5,  206-218 


T 

Temptation 

of  our  Lord  .  189 

function  of  T.  in  spirit¬ 
ual  life  .  311 

Theology 

definition  of  Dogmatic  T.  4-10 

Modern  Greek  T .  206-218 

sources  of,  cf.  s.v.  Dogma 

Theotokos, 

title  of  the  Blessed  Vir¬ 
gin  Mary  .  1S7 

Tradition,  and  Bible 

the  sources  of  dogma.  25-27 

contents  and  formula¬ 
tion  of  T.  .  . .  27-30 

Transubstantiation , 

doctrine  of,  .  328-336 

Trichotomistic  vs.  Dicho- 
tomistic  nature  of 
man  .  159 


430 


INDEX 


Trinity,  Holy  pages 

doctrine  of,  .  107-136 

definition .  107 

sources  for,  .  108-114 

properties  of  Persons..  124-126 

doctrine  in  Bible,  . 108-114 

formulation  of  by 

Church,  .  114-121 

Hypostases  and  Persons 
in  relation  to  the  Un¬ 
ity,  .  121-124 

subordination,  in  what 

sense,  .  124-126 

begetting  of  Son,  .  125-126 

procession  of  Spirit  .  .  .  126-132 
cf.  s.v.,  Filioque 
theological  speculation 

regarding  T .  132-136 

“Economic”  and  “Trans¬ 
cendental”  T . 132-136 

U 

Unction 

Sacrament  of .  386-393 

definition  and  discus¬ 
sion  of  text  in  St. 

James,  .  386-389 

Outward  signs,  minister 

and  recipients  of  U.,  389-390 

Grace  conferred  .  391-393 

and  Roman  doctrine  of 

“Extreme  U” .  393 

Unity,  of  Church  .  243-244 

Orthodox  Church  and  U.  249-263 


V 

Validity  pages 

No  V.  of  Sacraments 
outside  Orthodox 

Church  .  266-268 

validation  of  these  by 

Economy  .  292-300 

V.  of  Anglican  Baptism  287,  n.  1 
V.  of  Anglican  Orders  302-303 

Veneration 

of  ikons  of  the  Saints  403-404 

Via  Affirmatioms,  Eminen- 

tiae,  et  Negationis  . .  68,71-72 

Virgin  Birth  of  our  Lord  187-188 

Virgin  Mary,  Blessed, 
cf.  s.v.,  Mary 


w 

Will 

of  God,  Omnipotent ;  .  .  89-91 

Human  W.  of  Christ;  ..  186 

Free  W.  of  man,  ....  158-165 
in  relation  to  God’s 

Foreknowledge  .  96-100 

224-325 

Wisdom  of  God  .  100-101 

Works,  Oood,  and  Faith..  231-236 


Worship 

due  the  God-Man  ....  187 

due  the  Eucharist,  .  .  341-343 


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BY 

MOREHOUSE  PUBLISHING  CO. 
MILWAUKEE,  WIS. 


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